Avz Minerals Ltd v Fat Tail Holdings Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   AVZ MINERALS LTD -v- FAT TAIL HOLDINGS PTY LTD [2023] WASC 403

CORAM:   HOWARD J

HEARD:   26 OCTOBER 2023

DELIVERED          :   26 OCTOBER 2023

FILE NO/S:   COR 154 of 2023

BETWEEN:   AVZ MINERALS LTD

Plaintiff

AND

FAT TAIL HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Defendant


Catchwords:

Competing applications for declarations - Sections 168(1)(a), 169(1)(a), and 173(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Whether email addresses form part of the share registry where a member has nominated one to receive communications - Where no separate register held by the company - Whether Court should follow a decision of a co-ordinate court in the integrated national court system exercising federal jurisdiction - Orders made in terms of defendant's interlocutory process - Application dismissed

Legislation:

Constitution (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : P Neskovcin KC and E Nadon
Defendant : S K Dharmananda SC and J Sippe

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : DLA Piper Australia - Perth
Defendant : Thomson Geer - Perth

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Ardizzone v Valentino Nominees Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 55

Aurora Funds Management Ltd v Primary Securities Ltd [2019] NSWSC 630; (2019) 138 ACSR 1

Duckworth v Water Corporation [2012] WASC 30; (2012) 261 FLR 185

Electricity Generation and Retail Corporation t/as Synergy v EIT Kwinana Partner Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 3

Laufer v Gear [2021] WASCA 2

Lawrence v Melbourne Football Club Ltd [2022] VSC 658; (2022) 373 FLR 10

MDA National Ltd v Medical Defence Australia Ltd [No 2] (2014) 225 FCR 476

Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98

Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128

Pilbara Iron Co (Services) Pty Ltd v Chevron (TAPL) Pty Ltd [2020] WASC 296

Re Brashs Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 477

Re PanBio Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 366; (2000) 35 ACSR 458

Rizeq v State of Western Australia (2017) 262 CLR 1

Salini-Impregilo SPA v Francis [2020] WASC 72

HOWARD J:

  1. At the conclusion of the hearing on 26 October 2023 I made orders broadly in terms of the defendant's interlocutory process.  These are my reasons for doing so.

  2. By an Originating Process dated 2 October 2023, the plaintiff, AVZ Minerals Ltd (AVZ Minerals), sought a declaration that it (AVZ Minerals) had: 'complied with its obligations under s 173(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)[1] on 11 September 2023'.

    [1] Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references from here are to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

  3. The defendant, Fat Tail Holdings Pty Ltd (Fat Tail Holdings), by an Interlocutory Process dated 3 October 2023, sought a declaration: 'that once a member of [AVZ Minerals] had nominated an email address or other electronic address for the purpose of receiving shareholder communications then, on a proper construction of s 169(1)(a), the register of members … under ss 168(1)(a) and 169 … must contain the email address…

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Details
Case
[2023] WASC 403
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Avz Minerals Ltd was a company involved in a dispute with Fat Tail Holdings Pty Ltd, which arose from competing applications for declarations under Sections 168(1)(a), 169(1)(a), and 173(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The core of the dispute centred on whether email addresses form part of the share registry when a member has nominated one to receive communications, particularly in the absence of a separate register held by the company. Additionally, the case examined whether the Court should adhere to a decision made by a co-ordinate court within the integrated national court system exercising federal jurisdiction. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The legal issues the Court was required to decide involved interpreting the statutory provisions of the Corporations Act concerning the maintenance of a share registry and the implications of nominating an email address for receiving communications. The key question was whether the nomination of an email address by a member to receive communications constitutes part of the share registry when no separate register is maintained by the company. This required a careful examination of the statutory language, purpose, and legislative intent behind the provisions, particularly in the context of modern communication practices.

The Court's reasoning was that the statutory purpose of a company maintaining a members' register is to ensure a definitive statement of who is a registered member, from when, and in respect of how many shares of which particular class, as well as to facilitate communication with members. The Court held that the requirement for the register to be available for inspection and for copies to be made available suggests that a person inspecting and receiving a copy of the register should be in the same position as the company itself in terms of communicating with members. The Court found that the principal purpose for a member nominating an address, particularly an electronic address, is to permit communications and receipt of notices relevant to the company's affairs. The Court also noted that the legislative intent behind requiring the register to contain the member's address is to record the addresses the member has nominated for the purpose of receiving communications.

Based on these findings, the Court determined that the nomination of an email address by a member to receive communications should indeed be considered part of the share registry. Consequently, the application was dismissed in terms of the defendant's interlocutory process, meaning that Fat Tail Holdings Pty Ltd's application was rejected without prejudice to their rights to appeal the decision.

