Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

PONIATOWSKA v CHANNEL SEVEN SYDNEY PTY LTD (No 2)

[2020] SASCFC 5

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

29 January 2020

DEFAMATION - DAMAGES - GENERAL DAMAGES - ASSESSMENT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT - ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

In October 2011 the respondents broadcast a story on Today Tonight which depicted the appellant as having defrauded and cheated Centrelink of $20,000 in single parent benefits while working for a building company and having avoided prosecution by finding a loophole in social security law that did not require her to disclose her income to Centrelink. The story was also published on a Channel Seven website.

The appellant sued the respondents for defamation. The trial Judge dismissed the action. The Judge did not assess damages but summarised the evidence and made some findings of fact relevant to damages.

This Court allowed the appellant’s appeal on liability and heard submissions on the assessment of damages.

Held by the Court:

1. The appellant failed to establish a basis for the award of aggravated damages (at [92]).

2. Damages for non-economic loss assessed at $200,000 (at [172]).

3. Damages for economic loss assessed at $80,000 (at [172]).

4. The parties to be heard on interest and costs (at [173]).

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Sch 1 s 135.2; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 32, s 33, s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), referred to.
Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2019] SASCFC 111; Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 4) [2016] SASC 137; Nevin v B & R Enclosures Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 339; Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC (2016) 258 CLR 134; Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497; Bauer Media Pty Ltd v Wilson (No 2) [2018] VSCA 154; Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183; Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; Google Inc v Duffy [2017] SASCFC 130; Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] SASC 141; Pedavoli v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1674; Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 58, discussed.
Cripps v Vakras [2014] VSC 279; Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521; Rayney v Western Australia (No 9) [2017] WASC 367; Wagner v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 201; Forrest v Askew [2007] WASC 161; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254; Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 693; Jeffrey and Curnow v Giles; Giles v Jeffrey and Curnow [2015] VSCA 70, considered.

PONIATOWSKA v CHANNEL SEVEN…

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Details
Case
[2020] SASCFC 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Kourakis CJ, Blue and Nicholson JJ, considered the assessment of damages in a defamation proceeding brought by Ms Poniatowska against Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd. The appeal concerned the quantum of damages to be awarded following findings of liability against the defendant. The trial judge had not assessed damages but had made findings relevant to their assessment, and the Full Court determined it was appropriate to assess damages on appeal rather than remit the matter.

The primary legal issues before the Full Court were the assessment of general damages for non-economic loss in defamation, including the principles governing compensation for hurt feelings, damage to reputation, and vindication of reputation. The Court also considered the application of the statutory limit on damages for non-economic loss under section 33 of the relevant Act, and whether this provision affected the availability of aggravated damages for post-publication conduct. The Court was required to determine the factual basis for the assessment, including the extent of publication and the impact on the plaintiff.

The Court applied common law principles for assessing damages in defamation, noting that such damages serve to compensate for hurt feelings, repair damage to reputation, and vindicate the plaintiff's reputation. It was established that the harm caused by a defamatory publication extends beyond the date of publication to include ongoing hurt and the need for vindication throughout the litigation. The Court also addressed the statutory cap on non-economic loss, confirming that it operates as a limit and does not alter the common law principles for assessment. The Court rejected the contention that section 33 eliminated the right to aggravated damages, finding that the provision was directed at limiting non-economic loss rather than abolishing aggravated damages, and that any such intention would require express legislative provision.

