Blank v Commissioner of Taxation

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ

VAUGHAN RUDD BLANK  APPELLANT

AND

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION  RESPONDENT

Blank v Commissioner of Taxation

[2016] HCA 42

9 November 2016

S144/2016

ORDER

1.Appeal dismissed with costs.

2.Application for special leave to cross-appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

M Richmond SC with T O Prince for the appellant (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)

J T Gleeson SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth and J O Hmelnitsky SC with M J O'Meara for the respondent (instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Income tax – Assessable income – Where taxpayer participated in employee incentive profit participation agreement – Taxpayer granted claim to deferred compensation calculated on basis of company profit – Amount payable under agreement to taxpayer on termination of employment and execution of declaration of assignment and release – Whether amount income according to ordinary concepts or capital gain.

Words and phrases – "deferred compensation", "Genussscheine", "incentive profit participation agreement", "ordinary income", "pecuniary account".

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 26(e).
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 6-5(1), (4).
Swiss Code of Obligations, Art 657.

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ.  

Introduction

  1. The appellant, Mr Blank, was employed by Glencore Australia Pty Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Glencore International AG ("GI").  Glencore Australia provided services including the services of Mr Blank to Glencore AG, also a wholly owned subsidiary of GI.  An incentive profit participation agreement between Mr Blank, GI and Glencore AG provided "deferred compensation" for services to be rendered by Mr Blank, payable after notice of termination of his employment ("the IPPA 2005").  Mr Blank resigned and, pursuant to the IPPA 2005, on 15 March 2007 he became entitled to receive USD 160,033,328.25 payable in instalments ("the Amount").  Was the Amount income according to ordinary concepts and therefore part of Mr Blank's assessable income pursuant to s 6-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ("the 1997 Act")?  The answer is "yes". 

  2. Mr Blank did not return the Amount as income according to ordinary concepts but treated the 15 March 2007 event as giving rise to a capital gain in the 2007 income year.  On appeal to this Court, Mr Blank contended that the Amount was the proceeds of the exploitation of interconnected rights that conferred on him a right to receive, in the future, a proportion of the profit of GI and therefore assessable as a capital gain.  That contention should be rejected. 

  3. Accordingly, the alternative contentions of the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation, that the Amount was assessable income in Mr Blank's hands on other bases – under the second limb of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer EmporiumLtd[1] or as an eligible termination payment under s 27A(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936…

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Details
Case
[2016] HCA 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Blank against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, which had affirmed the Commissioner of Taxation's assessment of an amount received by Mr Blank as assessable income. The dispute concerned whether a payment received by Mr Blank under an employee profit participation agreement constituted ordinary income or a capital gain. Mr Blank had participated in agreements that granted him a claim to deferred compensation, calculated on the basis of company profits, which became payable upon termination of his employment and execution of a release.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the amount received by Mr Blank was income according to ordinary concepts, and thus assessable under section 6-5 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth), or if it represented a capital gain. This required the Court to determine the character of the rights Mr Blank held under the profit participation agreements and the nature of the payment received upon their realisation. The Commissioner contended the amount was assessable income, while Mr Blank argued it was a capital gain.

The High Court, in dismissing Mr Blank's appeal, reasoned that the amount received was in the nature of deferred remuneration for services rendered. The Court applied principles established in cases concerning the characterisation of receipts, focusing on the substance of the transaction. It found that the rights granted to Mr Blank under the profit participation agreements, including the entitlement to a share of profits, were fundamentally linked to his employment and constituted a reward for his past and future services. The payment received upon termination was therefore considered to be a substitute for income that would have been earned had his employment continued, or a form of deferred compensation, rather than a capital accretion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. An application by Mr Blank for special leave to cross-appeal on the timing of the assessability of the amount was also dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed with costs.

