SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Clampett v Queensland Police Service [2016] QCA 345
PARTIES:
CLAMPETT, Leonard William
(applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 160 of 2016
DC No 4861 of 2015DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Extension of Time s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 13 May 2016DELIVERED ON:
20 December 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
18 October 2016
JUDGES:
Gotterson and Philippides JJA and Jackson J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is granted.
2. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – WHEN APPEAL LIES – FROM DISTRICT COURT – where the applicant was convicted by a magistrate of driving while his driver’s licence was suspended – where the applicant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence to the District Court – where the application for leave to appeal to this Court was filed four days out of time – where the applicant did not demonstrate error in the decision of the District Court judge – whether an extension of time in which to appeal should be granted – whether leave to appeal against the decision of the District Court should be granted
TRAFFIC LAW – LICENSING OF DRIVERS – QUEENSLAND – DISQUALIFICATION, CANCELLATON OR SUSPENSION OF LICENCES – where the applicant was convicted by a magistrate of driving while his driver’s licence was suspended – where the applicant’s driver’s licence had been suspended by operation of the State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld) – where the applicant was notified of the suspension by the sending of a notice of intention to suspend to his last known address – whether the sending of the notice to this address was sufficient
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 39, s 39A
Criminal Code (Qld), s 23(2), s 24, s 36
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118(3)
State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld), s 104, s 105, s 158
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), s 78ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Bawden[2002] QCA 286, cited
Atkinson v Gibson [2012] 2 Qd R 403; [2010] QCA 279, cited
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; [1983] HCA 25, cited
Hayes v Surfers Paradise Rock and Roll Café [2011] 1 Qd R 346; [2010] QCA 48, cited
Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 218 CLR 493; [2004] HCA 30, cited
Puschenjak v Wade[2002] QCA 190, cited
Pusey v Wagner; Ex parte Wagner [1922] St R Qd 181, cited
R v GV[2006] QCA 394, cited
R v Mrsic[1998] QCA 470, cited
R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667; [1998] QCA 304, cited
Rodgers v Smith[2006] QCA 353, cited
Sancoff v Holford; Ex parte…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Clampett v Queensland Police Service and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] QCA 345
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the grounds for the appeal, including claims of bias, denial of natural justice, and errors in the prosecution process. The District Court judge had thoroughly reviewed the evidence and legal arguments, concluding that the applicant's guilt was evident given his admission to driving with a suspended licence. The legislation in question deemed the delivery of the suspension notice complete upon mailing, making the applicant's claim of non-receipt irrelevant. Additionally, the court noted that the mistake made by the applicant was one of law, not fact, and thus the defence of mistake of fact did not apply. The court found that the District Court judge had correctly dismissed the appeal, finding no bias or procedural unfairness and no error in the prosecution's handling of the case.
The court granted the application for an extension of time to appeal but refused leave to appeal. The reasoning was that while the applicant had not demonstrated any error in the District Court's decision, the granting of an extension of time was in the interests of justice, considering the procedural context and the nature of the appeal. The court concluded that no substantial injustice had occurred and that the appeal did not present a matter of public importance or a significant legal principle.
ORDERS:
1. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is granted.
2. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is granted.
2. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent contended that there was no basis to grant leave to appeal. Moreover, there was no substantial injustice and the applicant had not demonstrated that the District Court judge had erred. It was submitted by the respondent that his Honour had carefully and comprehensively addressed each of the points raised by the applicant and that the applicant had not identified any error in those reasons. It was submitted that, given the appropriate disposition of the appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act, there existed no matter of public or community importance, no question or principle of general importance nor any important point of law. In all the circumstances, it was said that the applicant had not suffered any injustice, much less a substantial injustice.Consideration The District Court judge reviewed, in some considerable detail, the evidence, the legal arguments and the magistrate’s findings in determining that the only conclusion to be drawn from the accepted evidence, given the manner in which the trial and appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act was conducted, was one of guilt. As the respondent pointed out, the applicant accepted at trial that not only was he the driver of the vehicle but also that his licence was suspended. The effect of the legislation was such that the alleged non-receipt of the notice of intention to suspend was irrelevant, as delivery of the notice is deemed to have occurred.[14] Furthermore, any mistaken belief on the part of the applicant as to whether his driving was lawful or authorised was, as the primary judge also found, a mistake of law[15] and so the defence of mistake of fact in s 24 of the Criminal Code (Qld) (the Code) was not applicable. As the primary judge correctly stated, the doctrine of mens rea does not apply to s 78 of the TORUM, as the offence is one of strict liability.[16] Given the effect of the legislation and the mistake being one as to law and not fact, the magistrate’s findings were plainly supported by the evidence, as the respondent submitted.[14]AIA, s 39 and s 39A; Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 95-97.[15]Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 218 CLR 493 at [11]-[13]; [59] and [90]; Pusey v Wagner; Ex parte Wagner [1922] St R Qd 181 at 184-185; Sancoff v Holford; Ex parte Holford [1973] Qd R 25 at 27.[16]See s 23(2) of the Code, applied to the TORUM by s 36 of the Code. The effect is that intent is immaterial unless it is expressly declared to be an element of the offence: Widgee Shire Council v Bonney (1907) 4 CLR 977 at 981-982. I accept the respondent’s submission that the District Court judge rightly found that there was no bias or denial of natural justice on the part of the magistrate. Procedural fairness had been accorded by efforts made by the magistrate to explain the proceedings and provide adequate opportunities to be heard. The District Court judge was also correct to conclude that there was no misnomer due to the applicant’s admission as to the name on the licence that he was issued and the applicant’s birth certificate.