Re: Opposition by Accolade Wines Australia Limited and Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark applications 1926574 (33) – P.N. BURGE & SONS, 1928531 (33) – BURGE + KIN (fancy) and 1967592 (33) –...
[2020] ATMO 146
•1 September 2020
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Accolade Wines Australia Limited and Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark applications 1926574 (33) – P.N. BURGE & SONS, 1928531 (33) – BURGE + KIN (fancy) and 1967592 (33) – WALKER BURGE – in the name of Burge Family Wine Estates Pty Ltd
Delegate: Nicholas Smith Representation: Opponent: Norton Rose Fullbright Australia
Applicant: Collison & CoDecision: 2020 ATMO 146
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - Section 52 opposition: ss 42(b), 44, 60 and 62A considered – none established – trade mark to proceed to registrationBackground
This decision concerns an opposition brought by Accolade Wines Australia Limited and Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd (collectively the ‘Opponent’) pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) to the registration of the trade marks (‘Trade Marks’) which are the subject of the applications detailed below in the name of Burge Family Wine Estates Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’):
Application Number:
1926574
Filing Date:
22 May 2018
Goods:
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages (except beer)
(‘Applicant’s Goods’)
Trade Mark:
P.N. BURGE & SONS
(‘PN Mark’)
Application Number:
1928531
Filing Date:
29 May 2018
Goods and Services:
Applicant’s Goods
Trade Mark:
(‘Kin Mark’)
Application Number:
1967592
Filing Date:
8 November 2018
Goods and Services:
Applicant’s Goods
Trade Mark:
WALKER BURGE
(‘Walker Mark’)
2. Following advertisements in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks of the Trade Marks’ acceptance for possible registration, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose in respect of the PN and Kin Mark on 29 November 2018 and the Walker Mark on 11 April 2019. The Opponent then filed Statements of Grounds and Particulars in respect of the PN and Kin Mark on 14 December 2018 and the Walker Mark on 3 May 2019 (‘SGPs’). The SGPs contain similar particulars and raise grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44, 59, 60 and 62A of the Act. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend in respect of the PN and Kin Mark on 5 February 2019 and the Walker Mark on 5 June 2019.
Evidence
The Opponent filed the following evidence in support of its opposition:
·In respect of PN and Kin Mark, a Declaration made on 8 May 2019 by Andrew Stark, the General Manager, Marketing and Category of Accolade Wines Australia, the parent company of Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd, with Annexures AS-1 to AS-83 (‘Stark Declaration’).
·In respect of the Walker Mark, a Declaration made on 6 September 2019 by Andrew Stark that is substantively identical to the Stark Declaration.
4. The Applicant filed the following evidence in answer:
·In respect of PN and Kin Mark, a Declaration made on 21 August 2019 by Amelia Walker Thomas, a director and secretary of the Applicant, with Exhibits AWT-1 to AWT-7 (‘Thomas 1’).
·In respect of the Walker Mark, a Declaration made on 20 September 2019 by Amelia Walker Thomas with Exhibits AWT-1 to AWT-5 (‘Thomas 2’).
The Opponent filed the following evidence in reply in respect of the Trade Marks:
·Declaration made on 23 October 2019 by Alyson Kathleen Poole, Senior Associate at Norton Rose Fulbright, the Opponent’s representative, with Annexures AKP-1 to AKP-13 (‘Poole Declaration’).
The entirety of the Stark Declaration, including publicly available information such as the Declarant’s connection to the Opponent and the use of the Opponent’s Trade Marks in marketing material, is claimed to be confidential. I adopt the approach of the Delegate in Source Homeloans Pty Ltd v Coles Group Ltd, who when in receipt of a similar claim (in that case in respect of the then opponent) stated:
The confidentiality claim obviously extends to the whole of the evidence led in support of the opposition. It is not clear to me how I could decide this matter without discussing the evidence the opponent has served and filed in support of its opposition. The onus in these proceedings is on the opponent to establish its grounds of opposition, at least to my satisfaction. Seemingly barred from any discussion of the opponent’s statements and exhibits and the weight that I attach to them if I were to lend credence to the claim, my hands would appear to have been effectively tied. Prima facie, the easiest way out of the dilemma would be to accede to the opponent’s wishes and find that it has not established its opposition. Thus, if I were to take Mr Peter’s request (made within several declarations) at face value, that would be the end of these matters.
This position, obviously, is extreme, since the opponent has filed this evidence in support of its opposition and must expect the evidence to be discussed and weighed. It will be sufficient for me to say, in setting out my reasons for my decision, that there are arguably commercially sensitive matters in the evidence that I do not need to discuss in detail (and, if I do, my consolation lies in the fact that the opponent in not being specific in its request has brought the problem upon itself). None the less, the evidence of the parties as a whole satisfies me of various things, which I will set out under the appropriate headings below.[1]
[1] Source Homeloans Pty Ltd v Coles Group Ltd [2008] ATMO 17, [5]-[6].
I note that, if a party considers a piece of information to be commercially sensitive it must identify that information with specificity. The Applicant has identified monetary figures as being of a confidential nature, and I will treat them as confidential. However with respect to the remaining aspects of the declaration if, in my summary of the Applicant’s evidence, I have disclosed information that is sensitive, then this is a problem that has arisen by that party not specifically identifying that information as sensitive. In particular in my decision I have to discuss the existence and nature of the restraint set out in a confidential Deed Poll though I have limited my discussion to any terms that are directly relevant to my decision.
8. Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended the parties were given an opportunity to request a hearing or to file written submissions. On 22 November 2019 the Applicant requested an oral hearing. The matter was initially set down for a hearing in Canberra on 21 July 2020 but was subsequently delayed until 28 July 2020. In line with usual practice, an email was sent to the parties on 5 May 2020 which contained a schedule for the provision of written summaries of submissions to be filed prior to the hearing. The Opponent filed written submissions on 7 July 2020 (‘Opponent’s Submissions’). The Applicant filed written submissions on 14 July 2020 (‘Applicant’s Submissions’). The hearing was held by video conference with Michael Hall SC and Sam Hallahan of Counsel representing the Applicant and Laura Thomas of Counsel representing the Opponent.
9. I am a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks and I am to decide the opposition as required by s 55 of the Act which provides that, unless the proceedings are discontinued, dismissed, or have lapsed under s 54A the Registrar must, at the end, decide:
(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or
(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;
having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.
In doing so I take account of the written record comprised of the materials mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and the oral submissions made by the parties at the hearing.
The Opponent
The Opponent consists of two winemaking companies, Accolade Wines Australia Limited and Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd. Accolade Wines Australia Limited acquired Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd on 2 February 2015.
11. The Opponent is the owner of the trade marks listed in Annexure A (‘Opponent’s Trade Marks’). The most relevant of these marks is Trade Mark 828529 consisting of the word mark GRANT BURGE registered for wine in Class 33 with a priority date of 22 March 2000 (‘Grant Burge Mark’). The goods for which the Opponent’s Trade Marks are registered are collectively referred to as the ‘Opponent’s Goods’.
12. The relevant claims/statements in the Stark Declaration can be summarised as follows:
· Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd was established in 1979 by Grant Walker Burge and Helen Margaret Burge (‘Parents’) and has since 1988 been involved in the production, sale and distribution of wines under the Grant Burge Mark.
· The Opponent’s Trade Marks are used on the Opponent’s wines, in marketing material, through the Opponent’s online store at through the Opponent’s wine club and cellar door operations
· The Opponent advertises its wine sold under the Opponent’s Trade Marks through a variety of traditional methods as well as a targeted content advertising campaign and a web presence and social media campaign. The Opponent’s Facebook page has 13,000 followers and its twitter page has 6,600 followers.
· The Opponent has won numerous awards for its wine sold under the Grant Burge Mark, indeed it has received over 580 trophies, medals and awards since 2006 indicating the notoriety and high regard the Opponent’s wine is held in the industry.
· As noted above the previous owners of Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd, prior to its acquisition by Accolade Wines Australia Limited, were the Parents, who are the parents of Trent Hamilton Walker Burge and Amelia Walker Thomas (‘Children’), the founders and directors of the Applicant. As part of the purchase the Parents entered into a deed poll of restraint on 30 January 2015.
13. The Annexures to the Stark Declaration display examples of the use of the Opponent’s Trade Marks on wine as well as marketing material, such as newsletters, vintage release programs and product portfolios. The Annexures also contain examples of the use of the Grant Burge Mark by third party media properties, such as reviews of the Opponent’s wine products. The Opponent has also provided examples of major retailers and significant restaurants offering the Opponent’s wine products. The Opponent provides confidential sales figures for the sales of wine bearing the Opponent’s Trade Marks from 2014 to 2018 and related promotional expenses. The Opponent’s sales figures are quite impressive, though the Opponent’s promotional spend is limited. The Opponent does provide a number of examples of print, signage, billboard, point of sale and stall advertising displays usually involving the Grant Burge Mark in combination with another of the Opponent’s Trade Marks. The Annexures also provide examples of food and wine and other promotional events where the Opponents wine is featured.
14. The Annexures to the Stark Declaration also include the deed poll of restraint entered into by the Parents (‘Deed’). The relevant provisions of the Deed are that Parents agree that they will not use or authorize any person to use ‘Burge’ in relation to the sale of wine, including in any company name or trade mark. The Deed also requires the Parents to procure the same agreement from all their Affiliates. For the purposes of the restraint referred to above, Affiliates are defined as including the immediate family (which would include the Children) provided that such persons may use ‘Burge’ when such use is part of the full name of the person and ‘Burge’ is proceeded by their first name.
15. The Annexures to the Stark Declaration also include an article by ‘the Real Review’ dated November 19, 2019 on Trent Burge which commences with ‘What do you do when your dad is as famous as Grant Burge and has sold his name to another company? Grant can’t use his name for any future wine venture, nor can his family… But Trent Burge wanted to do his own wine thing, and his solution was to name his brand Barossa Boy.’ It also states that ‘Being a Burge is a two-edged sword. Trent is a sixth generation winemaker, but he can’t use that famous surname.’
16. The Poole Declaration consists of evidence, mostly in the form of annexures, that the Applicant’s directors are now selling wine under their personal names, being Amelia Burge and Amelia & Trent Burge.
The Applicant
The Applicant is an Australian winemaking company founded and operated by the Children.
18. The relevant claims/statements in Thomas 1 and 2 can be summarised as follows:
· The Applicant was founded by the directors as part of their plan to develop a number of different wines based around their story as siblings. The Applicant was incorporated in 2016 and the directors wanted to adopt names which identified the Children as the owners of the company and distinguish the Applicant from the various other Burge brands used by the Opponent.
· The PN Mark reflects the declarant’s great grandfather’s original trading name when he started his wine business in 1928. The Kin Mark reflects the fresh identity that the Children wanted to create and one that their respective children may wish to be involved in. The Walker Mark combined the Children’s surname with their shared middle name Walker.
