O'Driscoll v Encore Aviation Pty Ltd; O'Driscoll Aviation Pty Ltd v Encore Helicopter Maintenance Pty Ltd

[2025] NSWSC 458

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

O'Driscoll v Encore Aviation Pty Ltd; O'Driscoll Aviation Pty Ltd v Encore Helicopter Maintenance Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 458

Hearing dates:

12 May 2025

Date of orders:

14 May 2025

Decision date:

14 May 2025

Jurisdiction:

Equity

Before:

Elkaim AJ

Decision:

1. Pursuant to r 22.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the defendants are to provide verified answers to the specified interrogatories (but not including Interrogatory No 36) set out in Annexure E to the affidavit of Andrew Michael Christopoulos dated 24 April 2025.

2. The defendants are to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the notice of motion filed on 24 April 2025.

3. No order as to costs arising from the notice of motion is made in respect of any costs associated with the plaintiff in Matter No 2021/106215.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE — interrogatories — personal injury claim — whether "special reasons" shown — where "special reasons" not required in parallel proceedings being heard together — whether interrogatories order "necessary" — where defendants disputed plaintiff’s admitted facts and authenticity of documents — whether proposed interrogatories are cross-examination

Legislation Cited:

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 56

Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth), s 27

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 22

Cases Cited:

Ahmad v South Western Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWSC 1327

Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v CE Heath Insurance Broking (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703

Lynch v Cash Converters Personal Finance Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 988

Upaid Systems Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd(No 2) [2014] FCA 1377

Category:

Procedural rulings

Parties:

Philip Gregory O'Driscoll (Plaintiff in 2021/103314)
Encore Aviation Pty Ltd (First Defendant in 2021/103314; Third Defendant in 2021/106215)
Encore Helicopter Maintenance Pty Ltd (Second Defendant in 2021/103314; First Defendant in 2021/106215)
O'Driscoll Aviation Pty Ltd (Plaintiff in 2021/106215)
R.B. Loxton & M.D. Wallace trading as Encore Helicopter Maintenance (Second Defendant in 2021/106215)

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr R McIlwaine SC (Plaintiff in 2021/103314)
Mr R Quickenden (Plaintiff in 2021/103314)
Mr A Flick (First and Second Defendants in 2021/103314; First and Third Defendants in 2021/106215)
Mr K Anderson (Plaintiff in 2021/106215)

Solicitors:
AC Lawyers (Plaintiff in 2021/103314))
Norton White (First and Second Defendants in 2021/103314; First and Third Defendants in 2021/106215)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Plaintiff in 2021/106215)

File Number(s):

2021/103314; 2021/106215

Publication restriction:

No

JUDGMENT

1. On 17 April 2018, the plaintiff was piloting a helicopter (VH-HUE) in the Snowy Mountains region of New South Wales. He was conducting an operation which included the lifting of machinery and moving the machinery to a different place.

2. The helicopter failed to maintain separation from the ground. It descended into a wooded area alongside the Yarrangobilly River. The helicopter was destroyed. The plaintiff alleges he was injured.

3. In these proceedings the plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants, essentially through negligent maintenance of the helicopter.

4. The first defendant admits that it provided maintenance services to the helicopter and that it owed a duty of care, within the limits of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), to the plaintiff. The second defendant denies it owed any duty of care to the plaintiff.

5. Both defendants deny any negligence on their respective parts. The defendants do not admit any injury on the part of the plaintiff and say further that injuries he received in 2005 are the cause of any losses from which he currently suffers.

6. By a notice of motion filed on 24 April 2025, the plaintiff seeks leave, pursuant to r 22.1(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), to issue interrogatories to the defendants. Leave is required because r 22.1 states that a court is not to order that any party answer interrogatories in a personal injury matter unless the court is satisfied “that special reasons exist that justify the making of the order.” As with all other applications seeking the issuing of interrogatories, the applicant must show that “the order is necessary at the time it is made” (r 22.1(4).

