Nduta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nduta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 1596

Appeal from: Nduta v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1220
File number: NSD 983 of 2016
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 10 November 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for a spousal visa – cl 820.211 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) required decision maker be satisfied that the visa applicant met the statutory definition of “spouse” when visa application lodged – where decision maker found the visa applicant did not meet statutory definition of “spouse” at the time visa application was lodged by relying, amongst other evidence, on letters drafted and received after visa application lodged – whether decision maker committed jurisdictional error by relying on material produced after lodgement of visa application

MIGRATION – where freedom of information request produced material to which decision maker did not refer in reasons – whether decision maker committed jurisdictional error by failing to refer in reasons to material produced in response to freedom of information request

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 236

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5F

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 82

Cases cited:

Ally v Minister for Immigration [2007] FMCA 430

Ally v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 49

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Truong [2016] FCAFC 54

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Telstra Corporation Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153

Date of hearing: 10 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Cutler
Solicitor for the Appellant: Phillip Silver & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 983 of 2016
BETWEEN:

FREDERICK MWANGI NDUTA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 NOVEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal given on 12 June 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a partner (temporary) (class UK) visa:  Nduta v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1220.

    Background

  2. The appellant was aged 23 at the time of his marriage on 15 September 2010 to his then 76 year old wife. He applied…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1596
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia, in the case of Nduta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, dealt with an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed a constitutional writ application seeking relief in respect of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal. The appellant, Nduta, was challenging the Tribunal's decision to affirm the Minister's delegate's decision not to grant him a partner (temporary) visa. The appellant claimed that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional errors in its consideration of the evidence, specifically by relying on material produced after the visa application was lodged and by failing to refer to certain documents obtained through a freedom of information request.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility and the genuineness of his marriage, particularly in light of the evidence presented after the visa application was lodged. The court also needed to determine if the Tribunal's failure to refer to specific material obtained through a freedom of information request constituted a jurisdictional error. The court examined the statutory and regulatory framework governing the assessment of spousal relationships for visa purposes, particularly the requirement for the decision-maker to be satisfied that the applicant met the statutory definition of "spouse" at the time the visa application was lodged.

The court concluded that the Tribunal did not commit a jurisdictional error by considering material produced after the visa application was lodged, as the decision-maker was not precluded from doing so. The court held that the Tribunal was required to consider all circumstances of the relationship, as mandated by regulation, but was not obligated to set out every piece of evidence in its reasons. The court also found that the Tribunal's failure to refer to certain documents obtained through a freedom of information request did not amount to a jurisdictional error, as the omission did not affect the Tribunal's ability to make a decision based on the extensive material already considered.

