Pineview Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Dimitriou (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pineview Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Dimitriou (No 2) [2019] FCA 1416

File number: NSD 1245 of 2018
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 30 August 2019
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – creditor’s petition – where debt relied upon is a judgment debt – where creditor seeks a sequestration order against the Respondent – where creditor’s petition opposed – notice of opposition to creditor’s petition had numerous grounds – whether bankruptcy notice was misleading because it did not identify the Respondent by name – whether there was “sufficient cause” why a sequestration order ought not be made – where debtor seeks to go behind judgment which is the basis for the debt in the creditor’s petition – whether substantial reasons shown for questioning judgment debt – whether debtor “solvent” or there was other “sufficient cause” not to make the sequestration order – whether requirements for making sequestration order satisfied

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – hearing of creditor’s petition – where hearing had previously been adjourned multiple times – where grounds of opposition filed by debtor had been amended on previous occasions

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 41(2), 52(1), 52(1)(c), 52(2), 52(2)(a), 52(2)(b)

Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) reg 4.02(1), 4.02(2), 4.02(3)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01(1)

Cases cited:

Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728

American Express International Inc v Held (1999) 87 FCR 583

Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Foyster [2000] FCA 400

Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Buckle (1998) 192 CLR 226

Christou v Demandem Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 695

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337

Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343

Curtis v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 144; 225 FCR 458

Dimitriou v Huybers [2017] NSWCA 252

Dimitriou v Huybers [2017] NSWCA 262

Dimitriou v Huybers (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 62

Eykamp v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 797

Furlong and Leishman v Wise & Young Pty Ltd & Ors(No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1987

Godfrey v Weriton Finance Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1057; 221 FCR 363

International Alpaca Management Pty Ltd v Ensor [1999] FCA 72

Kleinwort Bensen Australia Limited v Crowl (1987-88) 165 CLR 71

Knudsen & Yates trading as The Hargreaves Practice, in the matter of Sanders v Sanders [2003] FCA 1079

Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19

Octavo Investments Pty Ltd v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360

Pineview Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Dimitriou [2019] FCA 1342

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132

Re Capel; Ex parte Caram Finance Australia Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Finn J, 9 April 1998)

Re Kostezky; Ex parte Milder Elfman Szmerling Krycer Pty Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 101

Re Sarina; Ex parte Wollondilly Shire Council (1980) 43 FLR 163; 30 ALR 266

Re Wimborne; Ex parte a Debtor (1979) 24 ALR 494

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1416
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Pineview Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Dimitriou (No 2), the court considered a creditor's petition for a sequestration order against the respondent, George Dimitriou, based on a judgment debt. The petition was opposed by Dimitriou on multiple grounds, including whether there was sufficient cause for not making the sequestration order and whether the bankruptcy notice was misleading. The court was tasked with determining these issues and deciding whether the requirements for a sequestration order were satisfied.

The court began by examining the evidence presented by Dimitriou in support of his grounds of opposition. The evidence was sparse, with Dimitriou failing to provide sworn evidence about his financial position or the existence of assets. Instead, his arguments relied heavily on documentary evidence and assertions from the bar table. The court found that Dimitriou's evidence did not establish that he was solvent or that there were substantial reasons to question the validity of the judgment debt. The court also considered the principle that a debtor's ability to pay debts does not include paying debts from the money of others. Despite Dimitriou's claims that he would be able to pay his debts through the recovery of debts by associated companies, he provided no evidence to support this assertion.

The court then addressed the issue of whether there were substantial reasons to "go behind" the judgment debt. It noted that while a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt, the court has discretion to investigate the validity of the debt. The court found that Dimitriou had not provided sufficient evidence to justify questioning the validity of the judgment debt. The court concluded that the debt was a valid debt and that there were no substantial reasons to doubt its existence.

Finally, the court considered whether there was sufficient cause for not making a sequestration order. Dimitriou argued that he was not indebted to Pineview for the amount claimed and that he was in a temporary liquidity position. The court found these arguments unconvincing, noting that Dimitriou had not provided any evidence to support them. The court also rejected the argument that Pineview held the judgment debt on trust for third parties, finding that Pineview had the right to recourse to trust assets to satisfy its liabilities.

Based on its findings, the court made a sequestration order against Dimitriou, ordering that his estate be sequestrated and that the costs of the applicant be paid from his bankrupt estate. The court noted that the date of bankruptcy was 15 May 2018 and that a consent to act as trustee had been filed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A sequestration order under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) be made against the estate of George Dimitriou.

2. The costs of the applicant be assessed by a Registrar of the Court and be paid from the bankrupt estate of George Dimitriou in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1. The date of bankruptcy was 15 May 2018.

