Roguinski v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Roguinski v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1327

MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal refusing protection visa – whether Tribunal misconceived and misapplied the concept of “being persecuted”

WORDS & PHRASES – “being persecuted”

Migration Act 1958, s 430(1)(c), 476(1)

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 referred
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 discussed
Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council (1947) 47 SR(NSW) 416 discussed
The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 referred
Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (1989) 166 CLR 338 referred
Public Service Association of South Australia v Federation Clerks’ Union of Australia, South Australian Branch (1991) 173 CLR 132 referred
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 174 ALR 585 referred
R v Connell (1944) 69 CLR 407 discussed
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 175 ALR 585 followed
Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 855 followed
Kanagasabai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 205 referred
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred
Hagi-Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1156 followed

LEONID ROGUINSKI v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
VG 725 of 1998

KENNY J
17 SEPTEMBER 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 725 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

LEONID ROGUINSKI
Applicant

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 SEPTEMBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Tribunal made on 9 December 1998, affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa, be set aside.

2.The matter to which the decision relates be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination in accordance with law.

3.        The respondent pay the costs of and incidental to this application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 725 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

LEONID ROGUINSKI
Applicant

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

17 SEPTEMBER 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

introduction

  1. This is an application under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 9 December 1998, affirming a decision of the respondent, by his delegate, not to grant the applicant a protection visa. 

    background facts

  2. The applicant, Leonid Roguinski, was born on 5 November 1970.  He is a citizen of the Russian Federation, and of the Jewish faith.

  3. Mr…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1327
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Roguinski v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Leonid Roguinski, a Russian citizen and a Jew, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal, affirming the Minister's decision not to grant him a protection visa. The applicant claimed that he would face persecution in Russia due to his religion and thus, qualified for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958. The Tribunal, however, found that the applicant had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in Russia based on his religion. The primary legal issue was whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the applicant's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution due to his Jewish faith. The court examined the concept of "persecution" under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied this concept to the facts of the case. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had erred by not adequately considering the evidence of anti-Semitic incidents in Russia, and that this amounted to jurisdictional error.

The court considered the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf, which clarified that s 476(1)(b), (c), and (e) of the Act permitted the invocation of the common law concept of jurisdictional error. The court noted that if the Tribunal had asked the wrong question, ignored relevant material, or relied on irrelevant material, it would have exceeded its authority, resulting in a jurisdictional error. However, the court found that the Tribunal had not made any such errors. The Tribunal had correctly outlined the legal principles governing the concept of persecution and had considered the available country information. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error, and therefore, the application for judicial review should be dismissed.

The court ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be upheld, and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to this application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Tribunal made on 9 December 1998, affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa, be set aside.

2. The matter to which the decision relates be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination in accordance with law.

3. The respondent pay the costs of and incidental to this application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 9 December 1998, affirming a decision of the respondent, by his delegate, not to grant the applicant a protection visa. background facts The applicant, Leonid Roguinski, was born on 5 November 1970. He is a citizen of the Russian Federation, and of the Jewish faith. Mr Roguinski first arrived in Australia on 19 June 1993 as a participant in an exchange program between the Australian Department of Primary Industry and Energy and the Russian Rural Students Union. He left Australia on 7 August 1993. He returned on 30 April 1995, holding a fellowship with the Australian Program of Training for Eurasia and a visa valid until 31 December 1995. From 28 December 1995, he held four Business (Short Stay) visas, the last of which expired on 9 December 1996. On 5 December 1996, he applied for a protection visa. On 14 April 1997, a delegate of the respondent refused Mr Roguinski’s protection visa application. On 21 April 1997, he applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. He was notified, by letter dated 9 December 1998, of the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision. The decision under review in this proceeding is the Tribunal’s decision that it is not satisfied that Mr Roguinski has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the Russian Federation by reason of his religion. The applicant has claimed that anti-Semitism is rife in Russia; and that “because of my religion the only thing I could expect is continuous moral and physical harassment from the populace and government authorities”. legislative framework Section 36 of the Act provides:(1)There is a class of visas to be known as protection visas. (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.The Refugees Convention is defined in s 5(1) as the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and the Refugees Protocol, as the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967. Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 makes further provision for protection visas. Clause 866.221 of Schedule 2 provides that it is a criterion for a protection visa that the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Protection obligations arise in relation to a person who falls within the definition of “refugee” in the Convention as amended by the Protocol (collectively, “the Convention”). A refugee is defined in Article 1A(2) of the Convention as any person who:owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country … .reasons for the tribunal’s decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J
Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 makes further provision for protection visas. Clause 866.221 of Schedule 2 provides that it is a criterion for a protection visa that the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Protection obligations arise in relation to a person who falls within the definition of “refugee” in the Convention as amended by the Protocol (collectively, “the Convention”). A refugee is defined in Article 1A(2) of the Convention as any person who:owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country … .reasons for the tribunal’s decision The Tribunal began its reasons for decision by outlining the applicable legal principles in terms that are familiar to this Court. In discussing what is meant by “persecution”, the Tribunal stated:Not every threat of harm or interference with a person’s rights for a Convention reason constitutes ‘being persecuted’. Mason CJ referred to persecution as requiring ‘some serious punishment or penalty or some significant detriment or disadvantage’ (Chan at 388). Harm or threat of harm as part of a course of selective harassment of a person, whether individually or as a member of a group which is subjected to such harassment, amounts to persecution if done for a Convention reason. In appropriate cases it may include single acts of oppression, serious violations of human rights, and measures ‘in disregard’ of human dignity. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. The Tribunal referred to the published information on Russia that it had considered and “noted” “[f]rom this evidence” that:[T]here was an apparent paradox in the attitude to Jews in the post-Soviet Russian Federation. On the one hand, since the end of the Soviet era, Judaism has been recognised officially as one of the five religions operating in Russia and there is more freedom to practise the Jewish religion openly. … On the other hand, the strain of anti-Semitism which has been a factor in Russian and Soviet history has received a public boost with the new found freedom of expression in Russia. Following this statement, the Tribunal quoted passages from four publications: DFAT cable MS 11857 (19 November 1997) “Russia – Treatment of Jews in Khabarovsk”; UNHCR (1996) “Russia: The Status of Jews in the Post-Soviet Era, Current Situation”; US Federal News Service (27 February 1996) “Testimony before House International Relations Committee on Anti-Semitism in Russia by Paul A Goble and Alla Gerber”; and the Anti Semitism World Report 1998. Immediately thereafter, the Tribunal stated:The Tribunal concludes that, in general, anti-[S]emitism does not manifest itself as persecution of individuals; the country information cited above does indicates [sic] that there have been individual incidents of harassment.The Tribunal made no further analysis of the country information that it had set out in its reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

