FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Nduta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 1596
Appeal from: Nduta v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1220 File number: NSD 983 of 2016 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 10 November 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a spousal visa – cl 820.211 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) required decision maker be satisfied that the visa applicant met the statutory definition of “spouse” when visa application lodged – where decision maker found the visa applicant did not meet statutory definition of “spouse” at the time visa application was lodged by relying, amongst other evidence, on letters drafted and received after visa application lodged – whether decision maker committed jurisdictional error by relying on material produced after lodgement of visa application
MIGRATION – where freedom of information request produced material to which decision maker did not refer in reasons – whether decision maker committed jurisdictional error by failing to refer in reasons to material produced in response to freedom of information request
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 236
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5F
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 82
Cases cited: Ally v Minister for Immigration [2007] FMCA 430
Ally v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 49
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Truong [2016] FCAFC 54
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Telstra Corporation Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153
Date of hearing: 10 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 44 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Cutler Solicitor for the Appellant: Phillip Silver & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 983 of 2016 BETWEEN: FREDERICK MWANGI NDUTA
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal given on 12 June 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a partner (temporary) (class UK) visa: Nduta v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1220.
Background
The appellant was aged 23 at the time of his marriage on 15 September 2010 to his then 76 year old wife. He applied…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1596
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility and the genuineness of his marriage, particularly in light of the evidence presented after the visa application was lodged. The court also needed to determine if the Tribunal's failure to refer to specific material obtained through a freedom of information request constituted a jurisdictional error. The court examined the statutory and regulatory framework governing the assessment of spousal relationships for visa purposes, particularly the requirement for the decision-maker to be satisfied that the applicant met the statutory definition of "spouse" at the time the visa application was lodged.
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not commit a jurisdictional error by considering material produced after the visa application was lodged, as the decision-maker was not precluded from doing so. The court held that the Tribunal was required to consider all circumstances of the relationship, as mandated by regulation, but was not obligated to set out every piece of evidence in its reasons. The court also found that the Tribunal's failure to refer to certain documents obtained through a freedom of information request did not amount to a jurisdictional error, as the omission did not affect the Tribunal's ability to make a decision based on the extensive material already considered.
In summary, the Federal Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the relevant evidence and that its failure to refer to certain documents did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant argued that there was more material before the Tribunal than it set out in its statement of its decision record and that, indeed, [31] of the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrated that it had not considered the family violence claims and all of the evidence relating to them for the purposes of arriving at its decision in relation to whether he met the criterion of being a spouse at the time of making his application for the visa. In that respect, he pointed to the omission of any reference in the reasons of the Tribunal to the freedom of information documents themselves.Consideration The Tribunal had to make a written statement when making its decision that satisfied s 368(1)(b)-(d) setting out its reasons for its decision, its findings on any material questions of fact and referring to the evidence or other material on which the findings of fact were based. McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said of s 430(1), the exact analogue of s 368(1), in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [68]:… it is not right to read “material” as providing an objective or external standard of materiality. A requirement to set out findings and reasons focuses upon the subjective thought processes of the decision-maker. All that s 430(1)(c) obliges the Tribunal to do is set out its findings on those questions of fact which it considered to be material to the decision which it made and to the reasons it had for reaching that decision. (italic emphasis in original, bold emphasis added) Section 368 does not require the Tribunal to set out everything that it considered for the purposes of determining the circumstances of the relationship. Indeed, to do so, could place an intolerable burden on a decision-maker and require him or her to compile a statement of reasons that would extend, as the Departmental file did, for hundreds of pages for no good purpose. Indeed, as Tracey, Flick and Griffiths JJ said in Truong [2016] FCAFC 54 at [80], in relation to the obligation for the decision-maker, under reg 1.15A(2), to consider all of the circumstances: Second, even assuming the argument was advanced before the Tribunal, the failure of the Tribunal expressly to mention the argument does not of itself manifest jurisdictional error. The Tribunal was undoubtedly aware of the making of the final Order by that Court. No jurisdictional error is exposed in the failure of the Tribunal expressly to address all matters which could potentially affect its decision, let alone a factor created in a different statutory context and made for different purposes: cf. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 at [9] to [10] per Gleeson CJ; at [77] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 331 to 332 and 349. It is not necessary for the Tribunal “to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons”: WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46], (2003) 75 ALD 630 at 641 per French, Sackville and Hely JJ. The task of the Tribunal was to reach a state of “satisfaction” by reference to the far more extensive factual material placed before it and by reference to the mandate that it “must consider” those matters set forth in reg 1.15A(3). (italic emphasis in original, bold emphasis added)