FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Blank v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 154
Citation: Blank v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 154 Appeal from: Blank v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 87
Blank v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2014] FCA 517Parties: VAUGHAN RUDD BLANK v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File number: NSD 590 of 2014 Judges: KENNY, ROBERTSON AND PAGONE JJ Date of judgment: 29 October 2015 Catchwords: INCOME TAX – appellant participated in profit participation schemes as employee of company group in foreign countries and in Australia – employee allocated “profit participation units” (PPUs) and equal number of shares in holding company – amount payable to appellant on termination of employment – whether amount assessable as ordinary income or as a capital gain – whether amount deferred compensation – PPUs a mechanism for calculation of amount of profit share to be paid to appellant – conditional executory promise to appellant to pay amount on termination – amount was reward for service as deferred compensation – amount assessable as ordinary income – part of amount withheld for discharge of foreign tax liabilities – when income derived – that part of amount was derived when paid by agreement with appellant to foreign tax authorities – whether income exempt under section 23AG of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as foreign earnings derived from foreign service – apportionment under section 23AG not possible – whether CGT event C2 happened – cost base of asset if CGT event C2 happened – valuation of appellant’s rights under profit participation scheme – whether prejudice caused to respondent if appellant allowed to re-open case – both appeal and cross-appeal dismissed Legislation: Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Income Tax Act 1952 (UK)Cases cited: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18; 163 CLR 199
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil [2007] HCA 5; 229 CLR 656
Le Grand v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1258; 124 FCR 53
Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352
McLaurin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1961] HCA 9; 104 CLR 381
Allsop v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1965] HCA 48; 113 CLR 341
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v CSR Ltd [2000] FCA 1513; 104 FCR 44
Executor Trustee and Agency Company of South Australia Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 69; 48 CLR 26
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dixon [1952] HCA 65; 86 CLR 540
Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 111 ALR 716
Reseck v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 38; 133 CLR 45
Bridges (Inspector of Taxes) v Hewitt [1957] 1 WLR 59 Donaldson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1974] 1 NSWLR 627
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McArdle (1988) 89 ATC 4051
Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1966] HCA 48; 117 CLR 514
Henry v Foster (1931) 145 LT 225; 16 TC 605
Dewhurst v Hunter (1932) 146 LT 510; 16…
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- Case
- [2015] FCAFC 154
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the profit participation units and the agreements underpinning the scheme. It concluded that the payments were indeed a reward for services and constituted deferred compensation. The court further held that part of the amount withheld for foreign tax liabilities was also assessable as income when paid to the foreign tax authorities. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the payments were exempt under section 23AG of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as foreign earnings derived from foreign service. It also found that no capital gains tax event occurred upon the receipt of the payments. The primary judge's decision was affirmed, and both the appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, and the cross-appellant was ordered to pay the cross-respondent's costs of the cross-appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
4. The cross-appellant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of and incidental to the cross-appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In addition, the Commissioner submitted that the payments to the appellant could be characterised as ETPs within the meaning of ss 27A(1) of the ITAA 1936 and 82-130(1) of the ITAA 1997, because there was sufficient causal nexus between the termination of the appellant’s employment and the payment of the disputed amounts for it to be said that the one was in consequence of the other. The Commissioner also relied on FCT v Myer Emporium 163 CLR 199 to support an alternative proposition that, if the Court were of the view that the appellant’s gain was the proceeds of the realisation of assets, then those assets were held on revenue account, not capital account as the appellant’s argument assumed. Finally, the Commissioner argued that, if the Court were to hold that the appellant was assessable merely on a capital gain, then the primary judge erred in his assessment of the cost base, having regard to the evidence of Mr Samuel at trial as to the appropriate method of valuation. CONSIDERATIONWhether the payments were ordinary income Competing approaches Income is not a technical concept and the word “income” is to be construed in accordance with ordinary usages. In Australia, people commonly use the word “income” to refer to a reward for services: cf. Reuter v FCT 111 ALR at 730. This appeal largely turns on whether the primary judge was correct to characterise the payments of the Amount made to the appellant in the 2007 to 2010 income years as income within ordinary concepts, being the reward for services rendered by him. One may accept that, as the appellant submitted, from the perspective of the Glencore Group, the purpose of the profit participation arrangements was, as a 2007 prospectus said, “to promote management stability and to preserve Glencore’s capital” and that the arrangements led to “an alignment of the interests of management and key employees with those of Glencore”. This does not, however, identify, for tax purposes, the character of the payments made to the appellant, as the appellant at one point may have suggested. As we have seen, the primary judge held that the payments were the reward for services derived by the appellant when he received them. On the one hand, the Commissioner’s case was that his Honour was correct and that the payments were in the nature of deferred compensation. The Commissioner’s argument was, in essence, that the profit participation agreements (PPA 1993, PPA 1999, IPPA 2003 and IPPA 2005) provided contractual rights to receive cash instalments on termination. Senior counsel for the Commissioner submitted that the profit participation agreements provided an executory promise to pay money, “being a share of profit on termination”, in instalments and subject to withholding for Swiss tax. On the other hand, the appellant argued that the primary judge was in error and it was the shares, the PPUs and associated contractual rights conferred on him under the profit participation arrangements that were the reward for services rendered by him. He sought to substantiate his position by reference to various authorities, particularly Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352.