7. The notice of motion is supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff’s solicitor, Mr Andrew Christopoulos dated 24 April 2025. The proposed interrogatories are Annexure E to this affidavit.

8. The defendants oppose the making of the orders sought in the motion. They rely on an affidavit of their solicitor, Mr Gerry Tzortzatos, dated 7 May 2025.

9. Mr Tzortzatos points out that there are related proceedings (2021/106215) in which a claim is made for the loss of the helicopter (the hull proceedings). The parties are slightly different in that in the hull proceeding, the plaintiff is O'Driscoll Aviation Pty Ltd, and the defendants are Encore Helicopter Maintenance Pty Ltd, R.B. Loxton & M.D. Wallace trading as Encore Helicopter Maintenance, and Encore Aviation Pty Ltd.

10. The defendants’ opposition to the motion was put at three levels; there were no special reasons, the interrogatories were not necessary, and some of the proposed interrogatories were internally defective.

11. Before looking at some relevant principles it is important to note that there is no parallel motion in the hull proceedings. However:

1. On 11 April 2025, Chen J ordered that the two proceedings be heard together with evidence in one to be evidence in the other.

2. Mr Anderson appeared before me on behalf of the plaintiff in the hull proceedings and stated that his plaintiff supported the personal injury plaintiff’s application.

3. Had the plaintiff in the hull proceedings, not being a personal injury action, put on a corresponding motion it would not have faced the same hurdle of having to establish special reasons.

Principles

12. In Ahmad v South Western Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWSC 1327 Davies J referred to some authorities relating to special reasons and necessity. He stated, from [13]:

“13. In Ahmed El Hayek v Josslyn Vasic & Anor; QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited v Wesfarmers Federation Insurance Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1498 Garling J said:

[50] Whilst it is clear that ‘special reasons’, as a phrase, is an inexact one, capable of some elasticity in interpretation: see Keating v South East Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service (Supreme Court of NSW, 7 July 2006, unreported) at [24]-[25] per Hall J, it is necessary for an applicant for an order to show that there is something unusual or different which takes the matter out of the ordinary course: Priest v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 12 at [126] to [128] per Johnson J; Keating at [24];Boscolo at [18] per French J (as his Honour then was).

[51] Typically, but not exclusively, what will take the matter ‘out of the ordinary’ is:

(a) an inability to obtain the requisite factual material without the exercise of the discretion;

(b) that the applicant is in a position of some disability or disadvantage;

(c) the complexity of the subject matter is such that without the exercise of the discretion, real prejudice will result to the applicant;

(d) that in order to achieve the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, the discretion should be exercised.

[52] In addition, as with all questions of discovery, an issue of relevance must be satisfied, namely that the material sought to be discovered, and the answers to interrogatories will relate to a fact in issue. There are also other discretionary considerations.

14. In Edwards v Hornsby Shire Council [2014] NSWSC 600, a case where personal injury damages were claimed, Schmidt J said:

[16] The question of necessity must be approached as meaning ‘reasonably necessary for the disposing fairly of the cause or matter’ or ‘necessary in the interests of a fair trial’ (see Boyle v Downs [1979] NSWLR 192 at 205 per Cross J and Percy v General Motors-Holden's Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 289 at 292 per Rath J).

[17] Further, as discussed by Ward J in In the matter ofGerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd – Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 241 at [27] and [31]:

[27] Where the interrogatories seek information ‘within the knowledge of the defendants’, it might be expected that the test of necessity will be readily satisfied (as it was, for example, in Keating v South East Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service).

...

[31] In Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (No 4) (1991) 5 ACSR 758 Cole J said, of the principles applicable regarding interrogatories, (at [762]):

‘1. The object of interrogatories is to discover the truth. It has also the advantage of saving expense. When inquiry is made as to a matter which is entirely within the knowledge of the defendant and not within the knowledge of the plaintiff, and is relevant to the case, I do not know of any rule why the defendant should not be interrogated about it: Potter's Sulphide Ore Treatment Ltd v Sulphide Corporation Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 101 at 111; Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Inter-Continental Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 514 at 518.

