Godfrey v Weriton Finance Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Godfrey v Weriton Finance Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1057

Citation: Godfrey v Weriton Finance Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1057
Parties: MURRAY RODERICK GODFREY v WERITON FINANCE PTY LIMITED (ACN 135 966 568)
File number: NSD 1505 of 2013
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 18 October 2013
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Bankruptcy Notice – Application to set aside – where bankruptcy notice is served twice – whether bankruptcy notice could mislead the debtor – Application to extend time to comply with bankruptcy notice – whether allegations constitute grounds for the purposes of the Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g), 41, 41(6A), (7)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459C(2)(a), 459E(2)(c)
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 r 3.02(1)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) reg. 16.01
Cases cited: Abignano v Wenkart [1998] FCA 1468
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge (2003) 133 FCR 487
Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33
Cosenza v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] FCA 85
Genovese v BGC Constructions Pty Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 440
Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598
James v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 CLR 631
Klienwort Benson Australia v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71
Lee Chin Lien Yang v Mead [2009] FCA 1202
Lodhia v Trust Company of Australia [2005] FMCA 150
Northam v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] FCA 544
O’Meara v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1575
Northam v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] FCA 544
Re Fredericke and Whitworth; Ex parte Hibbard [1927] 1 Ch 253
Re Prow; Ex parte Dalgety Farmers Ltd (1985) 5 FCR 233
Re Pollard; Ex parte Lensing Management Co Pty Ltd  (1991) 33 FCR 284
Re Spurr; Ex parte Werner (1991) 31 FCR 236
Re Walsh (1982) 65 FLR 87
Re Wimborne, Ex parte the Debtor (1979) 24 ALR 494
Romano v Peldan [2003] FCA 767
Streimer v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211
Thorpe v Bristile Ltd (1997) 80 FCR 330
Walker v Nobel Einsiedel Pty Ltd (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Sweeney, Burchett and Einfeld JJ, 15 October 1992)
Date of hearing: 1 October 2013
Date of last submissions: 1 October 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL  DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 85
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Golledge
Solicitor for the Applicant: Carlos Toda & Co
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Wells
Solicitor for the Respondent: Farrar Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1505 of 2013

BETWEEN:

MURRAY RODERICK GODFREY
Applicant

AND:

WERITON FINANCE PTY LIMITED (ACN 135 966 568)
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 OCTOBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice served on 5 July 2013 be dismissed with costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1057
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Godfrey v Weriton Finance Pty Limited involved a dispute over a bankruptcy notice served twice on Mr Godfrey, who was represented by Carlos Toda & Co. Weriton Finance Pty Limited, represented by Farrar Lawyers, sought to set aside the application to dismiss the bankruptcy notice. The central legal issues were whether the bankruptcy notice could mislead the debtor by being served twice and if the applicant's allegations constituted grounds under the Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 to set aside the notice. The court examined the statutory requirements for a valid bankruptcy notice and whether the second service could impose an additional obligation on the debtor.

The court reasoned that the validity of a bankruptcy notice required strict compliance with legislative requirements, and any defect could invalidate the notice. However, the court concluded that the bankruptcy notice in question was not capable of misleading Mr Godfrey. The court held that once a bankruptcy notice is validly served, the debtor's obligation to comply is engaged, and a second service does not create a new obligation. The court further noted that Mr Godfrey, with his extensive experience in corporate insolvency, would understand that the second service did not absolve him of his responsibility to comply within the original 21-day period. Thus, the court dismissed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

