Henderson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation

[1970] HCA 62

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Windeyer J. Barwick C.J., McTiernan and Menzies JJ.

HENDERSON v. FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

(1970) 119 CLR 612

18 April 1969

Income Tax (Cth)

Income Tax (Cth)—Assessable income—Partnership—Assessable income of member—Manner in &hich income of partnership should be calculated—Return on earnings basis—Previous returns on cash receipts basis—Power of Commissioner to insist on calculation of income on a cash receipts basis—No warrant for combining results of more than one year in order to obtain assessable income for a particular year of tax—Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1966 (Cth), ss. 17, 90-92, 167, 190.

Decisions

1969, April 18.
WINDEYER J. delivered the following written judgment:-
These are two appeals, heard together, brought pursuant to ss. 187 and 197 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1966 (Cth), against assessments of income tax in respect of the years ended 30th June 1965 and 30th June 1966. The taxpayer, Roy Halliday Henderson, objected to the Commissioner's assessments on the unusual and surprising ground that they were too low. At the outset of the hearing the question was raised of where the onus lay. Was it for the taxpayer to show that the assessment was mistaken or for the Commissioner to show that it was correct? Counsel referred me to ss. 167, 177 and 185-190 of the Act. The last-mentioned section provides that "the burden of proving that the assessment is excessive shall lie upon the taxpayer". There is no express provision for the case of a taxpayer who appeals against an assessment as being too low. Although the proceedings in this Court are called an appeal, the Court is really called upon, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to determine the matter on the evidence before it. It has not to determine the correctness of the Commissioner's decision on the evidence before him. The Act does not in the present situation expressly state where the burden of the case lies. However, as the proceedings arise from the disallowance of the taxpayer's objection, I thought it proper to direct that the taxpayer's case should be presented first - a course to which the parties were agreeable. I did so without prejudice to the question, if it should ultimately arise, of whether the Commissioner must establish that the method of computation he had adopted was correct. However, it seems to me after hearing the evidence that the essential facts are not in dispute. The question is, what in law are their consequences? (at p619)

2. The Act provides, in s. 17, that income tax "is levied, and shall be paid . . . upon the taxable income derived during the year of income". Counsel were agreed that the question in this case depended upon the manner in which income should be calculated in respect of the years in question. The distinction between an earnings or accrual basis on the one hand, and a cash receipts, or modified cash basis on the other, for the computation of income, and the consequences of changing from one basis to another in the case of a continuing business are a familiar topic for accountants and in taxation law. Some aspects of these matters have been considered in this Court: see Commissioner of Taxes (S.A.) v. Executor Trustee and Agency Co. of South Australia Ltd. (Carden's Case) (1938) 63 CLR 108 ; Arthur Murray (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 314 ; Country Magazine Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 117 CLR 162 . In the United States the topic has produced much litigation and literature. But there the question emerges, for revenue purposes, from a different legal and administrative setting. I therefore do no more than note that I have found writings from the United States helpful in shewing how a question similar to that in this case has arisen there and there been met. (at p619)

3. It oversimplifies this case to regard it as turning simply on the distinction between calculating a taxpayer's income on an earnings and on a cash basis. The case concerns the income of the taxpayer Henderson; but the question arises in relation to income derived by him as a partner in a firm of public accountants. It is the method of calculating the income of the partnership business which is really in question. For this reason the case has implications for the future; and for other people than the taxpayer. So far as the taxpayer himself is concerned - and after all it is his tax which is in question before me - his return of income derived by him during the relevant years stated the actual amount which had been paid to him, said to be as his share of the profits of the partnership earned in the year. His case might, at first sight, therefore seem simple. It might be said that throughout the period of his membership of the firm he returned as part of his assessable income the sum he actually received in any year as his share of the partnership profits: that in the years in question that is so just as it was in earlier years. Looked at in this way, it may seem immaterial that the amount he was paid was at one time calculated on the basis of the firm's receipts and at another on the basis of its earnings - because, as a taxpayer, he has always returned as his income whatever moneys he had actually received each year by virtue of his being a partner. However, in computing the profits of the partnership business available for distribution in respect of the years in question, earnings, not actual receipts, were taken as the basis of calculation. The business was at relevant times increasing year by year. In each of the years in question the taxpayer and other persons entitled to share the profits received amounts which in total amounted to more than the total of the sums actually received by the firm during the relevant year. The firm had borrowed money to enable a distribution of more money than had actually come in. (at p620)

4. The Commissioner contends that he is not to look only at the sum which the taxpayer received as his share in the distributable profits of the partnership business, but at how this sum was arrived at. He says that, within the meaning of s. 167 of the Act, he was "not satisfied with the return" furnished by the taxpayer; and that he was therefore entitled to make the assessment that he did of the taxpayer's taxable income. This assessment, he says, must then stand unless the taxpayer can displace it: and that to displace it the taxpayer must shew that it was made on an impermissible basis. Counsel for the Commissioner put it as follows:

"It is our case that the initiative rests with the Commissioner and that the initiative can only be disturbed if the taxpayer can satisfy the Court that the method is one which is not open to the Commissioner having regard to the language of the Act."

He added:

"If the Commissioner chooses to adopt a basis which is not inconsistent with the meaning to be attached to 'gross income derived' (in s. 25 of the Act), then the fact that some other basis may be consistent with the concept of 'gross income derived' does not demonstrate the Commissioner's assessment to be wrong."

I am unable to accept this proposition in the extreme form in which it was put. (at p620)

5. I think that the rule is better stated as Dixon J. put in Carden's Case (1938) 63 CLR, at p 154:

"Unless in the statute itself some definite direction is discoverable, I think that the admissibility of the method which in fact has been pursued must depend upon its actual appropriateness. In other words, the inquiry should be whether in the circumstances of the case it is calculated to give a substantially correct reflex of the taxpayer's true income."

Assuming that the method which a taxpayer followed in his return was, in the particular circumstances, an appropriate method of accounting by which to measure his income derived in respect of a specified period, I do not think that s. 167 enables the Commissioner to insist on some other method being adopted, simply by saying that he is not satisfied with the taxpayer's return. Section 167 seems to me to be directed to a different situation. Certainly I think it does not put the Commissioner's decision beyond examination by the Court. It seems as well to turn at this point to what the Act says about the income of partners in business. (at p620)

6. A "partnership" is defined for the purposes of the Act as meaning "an association of persons carrying on business as partners or in receipt of income jointly, but does not include a company" (s. 6). This gives the word a wider meaning than it has for the ordinary law of partnership; for persons who are in receipt of income jointly are not, merely as such, partners for the purposes of the Partnership Acts of the several States. The first limb of the definition in s. 6, however, reflects the common statutory meaning of partnership - in the Western Australian Partnership Act, 1895, it is s. 7 (1) - "Partnership is the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit". The Income Tax Assessment Act having defined a partnership as an association of persons, proceeds - in ss. 90-94 and elsewhere - to treat the association as if it were a separate legal entity. But this Court has made it clear that the Act is not to be read as involving any departure from the strict theory of our law: Rose v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 84 CLR 118 . In Lindley on Partnership, 12th ed., (1962), p. 28, this is stated:

"The law, ignoring the firm, looks to the partners composing it; any change amongst them destroys the identity of the firm; what is called the property of the firm is their property, and what are called the debts and liabilities of the firm are their debts and their liabilities."

It could equally well be said that what is called the income of the firm is income of the partners; and that it is distributable among them according to the terms, express or implied, of the agreement between them. It would, however, be pedantic to quarrel with the provisions of the Act (s. 90) by which

"'net income' in relation to a partnership, means the assessable income of the partnership, calculated as if the partnership were a taxpayer, less all allowable deductions except the concessional deductions and deductions allowable. . . in respect of losses of previous years".