2. Generally speaking, a party may interrogate his opponent as to every relevant matter on which he could examine him, if he thought fit to call him as a witness at the trial: Lyell v Kennedy (1883) 8 App Cas 217 at 234; Hawkes v Schubach [1953] VLR 468 at 471; Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v C E Heath Insurance Broking (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703 at 709.’

[18] It is no answer to a proposed interrogatory that a document produced on subpoena deals with the topic or that a specific question is answered by the content of the document. Answers which are sought by the interrogating party must be material in the sense that they may enable that party to maintain its case and may be pursued, even if they destroy the opponent's case. A party is also entitled to seek admissions. As Ward J also discussed at [26]:

‘It is recognised that a legitimate purpose of interrogatories is that the answers will inform the plaintiff as to evidence to be obtained and may save the expense of proving part of its case (Attorney-General v Gaskill (1882) LR 20 Ch D 519 at 527 per Jessel MR, applied in Taylor v Santos Ltd [2000] SASC 305 and Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 204).’"

13. The defendants also referred me to two Federal Court authorities. In Upaid Systems Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd(No 2) [2014] FCA 1377 Yates J said this at [48]:

“One manifestation of this objection is that an interrogatory cannot be used to obtain access to another party’s evidence or witnesses or to cross-examine. In this latter regard, a question put to an opposing party in cross-examination may be a perfectly legitimate and admissible question for that purpose, but not necessarily so when sought in the form of an interrogatory. One way to test the matter is to ask whether the interrogatory could properly be asked of the opposite party in examination in chief, if called as a witness in the interrogating party’s case: Dunbar v Perc [1956] VLR 583 at 590-591.”

14. The defendants submitted that a number of the proposed interrogatories were “loaded” questions amounting to impermissible cross-examination.

15. In Lynch v Cash Converters Personal Finance Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 988, Gleeson J (as her Honour then was) said, from [24]:

“24. Ms E Collins SC, senior counsel for the respondents, noted that interrogatories are rarely administered, citing Granitgard Pty Ltd ACN 007 427 590 v Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd ACN 093 837 337(No 2) [2008] FCA 1451 at [32] and Alliance Craton at [27]. In the latter case, Mansfield J noted that interrogatories ‘are often seen as expensive and unnecessary to secure a proper disclosure of information’ and that modern case management has explored more efficient and effective avenues to achieve the proper disclosure of information.

25. In Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v CE Heath Insurance Broking (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703, Clarke J said at 707:

As a general rule it will be necessary…for the applicant to show that the provision of the answers will, or may, provide relevant information (such as admissions of facts and other material such [as] would facilitate the just and expeditious disposal of the proceedings) which the interrogating party has been unable to extract from his opponent. Because, however, of the pre-trial procedures in the court and its requirement that the parties make all admissions or concessions necessary to focus attention on the nature of the real dispute I envisage that an order will be unnecessary in many cases.

26. Generally speaking, interrogatories will not be permitted as to the contents of documents. In Becker v Smith’s Newspaper Ltd (No 1) (1931) SASR 1 at 8-9, Murray CJ said relevantly:

The interpretation of a document is a matter of law, as to which interrogation is not permissible, but, before interpretation begins, it is necessary to know the meanings of any foreign words that occur in the document, or any words or symbols which are insensible in the collocation in which they stand. Such meanings, however, are a matter of fact, as to which extrinsic evidence is admissible.”

16. By way of qualification to the defendants’ submissions concerning cross-examination masquerading as interrogatories, the plaintiff in the hull proceedings drew my attention to this passage from Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v CE Heath Insurance Broking (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703 at 709:

“However, in practice many interrogatories in the form of leading questions have been asked and allowed. Questions which require the party interrogated to obtain information from his servants and agents fall within the range of permissible interrogatories although many would be inadmissible if asked in evidence-in-chief.

