APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO APPEAL
REFUSED.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL - application for extension of time within which to appeal - exercise of discretion - whether good reason shown to account for the delay - whether interests of justice served by granting extension - factors to be taken into account - exceptional circumstances not necessary
R. v. Trew [1979] Qd.R. 29 R. v. Brown [1985] 2 Qd.R. 126 R. v. Ollis and Andersen (1986) 21 A.Crim.R. 256 R. v. Armstrong [1996] 1 Qd.R. 316 R. v. M [1996] 1 Qd.R. 532
Counsel:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf Mr P. Rutledge for the respondent
Solicitors:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
Hearing Date:
16 September 1998
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT
Judgment delivered 6 October 1998
1 The applicant represents himself and as he is impecunious and resides in Townsville, the Court acceded to his request to hear his submissions by telephone link.[1]
[1] See R.S.C. O. 40 r. 1A.
2 This is an application for extension of time within which to appeal from a decision of His Honour Judge Wall in the District Court at Townsville on 13 February 1998 under s. 118, District Court Act1967. His Honour dismissed an appeal under s. 222 of the Justices Act1886 from a decision of the Townsville Magistrates Court convicting the applicant of one count of production of a dangerous drug (s. 8, Drugs Misuse Act1986); one count of possession of a dangerous drug (s. 9, Drugs Misuse Act1986), and one count of possession of instructions for producing a dangerous drug (s. 8A, Drugs Misuse Act1986).
3 The relevant time period for filing an application for leave to appeal under s. 118 of the District Court Act1967 appears to be 28 days under r 334 of the District Court Rules.[2] The application for leave to appeal was not filed until 29 June 1998 and is therefore four and a half months outside the allowed time period. The principles applicable to applications for extension of time in criminal appeals are now less stringent than they were expressed to be in R. v. Trew[3], R. v. Brown[4] and R. v. Ollis and Andersen.[5] It was then suggested that in every case where an extension was sought, the court required “substantial reasons” to be shown why such an extension should be made, and that after a lapse of a considerable period of time, “very exceptional circumstances” were necessary.[6] Ollis and Andersen preferred the “exceptional circumstances” test, and suggested the same test in relation to amending grounds of appeal after time had expired. Such an approach however is now out of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Tait [1998] QCA 304
Case
[1998] QCA 304
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The matter before the court involved an application by the defendant, Tait, for an extension of time to appeal his criminal conviction. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia, which was called upon to decide whether the application should be granted based on the circumstances presented. The primary legal issue was whether Tait had demonstrated a sufficient reason for the delay in filing his notice of appeal and whether granting the extension would serve the interests of justice. In making its decision, the court considered various factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons provided for the delay, and the potential impact on the administration of justice.
The court found that Tait had not shown exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time, but that the interests of justice could still be served by granting a limited extension. The High Court noted that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was substantial, and Tait's reasons for the delay were not particularly compelling. However, the court also recognised that Tait had taken some steps to address the delay, and that there was a prospect of success on appeal. Taking all these factors into account, the court decided to grant the application for an extension of time, but limited the extension to a specific period.
In reaching its decision, the court emphasised that it must exercise its discretion carefully when considering applications for extensions of time in criminal appeals. The court noted that while exceptional circumstances are not necessary to warrant an extension, the applicant must still show good reason for the delay and demonstrate that the extension would serve the interests of justice. The High Court concluded that in this case, a limited extension of time was appropriate given the circumstances presented. The final orders of the court granted Tait an extension of time to file his notice of appeal, but limited the extension to a specific period, and ordered that the appeal be heard within that timeframe.