Whatever objections, verbal or in legal theory, may be made to speaking of a firm as if it were a legal person, there is no difficulty in the concept for accountancy and business purposes. Accountants are accustomed to what is called the "accounting entity convention" in relation to a partnership business, or I suppose, to any distinct enterprise. The Act requires that the collective income of the firm, as an association of persons carrying on business as partners, is to be treated as if the partnership were a taxpayer. But the Act does not subject it to tax. Section 91 provides that "a partnership shall furnish a return of the income of the partnership, but shall not be liable to pay tax thereon". From a partnership return it will appear that the partnership, considered as if it were a taxpayer, has either gained what the Act calls a "net income" or sustained what it calls a "partnership loss". Whichever it be, it is carried into the assessable income of each individual partner according to his share of it. In the case of net income it is added to his income from other sources in determining his taxable income of the relevant year. This is because, using the words of Rose's Case (1951) 84 CLR, at p 124 the part of the Act which deals with partnerships

"is based upon the view that the collective income earned by the partnership belongs according to their shares to the partners regardless of its liberation from the funds of the partnership, that is, its actual distribution".

As I understand the case for the Commissioner he says that, just as a taxpayer who is a partner can be taxed on his share of the partnership profit for a particular year although it was retained in the partnership funds and not then paid out to him, so he is not to be taxed in respect of amounts actually paid him as his share of partnership profits which, according to what the Commissioner regards as proper accountancy, were not properly so described. There is no suggestion that the amount received by the taxpayer was not properly determined as his share of the aggregate income of the firm if the way in which that was calculated was permissible for income tax purposes. (at p622)

7. The history of the business carried on by the partnership goes back many years. In 1930 a company, then known as The National Service Company Proprietary Limited, was formed. I shall hereafter call it "the company". It acquired by purchase an accountancy practice which had for some years before been conducted by a Mr. and Mrs. Woolcott for their own benefit. The company, led by Mr. C. P. Bird, now Sir Cyril Bird, carried on the business of public accountants until 1955. Then a change was made. This, I was told, was to comply with a view that a body corporate with limited liability should not engage in the profession of accountancy. The more senior professional employees of the company, who were also shareholders, took over, gratuitously, the accountancy practice. They carried it on as they had theretofore done, but now as partners not on behalf of the company. Sir Cyril Bird became the senior partner. He has continued to exercise a dominant influence in the affairs of the firm. It became known, and has continued to be known, as "C. P. Bird and Associates". The company continued in existence. Its name has been changed to "C.P.B. &A. Properties Pty. Limited". It still exists under that name. (at p623)

8. It seems there has never been a formal partnership agreement; but certain "rules" were formulated to take effect from 1st January 1955 when the partnership business began. These rules provided that the affairs of the partnership were to be under the control of the "Managing Partners"; and r. 1 states:

"The term 'Managing Partners' means such of the partners as are for the time being Directors of The National Service Company Proprietary Limited."

Two of the rules were as follows:

"11: The Managing Partners shall set aside from the net profits earned during each accounting period such sum for bonuses to partners and employees as the Managing Partners shall in their discretion think fit and such sum shall be distributed amongst such of the partners and employees in such shares and proportions as the Managing Partners shall in their discretion determine." "12: The Managing Partners may at any time admit an additional partner or partners."

There were, it seems, originally only two managing partners, former directors of the company. But early in 1966 a so-called "management board" was formed, consisting of seven of the partners. This number was later enlarged to nine; and the provisions of r. 1, requiring them all to be directors of the company, have not been observed. There is no other provision in the rules for determining who shall be a managing partner. It seems that the selection from time to time of those to become managing partners has been made mainly by Sir Cyril Bird. The managers meet from time to time. They were called by Mr. Cowden - a senior member of the firm and one of their number, who gave evidence - "the board", or "committee of management". (at p624)

9. There were, at relevant times, nineteen persons called partners and recorded as such for legal purposes. But there are, and at all relevant times were, between sixty and seventy or more persons who share with the nineteen "partners" the annual profits of the accountancy business. They, like those who are dignified as partners, are all qualified or partially qualified accountants. In the internal affairs of the firm these associates, other than the partners, are called employees. Their receipts from the firm are described as salary and bonus; and for income tax purposes they are shewn on group certificates. These salaries and bonuses are in fact arrived at by reference to the expected profits or the actual profits of the business. The partners return their income from the firm for taxation purposes as earnings, but they are not described as employees. That only nineteen of the participants in the profits of the business are called partners is the result of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1961 (W.A.), s. 14 (3), which at relevant times was as follows:

"No association or partnership consisting of more than twenty persons shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any business which has for its object the acquisition of gain by the association or partnership or the individual members thereof unless it is incorporated under this Act or is formed in pursuance of some other Act or letters patent."

(In 1966 the number twenty was by statute increased to fifty in cases such as the present one.) (at p624)

10. Mr. Cowden, speaking of the partners and the other associates, said:

"There is really no distinction as between the type of work or what one does or what one is paid. Were it not for the limit of twenty for the partnership, probably when we first formed it the partnership would have consisted of sixty or a hundred, or something like that. We were limited, however, to that number, and that is just the way we have stayed."

The profits are, he said, distributed among them all according to a formula related to years of service and applied to each according to the decisions and directions of the managing partners. All participate in the "bonuses" fixed by reference to profits actually accrued in the preceding year. (at p624)

11. No doubt the nineteen partners could not escape from any of the legal liabilities of partners, for they have written themselves down as partners. The others could perhaps deny that they were partners if it were sought to charge them as such, although on the evidence before me this is not clear. It was said that they do not all have a voice in the management of the affairs of the business, as those who carry on business as partners have. The affairs of the firm are, it seems, all under the control of the board of management, with some overriding influence by Sir Cyril Bird. But that apparently is by the consent of all those concerned. Moreover, if not having a voice in management meant always that the voiceless person cannot in law be considered a partner, then in this organization ten of the nineteen partners so-called seem to be disqualified, for they are not members of the board of management. A seemingly anomalous position has arisen simply because considerations of professional propriety are regarded as preventing the practice of accountancy by a company, and at the same time it was unlawful for more than twenty, and is now unlawful for more than fifty, accountants to practise in partnership in Western Australia unless they be a company. Those who are in fact associated as "C.P. Bird and Associates" have met this difficulty by a division of their numbers which is perhaps more verbal than real and have committed the management of their affairs in large measure to a board of management. This may not matter for the determination of the present case. What does matter is to see how the profits of the accountancy business were calculated, and the share of the taxpayer therein ascertained for the years in question. (at p625)

12. It is necessary to notice first that the company has had an increasingly important part in the whole scheme. The accountancy business is conducted in Perth, where the head office is in a building owned by the company, and also from branches in country centres in Western Australia. The company as at 30th June 1968 owned thirty-nine houses in the country, leased by it to the firm and occupied by accountants who are all associates in the business. The firm pays rent to the company. In this way the company gains profits and has declared and paid dividends to its shareholders. Many of those who participate in the profits of the accountancy business, whether as "partners" or "employees", are shareholders in the company. Others of them have lent money to the company. They receive interest on the moneys so lent. All have been encouraged by the managers to invest in the company part of the income they derive from the firm. The company and accountancy business are thus linked together for the benefit mainly of the same people. Both undertakings have prospered. (at p626)

13. I turn now to the way in which the profits of the accountancy business have been dealt with and accounted for - first before the years of income in question in this case - secondly during those years. (at p626)

14. The aim of the managing partners has always been that each year should finish without any profit remaining in the partnership accounts. They have accomplished this by the simple expedient of distributing all profits as salaries and bonuses and as rent to the company. The procedure adopted until 30th June 1964 was, very broadly stated, as follows. What was regarded as the gross profit of a year was arrived at as the difference between cash received and actual outgoings including "salaries". This was then paid or credited as rent to the company and as bonuses. The bonus for each recipient was determined by reference to his salary and years of service. The amounts for rent and for the bonuses were determined together by the managers. Whatever be the true analysis of the position of the participants other than the partners, I think that the so-called salaries paid to the nineteen partners, together with their bonuses, amounted in reality to a distribution of partnership profits, the share of each partner being calculated according to the contribution he was deemed to have made to the earning of those profits. This was of little practical consequence before the year 1964/1965, because in earlier years the partnership return of income was on an annual cash receipts basis; and each partner in his own return shewed as income the salary and bonus actually received by him in each year. (at p626)

