FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sharp v Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1477
Citation: Sharp v Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1477 Parties: COLIN ANDREW SHARP and COLIN ANDREW SHARP ATF THE SHARP FAMILY TRUST v COSSACK PEARLS PTY LTD ACN 009 212 015, DAMPIER PEARLING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 061 740 145, LINDSAY KEVIN BRADY and PAUL JOHN THOMAS File number WAD 208 of 2004 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 20 December 2011 Catchwords: TRADE PRACTICES – pearling agreements – loan agreement - misleading and deceptive conduct alleged
CONTRACT – termination of pearling agreement – breach alleged – rectification sought
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) s 10
Pearling Act 1990 (WA)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51A, 52Cases cited: Bolton v Mahadeva [1972] 2 All ER 1322 referred to
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Carlenka Pty Ltd (1995) 41 NSWLR 329 compared
Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 cited, discussed
Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Lake Cumberline Pty Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 599 cited
Fraser v NRMA Holdings Limited (1995) 55 FCR 452 cited, discussed
General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164 cited
Hoenig v Isaacs [1952] 2 All ER 176 referred to
Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre (1978) 140 CLR 216 cited
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 cited
Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 1340 cited, discussed
McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 230 cited, discussed,
Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 cited
Pearl Cost Divers Pty Ltd v Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 927 referred to
Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 cited
Zamperoni Decorators Pty Ltd v Lo Presti [1983] 1 VR 338 referred toDate of hearing: 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11 April 2011 Place: Melbourne (heard in Perth) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 130 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P G Clifford with Mr A P Rumsley Solicitor for the Applicants: Alan Rumsley Commercial Disputes Lawyer Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G R Donaldson SC with Ms D M Bradley Solicitor for the Respondents: Freehills
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 208 OF 2004
BETWEEN: COLIN ANDREW SHARP
First ApplicantCOLIN ANDREW SHARP ATF THE SHARP FAMILY TRUST
Second ApplicantAND: COSSACK PEARLS PTY LTD ACN 009 212 015
First RespondentDAMPIER PEARLING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 061 740 145
Second RespondentLINDSAY KEVIN BRADY
Third RespondentPAUL JOHN THOMAS
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE:
20 DECEMBER 2011
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed with costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1477
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court included whether Cossack had made any misleading or deceptive representations regarding future conduct, and if the termination of the pearling agreement was justified under the terms of the contract. Specifically, the court examined if Cossack was obligated to provide all necessary tags for the pearling quota and whether their failure to do so constituted a breach of contract. Additionally, the court considered the applicability of sections 51A and 52 of the Trade Practices Act in determining the existence of misleading conduct.
The court concluded that no misleading representations were made by Cossack, as there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant's claims. The court found that Cossack had fulfilled its obligations under the contract to provide tags, even though there was a shortfall. The termination of the contract was deemed lawful, as the applicant had not met the contractual requirement of catching and delivering 80% of the quota by the specified date. The court emphasised the importance of objective evidence and commercial probabilities in resolving the dispute, given the long-standing nature of the commercial relationship between the parties.
The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. The decision highlighted the necessity for clear contractual obligations and the importance of evidence in substantiating claims of breach and misleading conduct under the Trade Practices Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court on an application by Mr Sharp against Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd. The application was based on allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct, breach of contract, and seeking rectification of the agreements. The case proceeded through several stages, including the filing of statements of claim, defence, and counter-claims. The primary evidence came from the testimonies of Mr Sharp and Mr Brady of Cossack Pearls, with documentary evidence also being tendered. The case was heard by the court, which considered the factual evidence and the legal arguments presented by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In applying s 52 it may be necessary to notice the requirements of s 51A. Its effect was explained by Emmett J in McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 230 at 242 [44]. His Honour there said:“Under s 51A(1) of the Trade Practices Act, a representation is to be taken to be misleading if it is a representation with respect to any future matter and the maker of the representation does not have reasonable grounds for making the representation. Under s 51A(2), the maker of the representation with respect to any future matter is to be deemed not to have had reasonable grounds for making the representation unless it adduces evidence to the contrary. However, if evidence is adduced by a representor to the effect that the representor had reasonable grounds for making the representation, the deeming provision will not operate. Where the representor adduces such evidence, it is then a matter for the Court to determine, on the balance of probabilities in the ordinary way, whether or not the representor had reasonable grounds for making the representation.”See also at 283 [192] (per Allsop J).CONSIDERATION The principal witnesses on each side were, respectively, Mr Sharp and Mr Brady. They gave evidence about their commercial dealings and conversations which had occurred over a decade earlier. Unsurprisingly, their accounts differed in material respects. I formed the impression that these differences were not the result of any deliberate attempt, on either side, to mislead the Court. Rather they arose from failure of memory after such a long time and attempts being made to reconstruct what the witnesses considered it likely they would have said or done or understood in the circumstances then arising. Mr Sharp’s evidence was given through the prism of the failure of a commercial venture which he had entered into in the expectation of considerable financial gain. In such circumstances I consider that the proper approach is for the Court “to place primary emphasis on the objective factual surrounding material and the inherent commercial probabilities, together with the documentation tendered in evidence”: see Lake Cumbeline at [412], an approach subsequently endorsed by the High Court as being “orthodox and sensible”: see Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 599 at 603. The Purchase and Refit Conduct This representation was framed in different ways at different stages of the litigation. Mr Sharp also gave varying accounts of precisely what Mr Brady had said to him in the course of their discussions in which the representation was said to have been conveyed. The various formulations of this representation have been set out above at [56]. The applicants’ case relied, principally, on the evidence of Mr Sharp. In particulars provided in his statement of claim, Mr Sharp attributed to Mr Brady words to the effect that: “(a)If Pearl Coast wants to purchase the Anzac Pearl, Cossack would loan Pearl Coast the purchase price, which Pearl Coast could pay off over time, and would loan money to Pearl Coast to pay for the re-fit of the Anzac Pearl, with the payments to be made on each neap tide.(b)Cossack would engage Pearl Coast to fish the Cossack Quota for at least the next five years.(c)Cossack would also engage Pearl Coast to do the turning and transportation of shell harvested for Cossack.(d)Cossack would engage Pearl Coast to fish the Cossack Quota and provide turning and transportation services for at least as long as it took for Pearl Coast to repay Cossack through the income derived from providing those services.”