Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd v Chevron (Tapl) Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD -v- CHEVRON (TAPL) PTY LTD [2020] WASC 296

CORAM:   ARCHER J

HEARD:   23 & 24 JULY 2020

DELIVERED          :   14 AUGUST 2020

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1626 of 2020

BETWEEN:   PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD

First Plaintiff

HAMERSLEY IRON PTY LTD

Second Plaintiff

ROBE RIVER MINING CO PTY LTD

Third Plaintiff

AND

CHEVRON (TAPL) PTY LTD

First Defendant

CHEVRON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Defendant

MOBIL AUSTRALIA RESOURCES COMPANY PTY LTD

Third Defendant

SHELL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Fourth Defendant

OSAKA GAS GORGON PTY LTD

Fifth Defendant

TOKYO GAS GORGON PTY LTD

Sixth Defendant

JERA GORGON PTY LTD

Seventh Defendant

CHEVRON (TAPL) PTY LTD

First Plaintiff by counterclaim

CHEVRON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Plaintiff by counterclaim

MOBIL AUSTRALIA RESOURCES COMPANY PTY LTD

Third Plaintiff by counterclaim

SHELL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Fourth Plaintiff by counterclaim

OSAKA GAS GORGON PTY LTD

Fifth Plaintiff by counterclaim

TOKYO GAS GORGON PTY LTD

Sixth Plaintiff by counterclaim

JERA GORGON PTY LTD

Seventh Plaintiff by counterclaim

AND

PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD

First Defendant by counterclaim

HAMERSLEY IRON PTY LTD

Second Defendant by counterclaim

ROBE RIVER MINING CO PTY LTD

Third Defendant by counterclaim


Catchwords:

Gas Sale Agreement - Price review clause - Proper construction

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Judgment for the plaintiffs
Counterclaim dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Original Action

Counsel:

First Plaintiff : S K Dharmananda SC & C V Wren
Second Plaintiff : S K Dharmananda SC & C V Wren
Third Plaintiff : S K Dharmananda SC & C V Wren
First Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Second Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Third Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Fourth Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Fifth Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Sixth Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Seventh Defendant : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff : Johnson Winter & Slattery - Perth
Second Plaintiff : Johnson Winter & Slattery - Perth
Third Plaintiff : Johnson Winter & Slattery - Perth
First Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Second Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Third Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Fourth Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Fifth Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Sixth Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Seventh Defendant : Norton Rose Fulbright Australia

Counterclaim

Counsel:

First Plaintiff by counterclaim : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Second Plaintiff by counterclaim : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Third Plaintiff by counterclaim : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Fourth Plaintiff by counterclaim : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Fifth Plaintiff by counterclaim : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Sixth Plaintiff by counterclaim : M N Solomon SC & C E McKay
Seventh Plaintiff by counterclaim
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Details
Case
[2020] WASC 296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, brought proceedings against Chevron (Tapl) Pty Ltd, the defendant, concerning the interpretation of a price review clause in a gas sale agreement. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue was whether the defendant had breached the agreement by failing to provide a forecast of the price of gas to the plaintiff in the manner required by the contract.

The court had to determine the proper construction of the contractual clause, focusing on the language used, the surrounding circumstances, and the commercial purpose of the contract. Both parties presented extensive arguments, drawing on various legal principles, but ultimately agreed that the resolution depended on the specific wording and context of the contract. The court's task was to interpret the clause in a way that avoided commercial nonsense and inconvenience, while adhering to the plain meaning of the contractual terms.

In reaching its decision, the court emphasised the importance of a businesslike interpretation of the contract, consistent with the commercial purpose and context. It noted that if the contractual language was unambiguous, it must be enforced as written, even if the result seemed unreasonable. The court found that the clause in question was clear and unambiguous, and that the defendant had failed to comply with its obligations under the contract. Accordingly, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.

The court's final orders included a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd, and the dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim.

Orders

Orders of the court

Judgment for the plaintiffs

Counterclaim dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Electricity Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd,[9] the plurality said (citations omitted):The meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean. That approach is not unfamiliar. As reaffirmed, it will require consideration of the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract. Appreciation of the commercial purpose or objects is facilitated by an understanding 'of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating'. … [U]nless a contrary intention is indicated, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation on the assumption 'that the parties … intended to produce a commercial result'. A commercial contract is to be construed so as to avoid it 'making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience'. [9] Electricity Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35]. In Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd,[10] Gibbs J said:… If the words used are unambiguous the court must give effect to them, notwithstanding that the result may appear capricious or unreasonable, and notwithstanding that it may be guessed or suspected that the parties intended something different. The court has no power to remake or amend a contract for the purpose of avoiding a result which is considered to be inconvenient or unjust. On the other hand, if the language is open to two constructions, that will be preferred which will avoid consequences which appear to be capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust, 'even though the construction adopted is not the most obvious, or the most grammatically accurate' …[10] Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99, 109. The starting point for the proper construction of a contractual clause is the language used in the clause.[11] Whether a term of a contract is essential is a question of construction to be answered having regard to the general nature of the contract considered as a whole and to its particular terms.[12][12] DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd [1978] HCA 12; (1978) 138 CLR 423, 430 ‑ 431 (Stephen, Mason & Jacobs JJ). The principle to be applied was stated by Jordan CJ in Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd:[13]The test of essentiality is whether it appears from the general nature of the contract considered as a whole, or from some particular term or terms, that the promise is of such importance to the promisee that he would not have entered into the contract unless he had been assured of a strict or a substantial performance of the promise, as the case may be, and that this ought to have been apparent to the promisor … The parties' submissions traversed a wide range of authorities in relation to the proper approach to time stipulations. They discussed an equitable presumption. They discussed non‑promissory conditions precedent. They discussed a 'prima facie rule' that applied in mercantile contracts. They discussed a presumption that applies to rent review clauses. They discussed the principles of construction that apply to penalty clauses and exclusion clauses. Ultimately, however, both parties submitted that the issue fell to be determined on a proper construction of the Contract.