· The declarant is aware that as part of the sale of Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd, that the Parents entered into the Deed. The Children are not parties to the Deed and were never officeholders or shareholders of Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd. The Children were never involved in any negotiations surrounding the sale of Grant Burge Wines Pty Ltd to Accolade.
Notably the Opponent provides no evidence as to whether either of the Children had entered into an agreement with the Parents to give effect to the restraint in the Deed.
Grounds of Opposition, Onus and Standard of Proof
As indicated above in the SGP the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44, 59, 60 and 62A of the Act but in submissions indicated that it does not press the s 59 ground. To successfully oppose the application the Opponent needs to establish one of the nominated grounds.
21. The onus of proof in an opposition rests upon the Opponent.[2] The relevant standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.[3] The date at which the rights of the parties are to be determined is 22 May 2018, 29 May 2018, and 8 November 2018 (‘relevant dates’), being both the filing and priority dates of the respective applications in Australia.[4]
[2] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32].
[3] Following Pfizer Products Inc v Karam (2006) 70 IPR 599, [6]-[26], and Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133].
[4] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 595, see also s 29(1) Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 29(1).
Discussion
Section 44
The relevant provisions of the Act with respect to the ground of opposition pursuant to s 44 are reproduced below:
Section 44 - Identical etc. trade marks
(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant's goods) must be rejected if:
(a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:
(i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and
(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.
Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 2: For similar goods see subsection 14(1).(2)…
(3)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied:
(a)that there has been honest concurrent use of the 2 trade marks; or
(b)that, because of other circumstances, it is proper to do so;
the Registrar may accept the application for the registration of the applicant's trade mark subject to any conditions or limitations that the Registrar thinks fit to impose. If the applicant's trade mark has been used only in a particular area, the limitations may include that the use of the trade mark is to be restricted to that particular area.
Note: For limitations see section 6.
(4)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied that the applicant, or the applicant and the predecessor in title of the applicant, have continuously used the applicant's trade mark for a period:
(a)beginning before the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of:
(i) the similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) the similar services or closely related goods; and
(b)ending on the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark;
the Registrar may not reject the application because of the existence of the other trade mark.
Note 1: An authorised use of the trade mark by a person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark (see subsection 7(3)).
Note 2: For predecessor in title see section 6.
Note 3: For priority date see section 12.Section 10 - Definition of deceptively similar
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
23. To successfully oppose an application pursuant to s 44 of the Act the Opponent must establish the requirements of s 44(1), i.e. that at least one of the trade marks upon which it relies, being a trade mark registered by a person other than the Applicant:
· has a priority date which is earlier than that of the relevant Trade Mark (‘the first requirement’);
· is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the relevant Trade Mark (‘the second requirement’); and
· is in respect of similar goods, and/or services which are closely related to, the Applicant’s Goods (‘the third requirement’).
In the event that each of these requirements is satisfied by the Opponent it may still be possible for the Registrar to accept the application (or allow it to proceed to registration) if the Registrar is satisfied, pursuant to ss 44(3) and 44(4) of the Act, that there has been honest concurrent use of the relevant Trade Mark, other circumstances which would make registration of the relevant Trade Mark proper, or that the Applicant has continuously used the relevant Trade Mark beginning before the priority date of the Opponent’s relied upon mark. The EIA provides no evidence of use of the Trade Marks or other circumstances and hence there will be no need to consider these subclauses if ss 44(1) is established in respect of any of the Trade Marks.
The Opponent has particularised the ground of opposition in the SGP by reference to the Opponent’s Trade Marks. Each of the Opponent’s Trade Marks has a priority date that is earlier than the priority date of each of the Trade Marks and is registered for similar goods as the Trade Marks, i.e. alcoholic beverages or wine. The first and third requirements are satisfied.
Substantially identical and/or deceptively similar
For the purpose of the second requirement, it is only necessary to consider the Grant Burge Mark and trade marks numbered 1701649 and 1465752 (‘s44 Marks’) as they are the most similar to the Trade Marks, the others contain extra wording or stylisation that distinguishes them further. If I find the second requirement not satisfied by the above marks, I would reach the same conclusion with respect to the remainder of the Opponent’s Trade Marks.
I will now consider whether any of the Trade Marks are substantially identical with any of the s44 Marks. When considering ‘substantial identity’ in Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd Windeyer J said:
In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.[5]
[5] (1963) 109 CLR 407, 414.
28. The Trade Marks and the s44 Marks are set out below:
Trade Marks
P.N. BURGE & SONS WALKER BURGE
s 44 Marks
GRANT BURGE
29. On a side by side comparison there are clear differences between the respective trade marks, indeed the only common element is the shared use of the word ‘Burge’. The differences are sufficient for me to conclude that the respective trade marks are not substantially identical. I move then to consider whether the Trade Marks and the s44 Marks are deceptively similar.
30. The principal authority for guidance in determining whether trade marks are deceptively similar also comes from the judgment of Windeyer J in Shell Co (Aust) Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd:
On the question of deceptive similarity, a different comparison must be made from that which is necessary when substantial identity is in question. The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity.
Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant’s [trade mark].[6]
[6] Ibid [13].
31. Jacobson J in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v Kingsgate Hotel Group Pty Ltd summarised the principles of deceptive similarity with reference to the authorities as follows:
Without seeking to reformulate the various statements of principle stated in the Full Court authorities, it is sufficient for present purposes to identify the critical elements which seem to me to inform the issue of deceptive similarity in the present case. There are nine elements.
First, the judgment of likelihood of deception is a practical one. It requires an assessment of the effect of the challenged mark on the minds of potential customers: Woolworths[7] at [49]; Australian Woollen Mills[8] at 658.
