FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 382
Citation: Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 382 Appeal from: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Parties: EDUARD SENT v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File numbers: VID 310 of 2011
VID 313 of 2011Judge: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 16 April 2012 Catchwords: INCOME TAX - Employee incentive share trust plan — Whether payment to trust had character of ordinary income – Whether payment in substitution for bonuses from employment is ordinary income – Whether when part of amount deemed to be ordinary income assessable to the respondent but the remaining part is not — Whether respondent obtained a benefit or gain — Whether amount of ordinary income “derived” – When amount is applied or dealt with by a taxpayer - Whether exemptions applied to treat amount as a fringe benefit -
PENALTIES and OFFENCES — Recklessness - Failure by taxpayer to discharge onus regarding recklessness of tax agent – Failure to adopt a reasonably arguable position
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — Whether error of law by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal —– Statutory requirement to provide reasons – Whether inadequacy of reasons an error of law – Whether appropriate to set aside decision for failure to provide adequate reasons - Whether facts as found are capable of supporting the decision
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act1986 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth)Cases cited: Allen v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 195 FCR 416
Arthur Murray (NSW) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 314
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 290
Ballarat Brewing Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 82 CLR 364
Barrat v Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 222
Brent v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 418
BRK (Bris) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 46 ATR 347
Business and Research Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 173 FCR 204
Cameron Brae Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] 161 FCR 468
Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49
Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd (2009) 179 FCR 554 (Full Court)
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
Comcare Australia v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647
Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ (1994) 181 CLR 467
Commissioner of Taxation v Zoffanies Pty Ltd 132 FCR 523
Commissioner of Taxes (Vic) v Phillips (1936) 55 CLR 144
Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v Australian Postal Commission (1979) 37 FLR 457
Conley v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 81 FCR 24
Dennis Willcox v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267
Dornan v Riordan (1990) 24…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 382
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the payment had the character of income, focusing on whether the taxpayer had derived income and if it was applied or dealt with on his behalf or as his direction. The court held that the $11,600,000 payment had the character of income, and the operation of the constructive derivation provision in subsection 6-5(4) meant that the entire amount was assessable. The court rejected Sent's argument that the payment was not assessable because it was made to the trust and not directly to him, stating that the realities of the situation indicated that Sent had derived income. Regarding the penalty for recklessness, the court found that Sent had not discharged the onus of proving that his agent was not reckless.
In conclusion, the Federal Court upheld the AAT's decision that part of the $11,600,000 payment was assessable as ordinary income and that the penalties were appropriately imposed. The court found that the operation of the constructive derivation provision in subsection 6-5(4) applied, deeming the income derived by Sent. The court also found that Sent failed to prove that his agent was not reckless, thus upholding the penalty.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Sent also relies on the Tribunal’s findings of fact that the Payment was made to the Trust and not him, and argues that any benefit that he could derive from the Trust was subject to the Trustee’s discretion. He argues that the Tribunal’s findings that he did not directly or indirectly control the Trustee or the Advisor to Primelife through a shareholding in them, and that the entitlements under the Trust were non-transferable and subject to a vesting period, are restrictions such that he has not fully made any gain.The operation of subs 6-5(4) Mr Sent denies that there was any amount applied or dealt with by Primelife on behalf of or as directed by Mr Sent, as required by subs 6-5(4). He says that those words predicate an entitlement or degree of control over Primelife to be able to require it to carry out that application or dealing that he did not have. He argues that Primelife is a public company with an independent board and that he did not participate or vote in the meetings regarding his entitlements. At best for the Commissioner, counsel for Mr Sent contends that there was a request by Mr Sent to pay the relevant amount to the Trust, but not a direction. He cites Brent per Gibbs J at 318 as authority for the proposition that a request by a taxpayer is insufficient to require that income be treated as derived under subs 6-5(4). He argues that for it to be established that income was derived by Mr Sent pursuant to the section the Commissioner must prove that Mr Sent had the power and authority to direct Primelife to make the Payment. Contrary to Mr Sent’s submissions, I consider that subs 6-5(4) operates to deem that he did derive ordinary income from the Payment. The subsection allows two alternative bases under which income is taken to be derived by the taxpayer, which are:(a)when the amount is applied or dealt with in any way on behalf of the taxpayer; and (b)when the amount is applied or dealt with in any way as the taxpayer directs. The legislative intent of the provision is clear. In the absence of a provision such as subs 6-5(4) it would be a simple matter for a taxpayer to avoid income tax on amounts that if received by him would be income, merely by arranging for those amounts to be paid to another person, even though the taxpayer is receiving some benefit from the other person’s receipt of the amount. In Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Commissioner of Taxation (1940) 6 ATD 5 at 12 (“Permanent Trustee Co of NSW”) Rich J held in relation to an earlier constructive derivation provision - s 19 of the ITAA 1936 - that:The object is to prevent a taxpayer escaping tax, though his resources may have actually been increased by the accrual of the income and its transformation into some form of capital wealth, or its utilization for some purpose.This passage was noted with approval in Brent at 430. In McNeil at [15] the High Court per Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ held that:As an Australian resident, the assessable income of the taxpayer included income according to ordinary concepts derived directly or indirectly from all sources; in determining the existence of a derivation and when it occurred, the taxpayer was taken by s 6-5(4) “to have received the amount as soon as it [was] applied or dealt with in any way on [her] behalf or as [she directed]”.