In its assessment, the Full Court had regard to the admitted viewership figures for the broadcasts and the plaintiff's pleaded case. However, it declined to consider broadcasts on other Seven Network stations for which no evidence of connection to the defendants' publication was adduced. The Court also noted the complexity surrounding internet downloads, with limited data available regarding "page views" from various locations. Ultimately, the Court found that Ms Poniatowska had not established an entitlement to aggravated damages.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The trial Judge did not assess damages but summarised the evidence and made some findings of fact relevant to damages.[2] After hearing submissions from the parties, the Court decided to assess damages on the appeal rather than remit the assessment to a single Judge. These reasons address that assessment.[2] Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 4) [2016] SASC 137 at [469]–[671]. Background The background facts relevant to liability are set out in the reasons for judgment of Blue J in the reasons for judgment on liability.[3] The following background facts are supplementary or recapitulated.[3] [2019] SASCFC 111 at [18]–[167]. Ms Poniatowska was born in 1967 in Poland. In 1986 she commenced Bachelor and Master of Canon and Civil Law degrees, which she completed in 1991. She married in 1989. In November 1991 Ms Poniatowska emigrated with her husband to Australia. In 1992 her daughter was born and she also undertook a TAFE course in English. In 1993 she undertook an Information Technology course. In 1994 she undertook a one year Graduate Diploma of Business (Administrative Management) at the University of South Australia. In 1995 her son was born. In January 1996 Ms Poniatowska commenced employment with the Commonwealth government as an administrative services officer. She worked initially in the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs processing migration applications and then in the Department of Defence recruiting office. She remained there until she resigned in January 1998. In January 1998 Ms Poniatowska commenced employment with the University of South Australia as a student advisor, responding to student inquiries about university services and providing information and advice about programs and admissions. She remained there until January 2000. From 1999 onwards, she also worked in her husband’s second-hand car dealership. Her work included marketing, advertising and contacting clients. In January 2000 Ms Poniatowska commenced employment with radio station 5DN as an account manager, organising advertising campaigns for businesses and clients on a salary and commission. She remained there until December 2003. In January 2002 Ms Poniatowska commenced a part-time Master of Business (Administrative Management) degree at the University of South Australia, which she completed in December 2005. In November 2002 Ms Poniatowska’s husband left her and their children and later moved overseas. In January 2005 Ms Poniatowska commenced employment with Hickinbotham, selling house and land packages on commission. She experienced sexual harassment in the workplace which commenced in May 2005 and adversely affected her mental health. She remained there until February 2006, when Hickinbotham purportedly terminated her employment. In May 2006 Ms Poniatowska commenced employment with AV Jennings, selling house and land packages. She remained there until she resigned in October 2006 due to mental ill-health. In August 2006 Ms Poniatowska commenced (initially on a part-time basis) a Bachelor of Laws degree at the University of Adelaide, which she completed in December 2009.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In April 2014 the trial of Ms Poniatowska’s defamation action commenced. Evidence concluded in September 2014 and closing addresses were made in November 2014. Evidence relevant to damages Ms Poniatowska gave evidence about the effect of the Today Tonight story on her. Jeremy Cordeaux gave evidence that Ms Poniatowska had been a very effective sales representative at radio station 5DN. Dr Czechowicz gave expert evidence about Ms Poniatowska’s mental health and the effect of the sexual harassment at and subsequent proceedings against Hickinbotham, the Centrelink criminal proceedings and the Today Tonight story on her. Several reports by Dr Czechowicz were tendered. Mr Stillwell and Mr Burgess gave expert evidence concerning the effect of the Today Tonight story on Ms Poniatowska’s employment prospects. Their expert reports were tendered. Patsy Rowe, an employee of New Holland Publishers, gave affidavit and oral evidence concerning her dealings with Ms Poniatowska in relation to Ms Poniatowska’s manuscript What Does Not Kill You Makes You Stronger. Her evidence was that her assessment had been that the manuscript was not worthy of publication. On appeal, portions of two affidavits by Ms Poniatowska were tendered without objection or cross-examination in which she said that she has been unemployed since November 2014 when the defamation trial concluded. Ms Poniatowska did not seek to adduce any evidence on appeal from Dr Czechowicz due to the state of his health. The approach of the Judge to damages The Judge did not assess the amount of damages that he would have awarded if he had found liability established. However, the Judge found that Ms Poniatowska had not established an entitlement to aggravated damages, summarised evidence relevant to damages and made some findings that would be relevant to damages. As a general proposition, a judge should address all issues in reasons for judgment even though an issue does not affect the judge’s disposition of the case because the judge has already decided to dismiss the case on an anterior issue. This is because an appeal court might take a different view on the anterior issue. This general proposition applies to the assessment of damages when a judge has decided to dismiss a case on liability as much as to any other subsequent issue. In Nevin v B & R Enclosures Pty Ltd,[5] Tobias JA (with whom Sheller and Beazley JJA agreed) said:Although it can be put no higher than a rule of convenience, it is generally (although not invariably) the practice of judges both of this Court and the District Court who propose to find for the defendant in personal injury cases to assess damages in order to avoid the cost and expense, as well as the inconvenience in the taking up of valuable court time and resources, of a new trial limited to the issue of damages should there be a successful appeal on the issue of liability…In my opinion, where the issue of damages in personal injury cases has been fully litigated, and there is at least a reasonable possibility that the trial judge’s decision on liability in favour of a defendant may be overturned on appeal, it is both just and convenient that the trial judge should proceed to assess damages to guard against the eventuality of a successful appeal.[6] [5] [2004] NSWCA 339. [6] At [74]–[75].