On the other hand questions which tend to reflect on a witness’ credibility or could be asked in cross-examination only because they tend to damage a witness’ earlier evidence are disallowed because they do not relate to matters in question in the cause or matter: see Allhusen v Labouchere (1878) 3 QBD 654 per James LJ at 661.

In Bray this passage appears (at 105):

‘A question cannot be put to a party merely because the answer may discredit him. It is not like the case of a witness whose evidence the jury is asked to disbelieve on the ground that he is not a person worthy of credit: Allhusen v Labouchere, 3 QBD pp 661, 666. You cannot examine a party as you may a witness: Finch v Finch, 2 Ves p 493. A person cannot be interrogated upon every matter upon which he can be cross-examined: Sheward v Lonsdale, 5 CPD p 49: and see Whateley v Crowter, 5 E & B p 712, and post, p 113. By rule (see ante, p 91) interrogatories which do not relate to any matters in question in the cause or matter shall be deemed irrelevant notwithstanding that they might be admissible on the oral cross-examination of a witness’

The rule quoted, which is similar to the present English rule, tends to suggest that questions relating to a matter in issue are permissible even though they might only be asked in cross-examination. This rule was promulgated in 1883 after Lord FitzGerald had made his speech in Lyell.”

17. In his affidavit, Mr Christopoulos states that the plaintiff served a Notice to Admit Facts and Authenticity of documents dated 3 March 2025 on the defendants. The notice was met with a Notice Disputing Facts and Authenticity of documents dated 26 March 2025. The defendants dispute most of the facts in the plaintiff’s notice as well as the authenticity of documents listed in the notice.

18. A little confusingly the respective notices refer to a third defendant. Notwithstanding this anomaly the defendants’ responses to the plaintiff’s notice seem somewhat obstructive in that many of the questions and documents put forward by the plaintiff could seemingly be easily admitted. An example is the defendants’ declining to admit the authenticity of invoices rendered by the defendants. The reason given to me was that time limits imposed by the notice to admit process did not permit the examination of multiple documents. I did not find this ‘excuse’ to be particularly persuasive.

19. It is however apparent that the Notice to Admit Facts does have shortcomings. I have already mentioned a third defendant which does not exist in the personal injury proceedings. The reliance on the notice to admit process as providing a special reason for the interrogatories was accordingly weakened.

The primary dispute

20. There is no dispute that the helicopter ‘crashed’ due to an engine failure. Maintenance of helicopters involves regular inspection. The defendants were allegedly negligent in not performing a vibration test which, if properly done, would have exposed metal cracks in the engine. Identification of the cracks would have led to the helicopter being grounded for appropriate repair.

21. The defendants say the cracks were a product of the collision with the terrain and, in any event, would not have been identified by the suggested inspection.

22. An investigation of the incident was conducted by the Air Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), but its findings are not admissible in the proceedings (s 27 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth)).

Are there special reasons?

23. The plaintiff submitted the following special reasons in his written submissions:

“▪ To assist the parties and the Court in narrowing important factual issues thus saving Court time and costs to the parties.

▪ Important factual issues such as the form of the inspections of the Helicopter by the defendant are not set out in the defendant’s evidentiary statements. For example, the use of a torch and/or mirror.

▪ Enabling the parties to better assess the merits of their client’s position in the litigation.

▪ The defendant failed to admit many important facts or the authenticity of many of the documents set out in a notice to admit facts and authenticity of documents served by the plaintiff.

▪ The interrogatories have significance for both sets of proceedings.

▪ The interrogatories are consistent with the defendants’ duty to the Court pursuant to s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).”

24. In oral argument emphasis was placed on the following:

1. The plaintiff was unable to rely on the ATSB report to establish factual findings.

2. Special reasons would not have been required if the motion had been filed by the plaintiff in the hull proceedings.

25. I have not seen the ATSB report but assume it makes findings relevant to the incident. No doubt these findings could be of great assistance to the respective parties’ cases. The inadmissibility of the report is I think a special reason in favour of allowing interrogatories which canvass facts which are relevant to the legal proceedings. An aircraft crash investigation is very different to, for example, a motor car accident claim, where access could be had to police reports as well as to witness statements. In this matter, the plaintiff was the sole occupant of the helicopter and had no involvement in the maintenance which is alleged to be at the centre of the engine failure.

