FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZRHL & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 2369 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – whether the Tribunal overlooked evidence – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476 |
| Cases cited: SZRHL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1093; (2013) 136 ALD 641 WAFP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 319 |
| First Applicant: | SZRHL |
| Second Applicant | SZRHM |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1481 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 16 February 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 March 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 30 August 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Ms F McNeil |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr T Galvin of Minter Ellison |
ORDERS
Leave to amend the application made on 10 June 2016 is refused.
The application made on 10 June 2016 is dismissed.
The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $8,000.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1481 of 2016
| SZRHL |
First Applicant
| SZRHM |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 10 June 2016 seeking review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which, on 16 May 2016, affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) to refuse protection visas to the applicants.
The evidence before the Court is a bundle of relevant documents filed by the Minister and tendered by the applicants (“the Court Book” – “CB”, “AE1”).
Background
The applicants are husband and wife. Both are citizens of Bangladesh (CB 4 and CB 19). They arrived in Australia as holders of student visas in March 2007 (CB 93). They were granted further student visas on 14 May 2009. Those visas were cancelled on 17 June 2010. The applicants then remained in Australia without authority (CB 94.1).
On 28 February 2011, the applicants applied for protection visas (CB 1 to CB 51). Only the first applicant made claims to fear harm. The second…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 2369
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether to grant leave to amend the application to include the new ground, particularly given the delay and the applicant's reliance on the *SZRHL* decision. The Court was required to consider the merits of the proposed ground and whether it was irrational for the Tribunal to have reached its conclusion without first weighing all the evidence, including the psychologist's report, before determining the applicant's credibility.
Judge Nicholls reasoned that while a preferable approach might involve weighing all evidence before assessing credibility, it was not irrational for a decision-maker to focus first on the case presented by the applicant and, if that case is found to be untruthful, to then disregard corroborative evidence. This principle, drawn from *Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002*, supported the view that the Tribunal's approach was not necessarily irrational. Furthermore, the Court noted the unexplained delay in raising the new ground. Despite these concerns, the Court granted the parties an opportunity to make further submissions on the *SZRHL* argument due to the potential for the Tribunal to have repeated a jurisdictional error from a previous decision involving the same applicants.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However the further answer to this argument (to what is set out above), is to be found in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; (2003) 198 ALR 59 at [49] per McHugh and Gummow JJ:“In a dispute adjudicated by adversarial procedures, it is not unknown for a party’s credibility to have been so weakened in cross‑examination that the tribunal of fact may well treat what is proffered as corroborative evidence as of no weight because the well has been poisoned beyond redemption. It cannot be irrational for a decision-maker, enjoined by statute to apply inquisitorial processes (as here), to proceed on the footing that no corroboration can undo the consequences for a case put by a party of a conclusion that that case comprises lies by that party. If the critical passage in the reasons of the Tribunal be read as indicated above, the Tribunal is reasoning that, because the appellant cannot be believed, it cannot be satisfied with the alleged corroboration. The appellant's argument in this Court then has to be that it was irrational for the Tribunal to decide that the appellant had lied without, at that earlier stage, weighing the alleged corroborative evidence by the witness in question. That may be a preferable method of going about the task presented by s 430 of the Act. But it is not irrational to focus first upon the case as it was put by the appellant.”[Emphasis added.] In the circumstances, the sole ground of the proposed amended application lacks such merit as to argue that leave should be granted. Leave should be refused, especially in circumstances where again I note that there has been no explanation provided for the delay in raising this proposed ground. I note that in submissions in reply at the hearing before the Court, the applicants’ counsel raised, for the first time, a further argument in support of the proposed ground. The argument was that the judgment of Logan J in SZRHL (see above at [5]) supported the applicants’ argument that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in relation to the consideration of the psychologist’s report. This argument was not raised in the applicants’ initial oral submissions, let alone in their first written submissions in support of the application for leave to amend the application. The failure to raise this argument earlier also remained unexplained. Given this circumstance, it was open to consider refusing leave for the applicants to rely on this argument which was raised for the first time at such a late stage during the final hearing. However, as is set out above, SZRHL involved the same applicants. This case was remitted to the Tribunal, and led to the very Tribunal decision before the Court now. It would be of concern if the “current” Tribunal decision fell into the same jurisdictional error as the “earlier” Tribunal decision. It is appropriate to expect that Tribunal members would properly consider Court judgments, especially if they relate to a matter returned to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. In this light, I gave the parties the opportunity to make further written submissions on the argument said to arise from SZRHL. The applicants filed written submissions on 5 March 2018 (“the applicants’ second written submissions”). The Minister filed written submissions on 16 March 2018 (“the Minister’s second written submissions”).