Sent v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 382

Citation: Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 382
Appeal from: Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Parties: EDUARD SENT v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File numbers: VID 310 of 2011
VID 313 of 2011
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 16 April 2012
Catchwords:

INCOME TAX - Employee incentive share trust plan — Whether payment to trust had character of ordinary income – Whether payment in substitution for bonuses from employment is ordinary income – Whether when part of amount deemed to be ordinary income assessable to the respondent but the remaining part is not — Whether respondent obtained a benefit or gain — Whether amount of ordinary income “derived” – When amount is applied or dealt with by a taxpayer - Whether exemptions applied to treat amount as a fringe benefit -

PENALTIES and OFFENCES — Recklessness - Failure by taxpayer to discharge onus regarding recklessness of tax agent – Failure to adopt a reasonably arguable position

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — Whether error of law by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal —– Statutory requirement to provide reasons – Whether inadequacy of reasons an error of law – Whether appropriate to set aside decision for failure to provide adequate reasons - Whether facts as found are capable of supporting the decision

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act1986 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Allen v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 195 FCR 416

Arthur Murray (NSW) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 314
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 290
Ballarat Brewing Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 82 CLR 364
Barrat v Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 222
Brent v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 418
BRK (Bris) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 46 ATR 347
Business and Research Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 173 FCR 204
Cameron Brae Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] 161 FCR 468
Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49
Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd (2009) 179 FCR 554 (Full Court)
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
Comcare Australia v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647
Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ (1994) 181 CLR 467
Commissioner of Taxation v Zoffanies Pty Ltd 132 FCR 523
Commissioner of Taxes (Vic) v Phillips (1936) 55 CLR 144
Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v Australian Postal Commission (1979) 37 FLR 457
Conley v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 81 FCR 24
Dennis Willcox v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267
Dornan v Riordan (1990) 24…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 382
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia dealt with an appeal brought by Eduard Sent against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning a payment made by his employer, Primelife Corporation Limited, to a trust of which he was a beneficiary. The primary issue was whether the $11,600,000 payment constituted ordinary income, assessable under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Further, the court had to determine if the arrangement was subject to the anti-avoidance provisions and if administrative penalties imposed by the Commissioner of Taxation were justified. The AAT had found that part of the payment was assessable income, leading to the imposition of penalties.

The court considered whether the payment had the character of income, focusing on whether the taxpayer had derived income and if it was applied or dealt with on his behalf or as his direction. The court held that the $11,600,000 payment had the character of income, and the operation of the constructive derivation provision in subsection 6-5(4) meant that the entire amount was assessable. The court rejected Sent's argument that the payment was not assessable because it was made to the trust and not directly to him, stating that the realities of the situation indicated that Sent had derived income. Regarding the penalty for recklessness, the court found that Sent had not discharged the onus of proving that his agent was not reckless.

In conclusion, the Federal Court upheld the AAT's decision that part of the $11,600,000 payment was assessable as ordinary income and that the penalties were appropriately imposed. The court found that the operation of the constructive derivation provision in subsection 6-5(4) applied, deeming the income derived by Sent. The court also found that Sent failed to prove that his agent was not reckless, thus upholding the penalty.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