26. I also think the fact that no special reasons would have been required if the motion had been filed by the plaintiff in the hull proceedings is itself a special reason in the subject proceedings. Chen J’s orders allow the evidence in each case to be relied upon in the other case. It would be a quite extraordinary result if the plaintiff in the personal injury proceedings could not take advantage of interrogatories obtained in the hull proceedings.

27. I do not know why a corresponding motion was not put on in the hull proceedings. Nevertheless, the plaintiff in the hull proceedings supports the personal injury plaintiff’s motion and one would expect that if the motion failed because of a lack of special reasons, it could be quickly followed by a motion in the hull proceedings. This eventuality would amount to a significant waste of time and costs, and an obvious contravention of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

25. In addition, s 56 may also be viewed as a special reason. The proposed interrogatories are an attempt to establish certain basic facts about the maintenance of the helicopter. Some of these, such as whether a particular inspection was carried out, could presumably be answered by the relevant maintenance engineers. It is not an answer, as posed by the defendants, to say that the engineers are no longer in the employ of the defendants making it difficult to find the answers. The engineers have given statements. There is no apparent reason why they could not be approached to give answers to the interrogatories.

26. I am therefore satisfied that there are special reasons to allow the plaintiff to issue interrogatories.

Do the proposed interrogatories amount to cross-examination of witnesses?

30. I think a number of the questions are simple attempts to establish basic facts, such as which entity maintained the helicopter and what acts of maintenance were carried out. It was submitted by the defendants that many of the sought facts are already in the statements served by the defendants.

31. For example, Mr Ben Harris in his statement dated 9 September 2024, gives a good deal of detail about the maintenance work he carried out. In para 8 of his affidavit he says he carried out maintenance on the helicopter from August 2017 up until the accident on 17 April 2018. However, he very quickly qualifies his answer by stating “I was, from time to time, assigned to be present at sites from where the aircraft was conducting operations involving firefighting and lifting equipment.” From “time to time” indicates not every time. The proposed questions endeavour to establish who carried out the inspections and what they did. I do not think this is cross-examination.

32. There are some questions that, as described by defendants’ counsel, are “loaded”. Council gave proposed questions 32 and 33 as examples. I agree that there is an element of leading or loading in these questions, but I do not think that necessarily renders them inadmissible. To repeat part of the decision of Clarke J in Coal Cliff Collieries:

“However, in practice many interrogatories in the form of leading questions have been asked and allowed. Questions which require the party interrogated to obtain information from his servants and agents fall within the range of permissible interrogatories although many would be inadmissible if asked in evidence-in-chief.”

33. The proposed questions do not attack the credibility of Mr Harris, or Mr Loxton, rather they are designed to establish the factual consequences of a vibration test having been carried out.

34. Section 56 is also important here. The defendants submitted that the answers to the questions could be ascertained by cross-examination of the witnesses. However, if the revelations derived from cross-examination required fine tuning of the experts’ opinions, possible delay could ensue in the midst of the trial.

Are the interrogatories necessary?

35. Rule 22.1(4) requires the order for interrogatories to be necessary. It is important to observe a distinction between the interrogatories being necessary and the order being necessary. This distinction I think emphasises the need to comply with s 56. It is not a demand that each interrogatory be examined as to whether or not that particular interrogatory is necessary. Rather it is a requirement that an order for interrogatories is necessary.

36. The defendants submitted that:

“When one has regard to the proposed interrogatories, in light of the fact that the parties have exchanged evidence and expert reports and in particular in light of the statements served by the Defendants and annexed to the affidavit of Mr Christopulos and as annexures C and D, it is readily apparent that interrogatories are not necessary in any relevant sense.”

