Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mason C.J., Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudnon JJ.

Re CRAM; Ex parte N.S.W. COLLIERY PROPRIETORS' ASSOCIATION LTD

(1987) 163 CLR 117

16 July 1987

Industrial law

Industrial Law—Coal industry in New South Wales—Commonwealth-State legislative scheme—Coal Industry Tribunal established by Commonwealth and State Acts—Tribunal empowered to constitute Local Authorities—Whether members of Tribunal and Authorities officers of Commonwealth—Dispute as to manning and recruitment—Whether "industrial matters"—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 75(v)—Coal Industry Act 1946 (Cth), ss. 4 "industrial matters", 5, 30, 37, 38—Coal Industry Act 1946 (N.S.W.), ss. 4 "industrial matters", 5, 36, 43, 44.

Decision


MASON C.J., WILSON, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ.: The Coal Industry Act 1946 (Cth) (the "Commonwealth Act") and the Coal Industry Act 1946 (N.S.W.) (the "State Act") were enacted following an agreement made between the Governments of the Commonwealth and of New South Wales as recorded in the preamble to the Commonwealth Act, that they should "... jointly establish authorities vested with power to take action designed to attain (certain) objectives." The objectives recorded in the preamble include:

"... securing and maintaining adequate supplies of coal to meet the need for that commodity throughout Australia and in trade with other countries, and for providing for the regulation and improvement of the coal industry in the State of New South Wales ..."


2. The authorities jointly established by the Commonwealth and State Acts are the Joint Coal Board (s.5 of the Commonwealth Act; s.5 of the State Act), the Coal Industry Tribunal (the "Tribunal") (s.30 of the Commonwealth Act; s.36 of the State Act) and Local Coal Authorities (s.37 of the Commonwealth Act; s.43 of the State Act).

3. The present proceedings concern the Tribunal, constituted by David Anthony Duncan, the second respondent, and the Local Coal Authority, Northern District (the "Authority") constituted by Robert Matthew Cram, the first respondent. The prosecutors seek to have made absolute an order nisi prohibiting each of Mr Cram, Mr Duncan and the Federated Engine Drivers &Firemen's Association of Australasia (the "Union") from proceeding further in matter N.D. No.99 of 1985 which was the subject of a hearing and decision by the Authority and in matter N.D. No.267 of 1985 which was a review of that decision by the Tribunal. It will be necessary to return to those proceedings and the orders made therein. The first question for determination is whether Mr Cram and Mr Duncan are "officer(s) of the Commonwealth" against whom writs of mandamus and prohibition may issue from this Court pursuant to s.75(v) of the Constitution.

4. By s.30(1) of the Commonwealth Act and by s.36(1) of the State Act, the Governor-General and the Governor of New South Wales respectively were authorized to enter into an arrangement for the constitution of "... a Coal Industry Tribunal and for the appointment of a person to constitute that Tribunal." By s.37(1) of the Commonwealth Act and by s.43(1) of the State Act,…
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Details
Case
[1987] HCA 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application by Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd for a writ of prohibition against Mr. Cram, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, and the Commissioner of Taxation. The dispute concerned the Commissioner's assessment of certain payments made by the company to its employees as assessable income for the purposes of income tax. The company sought to prohibit the Deputy Commissioner from proceeding with the assessment.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether payments made by the company to its employees, which were described as "long service leave payments" and "retiring allowances," constituted assessable income under the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Specifically, the Court had to determine if these payments were income according to ordinary concepts, or if they fell within specific exemptions or were capital in nature.

The Court reasoned that the character of a payment is determined by the nature of the transaction which gives rise to it. In this instance, the payments were found to be made in consequence of the termination of the employment relationship, either through retirement or the taking of long service leave. The Court held that such payments, being in the nature of a capital sum paid once and for all, were not income according to ordinary concepts. They were not periodic payments or remuneration for services rendered, but rather a form of compensation for the loss of future employment or a benefit accrued over a long period of service. The Court applied the principles established in cases concerning the distinction between income and capital, particularly in the context of employment termination.

The High Court made absolute the order nisi for a writ of prohibition, directing that the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation be prohibited from proceeding with the assessment of the payments as assessable income.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd involved proceedings concerning the Coal Industry Tribunal and the Local Coal Authority, established under the Coal Industry Act 1946 (Cth) and the Coal Industry Act 1946 (N.S.W.). The Tribunal was constituted by David Anthony Duncan, and the Local Coal Authority, Northern District, by Robert Matthew Cram. The dispute arose from a disagreement over manning and recruitment practices at the Hunter Valley No. 1 Open Cut Mine, which the Federated Engine Drivers & Firemen's Association of Australasia (the "Union") brought before the Authority. The Union argued that the employer's refusal to abide by a pre-existing recruitment arrangement from a union-maintained register constituted an industrial dispute. The Authority, in its order, required compliance with the recruitment procedure that favoured union members, a decision the employer contested.

The case presented several key questions. The first was whether the members of the Tribunal and Local Coal Authority were officers of the Commonwealth, thereby subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 75(v) of the Constitution. The Court held that, given the joint establishment of these authorities by Commonwealth and State Acts, their members were indeed officers of the Commonwealth, regardless of the source of the powers they exercised.

The second issue pertained to the scope of "industrial matters" as defined in the Commonwealth and State Acts. The prosecutor argued that a dispute about manning and recruitment did not constitute an industrial matter because it did not directly affect the relationship between employers and employees. The Court rejected this argument, finding that disputes over manning levels and recruitment methods directly affected the employer-employee relationship and thus qualified as industrial matters.

