Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 4)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

PONIATOWSKA v CHANNEL SEVEN SYDNEY PTY LTD (No 4)

[2021] SASCFC 32

Judgment of The Full Court  

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable Justice Blue and the Honourable Justice Nicholson)

9 August 2021

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS

In September 2019 the Court delivered reasons for judgment allowing an appeal by the appellant against a judgment dismissing her defamation action against the respondents.

The Court heard submissions on the assessment of damages. In January 2020 the Court assessed damages for non-economic loss at $200,000, assessed damages for economic loss at $80,000 and rejected a claim for aggravated damages: Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] SASCFC 5.

In March 2021 the appellant applied for an order setting aside the order assessing damages and substituting a higher award of damages for economic loss and an award of aggravated damages.

Held:

1Assuming without deciding that the Court has power under rule 186.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) to set aside a judgment on appeal if the Court misapprehends a material fact or the law (at [16]), the appellant has not established that the Court misapprehended a material fact or the law in the various respects asserted by the appellant (at [27], [31], [34], [42], [43], [47]-[49], [52], [54], [57], [58], [61]-[65], [71]-[75]).

2Application dismissed (at [77]).

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (1993) 176 CLR 300; McAdam v Robertson (1999) 73 SASR 360; McAdam v Robertson (No 2) [2001] SASC 206; Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256; Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] SASCFC 5; Wagner v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 284, considered.

PONIATOWSKA v CHANNEL SEVEN SYDNEY PTY LTD (No 4)
[2021] SASCFC 32

Full Court: Kourakis CJ, Blue and Nicholson JJ

  1. THE COURT: In September 2019 the Court delivered reasons for judgment allowing an appeal by Malgorzata Poniatowska against a judgment of a Judge of this Court dismissing her defamation action against the respondents Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd and Channel Seven Perth Pty Ltd (collectively Channel Seven).[1]

  2. The trial Judge had not assessed damages but had made findings of fact relevant to damages. Ms Poniatowska invited the Court to assess damages itself rather than remit the assessment to a single Judge. Channel Seven invited the Court to remit the assessment to the trial Judge. The Court decided to assess damages itself.

  3. The Court heard submissions on damages. Ms Poniatowska adduced limited further evidence at the hearing in addition to the evidence adduced at trial before the trial Judge.

  4. In January 2020 the Court delivered a second set of reasons for judgment assessing…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASCFC 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered an application by Ms Poniatowska to set aside a previous appellate judgment. Ms Poniatowska sought to reopen the Court's reasons for judgment, have the prior orders set aside, and obtain a substituted award of damages for economic loss and aggravated damages. The application was brought under rule 186.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) and the Court's inherent jurisdiction.

The legal issues before the Court were whether it possessed the power to set aside its own appellate judgment and, if so, whether the grounds advanced by Ms Poniatowska warranted the exercise of that power. Specifically, the Court had to determine if it had misapprehended material facts or the law in its previous assessment of Ms Poniatowska's qualifications, her prospects of employment in sales or administration, and her earning capacity.

The Court acknowledged the principle that a court may, in exceptional circumstances, review or alter its judgment until it is perfected, particularly if it has proceeded on a misapprehension of fact or law. However, the Court emphasized that this power is discretionary and exercised with regard to the public interest in the finality of litigation. It is not to be used for re-arguing decided matters or as a means for unsuccessful litigants to seek a rehearing due to inadequate presentation of arguments. The Court found that Ms Poniatowska had not established any misapprehension of fact or law on the part of the Court regarding her business management qualifications, her employment prospects in sales or administration, or the assessment of her income level.

The application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held:

1 Assuming without deciding that the Court has power under rule 186.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) to set aside a judgment on appeal if the Court misapprehends a material fact or the law (at [16]), the appellant has not established that the Court misapprehended a material fact or the law in the various respects asserted by the appellant (at [27], [31], [34], [42], [43], [47]-[49], [52], [54], [57], [58], [61]-[65], [71]-[75]).