Second, the question of deceptive similarity is not to be decided by a side-by-side comparison. It is to be determined by a comparison of the impression based on recollection of the opponent’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have, and the impression that those persons would get from the opposed trade mark: Crazy Ron’s[9] at [73]; Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd [1963] HCA 66; (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 415 per Windeyer J.
Third, allowance must be made for imperfect recollection: Crazy Ron’s at [74].
Fourth, the effect of the spoken description must be considered: Woolworths at [49]; Crazy Ron’s at [75]; Australian Woollen Mills at 658.
Fifth, it is necessary to show a real tangible danger of deception or confusion: Woolworths at [43] and [50]; Crazy Ron’s at [76]; Southern Cross Refrigerating[10] at 594 – 595.
Sixth, a trade mark is likely to ‘cause confusion’ if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are ‘caused to wonder’ whether the two products come from the same source: Woolworths at [50]; Southern Cross Refrigerating Co at 595. This test sets a lower threshold than that which is required to establish that conduct is likely to mislead or deceive under s 18 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth): see McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v McDonald's System of Australia Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 159; (1980) 33 ALR 394 at 398 per Smithers J.
Seventh, all surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration. The circumstances include those in which the marks will be used, and in which the goods or services will be bought and sold, as well as the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services: Woolworths at [50]; Crazy Ron’s at [86] – [89]; Southern Cross Refrigerating at 595.
Eighth, the question of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is not to be answered by reference to the manner in which a party has used the mark, but by reference to what an applicant can do. That is to say, the use to which it can properly put the mark if registration is obtained: Woolworths at [50]; Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc [1973] HCA 43; (1973) 129 CLR 353 at 362 per Mason J.
Ninth, if a registered trade mark includes words which can be regarded as an ‘essential feature’ of the mark, another mark that incorporates those words may cause a tangible danger of deception or confusion by reason of consumers retaining an imperfect recollection of those words: Crazy Ron’s at [79]. However, care must be taken to not too readily characterise words in a composite trade mark as an ‘essential feature’ because to do so may effectively convert a composite mark into something different: Crazy Ron’s at [100].[11]
[7] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020.
[8] Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd [1937] HCA 51; (1937) 58 CLR 641.
[9] Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196; (2004) 209 ALR 1.
[10] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592.
[11] [2012] FCA 1022, [38]-[46].
The Opponent’s Submissions on this point focus on the fact that the Trade Marks and the s44 Marks each share the common element ‘Burge’, which is a surname, and in the context of the Applicant’s Goods, the wine industry features many examples of wine brands comprising a surname, such as Penfolds, Lindemans, Blass and Henschke. The Opponent submits that the surname ‘Burge’ is not a common surname like Smith or Jones and that the addition of the additional elements to each of the Trade Marks will not prevent consumers from being caused to wonder whether the Applicant’s Goods sold under any one of the Trade Marks come from the same source as the wine sold under the s44 Marks.
When considering the s44 Marks it is appropriate to consider each in turn. I find that trade mark 1465752, being is not deceptively similar to any of the Trade Marks. Trade mark 1465752 consists of a distinctive device that refers to various members of the extended Burge family and their dates of birth. While there is some conceptual similarity to the Kin Mark, the significant visual and aural differences between this mark and each of the Trade Marks is such that I consider that there is no realistic prospect of confusion between these marks.
Next, I consider trade mark 1701649 being . While it is appropriate to give less weight to the words ‘wines’ and ‘Australia’ when comparing the Trade Marks to the trade mark depicted above, the presence of the device element in trade mark 1701649 creates a significant visual distinction between this mark and each of the Trade Marks, which are also, due to the presence of the additional elements (being ‘P.N. … & Sons’, ‘+ kin’ and ‘walker’) clearly aurally and conceptually different.
The Opponent’s strongest arguments rest upon a comparison between the Grant Burge Mark and the Trade Marks, however I am unpersuaded that, given the nature of the Applicant’s Goods, the Grant Burge Mark is deceptively similar to any of the Trade Marks. The Applicant’s Submissions, which I broadly accept, is that the connotation of the Grant Burge Mark is that the wine produced under this mark is made by, or connected to, this particular person. The connotation produced by the Trade Marks is that this wine is produced by a different person (Walker Burge), or a different group of people (P.N. Burge & Sons, which brings to mind a person called PN Burge going in business with their sons and Burge + Kin, which brings in mind a person with the surname Burge, going into business with their family). Combined with the obvious visual and aural differences between the Grant Burge Mark and the Trade Marks (not least that the Grant Burge mark contains the first word ‘Grant’), the result is that there is no realistic prospect of confusion between these marks.
While the Opponent notes the case of Foster’s Wine Estates Ltd v Serafino Wines Pty Ltd[12] in which the then applicant’s trade mark SERAFINO MAGLIERI was deceptively similar to the opponent’s trade mark MAGLIERI, such a case can be clearly distinguished from the present case because in that case the MAGLERI mark relied on was a surname and hence consumers may have considered SERAFINO MAGLIERI the full name of the individual behind the MAGLIERI Mark. In the present case the Grant Burge Mark denotes an individual (not a surname); the Trade Mark denotes other individuals or family groups and hence there is not the same prospect of confusion arising from conceptual similarity[13].
[12] [2010] ATMO 81.
[13] The Panel notes that consumers may see the respective trade marks and think that the producers of the Applicant’s Goods are members of the same family as the goods sold under the Grant Burge Mark. That is not a determining factor – the respective marks clearly denote that the Applicant’s Goods are being produced from different trade sources to that of the Grant Burge Mark and hence they are not confusingly similar.
