SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Drews [2020] QCA 18
PARTIES:
R
v
DREWS, Troy Allen
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 140 of 2019
DC No 20 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Extension (Sentence)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Bundaberg – Date of Sentence: 10 March 2016 (Moynihan QC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
14 February 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
29 November 2019
JUDGE:
Sofronoff P and McMurdo JA and Boddice J
ORDERS:
1. The application to adduce further evidence be refused.
2. The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against sentence be refused.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – TIME FOR APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant pleaded guilty to two counts of deprivation of liberty, three counts of common assault, one count of torture, one count of grievous bodily harm and two counts of contravention of a domestic violence order – where the applicant was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with an automatic serious violent offence declaration for the count of torture – where the applicant makes an application for extension of time within which to appeal against the sentence – where the application for an extension of time was brought more than three years after the expiry of the statutory time for the filing of a notice seeking leave to appeal the sentence – where the applicant makes an application to adduce further evidence – whether the discretion to grant the extension of time should be exercised – whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing the application – whether the refusal of the extension would result in a miscarriage of justice
R v GV[2006] QCA 394, cited
R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667; [1998] QCA 304, citedCOUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
C M Cook for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
SOFRONOFF P: I agree with Boddice J.
McMURDO JA: I agree with Boddice J.
BODDICE J: Troy Allen Drews makes application for an extension of time within which to appeal against sentences of imprisonment imposed on 10 March 2016. Those sentences followed pleas of guilty entered by the applicant in the District Court at Bundaberg.
The applicant also seeks leave to adduce further evidence as to the sentence hearing and the conduct of his legal representatives.
Background
The applicant was born on 11 April 1979. He was aged 35 years at the time of the offences. He was aged 40 at the date of the hearing.
The applicant has a relevant and significant criminal history, including for offences involving violence and drugs. He has previously served periods of imprisonment.
Offences
On 10 March 2016, the applicant pleaded guilty to two counts of deprivation of liberty, three counts of common assault, one count of torture, one count of grievous bodily…
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- AGLC
- R v Drews [2020] QCA 18
- Case
- [2020] QCA 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the discretion to grant an extension of time should be exercised, whether there was a satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing the application, and whether the refusal of the extension would result in a miscarriage of justice. The court also had to consider whether the applicant should be granted leave to adduce further evidence concerning the sentence hearing and the conduct of his legal representatives.
The court found that the applicant's material did not reveal a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in bringing the application for an extension of time. Furthermore, the court concluded that any appeal would not enjoy sufficient prospects of success and that the refusal of the extension application would not result in a miscarriage of justice. The court also found that the applicant's complaints about his legal representatives related primarily to their conduct before he entered his pleas of guilty and during the sentencing submissions, and that there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the applicant did not terminate their services or raise his concerns at that time. Finally, the court concluded that the sentence imposed was well within an appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion, given the circumstances of the offences and the applicant's personal circumstances and mitigating factors.
The court refused the application to adduce further evidence and the application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against the sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to adduce further evidence be refused.
2. The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against sentence be refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The discretion to grant an extension is broad. An extension may be granted even in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay if the Court is satisfied that a refusal of the extension would result in a miscarriage of justice.[2][2]R v GV [2006] QCA 394 at [3].Consideration The applicant’s material does not reveal any satisfactory explanation for what is an inordinately lengthy delay for the bringing of an application for an extension of time within which to appeal the sentence. Further, a consideration of the grounds relied upon in support of any application for a grant of leave to appeal out of time supports a conclusion that any appeal would not enjoy sufficient prospects of success and there is no basis to conclude that a refusal of the extension application will result in a miscarriage of justice. The applicant’s complaints as to the conduct of his legal representatives relate largely to their conduct prior to the entry of his pleas of guilty and in the course of the sentencing submissions. There is no satisfactory explanation as to why the applicant did not, at that point, terminate their services or place his concerns on the record. In any event, a consideration of the sentencing submissions and remarks reveal that the applicant’s longstanding drug addiction, including the circumstances that the offences occurred whilst he was on “a methylamphetamine bender” were specifically canvassed at sentence and accepted by the sentencing Judge as being relevant in providing some context for the offending behaviour.[3][3]AB36/36. Finally, a consideration of the circumstances of the offences, in the context of the applicant’s personal circumstances and mitigating factors, supports a conclusion that an effective head sentence of ten years imprisonment, with the consequence of an automatic serious violent offence declaration was well within a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion, even allowing for the matters sought to be contended for as being relevant in the setting of that sentence. The offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty involved a course of conduct over a protracted period in which the applicant, as the principal offender, terrorised two complainants. The torturous assault of those complainants was properly described by the sentencing Judge as “cowardly, vicious and evil”.[4] One complainant suffered serious and life-threatening injuries. He was callously left for dead. That complainant was disabled, rendering him largely defenceless. There was nothing in that complainant’s conduct which provided any sensible reason for the applicant’s behaviour.[4]AB36/3. Notwithstanding the applicant’s pleas of guilty and his expressed remorse and the other matters in mitigation such as his troubled childhood, drug addiction and prospects of rehabilitation, an effective head sentence of ten years imprisonment imposed on an offender who had a relevant and significant criminal history, including previous convictions for violence and drugs, and who had committed the offences in question while on probation and when on bail for the domestic violence offence, fell well within an appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion.