Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GUMMOW ACJ
HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION   APPELLANT

AND

HELEN MARY McNEIL  RESPONDENT

Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil
[2007] HCA 5
22 February 2007
S56/2006

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed.

2.        Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court made on      8 August 2005 and in its place order that the appeal to that Court be     allowed, the orders of Conti J made on 14 April 2004 be set aside, and the          appeal by the taxpayer against the objection decision of the Commissioner made on 31 October 2002 be dismissed.

3.        The appellant pay the costs of the respondent of this appeal.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

B J Shaw QC with G J Davies QC and S H Steward for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

D H Bloom QC with W G Muddle and K J Deards for the respondent (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GUMMOW ACJ, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ.   The respondent ("the taxpayer") is a widow of advanced years who has lived all her life in Australia.  The amount of income tax at stake in this appeal is less than $600.  The year of income in question is that which ended on 30 June 2001.  The litigation has been treated as a test case, in the circumstances which are more fully described later in these reasons, and is said by the appellant ("the Commissioner") to affect more than 80,000 taxpayers.

  2. The taxpayer succeeded at first instance in the Federal Court (Conti J)[1] and an appeal by the Commissioner was dismissed by the Full Court (French and Dowsett JJ; Emmett J dissenting)[2].  No order for costs was made by Conti J.  An agreement was made between the parties that there be no order as to costs in the Full Court.  It was a condition of the grant to the Commissioner of special leave to appeal to this Court that the Commissioner pay the costs of the appeal in any event and not seek to disturb the position respecting costs in the Federal Court.

    The SGL buy-back scheme

  3. In 1987, the taxpayer acquired a parcel of shares in St George Building Society Ltd.  In 1992, these were converted into ordinary shares in St George Bank Ltd ("SGL") upon its change from a building society to a corporation carrying on the business of banking.  Since 1992, shares in SGL have been listed for quotation on the Australian Stock Exchange ("ASX").  In the years following 1992, the profitability of SGL increased.  As a result of rights issues, share-rounding plans and other events, at the time of the critical announcement by SGL on 12 January 2001 ("the record date"), the…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCA 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commissioner of Taxation appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, which had overturned a decision of Conti J. The dispute concerned whether certain amounts received by the respondent taxpayer from a share buy-back arrangement constituted assessable income or were subject to capital gains tax. The respondent had acquired shares which were later the subject of a buy-back arrangement, granting her "sell-back rights" held on trust for her absolute benefit. The core of the disagreement lay in the characterisation of the increase in value of these sell-back rights and the subsequent proceeds of sale for taxation purposes.

The High Court was required to determine whether the market value of the sell-back rights, at the time they were granted to the taxpayer for her absolute benefit, constituted a derivation of income. Further, the Court had to consider whether the remaining proceeds of sale were subject to income tax or capital gains tax, and whether these proceeds amounted to a derivation of income according to ordinary concepts. The Court also had to assess whether the sell-back rights could be treated as "severed" or "detached" from the respondent's shares for taxation purposes, and whether Subdivision D of Division 2 of Part III of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth) constituted a self-contained "code" regarding the taxation of receipts by shareholders from companies.

The majority of the High Court accepted the Commissioner's submissions, finding that the taxpayer derived assessable income on the listing date when her sell-back rights were granted by the company for her absolute benefit. This derivation was represented by the market value of those rights at that time. Consequently, it was unnecessary to consider the income nature of the receipt of the proceeds on the later sale date. The Court reasoned that the character of a receipt for the purposes of the statutory definition of income is not solely determined by its quality in the hands of the recipient, but requires an examination of the entire transaction.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court and reinstating the Commissioner's objection decision. The taxpayer was ordered to pay the costs of the Commissioner in the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court made on 8 August 2005 and in its place order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, the orders of Conti J made on 14 April 2004 be set aside, and the appeal by the taxpayer against the objection decision of the Commissioner

made on 31 October 2002 be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent of this appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GUMMOW ACJ ACJ, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ (dissent) CALLINAN J (dissent)
The taxpayer's second submission should be rejected.Conclusions and orders For the reasons stated earlier in these reasons, the Commissioner's submissions that the majority of the Full Court erred should be accepted. In particular, on the listing date, 19 February 2001, when the taxpayer's sell-back rights were granted by SGL to Custodial "for the absolute benefit" of the taxpayer, as stated in the Sell Back Right Deed Poll, there was a derivation of income by her represented by the market value of her rights of $514[46]. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the income nature of the receipt of the proceeds on 2 April 2001.[46]cf Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352. The appeal should be allowed and order 1 of the orders of the Full Court set aside. In place thereof, the appeal to that Court should be allowed, the orders of Conti J made on 14 April 2004 set aside and the appeal by the taxpayer against the objection decision of the Commissioner made on 31 October 2002 dismissed. The Commissioner is to pay the costs of the taxpayer of the appeal to this Court. The issues, the facts and the relevant statutory provisions are set out in the joint judgment. Because my opinion is a dissenting one, and I agree in substance with the reasoning of the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court, it is not necessary for me to state in elaborate detail why I would decide the appeal differently from the majority in this Court. The key to unlock the problem here is to be found in the observation of French J, that the money received by the respondent[47]:"… was not an entitlement derived from profits earned by the company. It arose out of the decision by the company to reduce its issued capital through a buy back process."And that, inevitably was what happened when the transactions for which the documents provided were carried into full effect: the capital, including the value of the respondent's rights as a shareholder in respect of it, became less than it would otherwise have been, because St George Bank Limited ("SGL") had expended some of that capital in buying some of its own shares and reducing thereby the number of shares on issue.[47]Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil (2005) 144 FCR 514 at 529 [44] per French J. In my view the character of a payment for the purposes of the statutory definition of income, that is, "income according to ordinary concepts", is not always to be, indeed cannot always be, determined simply and solely by reference to its quality in the hands of a recipient. I do not take GP International Pipecoaters Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[48] and the other cases referred to in the reasons for decision there, to be denying reference to the full circumstances leading to the receipt in the hands of the taxpayer. It will usually only be by reference to a transaction as a whole that the quality of a receipt, otherwise perhaps even unintelligible, will begin to be able to be ascertained. In GP International this Court was dealing with an argument that a receipt was disbursable by the taxpayer and should not for that reason be treated as income, and was not enjoining courts in the future from examining the whole of a transaction to identify the quality of a receipt.[48](1990) 170 CLR 124 at 136 per Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GUMMOW ACJ,