FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZRTC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 43
Citation:
SZRTC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 43
Appeal from:
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZRTC & Ors [2013] FCCA 1
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRUH & Anor [2013] FCCA 1164
Parties:
SZRTC AND SZRTD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SZRUH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File numbers:
NSD 740 of 2013
NSD 1864 of 2013Judges:
TRACEY, FLICK AND GRIFFITHS JJ
Date of judgment:
11 April 2014
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – construction of s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of “temporary residence” – whether a ‘right to enter and reside’ in another country is a right comprehended by s 36(3) – whether temporary period of residence must be co-extensive with period of protection obligation
Legislation:
Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – ss 36(2), 36(3)
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)Cases cited:
Acosta v Gaffney, 413 F Supp 827 (DNJ, 1976) – cited
Lopez v Franklin, 427 F Supp 345 (DMich, 1977) – cited
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZRTC & Ors [2013] FCCA 1 – discussed
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRHU [2013] FCAFC 91, (2013) 215 FCR 35 – applied
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenhip v SZRUH & Ors [2013] FCCA 1164 – discussed
NAGV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161 – cited
NBLB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1051 – cited
NBLC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 149 FCR 151 – cited
NBGM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 522 – cited
SZMWQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 97, (2010) 187 FCR 109 – cited
WAGH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 194, (2003) 131 FCR 269 – consideredDate of hearing: 27 February 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr J Gormly Solicitor for the Appellants: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Kennett SC with Mr J Smith Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 740 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZRTC
First AppellantSZRTD
Second Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
TRACEY, FLICK AND GRIFFITHS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
11 APRIL 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read SZRTC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] FCAFC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the construction of s 36(3) of the Act, which contains a series of qualifications on the grant of protection visas. The court held that s 36(3) applies when an applicant has not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of a right to enter and reside in a third country. The court rejected the applicants’ argument that the word “temporarily” should be interpreted as an indefinite period, as this would extend the meaning of the word beyond its ordinary understanding. Instead, the court held that the word “temporarily” should be interpreted in the context of each case, and the tension between the stability suggested by the word “reside” and the transience implied by the word “temporarily” must be resolved on the facts.
The court ultimately found that the applicants did not have a right to temporary residence in Turkey, as they had not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of such a right. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants, nonetheless, maintained that the words “reside” and “temporarily” each carried a “temporal meaning”. By this we understood the appellants to mean that, in cases such as the present, “temporarily” must be understood to mean an indefinite period which would not expire until the applicant ceased having cause to fear persecution for a Convention reason in his or her country of origin.CONSIDERATION Section 36 of the Act contains a cascading series of qualifications. Sub-section (3) operates as a qualification on sub-section (2). Sub-sections (4)-(5A) then operate as qualifications on sub-section (3): see NBLB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1051 at [38] (Emmett J), a construction endorsed on appeal by Bennett and Graham JJ; NBLC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 149 FCR 151 at 155, 166-7; and see also NBGM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 522 at 529 (Black CJ). The correct approach is, therefore, for the decision-maker to determine whether an applicant satisfies one or more of the criteria for a protection visa prescribed by s 36(2). If the answer to that question is in the affirmative it is necessary for the decision-maker then to turn to s 36(3) and determine whether or not the applicant is a person to whom that sub-section applies. If it does not, the “gateway”, created by s 36(2) to the granting of a visa remains open and there is no occasion to consider whether one or more of the qualifications to s 36(3) applies. If s 36(3) is found to apply, the decision-maker must then determine whether one or more of the qualifications contained in sub-sections (4), (5) and (5A), which ensure that Australia’s international obligations under the Refugee Convention are met, limit the operation of s 36(3) and keep the “gateway” open. This is the context in which s 36(3) falls to be construed. By s 36(3) Australia is deemed not to have protection obligations to a non-citizen “who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently” any third country. The relevant question posed by the sub‑section is whether it can be said, having regard to all of the circumstances, that an applicant for a protection visa has a right (in the broad sense recognised by the Court in Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRHU [2013] FCAFC 91, (2013) 215 FCR 35) to “reside …. temporarily” in the third country. There is an obvious tension between the stability which is suggested by the word “reside” and the transience implied by the word “temporarily”. That, however, is a tension which must be resolved on the facts in each case. It is not a warrant for extending the meaning of “temporarily” such that it covers the whole of the period (which may or may not be able to be ascertained at the time at which the relevant decision is made) during which the applicant remains subject to persecution in his or her country of origin.