I find that the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition under s 44.
Section 60
Section 60 of the Act is reproduced below:
Section 60 - Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia
The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:
(a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and
(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
To establish a ground of opposition under s 60 an opponent must demonstrate that as at the relevant dates there was another trade mark which had acquired a reputation in Australia amongst a significant or substantial number of persons in the relevant market such that use of the trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.[14]
[14] The present paragraph and the following paragraphs summarizing the requirements under s 60 of the Act are paraphrased from the decision of the Registrar’s Delegate in Australian Boutique Markets Pty Ltd v Rachael Zelensky and Jeffrey Zelensky [2013] ATMO 97.
In McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick, Kenny J considered what is intended by the word ‘reputation’ as used in s 60. Her Honour consulted the Macquarie Dictionary and on the basis of the definition provided concluded that it was ‘the recognition of the [trade mark] by the public generally’.[15] Her Honour quoted with approval the following words of Lockhart J in Re ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd:
[R]eputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements on television or radio, or in magazines and newspapers within the forum. It may be established by showing constant travel of people between other countries and the forum and that people within the forum, (whether residents there or persons simply visiting there from other countries) are exposed to the goods of the overseas owner …[16]
[15] [2000] FCA 1335, [81].
[16] (1992) 33 FCR 302, 343.
On the subject of reputation Kenny J also referred to the Hugo Boss decision, where the Registrar’s delegate observed:
[I]t is true that the assessment of the reputation of a trade mark goes far beyond mere examination of sales or turnover of goods sold under that trade mark and contemplation of the advertising and promotional figures.
As regards a trade mark, its reputation derives both from the quantum of sales under that mark and also its esteem, or image, projected by that trade mark. The quantum of sales, advertising and promotion contributes to the ‘recognition’ component of the trade mark’s reputation. The credit, image and values projected by a trade mark attaches to the ‘esteem’ component of the reputation as do the public events and other trader’s marks with which [the] owner of the trade marks in question chooses to associate the trade marks via sponsorships, cross-promotions, ‘contra deals’ and so forth.
It follows that a trade mark used in relation to goods with comparatively low sales may have a high and strong reputation by virtue of the high credit or esteem in which it is held, or, conversely, that a trade mark which has very high sales may have a strong reputation notwithstanding the lack of esteem that attaches to it. The particular popular images, or sets of values, that attach to the trade mark are also, therefore, important parts of the reputation of the trade mark and may be as strong an associative force in the minds of the public as the association of the trade marks with the goods or services themselves.[17]
[17] Hugo Boss AG v Jackson International Trading Co Kurt D Bruhl Gesellschaft MbH & Co KG (1999) 47 IPR 423, 426.
As stated above, in assessing reputation under s 60, what constitutes a significant or substantial number of persons in the relevant market must be considered. The case of Le Cordon Bleu BV v Cordon Bleu International Ltee[18] was decided under s 28(a) of the (now repealed) Trade Marks Act 1955. That provision did not refer to ‘reputation’ at all, only that use of the impugned trade mark would be ‘likely to deceive or cause confusion’. Nevertheless, the words of Heerey J provide some guidance:
What is ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ will depend on the nature of the goods or services in question. For some highly specialised products, awareness among a few thousand persons, or even less, might be sufficient … We are here concerned with foodstuffs sold in supermarkets, delicatessens, milk bars and other retail outlets. The relevant market is virtually the entire Australian population from early teenage years onwards.[19]
[18] (2000) 50 IPR 1.
[19] Ibid 20. Heerey J’s decision was overturned on appeal to the Full Federal Court, although not on the point quoted. Indeed the court specifically noted that his approach contained no error; see Renaud Cointreau v Cordon Bleu International Ltee [2001] FCA 1170, [75].
Furthermore, in practice, once the requisite reputation is demonstrated, the likelihood of deception or confusion increases the more closely the trade marks resemble each other.[20]
[20] Qantas Airways Limited v Edwards [2016] FCA 729, [142].
The Opponent has particularised the ground of opposition in the SGP on the basis of the reputation arising from the extensive use and promotion of the Opponent’s Trade Marks. The Opponent submits that it has a reputation in the Grant Burge Mark and other related trade marks incorporating the word ‘Burge’. The Applicant does not contest that the Opponent has a reputation in the Grant Burge Mark sufficient for the requirements under s 60(a) of the Act and the weight of evidence supplied by the Opponent confirms this fact. However the evidence does not satisfy me that the Opponent has any reputation in any of the other Opponent’s Trade Marks; the vast majority of the Opponent’s advertising, sales and esteem rests under the Grant Burge Mark. For completeness I note that the Opponent did not particularise, nor would I be minded to find, that the Opponent had a reputation in the word ‘Burge’ solus.
It is not sufficient that the Opponent merely establishes that its trade marks have a reputation; the Registrar must also be satisfied that because of that reputation the use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. Discussions and decisions on the subjects of deception and confusion are legion and a good number provide relevant comments in relation to a consideration of deception and confusion for the purposes of s 60. In a case concerning infringement and passing off, Australian Woollen Mills Limited v F S Walton and Company Limited, Dixon and McTiernan JJ said the following:
An attempt should be made to estimate the effect or impression produced on the mind of potential customers by the mark or device for which the protection of an injunction is sought. … The usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected. Potential buyers of goods are not to be credited with any high perception or habitual caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded. The course of business and the way in which the particular class of goods are sold gives, it may be said, the setting, and the habits and observations of men considered in the mass affords the standard.[21]
[21] (1937) 58 CLR 641, 658.