These proceedings are both appeals from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“AAT Act”). The Tribunal decision relates to whether some or all of a payment of $11,600,000 by Primelife Corporation Limited, the employer of Mr Eduard Sent, to a trust of which he was a beneficiary (“the $11,600,000 Payment” or “the Payment”) is assessable as income by the Commissioner of Taxation. It also relates to:(a)whether, if the $11,600,000 Payment is not assessable income, the arrangements leading to the Payment are caught by the anti-avoidance provisions of the taxation legislation; and(b)the imposition of administrative penalties by the Commissioner. The facts In the relevant period Mr Sent was the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of the public company, Primelife Corporation Limited. His employment agreement with Primelife provided for a five-year term that commenced on 1 July 1998, and for monetary bonuses payable in certain circumstances. At the commencement of the agreement Mr Sent’s remuneration comprised:(a)a base salary of $300,000 per annum; (b)an annual bonus of $300,000; and (c)an entitlement to three additional bonus payments (“Additional Bonus Payments”) based on Primelife’s profits and losses in the five financial years ending 30 June 1999 to 30 June 2003. In October 2000 an earlier oral agreement, to increase Mr Sent’s base salary to $600,000 per annum and to terminate the annual bonus of $300,000, was recorded in writing. Mr Sent’s entitlement to the Additional Bonus Payments continued under this varied employment agreement. In or about January and/or February 2001 Trinity Management Group Pty Ltd (“Trinity”), a company which described itself as an employee share plan administration company, was requested either by Primelife or by Mr Sent to provide advice as to “the optimal delivery mechanism” for payment of bonus amounts to Mr Sent. Trinity’s report dated 15 February 2001, which was paid for by Primelife, was titled Recommendation for delivery of bonus for Managing Director. Trinity advised, amongst other things, that:(a)the bonuses could be delivered to Mr Sent in the form of Primelife shares through a special purpose executive share trust;(b)the trust could provide a minimum vesting period of 12 months before a participating executive would be allowed to cash the units; and (c)the tax impost on the participating executive could be deferred until final disposal of the underlying shares. The Tribunal made the finding of fact that in a series of meetings leading up to June 2001, Primelife and Mr Sent agreed that he would waive his past and future bonus entitlements in return for the issue to him of five million fully paid ordinary shares in Primelife. As at about October 2001 Mr Sent’s entitlement to the three Additional Bonus Payments fell into three categories:(a)Bonuses that had accrued and were payable. In this category was an entitlement to the bonus titled the First Additional Bonus Payment which was based on Primelife's performance in the three financial years ending 30 June 1999-2001. This bonus was payable as that period was complete.(b)Bonuses that were accruing, relating to periods which had been part performed. Any bonuses earned were not payable until the period was complete. In this category were accruing entitlements to:(i)the Second Additional Bonus Payment based on Primelife’s performance in the four financial years ending 30 June 1999-2002; and(ii)the Third Additional Bonus Payment based on Primelife’s performance in the five financial years ending 30 June 1999-2003.Mr Sent was not yet eligible for these bonus payments and any bonus entitlement could not be calculated. (c)Bonuses relating to future periods which had not yet accrued in any sense. This category related to those portions of the Second and Third Additional Bonus Payments relating to Primelife's performance in the balance of the 2002 financial year (from October 2001 until 30 June 2002) and the whole of the 2003 financial year.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Had the shares been issued directly to Mr Sent it is unarguable that he would have been assessed on their value. If the cheque for $11,600,000 had been paid directly to Mr Sent then it too would clearly have been assessable. In either case receipt would be unconditional and there was nothing more to do to “earn” the amount. Because it would be unconditional the principle in Arthur Murray would not apply. The same is true if, as in this case, the unconditional Payment by Primelife to the Trust is taken to have been received by Mr Sent by operation of the constructive derivation provision in subs 6-5(4). Once the Payment was made on Mr Sent’s behalf or at his direction the entirety of it was assessable. Conclusion regarding Questions 1 and 4 In Permanent Trustee Co of NSW at 13 Rich J made an observation which is apt to this matter. He held that:To see whether income has been derived one must look to realities.In Arthur Murray the High Court per Barwick CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ noted at 318 that:The ultimate inquiry in either kind of case, of course, must be whether that which has taken place, be it the earning or the receipt, is enough by itself to satisfy the general understanding among practical business people of what constitutes a derivation of income.In this case, when looking to either the realities or to the general understanding among practical business people, I can reach no other conclusion than that the $11,600,000 Payment has the character of income