SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
SQH v Scott [2022] QSC 16
PARTIES:
SQH
(applicant/appellant)
v
MICHAEL JOHN SCOTT
(respondent)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first intervenor)
QUEENSLAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
(second intervenor)FILE NO/S:
BS No 11211 of 2020
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
23 February 2022 (restricted); 4 March 2022 (public)
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
26 May 2021; 18 June 2021
JUDGE:
Williams J
ORDER:
The Court orders that:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
I will hear further from the parties in respect of costs and as to whether any further orders are required.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – FEDERAL AND STATE INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY – QUEENSLAND –APPEAL – GROUND OF APPEAL – ERROR OF LAW – where the respondent, as the presiding officer at a Crime and Corruption Commission hearing, made a decision to require the applicant to answer the question “what is your knowledge of the involvement of [names of alleged co-offenders] in the trafficking of dangerous drugs”, after ruling that the applicant did not have a reasonable excuse, pursuant to section 194 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (CC Act) – where the applicant applies for leave to appeal under section 195(1) of the CC Act and, if leave is granted, an order setting aside the respondent’s decision – where the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland and the Queensland Human Rights Commission have intervened pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HR Act) – where the applicant claims a reasonable excuse because compulsory examination would lock the applicant into a version of events from which the applicant cannot depart at trial, especially when that version would include details about co-defendants – where the respondent claims that the fact of the applicant’s existing charge is not capable of constituting a reasonable excuse – whether the respondent erred in finding that the applicant did not have a reasonable excuse under section 194(1) of the CC Act because the coercive hearing occurred after the applicant had been charged and therefore had the capacity of constraining the applicant’s legitimate forensic choices in the future conduct of the applicant’s trial and, in the circumstances of this case, constituted a reasonable excuse
CRIMINAL LAW – FEDERAL AND STATE INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY – QUEENSLAND –APPEAL – GROUND OF APPEAL – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS – FAILURE TO CONSIDER – where the applicant submits that the applicant’s answers can be made available to the legal representatives for each co-defendant, which would limit the applicant’s forensic choices at trial – where the respondent claims that the applicant has not advanced any factual or legal basis, beyond assertion, for why section 201 of the CC Act is relevant to a claim of reasonable excuse – whether the respondent failed to have regard to a relevant consideration, namely section 201 of the CC Act and the impact that the availability of the coerced material to the…
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- AGLC
- SQH v Scott [2022] QSC 16
- Case
- [2022] QSC 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the respondent erred in finding that the applicant did not have a reasonable excuse under section 194(1) of the CC Act and whether the respondent failed to consider relevant factors, such as section 201 of the CC Act. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the respondent acted unlawfully under section 58(1)(a) of the HR Act by making a decision that was not compatible with the applicant's human right protected by section 32(2)(k) of the HR Act.
The court found that the respondent did not err in finding that the applicant did not have a reasonable excuse because the coercive hearing occurred after the applicant had been charged. This meant that the hearing had the capacity to constrain the applicant's legitimate forensic choices in the future conduct of the applicant's trial. The court also found that the respondent did not fail to consider relevant factors, such as section 201 of the CC Act, as the applicant did not provide any factual or legal basis beyond assertion for why this section was relevant to the claim of reasonable excuse. Lastly, the court held that the respondent did not act unlawfully under section 58(1)(a) of the HR Act because the decision was compatible with the applicant's human right protected by section 32(2)(k) of the HR Act, as the compatibility test required balancing the public interest in combating and reducing major crime against the private or personal concerns of those with information that may assist with the investigations.
The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's decision was justified under the relevant legislative schemes and compatible with human rights. The court will hear further submissions from the parties regarding costs and any further orders required.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Court orders that:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
I will hear further from the parties in respect of costs and as to whether any further orders are required.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Attorney-General adopts the respondent’s submission that the limits on human rights are justified at the second stage of the analysis under ss 8(b) and 13. The Attorney-General raises a further reason in addition to that referred to by the respondent in relation to deference which is discussed below.Consideration In respect of the compatibility test pursuant to s 13, this is a balancing exercise requiring a consideration of the various competing interests in respect of each factor. Ultimately here the compatibility considerations largely come down to balancing the public interest in combating and reducing major crime and the private or personal concerns of those with information that may assist with the investigations. In respect of some of the factors, there is not much of a difference between the parties. The divergence really is the factor in (d) (other less restrictive and available ways) and the balancing exercise in (e), (f) and (g). While it is submitted that there are other less restrictive available ways of achieving the purpose, this does not address the “code of silence” that is often present in respect of organised crime. Theoretically there may be other less restrictive options available. However the reality, as discussed in the explanatory material quoted above, is that due to the nature of organised crime the objects and purpose of the CC Act would be undermined if evidence derived from coerced examinations could not be used by the Commission in undertaking its statutory task. The protections put in place in accordance with the legislative scheme provide direct use immunity and confidentiality in respect of the identity of the witness and any evidence given. A further protective order requires limited disclosure of the evidence to prevent it from being given to the prosecution. The Court still has a supervisory role to play under s 31 of the HR Act at the ultimate trial and also has a discretion in respect of admissibility of evidence under s 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). Parliament in passing the amendment to include s 197(7) of the HR Act intended that derivative use immunity was not to be available in the context of coercive examinations, including of charged persons being asked about the subject matter of the charges. In all of the circumstances, while the decision of the respondent limited the applicant’s human rights in ss 31 and 32(2)(k) of the HR Act, the limit was justified under ss 8(b) and 13 of the HR Act and it was substantively compatible with human rights under s 58(1)(a) of the HR Act. The respondent’s compatibility analysis was not as extensive as the analysis and submissions at the hearing of the application for leave and the appeal. However, it is largely consistent with the approach contended for by the respondent and the Attorney-General at the hearing of the application for leave and appeal. No error is made out in respect of the respondent’s reasoning and decision. Accordingly, Ground Three is not established.Deference