Blank v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Blank v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 154

Citation: Blank v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 154
Appeal from: Blank v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 87
Blank v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2014] FCA 517
Parties: VAUGHAN RUDD BLANK v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: NSD 590 of 2014
Judges: KENNY, ROBERTSON AND PAGONE JJ
Date of judgment: 29 October 2015
Catchwords: INCOME TAX – appellant participated in profit participation schemes as employee of company group in foreign countries and in Australia – employee allocated “profit participation units” (PPUs) and equal number of shares in holding company – amount payable to appellant on termination of employment – whether amount assessable as ordinary income or as a capital gain – whether amount deferred compensation – PPUs a mechanism for calculation of amount of profit share to be paid to appellant – conditional executory promise to appellant to pay amount on termination – amount was reward for service as deferred compensation – amount assessable as ordinary income – part of amount withheld for discharge of foreign tax liabilities – when income derived – that part of amount was derived when paid by agreement with appellant to foreign tax authorities – whether income exempt under section 23AG of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as foreign earnings derived from foreign service – apportionment under section 23AG not possible – whether CGT event C2 happened – cost base of asset if CGT event C2 happened – valuation of appellant’s rights under profit participation scheme – whether prejudice caused to respondent if appellant allowed to re-open case – both appeal and cross-appeal dismissed
Legislation: Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Income Tax Act 1952 (UK)
Cases cited: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18; 163 CLR 199
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil [2007] HCA 5; 229 CLR 656
Le Grand v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1258; 124 FCR 53
Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352
McLaurin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1961] HCA 9; 104 CLR 381
Allsop v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1965] HCA 48; 113 CLR 341
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v CSR Ltd [2000] FCA 1513; 104 FCR 44
Executor Trustee and Agency Company of South Australia Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 69; 48 CLR 26
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dixon [1952] HCA 65; 86 CLR 540
Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 111 ALR 716
Reseck v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 38; 133 CLR 45
Bridges (Inspector of Taxes) v Hewitt [1957] 1 WLR 59 Donaldson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1974] 1 NSWLR 627
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McArdle (1988) 89 ATC 4051
Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1966] HCA 48; 117 CLR 514
Henry v Foster (1931) 145 LT 225; 16 TC 605
Dewhurst v Hunter (1932) 146 LT 510; 16…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Blank v Commissioner of Taxation is a case concerning the characterisation of payments made to the appellant under a profit participation scheme as either ordinary income or a capital gain. The dispute was heard and determined by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue in this case was whether the payments made to the appellant were assessable as ordinary income or as a capital gain. The appellant argued that the payments were the proceeds of the realisation of capital assets, while the Commissioner contended that the payments were deferred compensation for services rendered and therefore assessable as ordinary income.

The court examined the nature of the profit participation units and the agreements underpinning the scheme. It concluded that the payments were indeed a reward for services and constituted deferred compensation. The court further held that part of the amount withheld for foreign tax liabilities was also assessable as income when paid to the foreign tax authorities. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the payments were exempt under section 23AG of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as foreign earnings derived from foreign service. It also found that no capital gains tax event occurred upon the receipt of the payments. The primary judge's decision was affirmed, and both the appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, and the cross-appellant was ordered to pay the cross-respondent's costs of the cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