Background

Background to the litigation

Avz Minerals Ltd (the plaintiff) and Fat Tail Holdings Pty Ltd (the defendant) were engaged in a legal dispute concerning the interpretation of certain sections of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The central issue revolved around whether email addresses nominated by members to receive communications from the company form part of the company's share registry, particularly where no separate register is maintained by the company. The case arose from the defendant's application for declarations regarding the interpretation of sections 168(1)(a), 169(1)(a), and 173(3) of the Corporations Act. The defendant sought a declaration that email addresses nominated by members are not part of the share registry, while the plaintiff contended that such addresses do form part of the registry.

The dispute began when the defendant nominated email addresses for members of the plaintiff company to receive communications. The plaintiff argued that these email addresses were part of the company's share registry and thus subject to inspection and copying under the Corporations Act. The defendant, on the other hand, asserted that only physical addresses should be considered part of the share registry and that electronic addresses should not be included unless explicitly stated in the company's records. The urgency of the matter from the defendant's perspective further highlighted the need for a prompt resolution of this interpretative issue.

The matter came before the court as an interlocutory application filed by the defendant, Fat Tail Holdings Pty Ltd, seeking declarations regarding the interpretation of specific sections of the Corporations Act. This application followed an earlier decision by Riordan J in Lawrence, which had addressed similar issues. The court was asked to consider whether it should follow the reasoning and conclusions of Riordan J in the present case. Prior to this application, there were no significant procedural steps noted in the case history that directly pertained to the current legal dispute. The focus of the current proceeding was on the interpretation of statutory provisions and their application to the specific facts of the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether email addresses nominated by members to receive communications form part of the company's share registry under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. Whether the court should follow a decision of a co-ordinate court in the integrated national court system exercising federal jurisdiction in interpreting the relevant statutory provisions.

Held
1. The court held that email addresses nominated by members to receive communications do form part of the company's share registry under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. The court held that it should follow a decision of a co-ordinate court in the integrated national court system exercising federal jurisdiction in interpreting the relevant statutory provisions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I can be brief in my reasons for agreeing, with respect, with Riordan J. That will not interfere with the plaintiff's appeal rights as there is only one true construction of the relevant statutory provisions,[20] and so my reasoning will not be of much, if any, significance in any appeal. And as noted, there is some urgency about the determination of this question at least from Fat Tail Holdings' perspective.[20] Electricity Generation and Retail Corporation t/as Synergy v EIT Kwinana Partner Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 3 [229]; Laufer v Gear [2021] WASCA 2 [20]. Riordan J in Lawrence set out the relevant statutory provisions at some length ([31] - [37]) and the relevant principles of construction ([40] ‑ [48]). I have not sought to repeat them here. To those may be added the general principles of statutory interpretation which are well established and were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Mohammadi v Bethune,[21] and which do not need to be re‑stated here.[21] Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31] - [36] (Martin CJ, Mazza & Beech JJA). In my view, in the broad, the statutory purpose of a company having to set up and maintain a members' register include:(1)to allow a definitive statement as to who is a registered member, from when and in respect of how many shares of which particular class; and(2)to allow communication with members. That the register must be available for inspection and that copies must be made available of it (s 173(1) and (3)) suggests strongly to me that a person inspecting and receiving a copy of the register is to be, effectively, in the same position vis‑a‑vis communicating with the members as the company itself. With respect, the third, fourth and sixth reasons given by Riordan J appear to me to be particularly significant. They are, respectively:c.The Act contemplates that:i.a person, who inspects the register, may use the information to communicate with members providing it is for a proper purpose as described in s 177(1A) of the Act; andii.a company may use an 'electronic address (if any) nominated by a member' for the purpose of receiving notifications of meetings.[22]d.The principal purpose for a member nominating an address, or more specifically an electronic address, is to permit communications and receipt of notices relevant to the company's affairs. Accordingly, in my opinion, the legislative intent of requiring the register to contain the address of the member is to record the addresses, whether physical, electronic or otherwise, which the member has nominated for the purposes of receiving communications.f.The fact that the legislature did not intend the word 'address' to be limited to a residential address, when used generally in the Act, is apparent from s 205D because the subsection provides that a person's address for the purposes of a notice or application under the specified subsections must be their 'usual residential address' (except in the limited circumstances prescribed in s 205D(2), in which they are entitled to give an alternative address). The specified subsections do not include s 169 of the Act, and it is to be observed that no similarly limited meaning of address is prescribed for s 169.[23][22] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 249J(3).[23] This is the footnote from the original: The purpose of the requirement for a residential address in s 205D of the Act is for the enforcement of the payment of any judgment sum. As much is apparent from the section, because under s 205D(4), if a person uses an alternative address, ASIC may give details of the person's actual residential address 'for the purposes of enforcing the judgment debt'. It is notable that all of the specified subsections (except s 205H(2)) provide for strict liability offences.