The respondent’s case was, in substance, that the applicant had not identified any reviewable error. The applicant was, so the respondent submitted, inviting the Court merely to take a different view from the Tribunal about the evidence and the facts and, in particular, about the extent to which persecutory acts were experienced by Jews in the Russian Federation. By so doing, the applicant was inviting the Court impermissibly to engage in merits review.consideration of the parties’ submissionsConcept of Jurisdictional Error In this case, the applicant relied heavily on certain observations in the judgments of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1. The High Court, in Yusuf, overruled the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469. The High Court held, contrary to Singh, that s 430(1)(c) of the Act merely obliged the Tribunal to set out its findings on those questions of fact which it considered to be material to the decision that it made, and the reasons it had for reaching that decision: 180 ALR 1 at [34] per Gaudron J, [68] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, and [217] per Callinan J. The applicant did not, however, rely on this aspect of the case. He relied instead on the proposition in the joint judgment (and in the separate judgment of Gaudron J) that s 476(1)(b), (c) and (e) permitted an applicant for review under Part 8 of the Act to invoke the common law concept of jurisdictional error. At common law, the term “jurisdictional error” covers a number of kinds of error, including asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. As the High Court said in Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179:At least in the absence of a contrary intent in the statute or other instrument which established it, an administrative tribunal lacks authority either to authoritatively determine questions of the law or to make an order or decision otherwise than in accordance with the law. … If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it. After noting that the limitation in s 476(3) of the Act applied to only one ground of review in s 476(1), the joint judgment in Yusuf stated at [83]-[84]:[T]here is no reason to give either para (b) or para (c) of s 476(1) some meaning narrower than the meaning conveyed by the ordinary usage of the words of each of those paragraphs. In particular, it is important to recognise that, if the tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material, it ‘exceeds its authority or powers’. If that is so, the person who purported to make the decision ‘did not have jurisdiction’ to make the decision he or she made, and the decision ‘was not authorised’ by the Act. Moreover, in such a case, the decision may well, within the meaning of para (e) of s 476(1), involve an error of law which involves an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found. … No doubt it must be recognised that the ground stated in para (e) is not described simply as making an error of law. The qualification added is that the error of law involves an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found. That qualification emphasises that factual error by the tribunal will not found review. Adopting what was said in Craig, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion is not to make an error of law of the kind with which para (e) deals. That having been said, the addition of the qualification to para (e) is no reason to read the ground as a whole otherwise than according to the ordinary meaning of its language. If the tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material in such a way as affects the exercise of its powers, that will very often reveal that it has made an error in its understanding of the applicable law or has failed to apply that law correctly to the facts it found. If that is so, the ground in s 476(1)(e) is made out. See also [4] and [38]-[44] in the judgments of the Chief Justice and Gaudron J respectively.