2 Application dismissed (at [77]).

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 31 March 2021 Ms Poniatowska filed an interlocutory application, supported by an affidavit sworn by her on 30 March 2021, seeking reopening of our reasons for judgment in Poniatowska v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2), setting aside of the orders made on 13 May 2020 and substitution of a higher award of damages for economic loss and an award of aggravated damages.Power to set aside or vary judgment Ms Poniatowska in her interlocutory application relies on rule 186.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (the Rules) and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court as sources of power to set aside. In her written submissions, Ms Poniatowska cites McAdam v Robertson[5] and McAdam v Robertson (No 2)[6] in support of her contention that this Court has power to set aside a previous appellate judgment.[5] [1999] SASC 169, (1999) 73 SASR 360. [6] [2001] SASC 206. In McAdam v Robertson[7] Doyle CJ (with whom Bleby and Martin JJ agreed) quoted the following passage from the judgment of Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Smith v New South Wales Bar Association[8]:It has long been the common law that a court may review, correct or alter its judgment at any time until its order has been perfected. ... The power is discretionary and, although it exists up until the entry of judgment, it is one that is exercised having regard to the public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation. Thus, if reasons for judgment have been given, the power is only exercised if there is some matter calling for review. And there may be more or less reluctance to exercise the power depending on whether there is an avenue of appeal. It is important that it be understood that these considerations may tend against the re-opening of a case, but they are not matters which bear on the nature of the review to be undertaken once the case is re-opened, as this case was.and the following passage from the judgment of Mason CJ in Autodesk Inc v Dyason[9]:These examples indicate that the public interest in the finality of litigation will not preclude the exceptional step of reviewing or rehearing an issue when a court has good reason to consider that, in its earlier judgment, it has proceeded on a misapprehension as to the facts or the law. As this Court is a final court of appeal, there is no reason for it to confine the exercise of its jurisdiction in a way that would inhibit its capacity to rectify what it perceives to be an apparent error arising from some miscarriage in its judgment. However, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the Court; nor is it to be exercised simply because the party seeking a rehearing has failed to present the argument in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put. What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to re-argue their cases.[7] (1999) 73 SASR 360. [8] (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 265. [9] (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 302-303.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The second matter that Ms Poniatowska contends that the Court failed to take into account was that, apart from her qualifications as an admitted legal practitioner, she also holds business management qualifications (Master of Business (Administrative Management) and Graduate Diploma of Business (Administrative Management)). We did not overlook those qualifications. They are referred to at paragraphs [5] and [9] of our reasons for judgment.Prospects of employment in sales or administration Ms Poniatowska contends that the Court erred in its assessment of her prospects of obtaining employment in sales or administration by failing to take into account two matters. Ms Poniatowska refers to paragraph [158] of our reasons for judgment, in which we said:Mr Burgess did not address Ms Poniatowska’s prospects of employment in the fields in which she has worked. Her employment background involved either sales (radio station 5DN, Hickinbotham and AV Jennings) or administration or advice (Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Department of Defence and University of South Australia). Our assessment is that Ms Poniatowska would have had relatively higher prospects of obtaining employment in these fields than as a lawyer or as a contracts or commercial manager. However, she still would have faced similar types of negative features, such that her prospects of obtaining such an employment could only be assessed as modest. The first matter that Ms Poniatowska contends that the Court failed to take into account is that, apart from her qualifications as an admitted legal practitioner, she also had other relevant qualifications, namely a Master of Business (Administrative Management). We have addressed this above. The second matter that Ms Poniatowska contends that the Court failed to take into account is that negative features applying to seeking employment as a lawyer were not similar types of features to those applying to sales or administration. Beginning at paragraph [142], we summarised the evidence given by Mr Burgess, whose evidence was generally preferred by the trial Judge and this Court over the evidence given by Mr Stillwell. Mr Burgess in his evidence identified numerous negative features applying in respect of attempts by Ms Poniatowska to obtain employment. We explicitly recognised that they did not apply to the same extent in respect of sales or administration positions as they applied in respect of legal or contracts or commercial manager positions by stating that Ms Poniatowska would have had higher prospects of obtaining employment in the former fields. However, there remained negative features common to both fields of employment. There was no relevant misapprehension of fact.Level of Ms Poniatowska’s income Ms Poniatowska contends that the Court erred in its assessment of her earning capacity by failing to take into account two matters. Ms Poniatowska refers to paragraph [159] of our reasons for judgment, in which we said:Based on Ms Poniatowska’s level of earnings at Hickinbotham and AV Jennings, our assessment is that the net remuneration (including superannuation and deducting income tax) that Ms Poniatowska would have earned if she had been able to obtain employment would have been in the vicinity of $75,000 per annum.