FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Roguinski v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1327
MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal refusing protection visa – whether Tribunal misconceived and misapplied the concept of “being persecuted”
WORDS & PHRASES – “being persecuted”
Migration Act 1958, s 430(1)(c), 476(1)
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 referred
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 discussed
Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council (1947) 47 SR(NSW) 416 discussed
The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 referred
Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (1989) 166 CLR 338 referred
Public Service Association of South Australia v Federation Clerks’ Union of Australia, South Australian Branch (1991) 173 CLR 132 referred
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 174 ALR 585 referred
R v Connell (1944) 69 CLR 407 discussed
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 175 ALR 585 followed
Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 855 followed
Kanagasabai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 205 referred
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred
Hagi-Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1156 followedLEONID ROGUINSKI v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
VG 725 of 1998KENNY J
17 SEPTEMBER 2001
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VG 725 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
LEONID ROGUINSKI
ApplicantAND:
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 SEPTEMBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Tribunal made on 9 December 1998, affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa, be set aside.
2.The matter to which the decision relates be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination in accordance with law.
3. The respondent pay the costs of and incidental to this application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VG 725 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
LEONID ROGUINSKI
ApplicantAND:
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
17 SEPTEMBER 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
introduction
This is an application under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 9 December 1998, affirming a decision of the respondent, by his delegate, not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
background facts
The applicant, Leonid Roguinski, was born on 5 November 1970. He is a citizen of the Russian Federation, and of the Jewish faith.
Mr…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 1327
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf, which clarified that s 476(1)(b), (c), and (e) of the Act permitted the invocation of the common law concept of jurisdictional error. The court noted that if the Tribunal had asked the wrong question, ignored relevant material, or relied on irrelevant material, it would have exceeded its authority, resulting in a jurisdictional error. However, the court found that the Tribunal had not made any such errors. The Tribunal had correctly outlined the legal principles governing the concept of persecution and had considered the available country information. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error, and therefore, the application for judicial review should be dismissed.
The court ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be upheld, and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to this application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Tribunal made on 9 December 1998, affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa, be set aside.
2. The matter to which the decision relates be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination in accordance with law.
3. The respondent pay the costs of and incidental to this application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
The respondent’s case was, in substance, that the applicant had not identified any reviewable error. The applicant was, so the respondent submitted, inviting the Court merely to take a different view from the Tribunal about the evidence and the facts and, in particular, about the extent to which persecutory acts were experienced by Jews in the Russian Federation. By so doing, the applicant was inviting the Court impermissibly to engage in merits review.consideration of the parties’ submissionsConcept of Jurisdictional Error In this case, the applicant relied heavily on certain observations in the judgments of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1. The High Court, in Yusuf, overruled the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469. The High Court held, contrary to Singh, that s 430(1)(c) of the Act merely obliged the Tribunal to set out its findings on those questions of fact which it considered to be material to the decision that it made, and the reasons it had for reaching that decision: 180 ALR 1 at [34] per Gaudron J, [68] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, and [217] per Callinan J. The applicant did not, however, rely on this aspect of the case. He relied instead on the proposition in the joint judgment (and in the separate judgment of Gaudron J) that s 476(1)(b), (c) and (e) permitted an applicant for review under Part 8 of the Act to invoke the common law concept of jurisdictional error. At common law, the term “jurisdictional error” covers a number of kinds of error, including asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. As the High Court said in Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179:At least in the absence of a contrary intent in the statute or other instrument which established it, an administrative tribunal lacks authority either to authoritatively determine questions of the law or to make an order or decision otherwise than in accordance with the law. … If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it. After noting that the limitation in s 476(3) of the Act applied to only one ground of review in s 476(1), the joint judgment in Yusuf stated at [83]-[84]:[T]here is no reason to give either para (b) or para (c) of s 476(1) some meaning narrower than the meaning conveyed by the ordinary usage of the words of each of those paragraphs. In particular, it is important to recognise that, if the tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material, it ‘exceeds its authority or powers’. If that is so, the person who purported to make the decision ‘did not have jurisdiction’ to make the decision he or she made, and the decision ‘was not authorised’ by the Act. Moreover, in such a case, the decision may well, within the meaning of para (e) of s 476(1), involve an error of law which involves an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found. … No doubt it must be recognised that the ground stated in para (e) is not described simply as making an error of law. The qualification added is that the error of law involves an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found. That qualification emphasises that factual error by the tribunal will not found review. Adopting what was said in Craig, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion is not to make an error of law of the kind with which para (e) deals. That having been said, the addition of the qualification to para (e) is no reason to read the ground as a whole otherwise than according to the ordinary meaning of its language. If the tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material in such a way as affects the exercise of its powers, that will very often reveal that it has made an error in its understanding of the applicable law or has failed to apply that law correctly to the facts it found. If that is so, the ground in s 476(1)(e) is made out. See also [4] and [38]-[44] in the judgments of the Chief Justice and Gaudron J respectively.