Reg v The State of South Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 76 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

REG v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2020] SASC 36

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle

18 March 2020

TORTS - MALICIOUS PROCEDURE AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT - FALSE IMPRISONMENT

The plaintiff seeks damages from the defendant (the State of South Australia) for false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiff’s claim arises out of his imprisonment at the Adelaide Remand Centre (the ARC) for five days in April 2009. The imprisonment occurred following the issue of a warrant of remand by a Magistrate that specified “Correctional Institution: Glenside Campus of the Royal Adelaide Hospital.” The Glenside Campus of the Royal Adelaide Hospital (Glenside) is not a correctional institution under the Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA).

The plaintiff claims that as the warrant specified that he be remanded to Glenside and not the ARC (or, indeed, any correctional institution) there was no lawful basis for him to have been imprisoned at the ARC for five days.  He claims that in the circumstances the defendant is liable both for false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office.

The defendant denies any liability to the plaintiff. It does so on the basis that the Magistrate was only empowered to order that the plaintiff be detained at a correctional institution or in custody, and did not have power to order that the plaintiff be detained at Glenside. The defendant contends that while the warrant of demand was thus defective in specifying Glenside, under s 182(1) of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA), this did not invalidate the warrant. The defendant further contends that the Magistrate ordered that the plaintiff be detained in custody, and as the Correctional Services Act entitles the Chief Executive of the Department of Correctional Services to determine the correctional institution in which a person remanded in custody is to be placed, the plaintiff’s detention at the ARC was lawful. The defendant contends that as the detention was lawful, then both of the plaintiff’s claims must fail.

Held, per Doyle J, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims:

1. The Magistrate’s intention in issuing the Warrant of Remand on 23 April 2009 was to remand the plaintiff in custody, as opposed to bail, under s 59 of the Summary Procedure Act. Section 22(1) of the Correctional Services Act then authorised the detention of the plaintiff in any correctional institution. This is so regardless of whether the Magistrate intended to identify a particular location for the plaintiff’s custody.

2.      The reference to Glenside as the correctional institution in the warrant was a defect which, under s 182(1) of the Summary Procedure Act, did not render the warrant invalid.

3.      Accordingly, the warrant was valid and there was a lawful basis for the imprisonment of the plaintiff at the ARC.  The plaintiff’s claim of false imprisonment must therefore fail.

4.      The plaintiff’s claim for misfeasance in public office also fails at the threshold as the warrant was valid and his imprisonment lawful.

5.      Alternatively, the plaintiff’s claim for misfeasance in…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Reg v The State of South Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] SASC 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Reg v The State of South Australia involved the plaintiff, who claimed that he was falsely imprisoned and subjected to malicious procedures by the State of South Australia. The plaintiff alleged that he was detained at the Adelaide Remand Centre (ARC) when he was supposed to be at Glenside Psychiatric Hospital for a bail report. The plaintiff sought damages for the mental harm he suffered due to the alleged false imprisonment and malicious procedures. The court was required to determine the nature and extent of the plaintiff's psychiatric condition, whether the plaintiff's detention at the ARC constituted false imprisonment or misfeasance in public office, and the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.