In Registrar of Trade Marks vWoolworths Ltd French J highlighted the following further matters concerning confusion:
A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt. It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source.
In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services.[22]
[22] (1999) 45 IPR 411, 428. These considerations by French J are based on principles set out by Kitto J in Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 594-5.
In Pottle Productions Inc v Rute Ithalat Ve Ihracat Anonim Sirketi the delegate observed that:
The assessment of the likelihood of deception or confusion under section 60 is informed by the strength of the reputation of the Opponent’s trade mark(s), the inherent distinctiveness thereof, the degree of similarity between the trade marks under consideration and the nexus or connection between the goods and/or services of the parties. Each of these is a variable and it is possible that a trade mark’s reputation might be sufficiently strong and the degree of similarity to an opposed trade mark be so great (particularly where the trade marks are inherently distinctive) that confusion or deception will be a likelihood where very little, if any, nexus or connection exists between the goods and/or services under consideration.[23]
[23] [2012] ATMO 124, [40].
While it is not necessary to show that the marks are deceptively similar for the purposes of an opposition under s 60, as stated in Qantas Airways Limited v Edwards, ‘the degree of similarity between the allegedly conflicting marks will be a relevant consideration to be taken into account when considering the likelihood of confusion resulting from use of the opposed mark.’[24]
[24] [2016] FCA 729, [142].
I note my comments in paragraph 35 above in which I found that, given the nature of the goods for which they are to be used and the differences between the marks, none of the Trade Marks are deceptively similar to the Grant Burge Mark. I consider that, notwithstanding the reputation of the Grant Burge Mark, it is highly unlikely that any confusion will arise. Each of the Trade Marks are visually and aurally different from the Grant Burge Mark. Furthermore, in the wine industry it is common to sell wine under the name of the individual winemaker. Persons seeing the Grant Burge Mark are likely to think that the wine sold is in some way connected to the individual Grant Burge. Persons seeing the Trade Marks are likely to think the wine sold is connected to a different individual (Walker Burge) or a distinct family group (the PN Mark or Kin Mark). Given the matters above I am not satisfied that the use of any of the Trade Marks would be likely to cause confusion as a result of the reputation of the Grant Burge Mark.
I find that the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition pursuant to s 60 of the Act.
Section 42
Section 42 of the Act is reproduced below:
42 - Trade mark scandalous or its use contrary to law
An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if:
(a) the trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter; or
(b) its use would be contrary to law.The Opponent pressed this ground of opposition solely on the basis that the use of the Trade Marks would be contrary to law (s 42(b)). The onus is on the Opponent to establish that use of the Trade Marks by the Applicant would be, rather than could be, contrary to law on the balance of probabilities.[25] The relevant time for assessing whether an application is contrary to law is at the relevant dates but ‘looking forward to prospective conduct after registration’.[26]
[25] Advantage Rent-a-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 683.
[26] Time Warner Entertainment Co LP v Stepsam Investments Pty Ltd [2004] 59 IPR 343, 353.
The Opponent has particularised the ground of opposition in the SGP as follows:
3.1 The use of the Opposed Marks in relation to the Applicant’s Goods is likely to constitute a breach of section 18 and section 29 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), being Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and the common law tort of passing off, and therefore would be contrary to law.
3.2 As mentioned, the Opposed Marks are highly similar to the Opponents’ Marks. The Opponents have a reputation and goodwill in the Opponents’ Marks in relation to the Opponents’ Goods, which are the same, or similar to the Applicant’s Goods.
3.3 In light of the reputation and goodwill that the Opponents have acquired in the Opponents’ Marks, use of the Opposed Marks by the Applicant in connection with the Applicant’s Goods is likely to:
(1) mislead and deceive;
(2) cause consumers to be confused; and
(3) cause damage to the reputation and goodwill in the Opponents’ Marks.
3.4 For the above reasons, the Opposed Marks should not be registered.
As previously stated, the Opponent has failed to establish a ground of opposition under s 60 of the Act. The test for misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) is a more stringent one than that for deception or confusion under s 60,[27] and consequently I find that the Opponent has also failed to establish that the Applicant’s use of any of the Trade Marks would be contrary to s 18 of the ACL.
[27] See, e.g.: Ownit Homes Pty Ltd v Ownit Conveyancing Pty Ltd [2005] ATMO 47, [36]; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, 198.
Paraphrasing the statement of the Registrar’s Delegate in A G Professional Hair Care Products Ltd v Geagroup Invest SRL[28], where a trade mark does not run afoul of s 18 of the ACL, neither will it run afoul of s 29 of the ACL. In Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v IPC Media Pty Ltd, Beaumont J considered—in connection with the superseded Trade Practices Act1974 (‘TPA’)—that ‘the Court’s conclusion on s 52 would necessarily carry with it a conclusion on s 53(c) and (d)’.[29] Sections 52 and 53 of the TPA were, respectively, the equivalent provisions to ss 18 and 29 of the ACL. Hill J in Re Equity Access Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation also addressed the relationship between s 52 of the TPA and passing off. His Honour considered that:
The scope for the operation of s 52 will thus be broader than that involved in the tort of passing off so that in a case such as the present where the claim is for the protection of the reputation in a name against the use of that name by another, failure to succeed under s 52 or s 53 will invariably mean that proceedings for passing off would likewise fail.[30]
[28] [2014] ATMO 65, [50].
[29] [2003] FCA 104, [107].
[30] [1989] FCA 506, [40] (citations omitted).