In summary, the Federal Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the relevant evidence and that its failure to refer to certain documents did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal given on 12 June 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a partner (temporary) (class UK) visa: Nduta v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1220.Background The appellant was aged 23 at the time of his marriage on 15 September 2010 to his then 76 year old wife. He applied on 20 December 2010 for the visa based on his being the spouse of his wife within the definition of “spouse” in s 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As with much in the Act, nothing is as clear as it might seem. Not only does s 5F provide a definition of “spouse” but s 5F(3) provides that the regulations may make provision in relation to determining whether one or more of the conditions in s 5F(2) are satisfied. Relevantly, s 5F and reg 1.15A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) provided:5F Spouse(1)For the purposes of this Act, a person is the spouse of another person if, under subsection (2), the 2 persons are in a married relationship.(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), persons are in a married relationship if:(a)they are married to each other under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of this Act; and(b)they have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others; and(c)the relationship between them is genuine and continuing; and(d) they:(i) live together; or(ii)do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.(3)The regulations may make provision in relation to the determination of whether one or more of the conditions in paragraphs (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) exist. The regulations may make different provision in relation to the determination for different purposes whether one or more of those conditions exist. 1.15A Spouse(1)For subsection 5F(3) of the Act, this regulation sets out arrangements for the purpose of determining whether 1 or more of the conditions in paragraphs 5F(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act exist.(2) If the Minister is considering an application for:…(d) a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa;the Minister must consider all of the circumstances of the relationship, including the matters set out in subregulation (3).(3) The matters for subregulation (2) are:(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:(i)any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets; and(ii) any joint liabilities; and(iii)the extent of any pooling of financial resources, especially in relation to major financial commitments; and(iv)whether one person in the relationship owes any legal obligation in respect of the other; and(v)the basis of any sharing of day to day household expenses; and(b) the nature of the household, including:(i)any joint responsibility for the care and support of children; and(ii) the living arrangements of the persons; and(iii) any sharing of the responsibility for housework; and(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:(i)whether the persons represent themselves to other people as being married to each other; and(ii)the opinion of the persons’ friends and acquaintances about the nature of the relationship; and(iii)any basis on which the persons plan and undertake joint social activities; and(d)the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, including:(i) the duration of the relationship; and(ii)the length of time during which the persons have lived together; and(iii)the degree of companionship and emotional support that the persons draw from each other; and(iv)whether the persons see the relationship as a long term one. (emphasis added)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 368 does not require the Tribunal to set out everything that it considered for the purposes of determining the circumstances of the relationship. Indeed, to do so, could place an intolerable burden on a decision-maker and require him or her to compile a statement of reasons that would extend, as the Departmental file did, for hundreds of pages for no good purpose. Indeed, as Tracey, Flick and Griffiths JJ said in Truong [2016] FCAFC 54 at [80], in relation to the obligation for the decision-maker, under reg 1.15A(2), to consider all of the circumstances: Second, even assuming the argument was advanced before the Tribunal, the failure of the Tribunal expressly to mention the argument does not of itself manifest jurisdictional error. The Tribunal was undoubtedly aware of the making of the final Order by that Court. No jurisdictional error is exposed in the failure of the Tribunal expressly to address all matters which could potentially affect its decision, let alone a factor created in a different statutory context and made for different purposes: cf. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 at [9] to [10] per Gleeson CJ; at [77] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 331 to 332 and 349. It is not necessary for the Tribunal “to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons”: WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46], (2003) 75 ALD 630 at 641 per French, Sackville and Hely JJ. The task of the Tribunal was to reach a state of “satisfaction” by reference to the far more extensive factual material placed before it and by reference to the mandate that it “must consider” those matters set forth in reg 1.15A(3). (italic emphasis in original, bold emphasis added) In my opinion, the appellant’s argument on his first ground is misconceived. The Tribunal, in [17] and [18] of its reasons, made findings and gave its reasons for concluding that it was not satisfied of the truthfulness of the appellant’s evidence that he married for love, was genuinely committed to his sponsor and as to his assertions about the spousal relationship at the time of the application. That was a credibility-based finding as to the appellant’s evidence concerning the married relationship, as defined in s 5F(2) of the Act, at the time of his application for the visa. A visa applicant must satisfy the Minister, or decision-maker standing in the Minister’s shoes, such as the Tribunal, that he or she has met each criterion for the grant of the visa. In the circumstances of considering his relationship with his sponsor (i.e. his wife) at the time that he made his visa application, the Tribunal found as a fact that the appellant’s evidence did not satisfy it that he was a person who was actually a spouse or that he was one for the purposes and within the meaning of s 5F of the Act. Such a credibility-based finding was fatal to the success of the application. In reaching its conclusion on that issue in the review, the Tribunal did what reg 1.15A(2) required, namely, it considered all of the circumstances of the relationship, including the matters set out in reg 1.15A(3).