Taylor v Santos Ltd - [2000] SASC 305

TAYLOR V SANTOS LTD & ORS

[2000] SASC 305

RE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERROGATE

1................ JUDGE BURLEY......... The plaintiff has applied for leave to interrogate the second, third and fourth defendants. The application is supported by the affidavit of Mr Dugan sworn on 11 February 2000 (Document 158). In paragraph 7, Mr Dugan has stated that some 19 evidentiary issues are likely to arise concerning the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy plea. The plaintiff seeks evidence about these issues. This is confirmed in the written submissions of the plaintiff.

There are three sets of interrogatories respectively directed to the second, third and fourth defendants. In broad terms the interrogatories are confined to the allegation of civil conspiracy set out in paragraphs 29 to 33A of the more explicit statement of claim.
Paragraph 29 is as follows:
“29... Adler, Gibson and Armstrong acting on their own behalf and on behalf of Santos entered into the following agreement, at times and places unknown to the Plaintiff, in or about August to September 1996 (the September Agreement) and/or decided upon the following course of action:
(a).... That Gibson would withdraw his resignation as an employee and officer of Santos Europe and would resume his employment with that company;
(b)... That Adler would procure Santos and/or Santos Europe to accept Gibson’s withdrawal of resignation;
(c)... That Adler would remove the Plaintiff from the Guildford office and relocate him to Adelaide.
(d)... If the Plaintiff did not agree to such relocation forthwith, the Plaintiff’s employment with Santos would be terminated.
(e)... That they would ensure that the purchase by Santos and or Santos Europe of an asset known as the Armada Unit would not proceed.”
In paragraph 32 it is alleged that the September agreement was unlawful and in paragraph 33 it is alleged that the predominant purpose of the September agreement was to injure the plaintiff.
The first point to note is that the issues referred to by Mr Dugan in his affidavit are described as evidentiary issues rather than issues as defined by the pleadings. It is questionable whether interrogatories about evidentiary issues may be the subject of leave. As I understand the law, it has never been the province of interrogatories to interrogate about anticipated evidentiary disputes that may arise during the course of the trial.
The defendants, in opposing the grant of leave in respect of the interrogatories, complained that if leave was granted, the three defendants interrogated would have to disclose almost the entirety of their evidential case in relation to the issues relating to the alleged conspiracy without the plaintiff having done so. There is some substance in the complaint but, in my view, it does not sufficiently characterise the nature of the objection that may be taken to interrogatories which are directed to evidentiary issues as opposed to factual issues that arise and can be defined by reference to the pleadings.
It can be readily seen how an admission about the interrogating party’s case might assist with the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Taylor v Santos Ltd

Details

AGLC: Taylor v Santos Ltd [2000] SASC 305
Case: [2000] SASC 305
Decision Date: 8 September 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Taylor v Santos Ltd, the plaintiff sought leave to interrogate the second, third, and fourth defendants regarding allegations of civil conspiracy. The plaintiff's application was supported by an affidavit from Mr. Dugan, which outlined the potential evidentiary issues that might arise concerning the conspiracy. The interrogatories were specifically focused on the allegations of a conspiracy detailed in paragraphs 29 to 33A of the plaintiff's statement of claim, which included an agreement to remove the plaintiff from the Guildford office, threats of employment termination, and an agreement to prevent the purchase of an asset known as the Armada Unit.

The central legal issue before the court was whether interrogatories could be used to inquire about anticipated evidentiary issues, as opposed to factual issues defined by the pleadings. The defendants argued that granting leave would require them to disclose almost their entire evidential case without the plaintiff having done the same, which they considered to be unfair and oppressive. The defendants also argued that the interrogatories were overly broad and not directly related to the material facts in issue.

Judge Burley concluded that interrogatories should not be used to investigate matters of evidence but rather to ascertain material facts that are in issue. The interrogatories in question were largely directed towards obtaining the defendants' evidence, which is not the proper subject of interrogatories. The judge found that the interrogatories sought to delve into the defendants' trial briefs, which was inappropriate. Consequently, the application for leave to interrogate was refused.

The court also noted that even if the interrogatories had been deemed legitimate, the considerable burden on the defendants to answer them would have been oppressive. Therefore, the court did not need to address the defendants' arguments regarding the potential for self-incrimination. The final order was that the plaintiff's application for leave to interrogate the second, third, and fourth defendants was dismissed.

Orders