JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD -v- CHEVRON (TAPL) PTY LTD [2020] WASC 296
CORAM: ARCHER J
HEARD: 23 & 24 JULY 2020
DELIVERED : 14 AUGUST 2020
FILE NO/S: CIV 1626 of 2020
BETWEEN: PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
HAMERSLEY IRON PTY LTD
Second Plaintiff
ROBE RIVER MINING CO PTY LTD
Third Plaintiff
AND
CHEVRON (TAPL) PTY LTD
First Defendant
CHEVRON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Second Defendant
MOBIL AUSTRALIA RESOURCES COMPANY PTY LTD
Third Defendant
SHELL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Fourth Defendant
OSAKA GAS GORGON PTY LTD
Fifth Defendant
TOKYO GAS GORGON PTY LTD
Sixth Defendant
JERA GORGON PTY LTD
Seventh Defendant
CHEVRON (TAPL) PTY LTD
First Plaintiff by counterclaim
CHEVRON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Second Plaintiff by counterclaim
MOBIL AUSTRALIA RESOURCES COMPANY PTY LTD
Third Plaintiff by counterclaim
SHELL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Fourth Plaintiff by counterclaim
OSAKA GAS GORGON PTY LTD
Fifth Plaintiff by counterclaim
TOKYO GAS GORGON PTY LTD
Sixth Plaintiff by counterclaim
JERA GORGON PTY LTD
Seventh Plaintiff by counterclaim
AND
PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD
First Defendant by counterclaim
HAMERSLEY IRON PTY LTD
Second Defendant by counterclaim
ROBE RIVER MINING CO PTY LTD
Third Defendant by counterclaim
Catchwords:
Gas Sale Agreement - Price review clause - Proper construction
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Judgment for the plaintiffs
Counterclaim dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Original Action
Counsel:
| First Plaintiff | : | S K Dharmananda SC & C V Wren |
| Second Plaintiff | : | S K Dharmananda SC & C V Wren |
| Third Plaintiff | : | S K Dharmananda SC & C V Wren |
| First Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Second Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Third Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Fourth Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Fifth Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Sixth Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Seventh Defendant | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
Solicitors:
| First Plaintiff | : | Johnson Winter & Slattery - Perth |
| Second Plaintiff | : | Johnson Winter & Slattery - Perth |
| Third Plaintiff | : | Johnson Winter & Slattery - Perth |
| First Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Second Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Third Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Fifth Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Sixth Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Seventh Defendant | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
Counterclaim
Counsel:
| First Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Second Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Third Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Fourth Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Fifth Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Sixth Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | M N Solomon SC & C E McKay |
| Seventh Plaintiff by counterclaim |
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- Case
- [2020] WASC 296
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine the proper construction of the contractual clause, focusing on the language used, the surrounding circumstances, and the commercial purpose of the contract. Both parties presented extensive arguments, drawing on various legal principles, but ultimately agreed that the resolution depended on the specific wording and context of the contract. The court's task was to interpret the clause in a way that avoided commercial nonsense and inconvenience, while adhering to the plain meaning of the contractual terms.
In reaching its decision, the court emphasised the importance of a businesslike interpretation of the contract, consistent with the commercial purpose and context. It noted that if the contractual language was unambiguous, it must be enforced as written, even if the result seemed unreasonable. The court found that the clause in question was clear and unambiguous, and that the defendant had failed to comply with its obligations under the contract. Accordingly, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.
The court's final orders included a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd, and the dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim.
Orders
Orders of the court
Judgment for the plaintiffs
Counterclaim dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Electricity Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd,[9] the plurality said (citations omitted):The meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean. That approach is not unfamiliar. As reaffirmed, it will require consideration of the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract. Appreciation of the commercial purpose or objects is facilitated by an understanding 'of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating'. … [U]nless a contrary intention is indicated, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation on the assumption 'that the parties … intended to produce a commercial result'. A commercial contract is to be construed so as to avoid it 'making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience'. [9] Electricity Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35]. In Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd,[10] Gibbs J said:… If the words used are unambiguous the court must give effect to them, notwithstanding that the result may appear capricious or unreasonable, and notwithstanding that it may be guessed or suspected that the parties intended something different. The court has no power to remake or amend a contract for the purpose of avoiding a result which is considered to be inconvenient or unjust. On the other hand, if the language is open to two constructions, that will be preferred which will avoid consequences which appear to be capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust, 'even though the construction adopted is not the most obvious, or the most grammatically accurate' …[10] Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99, 109. The starting point for the proper construction of a contractual clause is the language used in the clause.[11] Whether a term of a contract is essential is a question of construction to be answered having regard to the general nature of the contract considered as a whole and to its particular terms.[12][12] DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd [1978] HCA 12; (1978) 138 CLR 423, 430 ‑ 431 (Stephen, Mason & Jacobs JJ). The principle to be applied was stated by Jordan CJ in Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd:[13]The test of essentiality is whether it appears from the general nature of the contract considered as a whole, or from some particular term or terms, that the promise is of such importance to the promisee that he would not have entered into the contract unless he had been assured of a strict or a substantial performance of the promise, as the case may be, and that this ought to have been apparent to the promisor … The parties' submissions traversed a wide range of authorities in relation to the proper approach to time stipulations. They discussed an equitable presumption. They discussed non‑promissory conditions precedent. They discussed a 'prima facie rule' that applied in mercantile contracts. They discussed a presumption that applies to rent review clauses. They discussed the principles of construction that apply to penalty clauses and exclusion clauses. Ultimately, however, both parties submitted that the issue fell to be determined on a proper construction of the Contract.