15. Over the years the accountancy business grew greatly and continued to grow; and some change occurred in the character of the work done; and more of the work was done on a credit basis, instead of the customers paying for it as it proceeded. In 1964 the partners, or the managers for them, decided that in the conditions which had come to prevail it would be better if the partnership income tax return were rendered on an earnings, or accrual, basis instead of as theretofore on a cash receipts basis. One of the matters which led them to this conclusion is said to have been a looking to the future, to the time when one or more of the senior partners would retire. It was apparently thought that by keeping the accounts of the partnership on an earnings basis each member of the firm would only receive and be taxed upon a remuneration proportionate to his contribution to the total earnings, and furthermore that neither a retiring partner nor continuing partners would suffer if a retirement occurred when there was a large sum outstanding for work done but not yet paid for. These matters were, I have no doubt, in the minds of those who decided to change the basis on which the accounts of the firm were kept. But I have not seen that they necessarily dictated a change in the method of calculating income for taxation purposes. It would no doubt be convenient if accounts kept for determining the internal affairs of the partnership, that is the relations of the partners one to another, were on the same basis as accounts kept for the purpose of recording partnership income for fiscal purposes. But, as I see it, the two do not have to correspond. The financial arrangements to be made when a partner retires or dies, and the firm is thereupon re-constituted, depend upon the agreement made or to be made between the partners to meet that situation. Nevertheless that situation, and the arrangements made by the partners to meet it, can obviously give rise to taxation problems, as for example in Commissioner of Taxation v. Happ (1952) 9 ATD 447; 5 AITR 290 . However, these questions do not arise in this case. Their only importance is that the partners thought it convenient or helpful for the regulation of their financial relations one with another, then and in the future, to adopt for the purposes of their business a new mode of accounting. And that seems to me to be a good reason why they should be permitted to adopt that mode for fiscal purposes also, if it be one which accords with the Act and truly reflects the assessable income of the partnership "calculated as if the partnership were a taxpayer". (at p627)

16. The decision in 1964 to make the partnership return on an earnings basis instead of a cash basis was strengthened by, indeed perhaps prompted by, the judgment of Ungoed-Thomas J. in Wetton, Page &Co. v. Attwooll (1963) 1 WLR 114; (1963) 1 All ER 166 . But I do not myself think, as apparently the taxpayer and his colleagues did, that his Lordship's reasoning there was, without any qualification, applicable to or decisive in the facts of this case. To those facts I return. (at p627)

17. The partnership return for the year ended 30th June 1965 was, for the first time, compiled on an earnings basis. It seems to me that, considered in the abstract, this method is quite appropriate for the kind of business which the partners were carrying on. I would be inclined to think that, for various reasons which I need not detail, it is in fact more suitable than the cash receipts method. But that is not all. As Dixon J. put it in the sentence which I have already quoted, "the inquiry should be whether in the circumstances of the case it is calculated to give a substantially correct reflex of the taxpayer's true income". I adopt this expression "substantially correct reflex" because I take the whole pronouncement in which it appears to be for me authoritative. I observe too that it accords with phrases used in the United States in statements that for a taxpayer's method of bookkeeping to be acceptable for revenue purposes it must "clearly reflect his income": see e.g., Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1942) 143 ALR 1054 . (at p628)

18. I think that the form of the partnership income tax return for the year 1964/1965 did not give a substantially correct reflex of the income of the partnership. That is not because an earnings basis was not in itself appropriate to measure the collective earnings of the partners and those associated with them in business for the year in question. It is because that year was only one of a series of years during which the business was carried on. When income is a regular annual produce governed by the rotation of the seasons, any period of twelve months can stand in isolation. Thus it was with predial tithes in their primitive form; for tilling the field, sowing and harvesting the crop all occur within the year. It is so too when income of distinct annual operations is measured in money, not as produce in kind - as for example if wool be shorn and the clip sold in the same accounting year. But this case is of another kind. What has to be measured is income "derived during the year of income". That income in this case is not like an annual crop. It it merely so much of a continuous incoming as is attributable to a particular year, either as being money received in that year or as being money earned in that year. Counsel's metaphor in argument of a continuous flow of water through a pipe to be measured in periods of time is apt and suggestive; but a difficulty obviously arises if a new meter be put upon the pipe different from that previously in use and measuring the constant flow in a different way. (at p628)

19. A general principle was expressed by the Chief Justice in the case of Ravenshoe Tin Dredging Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 116 CLR 81, at p 91 when he said:

"Once annual accounting to ascertain assessable income is undertaken, apart from special statutory provisions, the financial experience of the year is, as it were, isolated from earlier and from subsequent years: so to speak, it is self-contained. This is true, in my opinion, though the closing balances of one year became the opening figures for the next year's accounting."

But, as I understand it, this postulates both a continuing business and a method or basis of accounting which is constant from year to year. (at p629)

20. What has actually happened in the present case is that a sum of $179,530, treated in the partnership books as received by the partnership after 30th June 1964 in payment for work done in the year 1963/1964, has not been taken into account at all as income for taxation purposes. It was not shewn in the 1964/1965 return, because that was on an earnings basis and the work by which it was earned was done in the previous year. It had not been shewn in the previous year, because that was made on a cash receipts basis and it was not received in that year. The amount in question did not find its way into the distributable partnership profit of the year 1964/1965 and thus come to charge as income of the partners. That was secured by the entry as a debit in the partnership books of an equivalent sum (as at 30th June 1965, $175,668) as a liability to the company in respect of a premium for a lease by the company to the partnership of new business premises. (at p629)

21. The partnership, regarded as a taxpayer, thus says in effect that the whole of this sum of $179,530 is outside its assessable income and escapes tax: in the year it was earned it was not counted because it was not then paid: in the year it was paid it was not counted because it was not then earned. It is this kind of result of changing from a cash basis to an earnings basis, and then regarding the next year in isolation, that prevents the partnership return for 1964/1965 being a true reflex of income. It is not a true reflex, simply because taking the income there shewn with the income shewn in the previous year the two together do not reflect the true income over the period of two years combined. In the United States it has long been seen that adjustments must be made in the strictly logical application of a changed method of accounting in the year following the change, if either an escape of income from taxation or the subjection of the same income to taxation in successive years is to be avoided. Much has been written on this, and to meet the situation various conventions and procedures have become established in America. At one stage the change from one basis to another there depended largely upon the discretion of the revenue authorities. I gather from an article in the American Journal of Taxation of April 1967 that in the United States taxpayers no longer require permission to change from a cash to an accruals basis of accounting, for the adjustments to be made have apparently become stereotyped. But these administrative procedures are not applicable in law in the United Kingdom or in Australia. (at p630)

22. A method which is well-recognized in accountancy, and its rationale is apparent, for the determination of gross income of a period on an earnings basis may be stated broadly as follows. The net receipts of the business, being the difference between actual receipts and outgoings in the period, is first ascertained. To this is added the amount which at the end of the period is outstanding as debts due to the business proprietor in respect of the business. From the total of these two sums there is then subtracted the amount which was outstanding for debts due but not collected at the beginning of the period. The result will shew a profit or a loss for the period. The application of that method in the present case is complicated because to both the commencing and the ending figures for money due to the partnership there were added sums for what was called "work in progress". I shall come later to this. For immediate purposes, let it be assumed that the figure for work in progress represents money earned at the relevant date, and therefore properly added to the debts owing to the business as at those dates. As it happened, and whether by chance or design matters not, there was on 1st July 1964, the beginning of the year for which the partners had decided to adopt the new basis, a large sum owing to the partnership for uncollected debts for work done before then; and also a very large sum for work in progress. This was in part, if not wholly, the result of the steady growth of the business.

The year ended 30th June, 1965. (at p630)

23. In figures the position was as follows (I shall state all figures in dollars, not in pounds, irrespective of the period to which they relate):

(a) Debtors as at 1st July 1964 (that is the closing figure for the year ended 30th June 1964) $66,002: add work in progress at that date $113,528: total $179,530: from this subtract $2,432 liabilities of the business as at that date. The result is an opening figure of $177,098.

