FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 126
Appeal from: Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 342 File number: NSD 499 of 2018 Judges: GREENWOOD, CHARLESWORTH AND O’CALLAGHAN JJ Date of judgment: 7 August 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of whether the Assistant Minister engaged in jurisdictional error in making a non-revocation decision for the purposes of s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA Cases cited: Attorney‑General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
BP117 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 637
Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352
Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 489
Falzon v Minister for Immigration and order Protection (2018) 262 CLR 333
Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 160 ALD 123
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291
Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1
Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 362 ALR 48
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DRP17 [2018] FCAFC 198
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 81
Omar v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 279
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391
Swift v SAS Trustee Corporation (2010) 6 ASTLR 339
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 342
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451
Date of hearing: 29 August 2018 Date of last submissions: 29 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 185 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley ORDERS
NSD 499 of 2018 BETWEEN: BA GIANG TRAN
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
GREENWOOD, CHARLESWORTH AND O’CALLAGHAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
7 AUGUST 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is granted to the appellant to rely upon matters and grounds not advanced before the primary Judge.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
4.The appellant’s interlocutory application filed 7 August 2018 seeking…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles of legal unreasonableness as applied to the cancellation of a visa on character grounds. These principles, derived from cases such as Muggeridge, Li, Eden, and Stretton, stress that a discretionary power must be exercised reasonably and with rational foundation. The court must evaluate whether the decision lacks an intelligible justification or is plainly unjust, arbitrary, or capricious. The Assistant Minister's decision was scrutinized against these criteria to determine if it fell outside the bounds of lawful outcomes.
Upon review, the court found that the Assistant Minister's decision was not irrational or legally unreasonable. The Minister's reliance on past behavior, including the appellant's criminal history and the nature of his recent offense, was deemed rational. The Minister's speculation about future behavior was supported by evidence and did not constitute a breach of duty. The court concluded that the decision, while involving some postulation, was within the range of possible lawful outcomes given the statutory framework.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court also denied the appellant's interlocutory application for an adjournment of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is granted to the appellant to rely upon matters and grounds not advanced before the primary Judge.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
4. The appellant’s interlocutory application filed 7 August 2018 seeking an adjournment of the appeal is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The argument identified and addressed in that paragraph reflects the course of oral argument on the appeal and the Assistant Minister has been heard in respect of it. In our view it is appropriate to consider and decide the argument on its merits, notwithstanding that it finds no expression in the grounds of appeal.CONSIDERATION The sole question to be determined on the appeal is whether the Assistant Minister’s finding that there was a potential for the appellant to reoffend per se was irrational and therefore legally unreasonable. To the extent that the appellant requires leave to advance that argument, leave will be granted. The principles of legal unreasonableness in their application to the cancellation of a visa on character grounds were summarised in Muggeridge as follows:UnreasonablenessContext and principles…35The alleged error is one affecting the process of reasoning adopted by the Minister in the exercise of a discretionary power. It is well settled that a discretionary power conferred by a statute is to be construed as subject to the condition that it be exercised reasonably. The principles to be applied are considered at length in the various judgments in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) and in the decisions of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1 (Stretton). They may be briefly summarised as follows:(1)the power conferred under s 501(2) of the Act is implicitly confined by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 505 (Dixon J);(2)as Allsop CJ explained in Stretton (at [11]), the task of reviewing a decision for legal unreasonableness is not definitional, but one of characterisation:… the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, in sufficiently lacking rational foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power. …(3)the Court is to look to the reasons given for the decision to understand why the power was exercised as it was: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 (Singh);(4)as the Full Court explained in Singh, the process of review of legal unreasonableness ‘will inevitably be fact dependent’. The Court continued (at [48]):… That is not to diminish the importance of the supervising court maintaining an approach which does not involve the substitution of its own judgment for that of the decision-maker. Rather, it is to recognise that any analysis which involves concepts such as ‘intelligible justification’ must involve scrutiny of the factual circumstances in which the power comes to be exercised.(5)in a different review context, Deane J spoke of the requirement that a statutory tribunal act rationally and reasonably: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 367-368. His Honour’s explanation of the content of that obligation applies equally to the Minister in the exercise of the power conferred by s 501(2) of the Act (at 367):When the process of decision-making need not be and is not disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of such a duty if a decision of fact is unsupported by probative material. When the process of decision-making is disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of the duty if findings of fact upon which a decision is based are unsupported by probative material and if inferences of fact upon which such a decision is based cannot reasonably be drawn from such findings of fact.(6)nevertheless, as Wigney J said (with respect correctly) in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210 (at [55]):… allegations of illogical or irrational reasoning or findings of fact must be considered against the framework of the inquiry being whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal: SZRKT at 137 [148]. The overarching question is whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error: SZRKT at [151]. Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577 at [83]-[84] (Nicholas J); SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 140 ALD 78 at [113]. Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out: SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 135 ALD 276 at [66]; SZWCO at [64]-[67].Consideration36It may be observed from the outset that the task of the Minister necessarily involved a degree of postulation as to what might occur in the future should Mr Muggeridge’s visa not be cancelled and should he remain present in the Australian community. The Minister was entitled to speculate as to what might happen in the future by reference to evidence of what had occurred in the past. As the joint judgment held in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), ‘[p]ast events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability — high or low — of their occurrence.’ The adoption of a reasoning process that involved postulation or supposition cannot, in and of itself, therefore constitute jurisdictional error. It is nonetheless necessary that the hypotheses underlying the decision bear some rational connection to the evidentiary materials upon which the Minister is said to have relied.