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant gave evidence to the Tribunal during which it explored with him his relationship with his wife, including the age difference between them, allegations that he was having relationships with other women, and the mutual family violence issues. It also asked him about allegations made in, first, an unsigned letter faxed on 21 April 2011 that appeared to be from all six of the wife’s children. That letter raised concerns about their mother’s health, how she was being cared for and her relationship with the appellant. It also referred to a substantial inheritance that the wife would receive from the estate of a relative. Secondly, a letter dated 4 May 2011 from a friend of the wife raised similar concerns.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal recorded that it discussed all of the claims made against the appellant in relation to the nature of his commitment to his sponsor (wife) and had considered his responses, including that he loved his wife, was committed to her as a husband, was never unfaithful and never knew of the sponsor’s inheritance until after their marriage. His response to questions concerning the inheritance was that the children may not have liked him and possibly wrote their letter because of their interest in that inheritance. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims that he and the wife had bought a car together, but it found that the registration papers disclosed that the car was registered in his sole name. It also found that there was no evidence before it of any shared assets or liabilities, although it accepted that the appellant had contributed to the household’s costs. It found that the appellant and his wife had lived together in her rental property for about 19 months. It considered his evidence about their going shopping for food, his household work, including gardening, and evidence of the appellant and the wife going to events together. The Tribunal also considered claims by the six children, as set out in the delegate’s decision, that the appellant had gone out and left their mother alone a good deal of the time. It also considered the evidence given by a witness called by the appellant whom the Tribunal found to be an acquaintance and to whose evidence it gave little weight because it was apparent that she was not a close friend of the sponsor or the appellant. It also considered some brief written evidence from another person as to the relationship between the appellant and his sponsor. The Tribunal also noted that it had considered the statutory declarations of the two daughters that accompanied the application for the visa, the letter from all six of the wife’s children and the letter from the wife’s friend. Critically, the Tribunal found:17.Notwithstanding the review applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal remains concerned by the seriousness of the claims made against him by the sponsor, her friend and children. The Tribunal is also concerned by the highly unusual age difference between the review applicant and sponsor. These factors lead the Tribunal to question the credibility of the review applicant and his claims – which the Tribunal does not consider to be very plausible. As such, the Tribunal is not satisfied of the truthfulness of the review applicant’s evidence that he married for love, was genuinely committed to the sponsor and the spouse relationship. The Tribunal considers in the circumstances the sponsor’s claims that the review applicant married her for visa [sic] and had relations with other women, appear quite plausible.18.In reaching this conclusion the tribunal has also had some regards to the review applicant’s apparent online marriage discussions with a woman named Julia in Queensland, soon after his entry in Australia in 2009 as a student. The review applicant does not dispute this matter, set out in the decision record, merely stating he did not wish to marry Julia as she was a lesbian. He gave no explanation, however, as to why a lesbian woman in Queensland, a person he had not met in person, would be emailing him with confirmation of a marriage license. This evidence does suggest to the Tribunal that the review applicant’s motives in his relationship with the sponsor may not have been genuine. (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant argued that there was more material before the Tribunal than it set out in its statement of its decision record and that, indeed, [31] of the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrated that it had not considered the family violence claims and all of the evidence relating to them for the purposes of arriving at its decision in relation to whether he met the criterion of being a spouse at the time of making his application for the visa. In that respect, he pointed to the omission of any reference in the reasons of the Tribunal to the freedom of information documents themselves.Consideration The Tribunal had to make a written statement when making its decision that satisfied s 368(1)(b)-(d) setting out its reasons for its decision, its findings on any material questions of fact and referring to the evidence or other material on which the findings of fact were based. McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said of s 430(1), the exact analogue of s 368(1), in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [68]:… it is not right to read “material” as providing an objective or external standard of materiality. A requirement to set out findings and reasons focuses upon the subjective thought processes of the decision-maker. All that s 430(1)(c) obliges the Tribunal to do is set out its findings on those questions of fact which it considered to be material to the decision which it made and to the reasons it had for reaching that decision. (italic emphasis in original, bold emphasis added) Section 368 does not require the Tribunal to set out everything that it considered for the purposes of determining the circumstances of the relationship. Indeed, to do so, could place an intolerable burden on a decision-maker and require him or her to compile a statement of reasons that would extend, as the Departmental file did, for hundreds of pages for no good purpose. Indeed, as Tracey, Flick and Griffiths JJ said in Truong [2016] FCAFC 54 at [80], in relation to the obligation for the decision-maker, under reg 1.15A(2), to consider all of the circumstances: Second, even assuming the argument was advanced before the Tribunal, the failure of the Tribunal expressly to mention the argument does not of itself manifest jurisdictional error. The Tribunal was undoubtedly aware of the making of the final Order by that Court. No jurisdictional error is exposed in the failure of the Tribunal expressly to address all matters which could potentially affect its decision, let alone a factor created in a different statutory context and made for different purposes: cf. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 at [9] to [10] per Gleeson CJ; at [77] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 331 to 332 and 349. It is not necessary for the Tribunal “to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons”: WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46], (2003) 75 ALD 630 at 641 per French, Sackville and Hely JJ. The task of the Tribunal was to reach a state of “satisfaction” by reference to the far more extensive factual material placed before it and by reference to the mandate that it “must consider” those matters set forth in reg 1.15A(3). (italic emphasis in original, bold emphasis added)