(b) The closing figures, as at 30th June 1965, were: closing debtors $226,198; add work then in progress $77,862: total $304,060: from this subtract liabilities of the business as at that date, $47,032. The result is a closing figure of $257,028. (at p630)

24. Following the customary way of disposing of all profit, the partnership accounts shewed no cash profit (apart from an incidental sum of $284) for the period after payment of bonuses and current outgoings, including "salaries" and rent. The partnership return stated the partnership income as $284. The income of Henderson, the taxpayer, for the same period was shewn in his return as including "partner's salary $10,646". This was made up of $9,106 "salary" and $1,540 bonus. (at p631)

25. The Commissioner did not accept these returns as correct. In relation to the partnership income, he did not dispute that the salaries and bonuses were a proper charge in ascertaining profits; but he, in effect, wrote back the figures as returned to a cash basis by adding $177,098 to the $284 stated income, and then deducting $257,028, leaving a debit balance of $79,646. In this way he reversed the ordinary process of calculation on an earnings basis which the partnership had adopted. He added what had been subtracted and subtracted what had been added. He thereby reached the conclusion that the partnership had made a loss of $79,646. He then proceeded to distribute this among the nineteen partners. Ignoring the fact that, according to the arrangement between themselves, they did not participate equally in gains, he said that each should be regarded as liable for $4,192 as his share of what he had found to be a "loss". In the case of the taxpayer Henderson, this meant tht his taxable income, shewn in his return as $8,836, was reduced by the Commissioner by $4,192. After an addition of $30 by way of an adjustment immaterial for present purposes, a notice of assessment of tax was on 11th July 1967 issued to Henderson, based on a taxable income of $4,674 for the year ended 30th June 1965. Adjustments were made on similar lines in respect of the taxable incomes for the same period of each of the other eighteen partners; but it is only Henderson's case that is before me. (at p631)

26. The delay until July 1967 in issuing a notice of assessment for the year ended 30th June 1965 is explained by negotiations with the Commissioner which were proceeding in the meantime. But I have not been able, from the material before me, to reconcile the date 11th July 1967 with that stated in the first paragraph in a letter written by Cowden on behalf of the firm to the Commissioner dated 7th November 1966. This discrepancy in the dates of the notice of assessment seems to be of no moment; but the first three paragraphs of the letter are significant for other reasons. I therefore set them out.

"The partners in this firm have now received their income tax assessment notices in respect of the two income years ended 30th June 1966, and by the letter attached have authorized this firm to act as their agent in respect to those assessments. On their behalf it is again emphasised that the 'earnings' basis of calculation of the income of the partnership is now the most appropriate method. This is self evident from the accounts prepared for the two years concerned and the fact that the difference in taxable income between the 'earnings' basis and the 'cash' basis was $79,930 in the first year and $60,123 in the second, the 'cash' income being the lower in each case. For that reason alone we feel it must be conceded that the 'earnings' basis is far more appropriate than the 'cash'. Another reason however is that there are many others - perhaps 50 - who would and should be partners were it not for the legal limitation to 20. Thus it can be said the present 19 partners really hold the affairs of the partnership under some moral obligation for the benefit of partners and employees alike. The rights of each person are preserved through the company and not the partnership. That is why it was necessary for the 'premium' or 'additional rent' (referred to in previous correspondence) to be paid to the company of an amount equivalent to the debtors and work in progress at the date of conversion. It is therefore very important that at any point of time a retiring or deceased partner has no deferred tax liability in respect of a share of debtors and work in progress to which share in fact he is not entitled and would never receive." (at p632)

27. The last part of this extract from Cowden's letter refers to the balance of the sum of $179,530 abovementioned which was not brought to account as assessable income. It was, as I have said, shewn in the books as a liability of the partnership to the company in respect of a lease of the business premises. I shall deal with this later.

The year ended 30th June 1966. (at p632)

28. The same question arises in respect of the year ended 30th June 1966 as for the previous year. This time, however, the matter is not complicated by the receipt of any amount said to escape taxation, such as occurred during 1964/1965. Turning then to the details of the year 1965/1966 the relevant figures are:

(a) As at 1st July 1965, debtors and work in progress $304,060 (this the opening figure for this year is the closing figure of the previous year) less liabilities $47,032: giving an opening figure of $257,028.

(b) The closing figures as at 30th June 1966: debtors $291,260; add work in progress $68,333: total $359,593: from this subtract liabilities $42,442. The result is a closing figure of $317,151. (at p632)

29. Once again, what would ordinarily be regarded as partnership profits was absorbed as salaries and bonuses. The partnership return for the year therefore shewed the partnership as devoid of income. The Commissioner, following the same course as in respect of the previous year, adjusted the partnership income shewn as nil in the return, by adding $257,028 and deducting $317,151. That is to say he again added what had been subtracted and subtracted what had been added, thus in an artificial sense restoring a cash basis. In the result he said the partnership income shewed a loss of $60,123. This he distributed among the partners, attributing to each $3,164 as his share of the partnership loss. When carried into the income tax return of the taxpayer Henderson, this share in a loss has the result that instead of his having a taxable income as he shewed in his return of $13,203, the Commissioner says that his taxable income was $10,039, and tax was assessed accordingly. (at p633)

30. It is unreal and misleading to say that there was in either of the years in question what the Act in s. 90 calls a "partnership loss". In the first of the years the nineteen partners in fact received as salaries and bonuses a total of $148,476: in the second year $211,779. These amounts they got from the actual receipts of the undertaking and from moneys borrowed in anticipation of moneys earned. It is only because they chose to describe what they got as salaries, not as a share of profits, that the Commissioner can say that the partnership made a loss. The unreality of this proposition does not really matter for taxation purposes, because by s. 91, as it now stands and was at relevant times, the partnership as such is not liable to tax. If partnership profits are distributed to partners under the name of salaries, they come to charge as income of the recipients in the year in which the salaries were received. Nevertheless the approach which the Commissioner has taken highlights the problem of this case.

Assessments and objections. (at p633)

31. Seven of the partners, including Henderson, received notices of assessment of tax on the same date, 11th July 1967. In each case assessments for the two years in question were issued at the same time. These notices must I assume have taken the place of earlier notices for the same years referred to in correspondence in November 1966. A notice of objection covering these seven assessments was given in a letter, signed by Cowden on behalf of the firm acting as agents for the taxpayers concerned. This said:

"The objection is against the method of assessment of income of the partnership, full details of which were given in our letter of the 7th November 1966. The grounds of objection are also stated fully in that letter."

I have already set out part of the letter of 7th November. It is lengthy and argumentative and I do not think it necessary to quote it in full. Its last paragraph reads:

"We therefore object on behalf of all of the partners of

C. P. Bird &Associates against the adjustments to the income

of the partnership for the 2 years ended 30th June 1966, which have the effect of changing the method of computation of income from an 'earnings' to a 'cash' basis and in consequence against the assessment of income tax shown on the notices of assessment issued to the several partners for the same years, on the grounds that: - 1. The 'earnings' basis of computation of income was the most appropriate method in the years concerned. 2. There were good reasons for the change and sufficient to outweigh any difficulties in the transitional year. 3. If there is an obligation to include in the assessable income on a conversion from a 'cash' to an 'earnings' basis the value of the debtors and work in progress less creditors in addition to the 'earnings' income, the methods suggested in our letters of 15th October 1965 and 18th October 1966 were reasonable and achieve that end.

Would you please acknowledge this letter and advise us your decision at the earliest opportunity."

The Commissioner notified Henderson, on 19th October 1967, that the objection was disallowed. Thereupon at his, the taxpayer's request, the objection was, pursuant to the Act, treated as an appeal and forwarded to this Court. (at p634)

32. I need not set out the matters which in Mr. Cowden's letter were referred to as "the methods suggested in our letters of 15th October 1965 and 18th October 1966". The negotiations with the Commissioner had proved abortive before the present notice of assessment was issued on 11th July 1967. Proposals for a settlement had been made by both sides. They were not accepted. They have become irrelevant. The question is whether the assessments made should stand.