For these reasons I am not satisfied that use any of the Trade Marks by the Applicant would be contrary to law. Therefore, the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition under s 42(b).
Section 62A
Section 62A of the Act is reproduced below:
62A Application made in bad faith
The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the application was made in bad faith.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Marks Amendment Bill 2006 provided some non-exhaustive examples of applications made in bad faith:
·persons who monitor new property developments, register the names of new developments as trade marks for a number of services and then threaten the property developers with trade mark infringement proceedings unless the developers licence or buy the trade marks;
·persons who have a history of applying for trade marks that are deliberate misspellings of other registered trade marks;
·persons who identify trade marks used overseas but with no Australian use as yet who then apply to register the trade marks in Australia for the express purpose of selling them to the overseas owners.
The case of Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc (No 2) is a current leading Australian authority on s 62A. In that case, Dodds-Streeton J made the following comments, quoting from Harrison’s Trade Mark Application[31]:
Clearly the court, when considering bad faith, cannot apply a purely subjective test, called by Lord Hutton ‘the Robin Hood test’. The dishonest person or one with low standards cannot be permitted to obtain trade mark registrations in circumstances where a person abiding by a reasonable standard would not. The registration of a trade mark is designed to enable bona fide proprietors to protect their proprietary rights without having to prove unfair trading. Registration is not provided to help those with low moral standards.
… The words ‘bad faith’ suggest a mental state. Clearly when considering the question of whether an application to register is made in bad faith all the circumstances will be relevant. However the court must decide whether the knowledge of the applicant was such that his decision to apply for registration would be regarded as in bad faith by persons adopting proper standards.[32]
[31] [2004] EWCA Civ 1028; [2005] FSR 10.
[32] [2012] FCA 81, [147].
Her Honour continued later in the same decision:
The formulation in United Kingdom authority of bad faith as falling short of the standards of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and experienced persons in a particular area is, in my view, an apt touchstone. An overly literal application may, however, tend to negate the relevance attributed to the applicant’s mental state in the combined test preferred in Harrison.
Further, in my view, mere negligence, incompetence or a lack of prudence to reasonable and experienced standards would not, in themselves, suffice, as the concept of bad faith imports conduct which, irrespective of the form it takes, is of an unscrupulous, underhand or unconscientious character.[33]
[33] Ibid [165]-[166].
61. Her Honour also noted with approval a number of cases in which bad faith were found in specific circumstances as set out below:
In William Leith New Century Marquees (SRISO/018/00, UK Registry), the applicant applied to register a trade mark in respect of marquees, tents and related goods, although aware that NEW CENTURY was the opponent’s trade mark in the United States of America and that the opponent had started to trade in the United Kingdom under the trade mark. He was himself a customer and the delegate found that he should have been aware that the opponent could be expected to expand that trade, if it had not already done so. He had previously proposed a licence arrangement with the opponent although its terms were not clear. The delegate of the Registrar concluded:
Mr Leith subsequently adopted the sign NEW CENTURY MARQUEES as his own trade mark, and he used it in the UK. When he was challenged about this he sought to register the mark in combination with his own name. In my view, the mark he has applied to register is confusingly similar with the mark NEW CENTURY.
...
It is difficult to see how a person who applies to register a mark in his own name which he has previously recognised as the property of a potential overseas principal can be said to be acting in accordance with acceptable standards of commercial behaviour. I do not believe that combining the mark with the applicant’s own name is any answer to that criticism.[34][34] Ibid [151].
…
In Hard Coffee Pty Ltd v Hard Coffee Main Beach Pty Ltd [2009] ATMO 26, Hearing Officer Nancarrow held that applications to register the trade marks HARD COFFEE MAIN BEACH and HARD COFFEE were made in bad faith within the meaning of s 62A, where a company controlled by the applicant’s controller had previously obtained a licence from the opponent’s predecessor in title to use the HARD COFFEE MAIN BEACH trade mark, acknowledging in that context that it had not purchased any right, title or interest in the names and that the vendor retained title to all related intellectual property rights. The Hearing Officer considered that in the circumstances, the director clearly understood that the trade mark in question remained the property of the opponent in respect of coffee shops.[35]
[35] Ibid [153].
…
In Pritchard Pacific Pty Ltd Baltimore Aircoil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Brendan McCarrison and Breezewater Pty Ltd [2011] ATMO 46, the delegate upheld opposition to the registration of a trade mark for, inter alia, cooling towers and like apparatus and related services, on grounds including bad faith under s 62A of the Act. The delegate found that the applicant’s controller had a prior business connection with and knowledge of the opponent, such that a person standing in his shoes should have known that he should not apply for the registration of a trade mark deceptively similar to that used by his former business partner (at [42]).[36]
[36] Ibid [156].
The Opponent has particularised this ground of opposition in the SGP as follows:
4.1 The Applicant was aware at the time of filing the [Trade Marks] of the Opponents’ prior rights in the Opponents’ Marks in Australia and elsewhere globally.
4.2 The Applicant was aware at the time of filing that it was not entitled to register the [Trade Marks] for the Applicant’s Goods in light of the Opponents’ existing rights and the parties’ related entities’ previous business dealings.
4.3 Given the Applicant’s knowledge, and the knowledge of the Applicant’s related entities, filing the [Trade Marks] falls short of acceptable commercial behaviour.