2. A consent to act as trustee signed by Louise Ann Thomson has been filed under s 156A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ground three of the further amended notice of opposition, as set out earlier, raised a difficult, complex and somewhat unusual issue. The resolution of this issue was not assisted in any way by the approach of the parties. For his part, Mr Dimitriou did not adduce any affidavit or oral evidence concerning this ground. He simply tendered certain documents. One of the potentially critical documents did not emerge until the very last moment. Pineview did not assist in the elucidation of the relevant facts, though when pressed it ultimately conceded, through its counsel, that it did not dispute certain facts that were potentially relevant to the resolution of the issue. The Court was given virtually no assistance in relation to the relevant legal issues or principles in relation to this ground.Relevant facts and evidence in support of this ground The starting point is to consider what, if any, evidence was adduced in support of the five statements or contentions in relation to this ground as articulated in the further amended notice of opposition. The first contention is that Pineview holds the relevant judgment debt as trustee for Lee Rubino (as executor of the estate of the late Alfio Rubino) and Biagina Rubino (the Rubinos). Mr Dimitriou did not adduce any evidence from Lee or Biagina Rubino in relation to the nature or terms of the relevant trust. Nor was any trust deed tendered. There is, however, support for this contention in the judgment of White J. At [302], his Honour states:If Pineview recovers moneys pursuant to the judgments to be entered against Dimitriou, Wyse & Young and Wyse Accounting as outlined at para [300] above, the recovery would be trust property for which it would be required to account to the Rubinos, except insofar as it was entitled to have recourse to the moneys in order to indemnify itself against liabilities it had properly incurred in execution of the trust. That would include its liability to repay Huybers’ loan. But it would not thereby incur any further loss by reason of its having to account for any moneys recovered to the Rubinos. His Honour then went on to consider other liabilities which might be the subject of Pineview’s right of indemnity or reimbursement from the trust assets. Ultimately, Pineview did not dispute that it would hold any amounts that it ultimately recovers in respect of the judgment debt on trust for the Rubinos, subject to its right to have recourse to the trust assets so as to indemnify or reimburse itself in respect of any liabilities it had properly incurred from its execution of the trust. It may accordingly be accepted that, subject to the potential operation of the November 2016 deed, Pineview holds the judgment debt on trust for the Rubinos. It should be reiterated, however, that while Pineview may hold the judgment debt on trust, it nonetheless retains the right to have recourse to trust assets to satisfy its right of indemnity or reimbursement. The second contention relevant to this ground of opposition is that the judgment debt is the only asset now held by Pineview and that Pineview “has no duties to perform other than in respect of the judgment debt”. Mr Dimitriou did not adduce any evidence in relation to this contention. It is also somewhat difficult to comprehend exactly what is meant by the claim that Pineview has no duties to perform other than “in respect of the judgment debt”. That statement seems to accept or comprehend that Pineview has a continuing duty, as trustee, to recover or enforce the judgment debt. The contention that Pineview has no other duties as trustee, however, appears to put the matter too highly. While the trust deed was not in evidence, general principles would suggest that while it is still the trustee of the trust, Pineview will continue to have duties as trustee. There does not appear to be any suggestion, let alone evidence, that Pineview has been removed as trustee, or that the trust no longer exists.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

