The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 v Yau

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Court of Appeal
Supreme Court

New South Wales

Case Name: 

The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 v Yau

Medium Neutral Citation: 

[2017] NSWCA 341

Hearing Date(s): 

26 April and 15 May 2017

Decision Date: 

21 December 2017

Before: 

Beazley P at [1];
Leeming JA at [195];
Emmett AJA at [196]

Decision: 

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Catchwords: 

REAL PROPERTY – strata scheme for a residential and commercial building – application of Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW) – effect of non-compliance with notice requirements for a meeting of the executive committee specified in Sch 3, cl 6 – whether resolution passed by Executive Committee in breach of ss 65A and 80A – whether Executive Committee has authority to instruct legal representatives to settle legal proceedings
 
PROCEDURE – consent orders – whether consent orders may be set aside – orders already entered – circumstances in which orders may be set aside – whether court has a discretion to set aside orders when basis for setting aside the order has been established
 
AGENCY – ostensible authority – whether senior counsel has ostensible authority to enter settlement agreement – whether parties acted in reliance on representation of authority – whether no question of ostensible authority as a result of the principle that estoppel does not operate against a statute

Legislation Cited: 

Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), ss 6, 17, 21, 62, 65A, 75, 80A, 153, 181, 207, Sch 3, cls 6, 17
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 36.15

Cases Cited: 

2 Elizabeth Bay Road Pty Limited v The Owners - Strata Plan No 73943 (2014) 88 NSWLR 488; [2014] NSWCA 409
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41
Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc v Farrell [2016] NSWCA 256
Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; [1971] HCA 49
Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1991) 169 CLR 625; [1991] HCA 28
Barron v Potter [1914] 1 Ch 895
Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 1164
Burns v Corbett (2017) 316 FLR 448; [2017] NSWCA 3
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; [2012] HCA 56
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶61-232
Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising & Addressing Co Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 72; [1975] HCA 49
DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; [2000] HCA 17
Donellan v Watson (1990) 21 NSWLR 335
Doyle v Hall Chadwick [2007] NSWCA 159
Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480
Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; [1977] HCA 7
Geissler v Accro Motors Pty Ltd (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 31
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235; [1956] HCA 2
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry…

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Details
Case
[2017] NSWCA 341
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 (the Owners Corporation) appealed a decision of the primary judge concerning consent orders made by Bergin CJ in Eq. The dispute centred on whether these consent orders, which settled legal proceedings, could be set aside. The Owners Corporation argued that the underlying settlement agreement was invalid, rendering the consent orders irregular, illegal, or against good faith, and thus subject to being set aside under UCPR, r 36.15(1) or the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the consent orders could be set aside, and if so, under what circumstances. Specifically, the court had to determine if the executive committee of the Owners Corporation had the authority to instruct senior counsel to settle the legal proceedings. This authority was challenged on two grounds: firstly, that a meeting of the executive committee was not properly constituted due to insufficient notice, and secondly, that the settlement involved matters requiring a special resolution of the Owners Corporation, which had not been obtained. The court also considered whether the Owners Corporation's conduct after the orders were made constituted ratification and whether there had been an undue delay in seeking to set them aside.

