Chen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 37 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2013] FCAFC 133

Citation: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 133
Appeal from: Chen & Ors v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 892
Parties: JIESUI CHEN, KANDAN WEN and ZHIWEI WEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File number: NSD 1633 of 2013
Judges: KATZMANN, GRIFFITHS AND WIGNEY JJ
Date of judgment: 20 November 2013
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether valid visa application made – Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.10 required particular visa application to be made “at an office of Immigration in Australia” – visa application arrived by express post to GPO box before expiration of relevant deadline – application not collected by the Department from GPO box until after deadline had expired – whether GPO box an “office of Immigration” or “part of an office of Immigration” – if GPO box not an “office of Immigration”, whether applicant substantially complied with requirement
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 19B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 46, 47
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 2.07, 2.09, 2.10, sch 1
Cases cited: Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) (1999) 91 FCR 314
Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries (2010) 272 ALR 750
Hamilton v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 53 FCR 349
Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville (1988) 164 CLR 234
Jayasekara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 199
Macrae v St Margaret’s Hospital (1999) 19 NSWCCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li [2000] FCA 1456
MZYPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 1
Nair v Minister for Immigration (2001) 107 FCR 60
Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 167 FCR 494
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Scurr v Brisbane City Council (1973) 133 CLR 242
Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 245
Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 128 FCR 469
Date of hearing: 6 November 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 72
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr Stephen Lloyd SC and Mr Bora Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellants: Ren Zhou Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Geoffrey Kennett SC and Mr Martin Smith
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1633 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT  COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

JIESUI CHEN
First Appellant

KANDAN WEN
Second Appellant

ZHIWEI WEN
Third Appellant

AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGES:

KATZMANN, GRIFFITHS AND WIGNEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellants be granted leave to file the amended notice of appeal dated…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 133
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Chen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Circuit Court was called upon to determine whether the respondent's application for a subclass 892 State/Territory Sponsored Business Owner visa was validly submitted. Ms Chen, a holder of a subclass 163 visa, sought to apply for the new visa before her existing visa expired, but her application was lodged via an Express Post bag in a box outside a post office in New South Wales, addressed to a GPO Box in Adelaide that the Department of Immigration had designated as a receiving point for such applications. The central legal issue revolved around the interpretation of the legislative requirement that an application be made "at an office of Immigration in Australia," and whether the GPO Box qualified as such an office.

The court considered the ordinary meaning of the term "office of Immigration," focusing on whether a GPO Box could be considered an office under the Migration Regulations. The primary judge held that the GPO Box did not constitute an "office of Immigration," emphasizing the administrative logic and efficiency considerations underlying the requirement that applications be made at an office. The court rejected the appellants' reliance on previous cases, finding them distinguishable on the facts and instead aligning with the reasoning in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li, which held that applications must be made at an actual office of Immigration.