A debtor’s ability to pay their debts does not generally include an ability to pay debts from the money of other people: International Alpaca Management Pty Ltd v Ensor [1999] FCA 72 at [19].Evidence relevant to Mr Dimitriou’s ability to pay his debts Mr Dimitriou did not himself give any sworn evidence that he was able to pay his debts. Indeed, he adduced very little, if any, evidence concerning his personal financial position. Mr Dimitriou did not adduce any evidence concerning his debts or liabilities as at the date of the hearing. It is clear, however, that he has debts. Even putting the judgment debt owing to Pineview to one side, he has not paid the judgment debt in favour of Ms Huybers. He has also been ordered to pay the costs of various unsuccessful applications. To give but two examples to which the Court’s attention was directed, Mr Dimitriou was ordered to pay costs, including Pineview’s costs, in Dimitriou v Huybers [2017] NSWCA 252 and Rubino v Pineview Properties Pty Ltd (No 6) [2018] NSWSC 340. While Mr Dimitriou made various assertions from the bar table about his ability to pay the debts arising from those costs orders, he adduced no evidence that he had access to any cash resources, or was able to realise any assets within the near future, to enable him to pay those debts. Perhaps more significantly, Mr Dimitriou adduced no evidence concerning cash or assets owned by him. The extent of his evidence in relation to his assets was that he held shares in Wise and Young, which in turn owned shares in various other private companies, including Wise and Young and Defined Property. Mr Dimitriou made it clear that he held all his assets or “wealth” through his direct or indirect shareholdings in those private companies. Mr Dimitriou did tender his tax returns for the tax years ending 30 June 2017, 2018 and 2019. Those tax returns were signed the day before the final hearing. In the absence of any sworn evidence from Mr Dimitriou about the tax returns, or any other documentary evidence supporting any of the statements made in them, the tax returns were not admitted as evidence of the truth or accuracy of any of the statements made in them. To the extent that Mr Dimitriou advanced any case that he was able to pay his debts, that case was based on the proposition that the companies in which he had a direct or indirect shareholding would be in a position to recover or realise significant debts owed to them. Most of those debts had been the subject of litigation. Some of that litigation was referred to earlier in these reasons. The litigation appeared to be long running and complex. Some of the debts were secured by mortgages or other forms of security held over real property. Most if not all of the evidence concerning the debts owed to the companies associated with Mr Dimitriou consisted of documentary evidence. In short summary, as at the date of the final hearing following Mr Dimitriou’s successful application to reopen his case, the documentary evidence tendered by Mr Dimitriou was capable of establishing the following facts.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As events transpired, Mr Dimitriou only took the Court to a few documents. Some of those documents were affidavits that Mr Dimitriou had sworn for the purposes of, or filed in, proceedings in other courts. Those affidavits were only admitted into evidence on the strictly limited basis that they were evidence that Mr Dimitriou had relied on those affidavits in other proceedings and were not evidence of the truth of their contents. Had Mr Dimitriou wanted to rely on any of the facts deposed to in those other affidavits, he should have deposed to those facts in the affidavit or affidavits he swore for the purpose of this proceeding. It was oppressive and unfair of him to simply exhibit those affidavits to the affidavits sworn in this proceeding, particularly given that the other affidavits also annexed many documents. Relevant principles – Going behind a judgment The existence of a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 355. A judgment is, however, never conclusive evidence of a debt in bankruptcy proceedings and the Court may “go behind” the judgment to investigate whether there was a good debt to support it: Corney at 347. In Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212, Barwick CJ (with whom Windeyer and Owen JJ agreed) said (at 224):The judgment is never conclusive in bankruptcy. It does not always represent itself as the relevant debt of the petitioning creditor, even though under the general law, the prior existing debt has merged in a judgment. But the Bankruptcy Court may accept the judgment as satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor’s debt. In that sense that court has a discretion. It may or may not so accept the judgment. But it has been made quite clear by the decisions of the past that where reason is shown for questioning whether behind the judgment or as it is said, as the consideration for it, there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioning creditor, the Court of Bankruptcy can no longer accept the judgment as such satisfactory proof. It must then exercise its power, or if you will, its discretion to look at what is behind the judgment: to what is its consideration. In Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132, Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ (at [43]), with whom Edelman J relevantly agreed (at [97], [110]), made it clear that this statement should not be given the “artificially narrow application” that the appellant in that case urged, which was that the bankruptcy court’s discretion to go behind a judgment after a contested hearing was enlivened only in the event of some fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice. Rather, the categories in which the court will inquire into the validity of the judgment debt are not closed or constrained to any fixed categories. The discretion to go behind the judgment will be enlivened whenever there are “substantial reasons … for questioning whether behind [the] judgment there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioner”: Wren at 225 (per Barwick CJ); referred to with approval in Ramsay at [65] (per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ) and [110] (per Edelman J).Are there substantial reasons for questioning whether the debt is owing?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that Mr Dimitriou’s contention that the fact that the bankruptcy notice attached orders which did not specifically refer to him by name did not constitute a substantial defect. The bankruptcy notice as issued did not fail to meet any requirement made essential by the Bankruptcy Act and was not reasonably capable of misleading Mr Dimitriou.GROUND THREE: SUFFICIENT CAUSE WHY A SEQUESTRATION ORDER OUGHT NOT BE MADE? The submissions which were advanced on Mr Dimitriou’s behalf at the hearing on 14 December 2018 were that a sequestration order should not be made for two reasons. First, it was contended that Mr Dimitriou was not indebted to Pineview for the amount referred to in the bankruptcy notice. That was said to be because he had a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand against Pineview which exceeded the judgment debt by $18,895.38. Second, it was claimed that Mr Dimitriou’s position, as at the date of the 14 December 2018 hearing, was one of “temporary lack of liquidity” and that he was likely in the near future to obtain the benefit of various positive judgments in his favour. As was noted earlier, the further amended notice of opposition, which was filed in June 2019, appeared to abandon both of those contentions and to raise a new contention based on the fact that Pineview was said to hold the judgment debt on trust. That new contention will be addressed later in these reasons. For more abundant caution the original contentions or arguments in relation to this ground should be addressed despite the fact that they appeared to be abandoned in the further amended notice of contention. Is Mr Dimitriou indebted to Pineview for the amount in the notice? Before addressing this question, it is necessary to deal with two procedural issues that arose at the hearing on 14 December 2018.Procedural issues The first issue was whether Mr Dimitriou ought be permitted to raise this objection at all because it was not properly particularised in his amended notice of grounds of opposition to the creditor’s petition. Mr Dimitriou was not legally represented when he filed his initial notice of opposition. By the time the creditor’s petition came on for hearing, Mr Dimitriou had managed to secure legal representation by counsel who was apparently experienced in the law of bankruptcy. He secured an adjournment of the hearing to enable him to file an amended notice of opposition, settled by counsel, and to file further evidence. The amended notice of opposition that was filed by leave deleted a number of the original grounds of opposition. The grounds which were deleted included that Mr Dimitriou had a “counter-claim, set-off and cross-demand that is greater than the sum claimed in the Bankruptcy notice” (ground 3 in the original notice), that Mr Dimitriou did not “owe the money claimed by the creditor” (ground 6(c) in the original notice), that there were “substantial reasons for the Court to go behind the judgment” (ground 6(d) in the original notice) and that Mr Dimitriou had a “genuine and arguable claim against the creditor for an equivalent amount of the debt” (ground 6(e) in the original notice).