Australian Tramway Employees Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust

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17 CLR 680

legislature has excluded all idea of acting upon any power but

that of enacting a land tax-we are, I think, restricted to the single enquiry whether sec. 36 is really incidental to such a tax. In my opinion it is not, because the fiction it creates, namely, that the given person is to be deemed owner of certain land not in his name, is accompanied by an acknowledgment on the very face of the section itself, that the person in question has no

LAND Tax,

interest whatever in the land.

The provision therefore shows ex facie that it is not and cannot possibly be incidental to a land tax, because the idea of a person admittedly unconnected with the land in any way whatever being required personally to pay a tax upon it already imposed upon the owner, is ex vi termini foreign to the very idea of a land tax.

For this reason I am of opinion that the section is invalid, but that its invalidity does not infect any other enactment, and does not violate sec. 55 of the Constitution.

The judgment of GAVAN DUFFY and RICH JJ. was read by

GAVAN DUFFY J. Sec. 36 (2) of the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910, when read with the other sections of that Act and with the incorporating Land Tax Act 1910, was, in our opinion, designed to impose a tax on persons having no interest in the land in respect of which the tax is assessed. How should such an enact- ment be described Is it an attempt to impose a tax dealing with land, or is it an attempt to impose a tax other than a land tax SO as to bring the Land Tax Act within the mischief of the second part of sec. 55 of the Constitution as dealing with more than one subject of taxation ? The answer to this question may be found in a case already decided by this Court. All the Judges who took part in the decision in Osborne v. The Com- monwealth 1 expressed the opinion that the Land Tax Act 1910 incorporating the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910 does not deal with any subject of taxation other than land. It cannot, there- fore, be said that those Acts are, or any section of them is, bad under the second part of sec. 55 of the Constitution as dealing with more than one subject of taxation. The result is that the

112 C.L.R., 321.
17 CLR 681

legislature must be taken to have made an attempt to levy a land tax in respect of persons having no interest in the land, and the question is whether such an attempted exercise of power is valid. It seems to have been assumed by all the Judges who took part in the decision in Morgan v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Land Tax, N.S. W. 1 that such an enactment would be unlawful, because not warranted by the gift…

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Details
Case
[1913] HCA 53
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Tramway Employees Association brought a plaint against various employers, including the Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust, seeking, among other things, that all employees be permitted to wear and display a badge of membership of the Association. A dispute arose when some employers objected to and forbade the wearing of these badges by employees when in uniform or on duty. The President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration stated a case to the High Court of Australia, posing questions regarding whether the dispute constituted an "industrial dispute" or a dispute "as to industrial matters" within the meaning of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1911 and section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the right of employees to wear a union badge while on duty constituted an "industrial matter" and, consequently, whether a dispute concerning this right was an "industrial dispute" capable of being heard by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. This involved interpreting the scope of "industrial matters" as defined in the Act and as contemplated by the constitutional power to make laws with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond any one State.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Isaacs, Higgins, Powers, and Rich JJ., held that the question of permitting employees to wear and display a badge indicating membership in a trade association was an "industrial matter" within the definition of that term in section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1911. They further held that an "industrial dispute" could exist in respect of such a question, falling within the ambit of section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. Barton A.C.J., dissenting, took the view that the right to wear a badge was not an industrial matter in itself and did not become one merely because it might tend to strengthen the union, arguing that such matters were extraneous to the core industrial relationship and that employers retained the right to dictate what their employees wore on duty, subject to law and express agreement.

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