Ultimately, the court affirmed the primary judge's decision that Ms Chen's application was invalid as it did not meet the legislative requirement of being made "at an office of Immigration in Australia." The Federal Circuit Court denied the appeal, thereby upholding the Minister's contention that the GPO Box did not satisfy the statutory requirement for the submission of a visa application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The central question in this appeal is whether the making of an application for a particular type of visa by sending the application to a GPO Box in Adelaide nominated by the Minister’s Department as one of the places to which such applications must be sent satisfies a legislative requirement that an application be made “at an office of Immigration in Australia”. Background facts The relevant facts are not in dispute. Drawing primarily on the primary judge’s reasons for judgment, those facts may be summarised as follows. Ms Chen was the holder of a subclass 163 visa (which was a subclass of a Business Skills (Provisional) (Class UR) visa). Her visa was due to expire on 18 December 2012. Ms Chen wished to apply for a new subclass 892 State/Territory Sponsored Business Owner visa (which was a subclass of a Business Skills (Residence) (Class DF) visa). Pursuant to item 1104B(3)(f) of Sch 1 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations), it was a requirement for an applicant seeking to satisfy the primary criteria for a subclass 892 visa that he or she hold a Business Skills (Provisional) (Class UR) visa. The effect of this requirement for Ms Chen, given that her subclass 163 visa was due to expire on 18 December 2012, was that she was required to make her application for a subclass 892 visa by 18 December 2012. According to information provided by the Department in its Business Skills Entry information booklet, an application for a subclass 892 visa had to be made either by post to the Adelaide Onshore Business Skills Processing Centre at GPO Box 2399 Adelaide SA 5001 or by courier to the Centre’s Adelaide street address. The Department leased GPO Box 2399 at the Adelaide City Delivery Centre, Ground Floor, 26 Franklin Street, Adelaide South Australia (ACDC). The Department contracted with a company called Converga for the provision of mail and distribution services for the Adelaide Onshore Business Skills Processing Centre. Converga in turn contracted with Capital Transport to collect mail from Australia Post and deliver it to the Department’s Processing Centre. Capital Transport usually collected the mail from the ACDC and delivered it to the Department’s Processing Centre at around 8.00 am each working day. Once the mail had been delivered to the Processing Centre a record was made of incoming postal items. The items were then delivered to various sections of the Processing Centre between approximately 10.30 am and 11.00 am on the day the mail was delivered. At approximately 5.50 pm on 17 December 2012, an employee of Ms Chen’s migration agent placed an Express Post bag in an Express Post box outside the Chatswood Post Office in Chatswood New South Wales. The Express Post bag was addressed to the Adelaide Onshore Business Skills Processing Centre at GPO Box 2399 Adelaide SA 5001. The Express Post bag contained a letter from Ms Chen’s migration agent and completed application forms and related documents for a subclass 892 visa in respect of Ms Chen and her husband and child as members of her family unit.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The relevance of these matters will be considered below.Decision of Federal Circuit Court The primary judge accepted the Minister’s contention that Ms Chen’s application was not valid because it was not received within time in circumstances where an application could only validly be made “at an office of Immigration in Australia” and the GPO Box was not such an office, or part of such an office. The primary judge described the central matter as turning on the proper construction of reg 2.10(2A)(b). His Honour concluded that the appellants’ reliance on Nair v Minister for Immigration (2001) 107 FCR 60 was misplaced because that decision was “immediately distinguishable”. He also found that, contrary to the appellants’ submission, Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 167 FCR 494 did not assist their case and, if anything, tended to assist the Minister. The primary judge described the Full Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li [2000] FCA 1456 as providing “far greater assistance to the current circumstances”. That case related to reg 2.10(1)(b) (which provided at the time that “[a]n application for a visa must be made:… (b) in the case of an application to be made in Australia… at any office of Immigration in Australia”), which the primary judge regarded as being relevantly identical to reg 2.10(2A)(b). The Minister relied on the following passages in Li at [72] and [73], emphasising the reference to “administrative efficiency”:Regulation 2.10(1)(b) is plainly drafted on the assumption that an application for a visa is to be considered by the Minister, at least in the first instance. It proceeds on the basis that the prescribed form should not only set out the claims made by the applicant, but should be made at an office of Immigration. There are obvious reasons of administrative efficiency underlying the requirement that the application be made at an office of Immigration and not elsewhere. Among its other advantages, the requirement facilitates consideration of the application by the Minister, or his or her delegate. The requirement is consistent with the legislative insistence on completion of a prescribed application form, even to the point of conditioning the exercise of the Minister's powers on lodgement of a completed form.Regulation 2.10(1)(b), objectively viewed, prescribes the way in which an application for a visa is to be made, namely at an office of Immigration. The regulation applies in specified circumstances, namely where an application is to be made in Australia. It is therefore a regulation that prescribes the way for making an application in specified circumstances within the meaning of s 45(2)(a) of the Migration Act. If an application does not comply with reg 2.10(1)(b), the consequence is that the purported application is invalid: s 46(1)(b). The primary judge agreed with the Minister’s contention that to conclude that a post office box is “an office of Immigration in Australia” would involve a strained application of the plain wording of the meaning of “office” and did not sit comfortably with the Full Court’s description in Li as to the “administrative logic” underlying reg 2.10(1)(b) (see the extracts in [26] above).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants require leave to raise the third ground of appeal, which was not argued below. The Minister opposed leave being given. We will deal with that matter below. Was the application made at an office of Immigration? It is convenient to deal with the first and second grounds of appeal together. The Minister defends the primary judge’s finding that the visa application was not made when it reached the GPO Box on 18 December 2012 on the following broad grounds. First, he submits that the GPO Box was neither an “office of Immigration” nor part of an “office of Immigration”, merely a means by which the application could reach the office. While accepting that the expression has to be given its ordinary meaning, the Minister says that a post office box does not satisfy the Macquarie Dictionary definition of “office”, because the reference therein to a “room or place” denotes a physical space which one or more persons occupy while transacting business or discharging duties and which space is maintained for that purpose. The Minister argues that there are sound textual reasons for reading “office” in reg 2.10 as referring to a room or other space which is occupied by departmental officers while attending to their duties and as not extending to a post office box. Those textual reasons are said to be:(a)the terms of reg 2.10(4) which indicate that the drafter understood an “office” to be a place capable of being occupied by an officer;(b)for certain other classes or subclasses of visa the Regulations expressly provide that an application can be “made” by posting it to a specified post office box address. Secondly, the Minister submits there was no evidence below to indicate that the Department’s Adelaide GPO Box was part of an “office of Immigration” in Australia in circumstances where it was physically separate from any such office and remained separate in the context of the Regulations. Thirdly, the Minister says that Ryan J’s judgment in Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) (1999) 91 FCR 314 (“Cabal”) at [23] does not assist the appellants. The Minister contends that his Honour’s remarks in that case, which were directed to an application being forwarded in a way calculated to reach an office of Immigration, may be taken to have reached that place at the time when, in the ordinary course, it would have done so say nothing about what places do or do not in fact answer the description “office of Immigration”. Fourthly, the Minister disputes that the Department’s booklet had the effect of designating the GPO Box either as, or as part of, an “office of Immigration” for the purposes of reg 2.10(2A)(b). That is because whether a place is an “office of Immigration” is a question of fact and does not depend upon any designation via a booklet. In any event, the Minister says that the booklet did not in its terms achieve such a designation. The booklet simply told prospective applicants to send their applications to the Adelaide Onshore Business Skills Processing Centre and set out how items sent by mail or courier should be addressed in order to reach that office. It should be noted, however, that in oral argument Mr Kennett SC (who appeared with Mr Smith for the Minister) acknowledged that the booklet’s requirement that applications had to be sent by mail to the nominated GPO Box (as an alternative to the only other option of sending the application by courier to the nominated street address) was wrong and that the booklet should be revised. This acknowledgment did not deter the Minister from defending the appeal.