Work in progress. (at p634)

33. Before giving an answer to this question it is, I think, necessary to look at the figures given for what was described as "work in progress". The opinion which I express on this aspect is based upon what seem to me general principles. It is not directly based on the evidence in this case or derived from the arguments addressed to me. The question was mentioned cursorily by counsel; but it was not fully argued and much was taken for granted. However, I do not think I can overlook it. (at p634)

34. The value of work in progress is, no doubt, a familiar item, as an asset, in the accounts of manufacturers. And, like stock-intrade, it there enters into accounting of profit and loss for taxation purposes. The rationale of this is explained in the judgments in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Duple Motor Bodies Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1960) 1 WLR 510; (1960) 2 All ER 110; (1961) 1 WLR 739; (1961) 2 All ER 167 . In that case Lord Simonds said of the proposition that "stock-in-trade and work in progress must, for tax purposes, be regarded as a receipt. On that, professional accountants appear to be universally agreed, though it might not be at once obvious to the layman" (1961) 2 All ER, at p 171 . Lord Reid said, setting out what he called the background of the matter:

"It appears that, at one time, it was common to take no account of stock-in-trade or work in progress for income tax purposes; but long ago it became customary to take account of stock-in-trade, and for a simple reason. If the amount of stock-in-trade has increased materially during the year, then, in effect, sums which would have gone to swell the year's profits are represented at the end of the year by tangible assets, the extra stock-in-trade which they have been spent to buy; and similar reasoning will apply if the amount of stock-in-trade has decreased. So to omit stock-in-trade would give a false result. It then follows that some account must be taken of work in progress. Suppose that the manufacture of an article was completed near the end of an accounting period. If completed the day before that date, the article, if not already sold, has become stock-in-trade; if completed the day after that date it was still work in progress on that date. It could hardly be right to take that article into account in the former case but not in the latter. I do not know when it became customary to take into account work in progress, but it appears that that has been customary for many years, and it is not disputed that, at least in all ordinary cases, that must now be done" (1961) 2 All ER, at p 172.

These propositions relate to "work in progress" as a synonym for tangible things, goods in process of manufacture from raw materials, things which when completed will become stock-intrade. Accountancy theories differ as to the method of valuing such work. But "work" in that sense does not connote abstract activity, work done and labour expended. It denotes concrete tangible things, work on hand. But the ambiguity of the word "work" and the attraction for accountants of the phrase "work in progress" can I think mislead. In my opinion it is a mistake to suppose that the notion of the value of work in progress, in the sense of things uncompleted by a manufacturer or craftsman, can be simply transferred to uncompleted services by a tradesman or the practitioner of some profession, and to assume that it can there be applied in the calculation for taxation purposes, of income derived. I realize that in accountancy there is a similarity of a sort between unfinished goods and uncompleted services, and that the latter are sometimes described as work in progress. No doubt accounts can be kept in which a value is ascribed to uncompleted tasks by persons engaged in the practice of various trades and professions and rewarded by fees. Such accounts may be useful for many purposes, especially in the case of several persons practising a profession in association. The contribution of each to the earning of the collective income can be shewn by such accounts. And they may be useful in relation to the terms on which a partner retires from or a new partner enters a firm. But it is one thing to record when, and by whom, work is done which will produce income: it is another to say when income, the rewards of such work, was derived. I am aware that the expression work in progress has been used in some cases in arriving at the taxable income from fees for professional services: e.g., Wetton, Page &Co. v. Attwooll (1963) 1 WLR 114; (1963) 1 All ER 166 . Nevertheless I think that services rendered for fees do not result in income derived within the meaning of the Act until the fees are either paid or payable. This of course may be before an account for payment is rendered. For example, a physician may be entitled in law to be paid for attendances upon his patient before his treatment of him for his illness has been completed and he has sent him a bill. What he is thus entitled to be paid forms part of his income calculated on an earnings basis; but not for work in progress, but for work done. Similarly an accountant engaged to conduct a continuous audit may be entitled to be paid for the hours he has spent and for his attendances, although he only asks to be paid periodically. But when a professional man is, according to the terms of his engagement, not to be paid until his task is completed, I do not think he can be said to have earned anything by that task until then. A lawyer retained to write an opinion or draw a deed cannot ordinarily say that he has earned any income by his work until he has produced the result of it. Similarly with an auditor employed to give a certificate, an architect to prepare plans, an accountant to produce a balance sheet. A half-written legal opinion, a deed drawn in part only, plans unfinished and still on the drawing board, an incomplete balance sheet, are not like goods in course of manufacture. When completed they are not valuable because of their physical properties, but for the information they convey or the legal effect they produce. (at p637)

35. In the present case a record was kept of the time spent on each task by each accountant in the firm, partner or employee. A value was put on this work by reference to an hourly rate fixed by the managers for each person concerned according to his skill and experience. In this way the fee to be charged for services rendered was determined. This recording of the value of work in progress might be said to shew accruals, using that term in a sense which it appears often to have for accountancy practice, especially in the United States: see, e.g. pp. 471-473, 708-711, of the work Accounting Practice Management Handbook, edited by MacNeill, which was tendered in evidence. But accruals in this sense are not I think equivalent to earnings for the application of an earnings basis for the assessment of income according to our law. As I see it, they shew in terms of money the value of work which has been done towards the earning of money, not money which has been earned. Money is not I think earned income until it is in law recoverable as a debt. Of course, if an amount were recoverable as a quantum meruit although a task was not completed, it could be said to be earned. And, as I have said, services may create debts before a bill is sent to the debtor. But services rendered do not produce taxable income until they create a debt. And it must be a debt which is in fact recoverable, not a bad debt. (at p637)

36. Metaphorically stated, the difference between a cash basis and an earnings basis for calculating income for tax purposes is that in the first the crop is not counted until it is harvested and garnered, in the second it is counted when it is ripe for harvest; but while it is ripening and has not become harvestable, it is not to be taken into account as income: see Shaw v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1920) 27 CLR 340 . Deserting metaphor for the language of law and business, I quote again from the judgment of Dixon J. in Carden's Case (1938) 63 CLR, at p 155 where his Honour said :

"Speaking generally, in the assessment of income the object is to discover what gains have during the period of account come home to the taxpayer in a realized or immediately realizable form."

An estimate of the value of work in progress at a given date, made for the purposes of a taxpayer's business, does not necessarily shew that the sum so estimated is at that date immediately realizable. That is important in this case, because I cannot say from the evidence whether any part and, if any, how much of the sums set down as for work in progress at various dates really represents moneys then earned. If, as is possible, the only true earnings are the amounts described in the partnership accounts as debts to the partnership, not including the amounts said to represent work in progress, then the commencing figure for the year 1964/1965 should be $66,002. From this it would be necessary to subtract liabilities $2,432 - leaving a balance of $63,570. The figures as at other dates would, as I see the matter, have to be adjusted in the same way in any computation of income on an earnings basis. However, I cannot do more than indicate what I consider to be the proper principle to be applied. The evidence does not enable me to say what would be the result of its application.

Conclusions. (at p638)

37. I now state and explain my conclusions on the whole case.
(a) The Commissioner was in my opinion not justified in insisting on the partnership income being calculated in the year 1964/1965 or subsequent years on a cash instead of an earnings basis. (at p638)

38. Furthermore the Commissioner's assessments of the tax payable by the individual partners on the supposition that, calculated on a cash basis the partnership had in those years made losses to be distributed equally among the nineteen partners cannot be sustained.
(b) The assessable income of the taxpayer Henderson will, I consider, in the result include the amounts he actually received in cash as salary and bonuses in each of the years in question as his share of the partnership profits calculated on an earnings basis, and also any further amount attributable to the calculation on a proper basis of the assessable income of the partnership.
(c) The assessable income of the partnership for the year 1964/ 1965 includes, in my view, at least part of the sum of $179,530 reducible apparently to $177,098 by setting off liabilities outstanding at 30th June 1964. The amount of $179,530 is said to have included an amount of $113,528 described as for work in progress at 1st July 1964. There is nothing to shew that that amount or any part of it was then presently payable. The only evidence of the debts outstanding and payable at that date is that they amounted to $66,002. If the then outstanding liabilities of the period ended 30th June 1964 (namely $2,432) be deducted, the earnings due to the partnership and unpaid at 1st July 1964 appear to have had a value of $63,570. This amount, or whatever amount was in truth the sum of the recoverable debts earned in the earlier year, would, if the income of both periods were being calculated on a strict earnings basis, be deductible in the calculation of the income of the year 1964/1965. But that was the transitional year ; and, for the reasons I have given, when for taxation purposes a cash basis of accounting is abandoned and an earnings basis is adopted, the calculation cannot proceed as if an earnings basis had been in use throughout. An adjustment must be made, and this it seems to me involves a bringing to account, as earnings at the time when the new basis of accounting begins, all debts then collectable - that is all debts due and payable, excluding bad debts. What on an earnings basis would ordinarily be counted as the aftermath of the previous year is counted as part of the prima tonsura of the transitional year. Although the evidence specifically shews only a sum of $63,570 to be brought to account in this way, there would have to be added to it such part, if any, of the sum of $113,528 as represented debts recoverable at 30th June 1964. These two sums, $63,570 and such amount as was at the beginning of the year a recoverable debt arising from what was called work in progress, must, in the view I take, be brought to account as part of the assessable income of the year 1964/1965 as an adjustment made necessary by the change from a cash to an earnings basis. If the earnings basis had been constantly in use throughout, these amounts would have entered into the calculation of partnership income for the previous year and been deducted in the calculation for the year 1964/1965. (at p639)