and was applied or dealt with either at Mr Sent’s direction or on his behalf.QUESTIONS 2, 5 AND 6 - WHETHER THE $11,600,000 PAYMENT, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IS ASSESSABLE AS STATUTORY INCOME? Question 2 is the part of the paragraph numbered 2(a) in Mr Sent’s Amended Notice of Appeal which relates to statutory income, which states:Whether, given the findings of fact made by the Tribunal, the Tribunal erred in law in finding that the amount of $7,246,572 was properly assessable to [Mr Sent] in the year ended 30 June 2002 pursuant to…section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936? Mr Sent also seeks to distinguish White No 2. He points out that in White No 2 the Tribunal found that the taxpayer did not take reasonable care, whereas in this case there is a finding that Mr Sent did. He argues that reliance on this decision as authority will distort the operation of the penalty provision. I disagree. White No 2 stands for the straight-forward proposition that in relation to a penalty amount worked out under subs 284-90(1) Item 2 the conduct or state of mind of any tax agent is a necessary consideration. I am not without sympathy for Mr Sent’s contention that, where a taxpayer takes reasonable care to ensure that his tax affairs properly comply with the tax legislation, the state of mind of the tax agent is irrelevant unless the agent is the party that gave advice to the taxpayer. However, I reject it because subs 284-90(1) Item 2 is clear in its terms and effect. The policy rationale for requiring the tax agent (if any) to establish that he or she was not reckless is obvious. Subsection 284-90(1) imposes graduated penalties on taxpayers for mental states ranging from intentional disregard, through recklessness to lack of reasonable care by the taxpayer or agent. It is directed at the aim of ensuring that both taxpayers and their tax agents take appropriate care in the preparation and filing of tax returns. In objecting to the decision to impose a penalty for recklessness by him or his agent, Mr Sent bore the onus of establishing that his agent was not so.Necessity to remit this issue to the Tribunal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Sent also relies on the Tribunal’s findings of fact that the Payment was made to the Trust and not him, and argues that any benefit that he could derive from the Trust was subject to the Trustee’s discretion. He argues that the Tribunal’s findings that he did not directly or indirectly control the Trustee or the Advisor to Primelife through a shareholding in them, and that the entitlements under the Trust were non-transferable and subject to a vesting period, are restrictions such that he has not fully made any gain.The operation of subs 6-5(4) Mr Sent denies that there was any amount applied or dealt with by Primelife on behalf of or as directed by Mr Sent, as required by subs 6-5(4). He says that those words predicate an entitlement or degree of control over Primelife to be able to require it to carry out that application or dealing that he did not have. He argues that Primelife is a public company with an independent board and that he did not participate or vote in the meetings regarding his entitlements. At best for the Commissioner, counsel for Mr Sent contends that there was a request by Mr Sent to pay the relevant amount to the Trust, but not a direction. He cites Brent per Gibbs J at 318 as authority for the proposition that a request by a taxpayer is insufficient to require that income be treated as derived under subs 6-5(4). He argues that for it to be established that income was derived by Mr Sent pursuant to the section the Commissioner must prove that Mr Sent had the power and authority to direct Primelife to make the Payment. Contrary to Mr Sent’s submissions, I consider that subs 6-5(4) operates to deem that he did derive ordinary income from the Payment. The subsection allows two alternative bases under which income is taken to be derived by the taxpayer, which are:(a)when the amount is applied or dealt with in any way on behalf of the taxpayer; and (b)when the amount is applied or dealt with in any way as the taxpayer directs. The legislative intent of the provision is clear. In the absence of a provision such as subs 6-5(4) it would be a simple matter for a taxpayer to avoid income tax on amounts that if received by him would be income, merely by arranging for those amounts to be paid to another person, even though the taxpayer is receiving some benefit from the other person’s receipt of the amount. In Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Commissioner of Taxation (1940) 6 ATD 5 at 12 (“Permanent Trustee Co of NSW”) Rich J held in relation to an earlier constructive derivation provision - s 19 of the ITAA 1936 - that:The object is to prevent a taxpayer escaping tax, though his resources may have actually been increased by the accrual of the income and its transformation into some form of capital wealth, or its utilization for some purpose.This passage was noted with approval in Brent at 430. In McNeil at [15] the High Court per Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ held that:As an Australian resident, the assessable income of the taxpayer included income according to ordinary concepts derived directly or indirectly from all sources; in determining the existence of a derivation and when it occurred, the taxpayer was taken by s 6-5(4) “to have received the amount as soon as it [was] applied or dealt with in any way on [her] behalf or as [she directed]”.