The court found that the plaintiff suffered mental harm in the form of a recognised psychiatric condition as a result of his detention at the ARC. The court was not required to determine the specific label to be applied to the plaintiff's psychiatric condition, as the quantum of damages to be awarded did not depend on the use of a particular label. The court considered the evidence of two experts and found that the plaintiff's condition had a material impact on him and would continue to do so. The court found that the plaintiff's detention at the ARC was not fleeting and was undoubtedly a traumatic experience for the plaintiff. The court awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of $100,000, considering the significant impact of the detention on the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff had not established any conduct on the part of the officers involved in his imprisonment that was either lacking in bona fide or otherwise unjustifiable in the relevant sense, and therefore dismissed the plaintiff's claims for aggravated or exemplary damages.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims and entered judgment in favour of the defendant, the State of South Australia. The court found that the plaintiff had not established any basis for an award of aggravated or exemplary damages, and therefore the plaintiff's claims for such damages were dismissed. The court awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of $100,000 for the mental harm he suffered due to his detention at the ARC.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In structuring these reasons, I propose to commence by setting out my findings in relation to the plaintiff’s background, based largely upon the plaintiff’s own evidence. I will then set out my findings as to the circumstances leading to the plaintiff’s detention, most of which are uncontroversial and emerge from the contemporaneous documentary records. The next section of my reasons will address the evidence, and then my findings, in relation to the period the plaintiff spent at the ARC. I will then address the plaintiff’s two causes of action, and conclude with a consideration of the issues arising on an assessment of damages.The plaintiff’s background I make the following findings in relation to the plaintiff’s background, and the circumstances more generally, based primarily upon the plaintiff’s evidence. The plaintiff was born in 1959, and so was 60 years of age at the date of trial. He has been married for about 35 years. He and his wife have three sons and a daughter. The plaintiff had an unsettled childhood. His family moved around, including spending periods overseas, and as a result he went to a number of different primary schools. His parents separated when he was young, and he was brought up by his mother. But it would appear that his mother struggled with the responsibility of parenthood, and so he spent a lot of time in the care of others, including interstate relatives. He also spent a period as a ward of the State. The plaintiff’s mother married again, and he lived with her and his step-father from the age of about 12 through to 16. He said that his step-father brought him up well, but he described it as a “hard” upbringing. His step-father would discipline him physically. For his secondary schooling the plaintiff attended Adelaide Technical High School. He did so through to the end of year 11. He described his schooling as being easy for him; to the point that he found it boring. From the age of about 15, the plaintiff worked in a couple of Coles supermarkets. He was promoted quickly, and by the age of 18 he was a night manager in charge of about 20 people. At the age of 21 he spent a couple of years travelling around Australia, doing odd jobs as he moved around. This included spending periods working as a croupier, a geologist’s assistant, an explosives technician, a gardener and a cook. The plaintiff eventually returned to Adelaide at the age of about 23 or 24 with a view to settling down, getting married and having children. Within about a year he married his wife, whom he had met several years earlier through a church group he had been part of before leaving Adelaide. He worked as a manager with Woolworths, and she worked as a nurse. They bought a house and managed to pay it off within a few years. They had four children together. As at the date of trial their three sons were aged 32, 30 and 28, and their daughter was aged 17. While he worked hard to provide and care for his children, and to prevent them having to endure the instability and insecurity that he experienced as a child, the plaintiff acknowledged that at times he could have been a better father. He also acknowledged that he and his wife had had some marital difficulties over the years. But he said that he now considered that their difficulties were resolved, and that they were back together.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In relation to the circumstances of the plaintiff’s detention at the ARC, I shall commence by summarising the evidence before then setting out my findings.The plaintiff’s evidence The plaintiff had only a very limited recollection of the hearing before Magistrate Baldino on the afternoon of 23 April 2009. His recollection was that the police had taken him to the Adelaide Magistrates Court cells, and that he entered the court room from the cells, sat in the dock during the hearing, and then returned to the cells once the hearing had concluded. The plaintiff’s recollection, while very vague and general, was that the hearing last about 10 to 15 minutes. He said that once the Magistrate had been informed of the hearing that he had failed to attend, and the location from which he had come (i.e. the Glenside campus of the Royal Adelaide Hospital), he told the plaintiff that he would be going back to Glenside, or remanded to Glenside, to enable a bail report to be prepared, and to return to Court on 28 April 2009 to see whether he was suitable for bail. The plaintiff recalled discussion of a report that would take into account an assessment from a doctor from Glenside. Having returned to the cells, the plaintiff was then placed in a van operated by Group 4. There were a number of other prisoners in the van. At that stage he was not anxious, stressed or upset. He had been calm in the court room, and remained calm, because he thought he was going back to Glenside, and that there would be no issue with his bail report given that he had simply missed a court appointment. He was not handcuffed. However, things changed when they arrived at the sally port of the ARC and he realised that that was where he was being taken. He said that he told the Corrections officers who were present that he was not meant to be there; that he was meant to be going to Glenside. He understood that the Corrections officers then discussed this with the Group 4 officers who had brought him there. According to the plaintiff, a Group 4 officer said “We haven’t got time to take him to Glenside”. He said that the Corrections officers went back inside, apparently to work out what would happen to him. After what seemed like about five or ten minutes, the Corrections officers came back out into the sally port area, and one of them said “You’re coming in here”. He protested and said again that he was not meant to be there; that he was meant to be at Glenside. He was then told by the Corrections officer “Shut the fuck up, Skippy. This is where you’re staying.” He said again “I’m not meant to be here”, and was told “Just shut the fuck up”. When he continued to protest, the Corrections officer said that it could be sorted out next week. The plaintiff did not know the name of the Corrections officer who made the comments in the preceding paragraph. The best description he could give was a male who was about 6 foot 2 inches tall with a solid build (approximately 85 to 90 kilograms), with dark straight hair, and in his late 30s or early 40s.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the end, I do not think it is necessary for me to choose or prefer the evidence of one over the other, or to otherwise reach a concluded view as to the correct label to be applied to the plaintiff’s psychiatric condition. The quantum of damages to be awarded does not turn on the use of a particular label. It turns upon the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s impairment as a result of that condition. As to this matter, I consider that the two experts’ views are relatively consistent. Having regard to the evidence of both, I am satisfied that as a result of the plaintiff’s period of imprisonment at the ARC in late April 2009, he suffered mental harm in the form of a recognised psychiatric condition. Regardless of whether that condition is better characterised as PTSD or an Adjustment Disorder, it is a condition that has continued to impact the plaintiff to a material extent, and will continue to do so.Conclusion as to damages I have had regard to all of the matters mentioned above. Ultimately, however, the appropriate award of damages is largely a matter of impression. It is not susceptible of any detailed analysis, let alone calculation. On the assumption that the defendant either falsely imprisoned the plaintiff, or is liable for misfeasance in public office, it is significant that the imprisonment of the plaintiff was not fleeting. It continued for five days, and given the nature and circumstances of that imprisonment was undoubtedly a very traumatic experience for the plaintiff. It had a significant impact upon the plaintiff at the time, and has continued to have a material impact upon him. Wielding the broad axe that I consider is appropriate, I would have assessed the plaintiff’s damages in the amount of $100,000. I do not think the plaintiff has made out a basis for any award of aggravated or exemplary damages. On my findings, the plaintiff has not established any conduct on the part of the DCS officers involved in his imprisonment that was either lacking in bona fide or otherwise unjustifiable in the relevant sense. Nor has he established any conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.[13][13] White v State of South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521 at [430]-[454]; Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1.Orders For the reasons I have set out, I dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, and enter judgment in favour of the defendant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established