39. So much of the amount of $113,528 as first became recoverable as a debt during the year 1964/1965 was a part of the partnership income earned in that year. That was not as the result of the adjustment consequent upon the change from a cash to an earnings basis, but simply by virtue of the adoption of the earnings basis for the year.
(d) I put the above figures forward tentatively as indicative of the result which would follow from the adoption of what I consider to be proper principles in ascertaining the income of the partnership for the purposes of the Act for the year 1964/1965. I do not find these figures to be the correct figures. The evidence does not enable me to do that. I state only the course which I think should be followed to ascertain for taxation purposes the income of the partnership on an earnings basis of the transitional year. I use the figures given in evidence illustratively only of the end result of following that course. I express no opinion at all as to the precise sum which, according to the view I take, should be carried into the assessable income of the taxpayer, Henderson, pursuant to s. 92 of the Act. Moreover I am conscious that little argument was addressed to me as to the validity of taking work in progress into account.
(e) I should add at this point that the fact that a sum of $177,098, or thereabouts, was paid to or treated as a partnership liability to the company as a premium in respect of the lease of new premises does not, I think, alter the manner of calculating the partnership income of the year 1964/1965. This amount, the balance of the sum of $179,530 in question, was treated in this way in the partnership accounts pursuant, it is said, to some arrangement of which no precise evidence was given. On such material as I have, it seems to have been a disposal by the partners of some of the partnership income to obtain what appears to be a capital asset. It was not, so far as appears, an outgoing necessarily incurred in gaining the assessable income or in carrying on the business so as to be an allowable deduction according to s. 51 of the Act. But, as the question was not argued and the relevant facts were not investigated, I make no finding on this aspect.
(f) One arguement pressed for the taxpayer, for excluding the sum of $179,530, or any part of it, from the income, was that assessable income of the partnership for the year 1964/1965 was founded on the decision of the Court of Session in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Morrison (1932) SC 638 ; 17 Tax Cas 325 . That case was referred to by Dixon J. in Carden's Case (1938) 63 CLR, at p 158 , but nothing which his Honour said there supports the use it was sought to make of it in the present case. It was a case the reverse of this. A taxpayer changed the basis on which he calculated his "profits and gains" from an earnings basis to a cash basis. It was held that he was chargeable in respect of a particular sum which he received after the change, although before the change it had been taken into account in the calculation of his earnings in an earlier period. By changing the method on which he calculated his profits and gains he had subjected himself to tax in two successive years in respect of the same sum gained. However, it seems to me a mistaken use of analogy to say that means that in this case the partnership, considered as if it were a taxpayer, has, by changing the method on which it calculated its income, escaped tax altogether in respect of $179,530 which in a commercial sense formed part of its income.
(g) The assessment of the taxpayer, Henderson, for the year 1964/1965 should I consider be set aside.
(h) The assessment for the year 1965/1966 should also I consider be set aside. An earnings basis for ascertaining the partnership income was in my opinion appropriate for this year, as it was for the previous year. No difficulty arises in its application to the partnership for this year, and no adjustment of it is required such as was necessary in the transitional year. The recognized method of computation should be followed, namely by adding to cash gains during the year the debts payable at the end of the year and then subtracting debts outstanding at the beginning of the year: but again, in my view, this should be without allowing, at either end, for work in progress unless it had resulted in debts then presently payable. The net income of the partnership ascertained in that way should then be reflected in the assessable income of the partnership according to s. 92.

(i) For the reasons I have given, I shall allow the appeals. I think that it has been shewn that the Commissioner in assessing the taxpayer's income adopted an erroneous method of calculating the net income of the partnership and the taxpayer's interest in it. But I am unable, on the material before me, to accept as correct the calculation proffered on behalf of the taxpayer. It seems to me that a correct assessment of the partnership income would shew a larger sum than the taxpayer reckoned on, especially for the year 1964/1965. However, he has succeeded in his contention that his taxable income was more than the Commissioner said it was. In my opinion he has succeeded too in his claim that the partners should be allowed to return the partnership income on an earnings instead of on a cash receipts basis. To make good that claim was, I assume, the main purpose of his desire to pay a larger sum as tax than the Commissioner claimed. He may have succeeded beyond and against his desires ; and he may be moved to repeat the exclamation Pyrrhus is said to have uttered after his army had defeated the Romans. But he has won his case. I think he should have his costs.
(j) The question then is what consequential orders I should make. The case is unusual. To correct the present assessment further inquiries seem to be necessary, especially about the figures for what was called work in progress and the agreement with the company for a premium for a lease. I shall therefore remit the matter to the Commissioner so that, unless the parties come to an agreement, he can issue amended assessments for the years in question. (at p641)

40. Either party, or both parties, may wish to appeal to the Full Court from my order in this case, or they may wish to enter into negotiations. They should have sufficient time to consider the position. There are many persons directly or indirectly interested who are in Western Australia. I shall be pronouncing judgment and publishing these reasons for judgment in Sydney. I shall therefore, pursuant to O. 70, r. 6, of the Rules of this Court, fix a day two weeks after my doing so as the date after which, within twenty-one days, either party is to be at liberty to file and serve a notice of appeal from this decision.

Appeals against the assessments allowed with costs. Matters remitted to the Commissioner. Time within which a notice of appeal against this order may be given by either party to be twenty-one days from 2nd May, 1969. Usual order as to exhibits. (at p642)

41. From this decision the appellant appealed and the respondent cross-appealed to the Full Court. (at p642)

42. P. J. Kenny Q.C. (with him C. V. Cullinan), for the appellant. It is simply a question of what in reality was the gross income derived by this taxpayer and since he was a member of a partnership, by the partnership, during the relevant year. Section 25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act sets out in part the machinery for arriving at taxable income. It brings in the credit side. Each year should be taken by itself as a term of financial experience. Tax is assessed on the income derived in that year. It is not permissible to treat the income that is earned in one year but is as yet uncollected as part of the income derived in the following year. The correct measure of the income of this accountancy practice is the fees earned. What Dixon J. says in effect in Commissioner of Taxes (S.A.) v. Executor Trustee and Agency Co. of South Australia Ltd. (1938) 63 CLR 108 is that the question of which is the appropriate basis is one to be determined by having regard to the particular profession and the way it is practised in the particular case. (at p642)

