May v Queensland Police Service

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

May v Queensland Police Service [2022] QCA 121

PARTIES:

MAY, Natalie Bianka
(applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 323 of 2021
DC No 985 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2021] QDC 275 (Burnett DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

12 July 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 June 2022

JUDGE:

Mullins P

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to adduce evidence refused.

2.   Application for leave to appeal refused.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – WHEN APPEAL LIES – FROM DISTRICT COURT – BY LEAVE OF COURT – where the applicant was appearing in person before a magistrate on a stealing charge – where the magistrate instructed the applicant not to interrupt when the prosecutor or the magistrate was speaking – where the applicant objected to how the magistrate was conducting the proceeding – where the magistrate instructed the applicant not to speak over him when he was trying to speak to her – where the applicant interrupted the magistrate again – where the magistrate ordered the police officer who was the prosecutor to take the applicant into custody – where the order was made pursuant to s 40(3)(b) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the applicant physically resisted the prosecutor’s carrying the magistrate’s order to take the applicant into custody – where the applicant was charged with obstruct police officer – where after trial before another magistrate the applicant was convicted of obstruct police officer – where the applicant was late in filing the notice of appeal to the District Court – where the applicant applied for an adjournment of the hearing in the District Court – where the District Court judge refused the adjournment and refused to extend the time for the appeal due to the poor prospects of the appeal – where the applicant applies for leave to appeal the orders of the District Court judge – whether the District Court judge erred in concluding that there were poor prospects of a successful appeal

Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 40, s 222, s 223
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 615, s 790, s 796

Barmettler & Anor v Greer & Timms[2007] QCA 170, cited
Commissioner of Police v Antoniolli[2021] QCA 237, cited
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22, cited
MacGroarty v Clauson (1989) 167 CLR 251; [1989] HCA 34, cited
McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255, considered
R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667; [1998] QCA 304, cited

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on her own behalf
C M Z Wilkins for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on her own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MULLINS P:  Ms May applies for leave to appeal against the dismissal by Burnett DCJ…

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Details
Case
[2022] QCA 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of May v Queensland Police Service, the appellant, Ms May, sought leave to appeal against the orders of the District Court, which had dismissed her appeal against her conviction for obstructing a police officer. The appeal arose from events during a hearing before a magistrate on a charge of stealing, where Ms May resisted being taken into custody, leading to her charge and subsequent conviction for obstructing a police officer. The District Court judge dismissed Ms May's appeal on the grounds of poor prospects of success, and Ms May now sought leave to appeal to a higher court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the District Court judge erred in concluding that there were poor prospects of a successful appeal. The court had to determine whether Ms May could demonstrate that the District Court judge was incorrect in assessing the appeal's prospects. Additionally, the court considered whether Ms May should be allowed to adduce new evidence that was not presented during the initial proceedings.

The court found that the District Court judge had adequately considered the evidence and circumstances, and there was no error in concluding the poor prospects of the appeal. The evidence presented by Ms May after the initial proceedings did not alter the outcome of the original conviction. The court emphasized that the repercussions Ms May faced post-arrest, such as visa cancellation and immigration detention, did not impact the legality of her conviction for obstructing a police officer. The court concluded that the District Court judge's decision to refuse an adjournment and the extension of time for the appeal was based on the poor prospects of success, and there was no error in this assessment.

Accordingly, the court refused Ms May's application for leave to appeal and her application to adduce new evidence. The court found no basis to overturn the District Court's decision, maintaining that the appeal did not present a viable legal challenge to the conviction.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to adduce evidence refused.