37. I have already pointed to some of the subtleties that emerge from the statements, such as Mr Harris referring to carrying out maintenance “from time to time” rather than specifically stating when he did carry out the maintenance. Clearing up such anomalies I think justifies, and makes necessary, the order for interrogatories.

38. Generally speaking, and as submitted by the plaintiff, the proposed interrogatories are aimed at identifying: the specific defendant that carried out the work (Questions 4 to 15); the nature of the inspections and who carried them out (Questions 16 to 24); and the details of a particular issue reported upon by Mr Loxton on 22 March 2018 (Questions 25 to 35). I note the inclusion of Question 36 was not pursued.

39. The defendants, in relying upon Coal Cliff Collieries, asserted that the Court’s pre-trial procedures would lead to the parties making “all admissions or concessions necessary to focus attention on the nature of the real dispute …” The difficulty here is that there has not been discovery (again because this is a personal injury matter, see r 21.8 UCPR which also requires a specific order based on special reasons) and the Notice to Admit Facts was to some degree defective, for example in referring to a third defendant in the personal injury matter.

40. As I have already said, the plaintiff should not benefit from the defective Notice to Admit Facts, but the position remains that pre-trial procedures have not exposed all the necessary admissions and concessions. This is another reason why I think interrogatories are necessary.

Other points made by the defendants

41. The defendants submitted that a number of the interrogatories required “the person answering the interrogatories to look at documents and answer questions about the contents of those documents.” This in turn required an interpretation of the documents, the meaning of the documents speaking for themselves. The impermissibility of interrogatories to interpret documents was referred to by Gleeson J in Lynch (quoted above).

42. The proposed interrogatories referred to by the defendants were No’s 3, 12, 14, 15, 25, 27 and 28. My reading of the identified questions is that they seek clarity of the content of a document but not an opinion about its meaning. The distinction may in some cases be fine, but in the present case I think the questions are simply asking whether the documents have particular contents or refer to a particular action.

43. For example, proposed Interrogatory 14, asks:

“Look at the documents marked ‘A’ (15 pages) (marked in the top right-hand corner pages 5 to 9 of 74) are these tax invoices and related documents for maintenance services on the helicopter?”

44. These documents include some of the tax invoices said to be not authentic by the Notice Disputing Facts because the defendants did not have time to look at them. Either the documents are tax invoices, or they are not. The tax invoices exhibited in the Court Book appeared to me to require a very straightforward Yes or No. They are not documents requiring any degree of interpretation beyond their basic inspection.

45. The defendants pointed out that the interrogatories were directed to a corporation and would consequently need to be answered by an officer of the corporation. The officer would answer “from their own knowledge gained in the course of his duties or from inquiries made of other officers or agents of the company.” The defendants pointed out that some of the persons who might have the relevant answers were no longer employed by the corporation and were in any event to be called as witnesses.

46. The short answer to this complaint is that the corporation will need to do its best to answer the interrogatory but if it cannot do so, will answer accordingly.

47. In summary, I think there are special reasons to make an order under r 22.1(3), that the interrogatories are necessary, and that there is no element of any particular interrogatory which makes that interrogatory inappropriate. To the extent that there is a discretion as to whether I should make the order, I think my just stated conclusions overwhelmingly dictate the exercise of the discretion in the plaintiff’s favour.

48. In relation to costs I think the defendants, having resisted the motion but been unsuccessful, should pay the plaintiff’s costs. In respect of the plaintiff in the hull proceedings, because no notice of motion had been filed in those proceedings, I think there should be no order as to costs.

Orders

49. I make the following orders:

1. Pursuant to r 22.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the defendants are to provide verified answers to the specified interrogatories (but not including Interrogatory No 36) set out in Annexure E to the affidavit of Andrew Michael Christopoulos dated 24 April 2025.

2. The defendants are to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the notice of motion filed on 24 April 2025.

3. No order as to costs arising from the notice of motion is made in respect of any costs associated with the plaintiff in Matter No 2021/106215.

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Decision last updated: 14 May 2025