Nikolic v Twitter International Company

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2024 0087
GORAN NIKOLIC First Applicant
IDAZ09 PTY LTD Second Applicant
v
TWITTER INTERNATIONAL COMPANY (X CORP INC) Respondent

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JUDGE: BEACH JA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: On the papers
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16 April 2025
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2025] VSCA 80
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2024] VSC 381 (Gray J)

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Perfected court order – Power to set aside perfected court order made by consent following settlement of proceeding – No power to set aside perfected orders otherwise than on recognised grounds – No basis for setting aside settlement or orders – Judge plainly correct in refusing application to set aside perfected court orders – Application for leave to appeal from judge’s order having no prospects of success – Application for leave to appeal totally without merit – Application for leave to appeal refused.

Supreme Court Act 1986, s 14D.

Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 v Yau (2017) 96 NSWLR 587; Euromark Ltd v Smash Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) [No 2] [2024] VSCA 152, applied.

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Counsel

Applicants: In person
Respondent:      —

Solicitors

Applicants:
Respondent: Thomson Geer

BEACH JA:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal an order made by a judge[1] dismissing an application made by Goran Nikolic and IDAZ09 Pty Ltd (‘the plaintiffs’) to set aside consent orders made in July 2021 dismissing their proceeding against Twitter International Company (‘the defendant’), and their application to reinstate the proceeding in which the consent orders had been made. For the reasons given below, the application has no prospects of success. Indeed, the application is totally without merit.[2] Leave to appeal must be refused.

    [2]As to the consequences of the application being determined to be totally without merit, see s 14D(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1986.

Background

  1. The factual background of this proceeding is closely related to the factual background of the plaintiffs’ proceeding against Nationwide News Pty Ltd, in which I have also delivered reasons for judgment today.[3]

    [3]Nikolic v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2025] VSCA 79 (‘Nationwide Refusal Reasons’).

  2. Both proceedings arise from offensive material being published on Twitter using accounts or ‘handles’ that contained the distinctive alphanumeric combination ‘idaz09’, which is virtually identical (save for the use of lower case letters) to the second plaintiff’s name. As explained in the Nationwide Refusal Reasons, those handles (‘the unauthorised Twitter handles’) and the material published on Twitter through their use were not authorised by the plaintiffs.

  3. On 15 January 2019, the plaintiffs commenced the proceeding below against the defendant claiming damages in defamation.[4] The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had published a matter that, in its natural and ordinary meaning, bore the following meanings:

    (a)the plaintiffs are racists;

    (b)the plaintiffs are homophobic;

    (c)the plaintiffs hold an anti-Muslim view;

    (d)the first plaintiff is unpatriotic in that he…

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Details
Case
[2025] VSCA 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The dispute between Nikolic and Twitter International Company arose in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The case involved an application by Nikolic to set aside a perfected court order that had been made by consent following the settlement of the proceeding. The application was based on alleged misrepresentations and coercion by Twitter during the settlement process. The court was required to decide whether it had the power to set aside a perfected court order made by consent following a settlement, and if there were grounds for setting aside the order.

The court considered the relevant statutory provisions and case law, including Bailey v Marinoff, The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 v Yau, and Euromark Ltd v Smash Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq). The court found that there was no power to set aside a perfected court order made by consent following a settlement, except on recognised grounds. The court also found that there was no basis for setting aside the settlement or orders, as there was no evidence of misrepresentations or coercion by Twitter. The judge was plainly correct in refusing the application to set aside the perfected court orders.

The court further found that the application for leave to appeal from the judge’s order had no prospects of success and was totally without merit. The application for leave to appeal was therefore refused. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated any error of law or fact by the primary judge, and that there was no basis for setting aside the settlement or orders. The decision of the court was upheld, and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

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