4. The cross-appellant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of and incidental to the cross-appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons stated below, we would dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal, essentially because in our view the primary judge correctly held that the payments in question were assessable as ordinary income and we discern no error in his Honour’s determination of two other related issues, including his refusal of leave to re-open.THE FACTS FOUND BY THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary facts are not in contest. The parties accepted the primary judge’s findings and analysis in Blank [2014] FCA 87 at [14]-[46]. The following is merely an abbreviated version of those findings, intended to do no more than assist the reader here. The appellant was employed by GI or a subsidiary between November 1991 and 31 December 2006 in a number of countries, including Australia, from 2002 to the end of 2006. He became an Australian resident for fiscal purposes in 2002. As a consequence of his employment by companies in the Glencore Group, he acquired entitlements to participate in an employee profit participation plan and in replacement plans. On 15 March 2007, some months after he ceased his employment with the Glencore Group, the appellant executed a number of documents, including the Declaration, pursuant to an employee profit participation plan as it then existed, and became entitled to receive the Amount in relinquishment of “his claim to payments with respect to [profit entitlements] allocated in his name together with all preferential and ancillary rights”. An understanding of the employee profit participation arrangements under which the appellant acquired his entitlements is central to the case. The primary judge gave a detailed account of them in Blank [2014] FCA 87 at [14]-[36]. The following is drawn from that account. GI operated employee profit participation plans from about 1993 to 2010. Until 2006 there was only one type of profit participation plan, which became known as the ordinary profit participation plan. The original terms of the appellant’s participation in this type of plan were set out in two agreements executed around May 1994: (1) an agreement with GI (formerly called Marc Rich & Co AG) entitled “Profit Participation Agreement” (PPA 1993); and (2) an agreement with Glencore Holding AG (the ultimate holding company of the Glencore Group) entitled “Shareholders’ Agreement (NEWHO)” (SA 1994). These two agreements were “stapled” together, the validity of the PPA 1993 being conditional on the execution of the SA 1994 and the operation of the SA 1994 being conditional on execution of the PPA 1993. Relevantly, under the SA 1994, the appellant was entitled to be issued shares in Glencore Holding AG (GH) (formerly Newgen AG) from time to time at a price of CHF50 per share (that is, par value) to be paid in cash, provided he had previously executed a Profit Participation Agreement with GI. The appellant could not sell, assign, transfer or otherwise deal with the shares without the prior written consent of GH or the occurrence of a “Triggering Event”. A “Triggering Event” gave rise to a call option for GH, and a put option for the appellant, over all shares in GH held by him at a price equal to their par value of CHF50 per share. The termination of employment by virtue of retirement was a “Triggering Event”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge recorded that from 31 July 2007 until 1 July 2010, in accordance with its contractual obligations GI paid to the appellant, or dealt with at his direction, 14 instalment payments. The timing and amount of the payments, including the principal and interest component of each payment, is set out in a table in his Honour’s reasons: see Blank [2014] FCA 87 at [47].DECISIONS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE As earlier indicated, in reasons delivered on 21 February 2014, the primary judge held that the payments made by GI to the appellant in the income years 2007 to 2010 were assessable as ordinary income; and on 27 February 2014, the appellant applied to re-open his case in order to argue that s 23AG of the ITAA 1936 applied to exempt part of the Amount from tax. The primary judge dismissed this application on 22 May 2014 and made final orders on 26 May 2014. The beginning and end of the primary judge’s analysis of the nature of the payments were the agreements. His Honour stated (Blank [2014] FCA 87 at [95]):There can be no doubt, if the recitals (called preamble) to the instruments under the last two manifestations of the PPPs – the IPPA 2003 and the IPPA 2005 – can be taken as a guide, that the plans were intended by the relevant parties – GI, [Glencore] AG and the applicant – to provide the applicant with deferred compensation in consideration of the services to be rendered by the applicant to his Glencore Group employer. Further support for this conclusion is to be drawn from the operative part of the instruments, in the case of the IPPA 2005 – the definition of Incentive Profit Participation/IPP and Plan in paras 10 and 16; Clause [A.1.1]; “GI grants Employee deferred compensation…”; and Clause A.1.2 refers to GS being “issued solely for the purpose of … calculating the amount of deferred compensation”. The primary judge rejected the appellant’s submission that the GS were themselves provided as a reward for services and that, subsequent to the termination of his employment, he simply received the proceeds of the realisation of capital assets: Blank [2014] FCA 87 at [96]-[102], stating (at [102]) that:It is the money constituting the Amount, not the contractual right to the Amount, which is the reward for his services and if that analysis be correct, it is the money constituting the Amount which is ordinary income not the monetary value of the contractual right. Having found that the payments made by GI to the appellant were assessable as ordinary income, it was unnecessary for the primary judge to consider the respondent Commissioner’s contention that, if the GS were properly characterised as assets of the appellant, then they were revenue assets and the gain on their realisation was ordinary income according to the principles in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18; 163 CLR 199. Nor was it necessary for him to consider the Commissioner’s contention that the payments were income from property by analogy with the decision of the High Court in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil [2007] HCA 5; 229 CLR 656. His Honour nonetheless commented that these contentions had “no arguable merit”: Blank [2014] FCA 87 at [94].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In addition, the Commissioner submitted that the payments to the appellant could be characterised as ETPs within the meaning of ss 27A(1) of the ITAA 1936 and 82-130(1) of the ITAA 1997, because there was sufficient causal nexus between the termination of the appellant’s employment and the payment of the disputed amounts for it to be said that the one was in consequence of the other. The Commissioner also relied on FCT v Myer Emporium 163 CLR 199 to support an alternative proposition that, if the Court were of the view that the appellant’s gain was the proceeds of the realisation of assets, then those assets were held on revenue account, not capital account as the appellant’s argument assumed. Finally, the Commissioner argued that, if the Court were to hold that the appellant was assessable merely on a capital gain, then the primary judge erred in his assessment of the cost base, having regard to the evidence of Mr Samuel at trial as to the appropriate method of valuation. CONSIDERATIONWhether the payments were ordinary income Competing approaches Income is not a technical concept and the word “income” is to be construed in accordance with ordinary usages. In Australia, people commonly use the word “income” to refer to a reward for services: cf. Reuter v FCT 111 ALR at 730. This appeal largely turns on whether the primary judge was correct to characterise the payments of the Amount made to the appellant in the 2007 to 2010 income years as income within ordinary concepts, being the reward for services rendered by him. One may accept that, as the appellant submitted, from the perspective of the Glencore Group, the purpose of the profit participation arrangements was, as a 2007 prospectus said, “to promote management stability and to preserve Glencore’s capital” and that the arrangements led to “an alignment of the interests of management and key employees with those of Glencore”. This does not, however, identify, for tax purposes, the character of the payments made to the appellant, as the appellant at one point may have suggested. As we have seen, the primary judge held that the payments were the reward for services derived by the appellant when he received them. On the one hand, the Commissioner’s case was that his Honour was correct and that the payments were in the nature of deferred compensation. The Commissioner’s argument was, in essence, that the profit participation agreements (PPA 1993, PPA 1999, IPPA 2003 and IPPA 2005) provided contractual rights to receive cash instalments on termination. Senior counsel for the Commissioner submitted that the profit participation agreements provided an executory promise to pay money, “being a share of profit on termination”, in instalments and subject to withholding for Swiss tax. On the other hand, the appellant argued that the primary judge was in error and it was the shares, the PPUs and associated contractual rights conferred on him under the profit participation arrangements that were the reward for services rendered by him. He sought to substantiate his position by reference to various authorities, particularly Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352.