43. J. L. Toohey Q.C. (with him Miss E. M. Collins), for the respondent. It was open to the Commissioner, notwithstanding the basis on which the taxpayer had formulated his return, to assess the income of the taxpayer on a cash basis. It was open to the Commissioner to do this having regard to the terms of the Act and also because it gave a substantially correct reflexion of the appellant's true income. If there are two methods of approach, either of which is consistent with the Act, then it is not enough for the taxpayer merely to show that he himself has adopted a basis which is consistent. It does not necessarily follow that any one figure can be said alone to be the assessable income of the taxpayer. It is conceivable in a situation in which you have conflicting views as to what is a proper basis of determing the assessable income that there may in fact be more than one figure. The Commissioner has the initiative of determining the assessable income of the taxpayer. If he has arrived at a determination by a method that is not inconsistent with the Act, by a method which is not contrary to any provisions of the Act, then that assessment remains and is not disturbed merely by the taxpayer's demonstrating that on the basis of accounting principles or by reference to some other criteria the figure he advanced may also be said to represent the assessable income of the taxpayer. (He referred to George v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 86 CLR 183, at pp 203-204 .) Although Windeyer J. was sitting in the exercise of original jurisdiction the obligation still lies upon the taxpayer to displace the assessment which the Commissioner has made. This emerges most clearly from McAndrew v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 98 CLR 263, at pp 271, 280 . The obligation on the taxpayer is one which arises out of the pattern of the Act itself, apart from s. 190. There are two aspects to be looked at in comparing the two methods: first, the requirements of the Act and, secondly, their appropriateness. The assessment is supported, first having regard to what gross income derived means and secondly because the receipts basis is more appropriate. (He referred to Leigh v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 1 KB 73, at p 77 and to Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue commissioners (1961) AC 31, at p 62 .) Bearing in mind what the taxpayer was seeking to do, the year 1965 could not be taken in isolation because to do so would mean that there could be a substantial sum of money represented by the book debts and other debts due and payable, of which the amount was unknown, which would not be brought to taxation at any time. What the Commissioner did was to make an adjustment which he thought resulted in a true picture of the gross income derived by the taxpayer in respect of the year in question. The importance of Commissioner of Taxes (S.A.) v. Executor Trustee and Agency Co. of South Australia Ltd. (1938) 63 CLR 108 in this context is that notwithstanding a provision such as s. 63 which might be said to point to the admissibility of an earnings basis, the Court in that case held that in the case of the professional man there involved the receipts basis was an appropriate basis. This is supported by Arthur Murray (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 314 . In insisting on the cash basis, the Commissioner was therefore adopting an approach which had been judicially approved as long ago as 1938, admittedly in regard to a particular taxpayer, but to a taxpayer of a professional type. What the taxpayer is seeking to do here is to adopt a method which in the Commissioner's submission is inappropriate and to force it on the Commissioner who, it is maintained, has the initiative. The ultimate question is whether the taxpayer has demonstrated that the assessment which the Commissioner has raised in respect of each year is an assessment which cannot be supported. (at p644)

44. P. J. Kenny Q.C. in reply. So far as the adjustment is concerned it is submitted that income tax is assessable in respect of each year of income taken by itself. The subject of tax is the taxable income derived during the year of income, that is to say the gross income derived during that year less the allowable deductions. Each year is to be regarded as self-contained. Assessable income of one year cannot be treated as assessable income of another year. In the assessment of any year's income the fact that an incorrect assessment was made in an earlier year is irrelevant. There is no reason requiring an adjustment to be made in respect of income of any past year in the assessment of the current year. (He referred to Commissioner of Taxes (S.A.) v. Executor Trustee and Agency Co. of South Australia Ltd. (1938) 63 CLR 108, at pp 134-135 ; Ravenshoe Tin Dredging Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 116 CLR 81, at p 91 ; Country Magazine Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 117 CLR 162, at p 165 ; Squatting Investment Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 86 CLR 570, at p 638 and Ballarat Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 82 CLR 364.)

Cur. adv. vult. (at

p644)

1970, February 19.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. The appellant is a member of a partnership practising the profession of accountants under the firm name of C. P. Bird &Associates. This partnership constituted during the financial years 1963-1964, 1964-1965 and 1965-1966 his sole source of income. By it he was paid a salary and a bonus but received no distribution of the profits as such. Sections 90 and 91 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1966 (Cth) (the Act), however, required the appellant to pay income tax upon the full amount of his share of the income derived by partnership in each year of tax. In the years ended 30th June 1965 and 30th June 1966 respectively the partnership determined its profits on the basis of fees earned and accounts incurred during the year. It made its returns of partnership income on the same, i.e., on an earnings, basis. It distributed to its members, nineteen in all, the whole of this profit for each year by way of salary and bonuses, borrowing money to the extent to which its cash receipts for the year were inadequate to enable it to make this distribution. The appellant returned as his assessable income the amount thus received by him in each of these years from the partnership. But the respondent (the Commissioner) was of opinion that in respect of these tax years a "cash received and accounts paid" basis was the proper basis on which to ascertain the income of the partnership. Accordingly he assessed the appellant on the footing that he derived income in each of those tax years to the extent of his entitlement to a share of the partnership income so ascertained. With each of his assessments made under s. 166 of the Act the Commissioner served on the appellant an adjustment sheet disclosing the figuring by which he had re-adjusted the figures in the partnership return to represent a computation of the partnership income on a cash basis instead of an earnings basis. The result of this conversion was to treat the partnership as having in each of the tax years suffered a loss, a result to be expected in so far as the partnership had had to borrow money to distribute in cash profits calculated on an earnings basis. (at p645)

2. The appellant, having objected to the assessments, appealed to this Court against them. He had returned a taxable income of $10,646 and $13,203 respectively in the years 1964-1965 and 1965-1966. The assessments were for an amount of income tax based on a taxable income of $4,674 and $10,039 bringing to account his share of the partnership loss. In the calculation of the income of the partnership on either basis, the salaries paid to the partners were treated as outgoings of the partnership and not as a distribution of profits. (at p645)

3. The appellant's appeal against these assessments was heard by my brother Windeyer who decided that the assessable income of the appellant would be that sum which would represent his share of the income of the partnership computed on an earnings basis. Consequently he decided that the assessment computed upon cash received basis was erroneous. However, his Honour held that the income of the partnership for the tax year 1964-1965 ought to be calculated in a particular manner, for a reason to which I shall later advert. Suffice it to say at this point that the appellant has appealed against the order made in respect of the year ending 1965 by reason of this particular manner of calculation and that the Commissioner has appealed against his Honour's orders in so far as they are based on an income of the partnership computed on an earnings basis. (at p646)

4. A question arose before his Honour as to whether s. 190 casts on the taxpayer-appellant the burden of establishing that the Commissioner's assessment is erroneous where the ground of appeal is, as it was here, not that the assessment was for too much but that it was for too little. But the parties accepted the position that in the hearing of the appeal the appellant should begin and no occasion has arisen to resort to the onus of proof to resolve any question arising in the appeal. Thus, no need to discuss the operation of s. 190 now arises. (at p646)

5. In my opinion, his Honour was clearly right to conclude that a computation of the income derived by the partnership in each of the years in question upon an earnings or accrual basis would yield the correct figure for the assessable income of the appellant. The details of the manner of operation of the partnership and its relation to the company C. P. Bird &Associates Pty. Ltd. are to be found in his Honour's reasons for judgment and need not be repeated here. But some particulars extracted from the evidence by counsel for the appellant are worth recalling as indicating the nature and extent of the operations of the partnership and to bring those operations into sharp contrast with the operations of the medical practitioner whose affairs were the subject of discussion and decision in Commissioner of Taxes (S.A.) v. Executor Trustee and Agency Co. of South Australia Ltd. (Carden's Case) (1938) 63 CLR 108 . (at p646)

6. At relevant times the partnership employed a total of 295 persons of whom about 150 were qualified accountants. Fees earned for the year ending 30th June 1965 amounted to $1,181,166 and in the year ending 30th June 1966 to $1,374,000. Bad debts in the year ending 30th June 1965 amounted to $98 and in the year ending 30th June 1966 to $641. Its disbursements, excluding salaries to partners, for the year ending 30th June 1965 amounted to $1,045,358 and for the year ending 30th June 1966 to $1,074,567. The accountancy practice which it conducted in various centres was said to be the largest in Western Australia and one of the largest in Australia. (at p646)

7. It is apparent, in my opinion, that what such a business earns in a year will represent its income derived in that year for the purposes of the Act. The circumstances which led the majority of the Court to conclude in Carden's Case (1938) 63 CLR 108 that a cash basis was appropriate to determine the income of the professional practice carried on by the taxpayer personally are not present in this case. (at p647)