Decision

Reasons for decision

If it were necessary to decide, we would reject Channel Seven’s contention. There is no reason to construe section 33 as changing the common law by eliminating the right to aggravated damages for post-publication conduct. First, subsection 33(2) is addressed, and all of the other subsections of that section are also clearly addressed, to a limit on damages for non-economic loss: not to aggravated damages as such. Secondly, section 33 and the Act as a whole merely modify in specific and limited respects the operation of the common law tort of defamation. Thirdly, the posited elimination would represent a very substantial change in the common law and, if that were intended, it may be expected that the legislature would have expressly so provided.Conclusion Ms Poniatowska has not established an entitlement to aggravated damages.Damages for non-economic lossFactual basis for assessment Channel Seven admitted that the average number of viewers for the Seven Network stations was 331,000 viewers in Sydney and 156,000 viewers in Perth. The case was conducted at trial and on appeal on the basis that, on the one hand, there should be a single assessment of damages against both defendants for the collective damage caused by the broadcasts in New South Wales and Western Australia (and indeed for the internet story) and, on the other hand, the section 33 cap (if it applies) applies to damages against both defendants collectively and not severally. Ms Poniatowska pleaded that the broadcast story was also broadcast on a further 33 television stations around Australia. Channel Seven admitted that it was broadcast on 17 of those stations (pleading that they were not operated by them) and no evidence was adduced by Ms Poniatowska to prove broadcast by the other 16 stations. The 17 stations included Brisbane, four regional cities in Queensland, two regional cities in New South Wales, five regional cities in Victoria, Canberra, Hobart, Darwin and Alice Springs. The broadcast story was not broadcast in Adelaide or Melbourne. The Judge found that Ms Poniatowska had not pleaded a case against Channel Seven directly for publication by other Seven Network stations; however, it was open to her on her pleadings to contend that the further publication by the 17 stations was relevant to the assessment of damages flowing from the original publication. Ms Poniatowska did not adduce any evidence of a connection or relationship between the publication of the story by either respondent on the one hand and broadcast of the story by the other 17 Seven Network stations. In those circumstances, we have no regard to the broadcast by those 17 stations in the assessment of damages. The position in respect of internet downloads is unfortunately complex. Ms Poniatowska tendered as exhibit P19 a letter from Channel Seven’s solicitors to her solicitor. The letter stated that the defendants admitted that the story was uploaded to “the Today Tonight website” but did not admit that it was downloaded by any person. It did not explain what was meant by “the Today Tonight website”, particularly in the context in which the content of the Today Tonight program varied (at least in respect of the story and inferentially more generally) from State to State and from station to station. The letter said that the defendants did not have any relevant documents relating to access by users to the website but data had been extracted from the Yahoo Web Analytics Web database. The letter enclosed a table referring to a url Yahoo webpage). The table showed a number of “page views” from various locations in each of October, November and December 2011 and January 2012. The total for the four months was 42 from Sydney, nine from Melbourne, seven from Brisbane, four from Adelaide, two from Perth and one from each of Christchurch and Germany.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 32 of the Act provides:32—Damages to bear rational relationship to harmIn determining the amount of damages to be awarded in any defamation proceedings, the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded. Section 33, discussed above, imposes a limit on damages for non-economic loss. The Judge in his reasons for judgment said that the relevant amount of the limit was $366,000 being the amount gazetted with effect from 15 May 2014. While Ms Poniatowska refers to the fact that the limit has now been increased to $407,500, she does not challenge the Judge’s approach of regarding the date of trial as the relevant date for determination of the amount of the limit. We proceed on that basis, noting that, for reasons that will appear, we assess damages for economic loss below the limit on any view. It is common ground that the limit operates as a cap and not so as to require a court to scale the damages awarded against the maximum amount. Damages are otherwise to be assessed under common law principles (subject to mitigation under the Act, which has no specific application in the present case). Damages for non-economic loss in defamation address three overlapping aspects of compensation for harm: compensation for hurt to the plaintiff’s feelings and damage to the plaintiff’s reputation and compensation to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation. In Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd,[23] Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said:Specific economic loss and exemplary or punitive damages aside, there are three purposes to be served by damages awarded for defamation. The three purposes no doubt overlap considerably in reality and ensure that “the amount of a verdict is the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations”. The three purposes are consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the appellant by the publication, reparation for the harm done to the appellant’s personal and (if relevant) business reputation and vindication of the appellant’s reputation. The first two purposes are frequently considered together and constitute consolation for the wrong done to the appellant. Vindication looks to the attitude of others to the appellant: the sum awarded must be at least the minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the appellant’s reputation. “The gravity of the libel, the social standing of the parties and the availability of alternative remedies” are all relevant to assessing the quantum of damages necessary to vindicate the appellant.[24][23] (1993) 178 CLR 44.[24] At 60–61. (Footnotes omitted) The harm caused by the defamatory publication does not end at the time of publication but encompasses continuing harm including ongoing hurt feelings during and up to the conclusion of the litigation by the plaintiff seeking vindication.[25] [25] Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor(1928) 41 CLR 254 at 263 per Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ; Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 693 at 706 per Gallop, Davies and von Doussa JJ; Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183 at [75]–[76] per Tobias and McColl JJA; Jeffrey and Curnow v Giles; Giles v Jeffrey and Curnow [2015] VSCA 70 at [26]–[27] per Warren CJ and Tate JA.