The court found that the applicant's case was reasonably arguable, and therefore rejected the respondent's challenge to the competency of the application. The court also concluded that the grounds stated in the affidavit were sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice served on 5 July 2013 with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice served on 5 July 2013 be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent also raised as a threshold issue that the applicant had failed to identify any grounds as required by s 41 of the Act and rule 3.02(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 (‘Rules’). In the alternative, the respondent contended that there is no irregularity in the Notice and no basis upon which to set the Notice aside.1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1.1 Preliminary The trial proceeded on affidavits, being comprised of a brief affidavit sworn by the applicant purportedly deposing as to the grounds of the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice and, for the respondent, affidavits of the respondent’s solicitor and various persons who had endeavoured to effect service of the Notice on the applicant. Neither party challenged the evidence of the other by cross-examination. However, issue was taken with respect to certain inferences that I was invited to draw from the evidence, albeit that those that the respondent ultimately submitted were necessary to its case were more limited than those set out in the respondent’s written submissions. It is necessary to commence with an explanation of the circumstances in which the Bankruptcy Notice came to be served twice. 1.2 Service of the Bankruptcy Notice on 5 July 2014 Mr Godfrey co-founded Veritas Advisory in 2013 with David Iannuzzi and is a principal of the firm. According to the website for Veritas Advisory, the practice provides a full corporate and personal insolvency service together with forensic accounting. The solicitor for the respondent, Mr David Farrar of Farrar Lawyers, was instructed on or about 21 June 2013 by the respondent to serve the Bankruptcy Notice upon Mr Godfrey. By a letter dated 24 June 2013, Farrar Lawyers advised the solicitors for the applicant, Carlos Toda & Co, that they were instructed that the respondent had agreed to withdraw an earlier bankruptcy notice for an alleged failure to comply with the formal statutory requirements. Farrar Lawyers also put the applicant on notice that if they did not hear from him by 4.15pm that day as to any other claims that the applicant contends operate as a defence, cross-claim or set off, they would immediately cause a bankruptcy notice to issue and be served. Receipt of that letter was acknowledged by the applicant’s solicitors by letter dated 25 June 2013 which also advised that “We are currently considering our client’s position and we expect to be in a position to advise our client within the next seven (7) days.” Subsequently, on 2 July 2013 the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the respondent’s solicitors advising that they were instructed that their client was not insolvent and was “in the process of formulating a proposal to purchase certain causes of action from the liquidator of DTC No. 1 Pty. Limited (In Liquidation) which, inter alia, will ground cross claims against your client and Mr Werry personally.” Following receipt of that letter, the solicitor for the respondent telephoned the liquidator of DTC on 3 July 2013 and was advised by the liquidator that he had not received any such proposal. That advice was confirmed by email sent on the same day by the liquidator to the applicant’s solicitors.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the other hand, it may legitimately be observed that the statutory demand resembles a bankruptcy notice and achieves essentially the same purpose: Michael Murray, Keay’s Insolvency: Personal and Corporate Law and Practice (Thomson, 5th ed, 2005) 254. The practical legal similarities were effectively recognised during oral submissions by the applicant’s counsel when he described statutory demands as being a “closely analogous field” which is the “equivalent in the corporate context of a bankruptcy notice”. Importantly for present purposes, a statutory demand must require the company to pay the amount of the debt, or the total of the amounts of the debts, or to secure or compound for that amount or total to the creditor’s reasonable satisfaction, within 21 days after the demand is served on the company: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E(2)(c). In short, it stretches credibility, in my view, to suggest that a person with over thirty years experience in corporate insolvency would not have at least a basic understanding of personal insolvency issues sufficient to appreciate the basic obligations imposed upon him on being served with a bankruptcy notice and that service of a notice for a second time would not, without more, absolve him from compliance with the notice when first served. It follows in my view that in answering the key question of whether the notice could reasonably have misled Mr Godfrey, his considerable professional experience as a corporate insolvency practitioner is potentially relevant. CONCLUSIONS In the circumstances of this case, I have reached the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Notice was not capable of misleading the applicant. Rather, I consider that a debtor in the applicant’s circumstances served again with the Notice on 24 July 2013 would have understood that the act of second service would not absolve him from the responsibility to comply with the Notice within the period of 21 days from the date of first service on 5 July 2013. In reaching this view, I have had regard to the following matters. First, as matter of law, the obligation to comply with the Notice was engaged upon effective service on 5 July 2013. The later service of the same notice without more could not, in my view, relieve the applicant of that duty. The applicant asserted that in the absence of an election or statement identifying which act of service was relied upon, a second and concurrent obligation would arise upon the same notice being served again by reason of the fact that the notice stated that the recipient had 21 days within which to comply from the date of service. However, the applicant did not refer me to any statutory provision or authority suggesting that to be the case. Furthermore, it does not follow from the fact that service on both dates was undertaken by a means authorised by the regulations (namely, regulation 16.01 of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth)) that service on both occasions had the same legal consequences. In my opinion, once the Bankruptcy Notice was validly served on 5 July 2013, an act of bankruptcy would be committed upon the failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Notice within 21 days of service by virtue of s 40(1)(g) of the Act, unless the debtor satisfied the Court that he had a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand satisfying the criteria in s 40(1)(g). That consequence denies the possibility in law, in my opinion, of a second inconsistent obligation arising if the Notice should be served again, whether the next day or otherwise, before the expiry of the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issues raised by the application in this matter were complex, as will be apparent from these reasons, and I consider that the applicant’s case was reasonably arguable. It follows that I reject the respondent’s challenge to the competency of the application on these grounds. Furthermore, while the grounds on which the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice could have been stated in a more fulsome way, I do not consider that there has been a failure to comply with rule 3.02(1)(b)(i). As earlier mentioned, in his affidavit sworn on 26 July 2013 the applicant accepted that he received a copy of the Bankruptcy Notice dated 4 July 2013 by facsimile on 5 July 2013 and was personally served at his office on 24 July 2013. The basis on which the applicant sought to set aside the Notice was that it was capable of misleading the applicant by reason of having been served twice. As such I consider that the affidavit sufficiently set out the grounds on which the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice was made so as to comply with the requirements of rule 3.02(1)(b)(i). 3. CONSIDERATION: VALIDITY OF THE BANKRUPTCY NOTICE 3.1 Relevant principles Subject to one important caveat explained below, the principles to be applied in determining the validity of a bankruptcy notice were common ground between the parties. First, the courts have required strict compliance with the legislative requirements for a bankruptcy notice. That approach has been upheld having regard in particular to the seriousness of the consequences of non-compliance for the debtor and potentially for the rights and obligations of others: Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33 at 41 [22] (Black CJ, Heerey and Sundberg JJ). As Deane J stated in an oft-cited passage in Kleinwort BensonAustralia v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 (‘Kleinwort’) at 81-82:“It has long been a fundamental precept of the law of bankruptcy that “a bankruptcy notice, which is the foundation of a bankruptcy, attended as a bankruptcy is with penal consequences, is a matter in which great strictness is required”: per Cozens-Hardy M.R., In re A Judgment Debtor, 530 of 1908 (50); see also James v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (51). A defect in a bankruptcy notice will invalidate it “except in the case of a merely formal defect”: per Vaughan Williams L.J., In re OCS (A Debtor); Ex part The Debtor (52), see also In Re a Debtor No. 21 of 1950; Ex part the Debtor v Bowmaker Ltd (53). If a defect in a bankruptcy notice is other than a formal one, the notice itself is defective and failure to comply with it does not constitute an act of bankruptcy. It is true that the strictness of the above rules leaves open the possibility of abuse by unscrupulous debtors. That is, however, an unavoidable concomitant of the protection of ordinary people faced with the threat of being made bankrupt.” Secondly, as Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Gaudron JJ held in Klienwort at 79, “a bankruptcy notice is a nullity if it fails to meet a requirement made essential by the Act, or if it could reasonably mislead a debtor as to what is necessary to comply with the notice”. The present case is said to be one that falls in the latter category.