8. It is necessary, however, to deal with a particular submission made on behalf of the Commissioner. Pointing to ss. 166, 167 and 190 of the Act, it was claimed that the Act gave the Commissioner, as counsel said, an "initiative" to determine the assessable income of a taxpayer and that so long as in determining that income he employed a method which was not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act, there would be no ground for setting aside the figure at which he arrived for that income. He then says, using the view of the majority in Carden's Case (1), that the computation of the income of a professional practice upon a cash basis is an appropriate method of ascertaining the income derived in the year of tax and not in any respect inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, it was argued that it is not enough for the appellant to establish that a computation on an earnings basis is also appropriate, or even that the figure of assessable income which it produces is a better indication of that income than the figure at which the Commissioner assessed by a computation upon a cash basis. Nothing short of establishing that the basis of calculation was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act will suffice, according to the argument, to warrant the setting aside of the assessment. (at p647)

9. This argument, strongly pressed before us, is, in my opinion, clearly untenable. The Act by s. 17 levies income tax upon the amount of taxable income derived by the taxpayer in the year of tax. The taxable income results from the application of the provisions of the Act to what is in fact the assessable income of the taxpayer: that in the case of a taxpayer resident in Australia is the whole of the income which is not expressly exempted by the Act, which the taxpayer has derived during the year of tax from any source whether within or beyond Australia. That assessable income when ascertained must be expressed in a figure. There cannot in fact be alternative figures for such assessable income. The figure determined as that income may be the result of estimation, as well as of calculation, and its determination may involve the acceptance of opinions, expert or otherwise. In the long run it may be the outcome of an exercise of judgment. But however arrived at, the result is a figure, the assessable income in fact of the particular taxpayer for the year of tax. (at p648)

10. Of course, the Commissioner has the capacity under the Act to make an assessment of the income tax payable by the taxpayer, that process involving the formation of opinion or judgment as to the taxpayer's assessable income and, having regard to the terms of s. 190, it must rest on the taxpayer in an appeal against an assessment based on the amount of the assessable income so determined to show that the Commissioner's figure for that income is wrong. But the question of onus apart, the issue on such an appeal is what in fact is the assessable income of the taxpayer derived in the relevant year of tax. No doubt where the Commissioner's figure is the result of the application of some method of computation to figures not otherwise in dispute, the contest may appear to be one as to the appropriate method of computation of the income derived: and the determination of such a method of computation will resolve the issue, which is what is the amount of the assessable income derived. But unless the method of computation yields what is in fact the correct figure for that income it cannot be said to be appropriate in the circumstances or to be not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Whilst opinion may differ as to that fact, ultimately the opinion of this Court will determine it. (at p648)

11. In the present case, as I have said, in my opinion, the figure of assessable income computed on the footing of the net earnings of the partnership in each of the years in question was the correct figure and the figure adopted by the Commissioner as that assessable income was a wrong figure. In my opinion, therefore, the assessments of the Commissioner were properly set aside. That means that the Commissioner's cross appeal should be dismissed. (at p648)

12. However, the appellant's appeal remains to be dealt with. This arises out of the qualification which his Honour made to the computation made on an earnings basis of the partnership income derived in the year ended 30th June 1965. His Honour thought that in respect of this year the amount of fees earned but uncollected at the end of the year ended 30th June 1964, less the amount of unpaid obligations to the extent to which the fees were collected during the year ended 30th June 1965, should be added to the net fees earned during that year in order to arrive at the income derived by the partnership in that year. (at p648)

13. The occasion which prompted this course was that the partnership had computed its income for the year ended 30th June 1964 upon a cash received basis, the partnership had made its taxation return on that footing and the appellant had returned his income accordingly. The Commissioner had accepted these returns and assessed the appellant to income tax on the basis of them. Fees outstanding at the end of that year were thus not brought to tax in that year. If the partnership income were computed for the year ending 30th June 1965 upon an earnings basis and the relevant earnings were confined to the earnings of that tax year, those fees outstanding, which amounted to a considerable sum in the order of $179,000, if no other action should be taken, would be collected without ever being brought to tax. (at p649)

14. The reason that his Honour in those circumstances thought that these outstanding fees should be included in the earnings of the year ended 30th June 1965 was that the income of a continuing business such as that under consideration could not be regarded as ". . . an annual crop. It is merely so much of a continuous incoming as is attributable to a particular year . . .". Referring to the exclusion by the partnership from its 1965 return of the fees outstanding at the end of the year 1964, his Honour said (at p. 629 above) :

"It is this kind of result of changing from a cash basis to an earnings basis, and then regarding the next year in isolation, that prevents the partnership return for 1964/1965 being a true reflex of income. It is not a true reflex, simply because taking the income there shewn with the income shewn in the previous year the two together do not reflect the true income over the period of two years combined." (at p649)

15. But, with due respect to his Honour, there cannot be any warrant in a scheme of annual taxation upon the income derived in each year of taxation for combining the results of more than one year in order to obtain the assessable income for a particular year of tax. Of course, the experience of a prior year may be reflected in the opening figures of the relevant year but they become and are figures of that year and not figures of two years in combination. Once it is decided that the partnership income derived in the year in question will be the net amount of its earnings of that year, it is, in my opinion, only the earnings of that year which can be included in the computation. There was some question raised in argument as to when and to what extent these outstanding fees had in fact been collected : but, as I see the case, nothing presently turns on the determination of that question. I shall deal separately with an unrelated question as to what has been referred to in argument as work in progress. (at p649)

16. As the income of the partnership derived in the year ending 30th June 1965 is properly the amount of its net earnings in that year and as those factors which make a computation of such earnings appropriate to determine that income were equally present in the preceding year, it follows that the figure at which the partnership income for the latter year was arrived at on a cash received basis was not the proper amount of the partnership income derived in that year. Consequently the assessment of the appellant for income tax for the year ended 30th June 1964 was erroneous and could have been rectified by the respondent by an amended assessment within three years of its making : see s. 170. The fact that that course may now be impossible by reason of the lapse of time affords no reason, in my opinion, for any departure from the annual basis on which the income of the tax year in question is to be computed. The uncollected fees in question apparently were earned in a year prior to the year ending 30th June 1965 and there is, in my opinion, no basis for the inclusion of any part of them in fees earned in that year. Accordingly, in my opinion, the appellant should succeed in his appeal. (at p650)

17. There remains a question as to the appropriate order to be made. The assessments should be set aside and the matter remitted to the Commissioner for re-assessment of the appellant's taxable income in each of the years under appeal by including in his assessable income his share of the net earnings of the partnership in each of such years. (at p650)

18. In ascertaining such earnings, only fees which have matured into recoverable debts should be included as earnings. In presenting figures before his Honour allowance was made for what was termed "work in progress". But this, in my opinion, is an entirely inappropriate concept in relation to the performance of such professional services as are accorded in an accountancy practice when ascertaining the income derived by the person or persons performing the work. When the service is so far performed that according to the agreement of the parties or in default thereof, according to the general law, a fee or fees have been earned and it or they will be income derived in the period of time in which it or they have become recoverable. But until that time has arrived, there is, in my opinion, no basis when determining the income derived in a period for estimating the value of the services so far performed but for which payment cannot properly be demanded and treating that value as part of the earnings of the professional practice up to that time and as part of the income derived in that period. It may be that a different course can be taken if an estimation of profits is being made for some other purpose than the present. Consequently, in determining the income of the partnership in either of the years in question for the purposes of assessment of tax, only accrued fees may be included in that income. I have used the word "recoverable" to describe the point at which income is derived by the performance of services. I ought to add that fees would be relevantly recoverable though by reason of special arrangements between the partnership and the client, time to pay was afforded. (at p651)

19. In the result, the appeal should be allowed and the cross appeal dismissed. The assessments should be set aside and the matter remitted to the respondent to re-assess the appellant conformably to the Court's reasons for judgment. (at p651)

McTIERNAN J. I agree with the reasons for judgment of the Chief Justice. (at p651)

MENZIES J. I agree in the judgment of the Chief Justice. (at p651)

Orders

In each case appeal allowed with costs. Cross appeal dismissed with costs. Order that, in reassessing the appellant pursuant to the order of Windeyer J., the Commissioner shall reassess in conformity with the Court's reasons for judgment given this day.