2. Application for special leave to cross-appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

These reasons will address the facts and then turn to consider whether the Amount was income according to ordinary concepts and therefore part of Mr Blank's assessable income pursuant to s 6-5 of the 1997 Act. Finally, the Commissioner's application for special leave to cross-appeal on the timing question will be addressed.FactsThe Glencore Group and Mr Blank's employment Glencore Holding AG ("GH") was the ultimate holding company of the Glencore group of companies ("the Glencore Group"). The Glencore Group operated one of the world's largest international commodity trading businesses. GI was incorporated in Switzerland. 85% of the shares in GI were held by GH. Until 2002, the remaining 15% of the shares in GI were held by an unrelated industrial company. From 2002, the remaining 15% of the shares in GI were owned by Glencore LTE AG, another company in the Glencore Group. The shares in GH and Glencore LTE AG were owned by employees of the Glencore Group who were invited and agreed to participate in "employee profit participation plans" operated by GI. Key employees of GI were therefore the indirect owners of shares in GI. Between November 1991 and 31 December 2006, Mr Blank was employed by either GI or one of its wholly owned subsidiaries and, until early 2002, he worked variously in South Africa, Switzerland and Hong Kong. Mr Blank arrived in Australia in early 2002 to take up a position as a senior trader in the coal division with Glencore Australia. Mr Blank became a resident of Australia on 2 January 2002 and retained that fiscal status. Profit participation agreements and shareholders' agreements From about 1993 until 2010, GI operated employee profit participation plans. Certain employees of GI and its subsidiaries were selected to participate in a plan and become entitled to receive financial benefits. Employees' participation in the plans was in addition to their salary and any bonuses they were entitled to receive. Mr Blank's participation was initially governed by two "stapled" agreements – an agreement with GI entitled "Profit Participation Agreement" ("the PPA 1993") and an agreement with GH entitled "Shareholders' Agreement" ("the SA 1994"). They were "stapled" in that the validity of each of the PPA 1993 and the SA 1994 depended on the execution of the other agreement. The PPA 1993 was amended in 1996 and replaced prospectively in October 1999 by a new profit participation agreement with GI ("the PPA 1999"). It was common ground that the PPA 1993, the PPA 1993 (as amended in 1996) and the PPA 1999 were substantially similar. It is therefore necessary to turn to consider the terms of the PPA 1999.The PPA 1999 and the SA 1994 Under the PPA 1999, Mr Blank was granted a "Profit Participation", defined as "a participation in the results[[2]] of GI", in the form of (a) "Genussscheine" ("GS") and (b) a contractual claim[3]. [2]The PPA 1993 used the expression "future profits" rather than "results". [3]cl A.1 of the PPA 1999. GS are provided for by Art 657 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. The English translation of Art 657 relied on by the parties translated GS as "profit sharing certificates" and relevantly provided: "1 The articles of incorporation may foresee the creation of profit sharing certificates in favor of persons who are linked with the Company … as … employee or in a similar way. They must state the number of issued profit sharing certificates and the content of the rights attached thereto. 2 With the profit sharing certificates, the persons entitled may be granted claims only to a share of the balance sheet profit …3 The profit sharing certificate shall not have a par value; it shall neither be called participation certificate nor be issued against a contribution which is shown under the assets in the balance sheet." (emphasis added)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ
The Declaration mistakenly deleted elements of the pro-forma declaration contained in the IPPA 2005 and made it appear that the Amount was to be paid by GH when the Amount was in fact to be paid by GI[58]. Neither party suggested that this error was significant.[58]Blank v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 95 ATR 1 at 19 [39]; see also at 17-18 [36].Decisions below The primary judge (Edmonds J) held that the Amount was ordinary income because it was deferred compensation for services rendered by Mr Blank, as recorded in the IPPA 2005. His Honour rejected Mr Blank's contention that the allocation of the GS and the PPU were the reward for services and that the Amount was simply the realisation of the rights attached to the GS and the PPU[59]. [59]Blank v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 95 ATR 1 at 31-32 [94]-[97]. The primary judge also rejected the Commissioner's contentions that, even if the GS could be characterised as assets of Mr Blank (in the form of contractual rights), they were revenue assets and the gain on realisation of them was ordinary income under the second limb of Myer Emporium, and that the Amount was an ETP[60]. In separate reasons, the primary judge relevantly held that, in relation to the timing question, the first two instalments of the Amount were not derived in the 2007 income year[61]. [60]Blank v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 95 ATR 1 at 31 [93], 34 [105].[61]Blank v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2014) 98 ATR 379 at 388 [44]‑[45]. On appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, Kenny and Robertson JJ held that the Amount was assessable as ordinary income. Their Honours rejected the contention that the rights under the profit participation plans, or the PPU, were themselves a benefit provided in consideration of services to be provided by Mr Blank[62]. [62]Blank v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 329 ALR 213 at 235‑236 [84]-[85], 237 [92]. Pagone J, in dissent, held that the combined effect of the IPPA 2005 and the SA 2005 was to confer on Mr Blank "an entitlement like that of a shareholder"[63] in the form of an entitlement to GI's profits and that the Amount was therefore the realisation of those "entitlements" and a gain of a capital nature rather than ordinary income[64]. [63]Blank v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 329 ALR 213 at 252 [130].[64]Blank v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 329 ALR 213 at 258 [138], 260 [142]. The Full Court unanimously agreed with the primary judge on the timing question[65].[65]Blank v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 329 ALR 213 at 238 [96], 263 [146].Applicable law The arrangements in issue in this appeal, including Art 657 of the Swiss Code of Obligations and the Articles of GI and Glencore AG, have their foundation in Swiss law. Each profit participation plan was governed by, and to be construed and interpreted in accordance with, the substantive laws of Switzerland[66]. The parties conducted the matter below and in this Court on the agreed basis that the proper construction of those arrangements was to be determined according to Australian law[67].[66]See cl C.6 of the PPA 1993; cl C.8 of the PPA 1999; cl C.11 of the IPPA 2005.[67]See Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331 at 343 [16], 370 [116], 372 [125], 411 [249]; [2005] HCA 54.Issues on appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