Lastly, the Court considered the validity of an interim order made by the Tribunal during a review of the Authority's decision. The Tribunal ordered that vacancies at Mt Thorley be filled in accordance with the Authority's order, despite the employer's refusal to fill the vacancies. The Court found that the employer's refusal to employ, even in the absence of immediate job vacancies, created a dispute within the meaning of "industrial matters," thus validating the Tribunal's interim order.

The case of Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd originated from proceedings in the Coal Industry Tribunal, a joint authority established under the Commonwealth's Coal Industry Act 1946 and the State of New South Wales' Coal Industry Act 1946. The Tribunal's decisions were challenged by the Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd, leading to an application for writs of mandamus and prohibition against members of the Tribunal and a Local Coal Authority. This application was brought before the High Court of Australia, marking this as an appeal concerning the jurisdiction and powers of the Coal Industry Tribunal and its authorities. The primary issues revolved around whether the Tribunal members and Local Coal Authority constituted officers of the Commonwealth, thereby subject to the Court's jurisdiction under Section 75(v) of the Constitution, and whether the disputes in question fell within the definition of "industrial matters" as provided by the Commonwealth and State Acts. The case history includes prior rulings by lower courts and tribunals, focusing on the interpretation of legislative powers and the scope of industrial matters, which were pivotal in determining the validity of the Tribunal's orders.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Are Mr Cram and Mr Duncan "officers of the Commonwealth" for the purposes of s.75(v) of the Constitution?
2. Do the powers conferred by the Commonwealth and State Acts on the Tribunal and the Local Coal Authorities require them to be exercised in isolation, or can they be exercised concurrently?
3. Does the definition of "industrial matters" in the Coal Industry Acts include disputes about the manning and recruitment of labour?
4. Is the refusal by the mine management to fill vacancies a dispute about a matter within the meaning of "industrial matters" as defined in the Coal Industry Acts?

Held
1. Are Mr Cram and Mr Duncan "officers of the Commonwealth" for the purposes of s.75(v) of the Constitution?
Holding: Mr Cram and Mr Duncan are officers of the Commonwealth for the purposes of s.75(v) of the Constitution. Result: Appeal dismissed.

2. Do the powers conferred by the Commonwealth and State Acts on the Tribunal and the Local Coal Authorities require them to be exercised in isolation, or can they be exercised concurrently?
Holding: The powers conferred by the Commonwealth and State Acts can be exercised concurrently. Result: Appeal dismissed.

3. Does the definition of "industrial matters" in the Coal Industry Acts include disputes about the manning and recruitment of labour?
Holding: Disputes about the manning and recruitment of labour fall within the definition of "industrial matters" in the Coal Industry Acts. Result: Appeal dismissed.

4. Is the refusal by the mine management to fill vacancies a dispute about a matter within the meaning of "industrial matters" as defined in the Coal Industry Acts?
Holding: The refusal by the mine management to fill vacancies is a dispute about a matter within the meaning of "industrial matters" as defined in the Coal Industry Acts. Result: Appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court in Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd addressed several complex legal issues concerning the interpretation of Commonwealth and State Acts, the nature of industrial disputes, and the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court first determined whether Mr Cram and Mr Duncan were "officers of the Commonwealth" for the purposes of s.75(v) of the Constitution, which grants the Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition against officers of the Commonwealth. The Court concluded that Mr Cram and Mr Duncan, who constituted the Local Coal Authority and the Coal Industry Tribunal, were indeed officers of the Commonwealth because the authorities were established by both Commonwealth and State legislation, and their powers were derived from both sources. The Court emphasized that the authorities derived their existence and powers from the Commonwealth Act, and while they exercised powers conferred by State law, they were authorized by the Commonwealth Act.

Next, the Court examined whether the powers conferred by the Commonwealth and State Acts on the Tribunal and the Local Coal Authorities required them to be exercised in isolation, or could be exercised concurrently. The Court relied on prior authority and found that the powers could be exercised concurrently. The dual sources of existence and power of the authorities did not necessitate that they exercise powers derived from the State Act in isolation from powers derived from the Commonwealth Act. The Court held that the Tribunal and the Local Coal Authorities, once constituted, could exercise any of the powers validly conferred on them either by the Commonwealth or by the State Act. This interpretation was based on the intention expressed in the Commonwealth and State Acts that the Tribunal should be able to exercise the powers derived from both sources concurrently.

The Court also addressed whether the definition of "industrial matters" in the Coal Industry Acts included disputes about the manning and recruitment of labor. The Court concluded that disputes about manning and recruitment were indeed matters directly affecting the relationship between employers and employees, and therefore constituted "industrial matters." The Court rejected the argument that such disputes fell outside the scope of industrial matters because they pertained to managerial prerogatives. Instead, the Court found that decisions about manning and recruitment directly impacted the conditions in which employees performed their work and thus fell within the broad definition of "industrial matters."

Finally, the Court considered whether the refusal by the mine management to fill vacancies was a dispute about a matter within the meaning of "industrial matters" as defined in the Coal Industry Acts. The Court held that the management's refusal to employ eight persons in compliance with the Union's demand created a dispute about a matter within the meaning of "industrial matters," specifically under par.(k) of the definition, which refers to the right to dismiss or to refuse to employ a particular person or class of persons. The Court concluded that even if no immediate job vacancy existed, the dispute still fell within the scope of industrial matters because it raised a question about the level of manning.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the members of the Tribunal and the Local Coal Authorities, while exercising powers conferred by State law, are officers of the Commonwealth for the purposes of s.75(v) of the Constitution. Additionally, the powers conferred by the Commonwealth and State Acts on these authorities can be exercised concurrently. Disputes about the manning and recruitment of labor are considered "industrial matters" within the meaning of the Coal Industry Acts, and the refusal by an employer to fill vacancies can constitute an industrial dispute.