2. Application for leave to appeal refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On the basis of the evidence of the prosecutor to the effect that he responded with escalating force in response to Ms May’s escalation of resistance, the District Court judge found (at [47] of the reasons) that the level of force applied in the arrest was reasonable and appropriate within the meaning of s 615(1) of the PPR Act and was therefore not excessive and rejected the challenge to Magistrate Payne’s finding in that respect. The District Court judge also recorded (at [48]) Ms May’s reliance on self-defence on the appeal that was not argued before Magistrate Payne and rejected that submission on the basis that the arrest itself was lawful and therefore no issue of self-defence arose.Whether leave should be given to adduce evidence Ms May’s affidavit affirmed on 31 May 2022 sets out her version of what occurred before the Acting Magistrate on 12 October 2017. It is inappropriate to receive that evidence, when Ms May did not give evidence before Magistrate Payne. The affidavit also deals with the aftermath of her arrest, particularly the cancellation of her visa and her being held in immigration detention. It is understandable, particularly from the viewpoint of a self-represented litigant, that these were significant repercussions for her in relation to her immigration status which she links to the Acting Magistrate’s ordering that she be taken into custody and submits resulted in a substantial injustice being inflicted on her. That does not equate to substantial injustice in the proceeding for the charge that was directly concerned with Ms May’s physical response to the prosecutor’s carrying out the order of the Magistrate to take her into custody. Those repercussions set out in Ms May’s affidavit are not relevant to the issues that were raised on Ms May’s appeal to the District Court which were confined to whether any error of law was made by Magistrate Payne or whether the District Court judge on a rehearing on the evidence adduced before Magistrate Payne reached the same conclusion on the facts necessary to prove guilt of the charge beyond reasonable doubt. Those significant repercussions experienced by Ms May that followed the order of the Acting Magistrate under s 40 of the Act do not bear on whether Ms May was convicted properly of the charge. The application for leave to adduce evidence must therefore be refused.What should be shown on an application for leave to appeal to this Court The question of whether the District Court judge erred in refusing to adjourn the hearing of the appeal and whether the District Court judge erred in refusing to extend the time for the appeal was determined by the District Court judge’s conclusion (at [19], [22], [47] and [51] of the reasons) as to the poor prospects of a successful appeal by Ms May to the District Court. It is therefore appropriate to consider whether Ms May can show that the District Court judge was in error in reaching the conclusion that his Honour did about the prospects of her appeal to that court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Magistrate Payne set out (at [34] of her Honour’s reasons) extensive findings of fact based on what her Honour gleaned from the evidence of the witnesses and the assistance provided by the recording of the proceeding. Magistrate Payne found that it took about seven minutes from the time that the prosecutor said, “You’re under arrest” until Ms May was handcuffed and taken to the watchhouse.Magistrate Payne’s decision Magistrate Payne was extremely fair in identifying (at [47] of her Honour’s reasons) anomalies in the proceeding on 12 October 2017. Despite Magistrate Payne’s observing (at [48]) that a “heightened reaction” by Ms May when she was ordered to be detained was understandable, considering the circumstances leading up to the Acting Magistrate’s giving that order to the prosecutor, Magistrate Payne identified the problem for Ms May was that her continued resistance over several minutes did not abate. Magistrate Payne described it as “more than a heightened reaction that might have been reasonable in the circumstances”. Magistrate Payne therefore concluded (at [49]) that Ms May’s protracted physical and verbal resistance did obstruct the prosecutor. Magistrate Payne considered (at [52] of her Honour’s reasons) the power that the prosecutor was exercising in responding to the Acting Magistrate’s order was s 796 of the PPR Act. Section 796(1) applies if, under another Act or law, a tribunal (which includes a court) has power to lawfully order the apprehension or detention of a person, including under a warrant or to give any other order or direction for which the help of a police officer may be reasonably necessary. Section 796(2) imposes the duty on a police officer to comply “with any lawful direction, request, or order of the tribunal and any reasonable request the judge or other presiding officer may lawfully make”. Magistrate Payne recorded (at [54] of her Honour’s reasons) that the Acting Magistrate ordered Ms May’s detention pursuant to s 40 of the Act. Section 40 provides:“(1)A person who—(a)wilfully insults a justice or a witness or an officer of the court during his or her sitting as, or, as the case may be, attendance in a Magistrates Court or during his or her sitting or, as the case may be, attendance in any examination of witnesses in relation to an indictable offence or who is on his or her way to or from any such court or examination; or(b)wilfully misbehaves himself or herself in such a court or in the place where such an examination is being held; or(c)wilfully interrupts the proceedings of such a court or examination; or(d)unlawfully assaults, or wilfully obstructs a person in attendance at such a court or examination; or(e)without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order or direction of such court or justice;may by oral order of such court or justice, be excluded from such court or examination and, whether the person is so excluded or not, may be summarily convicted by such court or justice of contempt.(2)A person convicted under subsection (1) is liable to a maximum penalty of 84 penalty units or imprisonment for 1 year.(3)A person referred to in subsection (1)—(a)may be dealt with under this section without a complaint being made or a summons being issued in respect of the person; and(b)may be taken into custody by a police officer on order of such court or justice and without further warrant; and(c)may be called upon by such court or justice to show cause why the person should not be convicted of contempt under this section; and(d)may be dealt with by such court or justice under this section upon the court’s or justice’s own view, or upon the evidence of a credible witness.(4)A court or justice may, if it or the justice thinks fit, accept from any person convicted by it or the justice of contempt under this section, an apology for such contempt and may recommend that the Governor in Council remit or respite any fine or punishment imposed on such person in respect of such contempt.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.