FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 187
Citation: Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 187 Appeal from: Sent v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 382 Parties: EDUARD CHRISTIAAN SENT v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File number: VID 363 of 2012 Judges: EMMETT, EDMONDS AND RARES JJ Date of judgment: 19 December 2012 Catchwords: INCOME TAX – whether a payment made to the appellant’s nominee in substitution for past and future bonus entitlements of the appellant under his employment agreement, to enable the nominee to take up shares for the appellant, was assessable income of the appellant pursuant to s 6-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – whether the appellant discharged the onus imposed by s 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1974 (Cth) of establishing that the assessment by the Commissioner of a 50% administrative penalty was excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZK; Sch 1: ss 284-75, 284-90
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 6-5Cases cited: Constable v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 86 CLR 402 distinguished
Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 72 CLR 634 referred toDate of hearing: 29 November 2012 Place: Sydney (heard in Melbourne) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 42 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Tisher Solicitor for the Appellant: Russell Kennedy Solicitors Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Sharpley Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 363 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: EDUARD CHRISTIAAN SENT
AppellantAND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGES:
EMMETT, EDMONDS AND RARES JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 363 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: EDUARD CHRISTIAAN SENT
AppellantAND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGES:
EMMETT, EDMONDS AND RARES JJ
DATE:
19 DECEMBER 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a judge of this Court –
(1)dismissing the appellant’s appeal (VID 310/2011) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”); and
(2)allowing the respondent’s (“Commissioner’s”) appeal (VID 313/2011) from the decision of the Tribunal; and affirming the Commissioner’s objection decision.
The appellant’s notice of appeal raised some 18 grounds of appeal by reference to 11 questions of law, but at the end of the day there were only two primary issues agitated on the appeal. Depending on how those primary issues are resolved, all issues underlying the grounds of appeal would be resolved or there would be a need to…
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- Case
- [2012] FCAFC 187
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the payment made to the appellant's nominee was assessable income of the appellant pursuant to section 6-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The court held that the payment was made to the Trustee at the request/direction of the appellant such as to trigger the provisions of section 6-5(4) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The court also found that the appellant did not discharge the onus imposed by section 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1974 (Cth) of establishing that the assessment by the Commissioner of a 50% administrative penalty was excessive. The court held that the penalty was not excessive and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court found that there was no evidence to support a finding that any loan or loans were made by the Trustee to the appellant to enable him to take up units in the Trust. The court found that at best for the appellant, he was indebted to the Trustee for $11,600,000 on account of the subscription price for the units. However, the conclusion was indisputably open that such an indebtedness did not accord or coincide with the contractual arrangements between Primelife and the appellant covering the issue of the units in the Trust. Moreover, the inference was undoubtedly open that, if such an indebtedness existed, it was never intended that the Trustee collect or enforce that indebtedness contrary to those contractual arrangements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The only observation we would make on this fact-finding process concerns the alleged loan or loans made by the Trustee to the appellant to enable him to take up units in the Trust:(1)In our view, there is no evidence to support a finding that any such loan or loans were made and the Tribunal made no such finding;(2)at best for the appellant, the Tribunal found that the appellant was indebted to the Trustee for $11,600,000 on account of the subscription price for the units; but(3)the conclusion is indisputably open that such an indebtedness did not accord or coincide with the contractual arrangements between Primelife and the appellant covering the issue of the units in the Trust. Moreover, the inference is undoubtedly open that, if such an indebtedness existed, it was never intended that the Trustee collect or enforce that indebtedness contrary to those contractual arrangements.CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSISFirst Primary Issue Following the execution of the Share Issue Deed on 2 October 2001 and Primelife’s shareholders’ approval on 30 November 2001, the appellant’s accrued and contingent bonus entitlements under his employment agreement had been replaced by an absolute entitlement to be issued with five million fully paid ordinary shares in Primelife. While the execution of the Deed and the shareholders’ approval did not give rise to a derivation of assessable income by the appellant, had Primelife subsequently issued the shares to the appellant or, at his direction, to a nominee, such an event would have given rise to a derivation of income by the appellant as a reward for services rendered or to be rendered. It was argued, understandably not with great force, that the appellant’s share entitlement was subject to the same contingencies as the bonus entitlements and that until these contingencies were satisfied by the appellant rendering the services under the employment agreement, there could be no derivation. We reject that. The share entitlement was, by the terms of the Share Issue Deed, free and clear of any contingency as to services provided or to be provided and was not defeasible or subject to any condition subsequent which could be described in the way of “claw back”, whatever that encompasses. There would be nothing to deny derivation, in the sense of the shares “coming home”, at the time they were issued. The derivation point aside, it is, in our view, beyond argument that the character of any such benefit in the form of the shares issued would be income; they would be as much a reward for services rendered or to be rendered as payment of the bonus entitlements. Why, it may be asked, should it be any different if Primelife, instead of issuing five million fully paid shares in its capital to the appellant or his nominee, pays the amount of $11,600,000 to the appellant or his nominee, as it did on or about 21 December 2001 by payment to the Trustee (see [20] above). Clearly, the answer is that it should make no difference. True it is that the payment is made to the Trustee, and not to the appellant, but on any view or level, the payment is made to the Trustee at the request/direction of the appellant such as to trigger the provisions of s 6-5(4) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (“the 1997 Act”).