4.4 For this reason, the application for the Opposed Mark was made in bad faith and should not be registered.
I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence that the Children, at the relevant dates, were aware that the Parents had signed the Deed, prohibiting their parents from using the name ‘Burge’ as a trade mark. This is admitted in Thomas 1 and 2. While noting that Amelia Thomas does not give evidence directly on this point, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Children were aware of the contents of the Deed. I note that the Deed contained specific and carefully negotiated restrictions as to the children’s use of the family name Burge, that the Parents would procure their Children’s agreement to these restraints. It would be implausible for the Children to be aware of the existence of the Deed and not aware of these carefully negotiated terms. I also note the content of the article from the ‘the Real Review’ dated November 19, 2019 on Trent Burge that specifically refers to Trent Burge’s inability to use the Burge name and having created a new brand separate to the Burge name. The legal correctness of the article is not relevant, but what it does show is a general understanding by Trent Burge of the existence of the restraint in the Deed and that it was intended to apply to him.
The Applicant submits that the Deed only restricts the use of 4 specific marks (one of which is ‘burge’), which do not include the Trade Marks. This is incorrect. The Deed operates to restrict the use of the name ‘Burge’ ‘in relation to the sale of wine or related goods and services including in any… trade mark’. This includes trade marks that contain the word ‘burge’ such as the Trade Marks. This interpretation is supported by the specific exception granted to the Children, that allows them to use the name ‘Burge’ where the use is part of their full name.
Were the Trade Marks to be used by the Parents, such use would clearly be in breach of the Deed. The issue in this proceeding is this: neither the directors of the Applicant nor the Applicant itself are parties of the Deed and hence are not directly bound by it. Rather the Deed binds the Parents to procure the agreement of Children to the restraint set out in the Deed. Neither of the Children give evidence as to whether this agreement was ever procured.
The Opponent suggests that I should infer, based on the absence of any evidence on this topic from the Applicant, that the Children must have agreed to comply with the restraints set out in the Deed, with the alternative being that the Parents failed to procure such restraints and are in breach of the Deed. I am not prepared to make that inference. There is simply no evidence before me as to what has transpired between the Parents and the Children and in the absent any cross-examination of the witness, subpoenas or discovery, I simply have no basis to conclude whether it is more probable that the Parents breached their Deed or that the Children breached the obligations placed on them by the Parents. The question of which entity, if any, breached the Deed is a matter that can only be resolved in the court.
The onus is on the Opponent to establish bad faith and it will not be found easily given the serious nature of the allegation.[37] While the act of applying to register a trade mark that an applicant has previously recognised as the property of another has previously been held to support a finding that s 62A has been established[38], the present case is a unique fact situation where there is insufficient evidence before me to find that the Children (who are the founders and directors of the Applicant), have ever entered into an agreement that imposes any obligation on them not to register the Trade Marks. Rather, what they appear to have done is to undermine the intent of the Deed, which could result in the Opponent potentially suffering damages from the Parents’ breach of the obligation under the Deed to procure the restraint from the Children.
[37] Hard Coffee Pty Ltd v Hard Coffee Main Beach Pty Ltd [2009] ATMO 26, [12].
[38] Bombala Council v Peter Wilkshire [2009] ATMO 33, [35].
While the scope of the s62A ground does not require proof that the Applicant (or its controlling minds) has breached a formal legal obligation, I am not persuaded that the actions of the Children in potentially undermining the intent of the Deed of which they were aware but by which they were not prima facie bound is conduct that falls short of the ‘standards of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and experienced persons’.[39] To find otherwise would be to import an obligation on the Children to comply with restraints in an agreement to which they were not (on the evidence before the Registrar) a party .
[39] DC Comics v Cheqout Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 478, [77].
I note that the conduct engaged in by the Children came very close to satisfying the requirements of s 62A as being conduct of an underhand character and that I would have had no hesitation in finding bad faith were there evidence before me to show that either of the Children in any way agreed to comply with the Deed. While I acknowledge that any such evidence is likely within the possession of the Applicant, and the Applicant may well have benefited in this matter from its failure to provide more detailed evidence, I can only deal with the application based on the evidence before me; and cannot engage in speculation on what evidence the Applicant may have provided were it subject to cross-examination or discovery. Such evidence is, if this decision is appealed, a matter for the court hearing the appeal.
I find that the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition under s 62A.
Decision
The Opponent has failed to establish any of the grounds of opposition it nominated in the SGP. Trade mark numbers . 1926574, 1928531, 1967592 may proceed to registration not less than one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar has been served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur until either the appeal is withdrawn or discontinued. Otherwise the disposition of the application should be in accordance with the Court’s order or direction.
Costs
72. The Applicant has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. I accordingly award costs in respect of trade mark number 1926574 against the Opponent under section 221 of the Act in the relevant amounts under Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995. In respect of trade mark number 1928531 I award reduced costs against the Opponent in the same manner as indicated in Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhard v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd[40]. In respect of trade mark number 1967592 I award reduced costs against the Opponent in the same manner as indicated in Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhard v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd[41].
[40] [2001] ATMO 78.
[41] ibid.
Nicholas Smith
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
1 September 2020Annexure A
Number
Trade Mark
Priority Date
Goods or Services
828529
GRANT BURGE
Mar 22, 2000
Class 33: Wine
994377
GRANT BURGE HUNDRED OF BAROSSA
Mar 23, 2004
Class 33: Wines; spirits; liqueurs
1465752
Dec 16, 2011
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages (except beers)
1701649
Jun 19, 2015
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages (except beers)
1709613
Jul 24, 2015
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages, except beers; wines
1709614
Jul 24, 2015
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages, except beers; wines
1709615
Jul 24, 2015
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages, except beers; wines
1709616
Jul 24, 2015
Class 33: Wines
1850147
Jun 7, 2017
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages, except beers; wines
0
32
0