The court reasoned that for consent orders to be set aside under UCPR, r 36.15(1), it must be shown that they were made irregularly, illegally, or against good faith. While the primary judge found that an invalid underlying agreement could render orders irregular, he concluded that the Owners Corporation had not established this. Furthermore, even if irregularity were found, the primary judge would not have exercised his discretion to set aside the orders due to ratification and delay. The Owners Corporation's argument that the court was compelled to set aside the orders under its inherent jurisdiction if the underlying agreement was void was also considered. However, the court noted that the respondents contended that entered court orders are generally final and cannot be set aside except in specific circumstances like fraud, which were not present.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The question whether the consent orders made by Bergin CJ in Eq on 14 August 2013 can be set aside was considered by the primary judge by reference to UCPR, r 36.15(1). That rule provides:“36.15 General power to set aside judgment or order(1) A judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may, on sufficient cause being shown, be set aside by order of the court if the judgment was given or entered, or the order was made, irregularly, illegally or against good faith.…” The primary judge considered, at [140], that if it were shown that the underlying agreement was not binding on the Owners Corporation he would have accepted that the making of the orders could be regarded as irregular within the meaning of the rule: see Romeo v Papalia [2012] NSWCA 221. However, his Honour held that the Owners Corporation had not established that the orders had been made irregularly, illegally, or against good faith within the meaning of the rule. His Honour further observed, at [141], that had he found that the orders had been made irregularly, illegally or against good faith he would not have exercised the power under the rule to set aside the consent orders, in circumstances where he considered that the conduct of the Owners Corporation following the making of the orders amounted to a ratification of the agreement and there had been a substantial delay in seeking to have the orders set aside. On the appeal, the Owners Corporation submitted that the court had power in its inherent jurisdiction to set aside consent orders that had been entered if the underlying agreement upon which the consent orders were based was void or invalid: see Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235; [1956] HCA 2. It contended that if it established that the consent orders were based upon an invalid or void agreement, then no question of discretion arose and the court, in its inherent jurisdiction, was compelled to set aside the orders. The Owners Corporation continued to rely upon UCPR, r 36.15 as a secondary argument. The issue of voidness or invalidity was based upon the Owners Corporation’s contention that the EC had no authority to authorise senior counsel to enter into the agreement that underlay the consent orders. It followed on this argument that senior counsel had no authority to seek to have the court make the consent orders. Senior counsel lacked authority, on the Owners Corporation’s argument, on two bases. First, because the meeting of the EC at which it had been determined to instruct senior counsel to settle the matter was not properly constituted, as 72 hours’ notice of the holding of the meeting had not been given: see Sch 3, cl 6. Secondly, because the underlying settlement involved matters that could only be determined by the Owners Corporation: see ss 21(1)(a), 65A and 80A. The respondents, for their part, submitted that the Owners Corporation had not sought to challenge, in the court below or on the appeal, the authority of the legal representatives to seek to have the court make the consent orders. This was relevant, according to the respondents, as different principles applied to setting aside court orders as opposed to setting aside a compromise or agreement entered into between parties. They contended that, save for specific circumstances such as fraud, which did not apply here, orders of a court that have been entered are final and cannot be set aside: see Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; [1971] HCA 49 at 530-531 per Barwick CJ, 531-532 per Menzies J, and 537 per Walsh J; Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; [1977] HCA 7 at 154; DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; [2000] HCA 17. The respondents contended that the Owners Corporation’s argument failed to recognise this distinction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The relevant terms of ss 62 and 65A were as follows:“62 What are the duties of an owners corporation to maintain and repair property?(1) An owners corporation must properly maintain and keep in a state of good and serviceable repair the common property and any personal property vested in the owners corporation.(2) An owners corporation must renew or replace any fixtures or fittings comprised in the common property and any personal property vested in the owners corporation.(3) This clause does not apply to a particular item of property if the owners corporation determines by special resolution that:(a) it is inappropriate to maintain, renew, replace or repair the property, and(b) its decision will not affect the safety of any building, structure or common property in the strata scheme or detract from the appearance of any property in the strata scheme.Note. The decision of an owners corporation under subsection (3) may be reviewed by an Adjudicator (see section 138).…65A Owners corporation may make or authorise changes to common property(1) For the purpose of improving or enhancing the common property, an owners corporation or an owner of a lot may take any of the following action, but only if a special resolution has first been passed at a general meeting of the owners corporation that specifically authorises the taking of the particular action proposed:(a) add to the common property,(b) alter the common property,(c) erect a new structure on the common property.(2) A special resolution that authorises action to be taken under subsection (1) in relation to the common property by an owner of a lot may specify whether the ongoing maintenance of the common property once the action has been taken is the responsibility of the owners corporation or the owner.(3) If a special resolution under this section does not specify who has the ongoing maintenance of the common property concerned, the owners corporation has the responsibility for the ongoing maintenance.…” Chapter 3, Pt 3 dealt with the finances of the strata scheme. The Owners Corporation further challenged the validity of the settlement on the basis that the relevant expenditure had not been approved by it. The following provisions were relevant to this argument.“75 Estimates to be prepared of contributions to administrative and sinking funds…(5) An owners corporation of a large strata scheme must include in the estimates prepared under this section at an annual general meeting specific amounts in relation to each item or matter on which the owners corporation intends to expend money, or on which the owners corporation is aware money will be likely to be expended, in the period until the next annual general meeting.…80A Limit on spending by executive committees of large strata schemes(1) If a specific amount has been determined as referred to in section 75 (5) for expenditure on any item or matter, the executive committee of the owners corporation concerned must not, in the period until the annual general meeting next occurring after the determination was made, spend on the item or matter an amount greater than that determined amount for expenditure on the item or matter plus 10 per cent.(2) The owners corporation of a large strata scheme may by resolution at a general meeting remove the limitation imposed by subsection (1) generally or in relation to any particular item or matter.…”