Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1251

Citation: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1251
Appeal from: Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1282
Parties: MANPREET KAUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 369 of 2014
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 21 November 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – Migration Review Tribunal – application for partner visa - whether genuine spousal relationship – whether allegations of family violence required to be considered.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Alsalem v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship and Another [2013] FCCA 1407
Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Collins v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FMCA 571
Collins v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FMCA 571
Guven v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another [2006] FMCA 311
Guven v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another [2006] FMCA 311
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2014] FCCA 1282
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Yang v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2014] FCCA 20
Yang v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2014] FCCA 20
Date of hearing: 18 November 2014
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms F Batten
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 369 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MANPREET KAUR
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant pays the First Respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 369 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MANPREET KAUR
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE:

21 NOVEMBER 2014

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant, Ms Manpreet Kaur, is an Indian national.  She appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1251
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kaur, the appellant, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss her application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) not to grant her a partner visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider her claim of domestic violence in the relationship, which she claimed warranted the grant of the visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, and the appellant now appealed to the High Court of Australia.
The High Court found that the Tribunal had correctly assessed the evidence and determined that the appellant and her sponsor were not in a spousal relationship as defined by the Act. The Tribunal had considered the evidence presented by the appellant and concluded that it was not satisfied that the appellant satisfied the criteria for a partner visa. The Court found that the Tribunal had not committed jurisdictional error in reaching this conclusion and that it was not the function of the Court to substitute its own view of the facts for the decision of the Tribunal. The Court also found that there was no requirement for the Tribunal to consider the appellant's claim of domestic violence as it was not relevant to the decision of whether the appellant satisfied the criteria for a partner visa.

The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The High Court found that the Federal Circuit Court did not err in dismissing the appellant's application for judicial review and that there was no basis for the appellant's appeal. The Court emphasized that it was not the function of the Court to engage in a merits review of the Tribunal's decision and that the Tribunal had correctly assessed the evidence and reached its conclusion. The Court also found that the claim of domestic violence was not relevant to the decision of whether the appellant satisfied the criteria for a partner visa. The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant pays the First Respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out I consider the learned primary judge did not err in dismissing the appellant’s application for review, and I dismiss the appeal.FACTUAL BACKGROUND The appellant was born in 1982 and she first arrived in Australia on 6 April 2009 as the holder of a Subclass 572 student visa. She met the man she later married, Luke Dennis Venness, at the Sydney Opera House on 7 March 2011 and they had commenced what the appellant described as a serious relationship by 10 July 2011. Mr Venness is a citizen of Australia who was unemployed at the time and ten years the appellant’s junior. The appellant states that Mr Venness asked her to marry him on Christmas Day 2011 and they married on 21 March 2012. The appellant applied for a partner visa on 11 April 2012 and was sponsored in the application by Mr Venness. She claimed that:(1)she was in a relationship with Mr Venness, her sponsor, who was an Australian citizen; and(2)she and Mr Venness were married on 21 March 2012. The appellant and Mr Venness provided some evidence regarding the inception and development of their relationship, including photographs of the wedding and statutory declarations from two friends who declared that the marriage was genuine. On 16 August 2012, before her visa application had been dealt with, the appellant said that she suffered family violence at the hands of Mr Venness and had been forced to flee their home. She provided the following material in support of her claim:(a)her statutory declaration of 10 August 2010;(b)a social worker/counsellor’s statutory declaration of 13 August 2012; and (c)a psychologist’s statutory declaration of 14 August 2012. As I have said, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a partner visa, and that decision was affirmed by the Tribunal. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review.THE DECISION OF THE DELEGATE The decision of the delegate has been overtaken by a full merits hearing by the Tribunal and it is unnecessary to deal with the delegate’s decision in any detail. It suffices to note that the delegate found that the appellant did not satisfy cl 820.211 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) and on that basis the delegate refused to grant the appellant a partner visa. In particular, the delegate found that the appellant and Mr Venness were not in a spousal relationship as defined by s 5F of the Act, and as a result he considered it unnecessary to deal with the appellant’s claim of domestic violence.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Following receipt of the application, on 14 January 2013 the Tribunal invited the appellant to provide additional material or written arguments in relation to the delegate’s decision but she did not submit any further information. On 10 September 2013 the Tribunal wrote to the appellant informing her that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but that it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the appellant to give evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 14 November 2013.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It suffices to note that the delegate found that the appellant did not satisfy cl 820.211 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) and on that basis the delegate refused to grant the appellant a partner visa. In particular, the delegate found that the appellant and Mr Venness were not in a spousal relationship as defined by s 5F of the Act, and as a result he considered it unnecessary to deal with the appellant’s claim of domestic violence.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Following receipt of the application, on 14 January 2013 the Tribunal invited the appellant to provide additional material or written arguments in relation to the delegate’s decision but she did not submit any further information. On 10 September 2013 the Tribunal wrote to the appellant informing her that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but that it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the appellant to give evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 14 November 2013. On 14 November 2013 the appellant appeared before the Tribunal with a registered migration agent and with the assistance of an interpreter. The hearing was conducted in English and Punjabi as required. She gave evidence and presented arguments in support of her application. The appellant provided a marriage certificate to the Tribunal that indicated that she married Mr Venness on 21 March 2012 at Quakers Hill, NSW. Two witnesses, Satinder Singh and Baljeet Sanger, provided statutory declarations that the marriage was genuine and gave evidence to that effect. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant and Mr Venness were married to each other by a marriage that was valid for the purposes of the Act. The appellant also adduced evidence to the Tribunal in relation to her claim that she had suffered domestic violence at the hands of Mr Venness. The Tribunal’s statement of decision and reasons firstly noted that the appellant claimed to be the spouse of a sponsor, Mr Venness, who is an Australian citizen for the purposes of cl 820.211(2)(a) and 820.221 of the Regulations. By reference to the appellant’s circumstances and by a process of elimination in relation to the various other eligibility requirements under cl 820.211, the Tribunal concluded (correctly in my view) that cl 820.211(2) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations was the only subclause relevant to the application. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant satisfied the criteria for a partner visa as provided for in Part 820 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. The Tribunal reached this view by considering the definition of “spouse” contained in s 5F of the Act which provides:(1)For the purposes of this Act, a person is the spouse of another person if, under subsection (2), the 2 persons are in a married relationship.(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), persons are in a married relationship if:(a)they are married to each other under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of this Act; and(b)they have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others; and(c)the relationship between them is genuine and continuing; and(d)they:(i) live together; or(ii) do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.(3)The regulations may make provision in relation to the determination of whether one or more of the conditions in paragraphs (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) exist. The regulations may make different provision in relation to the determination for different purposes whether one or more of those conditions exist.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the hearing before me the appellant was assisted by an interpreter, but not legally represented. I now turn to consider each ground of appeal.CONSIDERATIONGround One – Not satisfied with the Court’s decision This ground does not particularise the complaint or identify any error on the part of the learned primary judge. I t is nothing more than a bare statement by the appellant and it does not establish jurisdictional error. This ground must fail.Grounds Two and Three – The appellant’s belief that she had true relations with her ex-husband In my view these grounds seek that the Court engage in an impermissible merits review of the Tribunal’s decision. The jurisdiction of the Court in the present case is confined to circumstances where the Tribunal has committed jurisdictional error: s 476A of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. It is well-established that it is not the function of a Court to engage in fact-finding so as to substitute its own view of the facts for the decision of the Tribunal: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40-41; Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 36 per Brennan J. The Tribunal decision reveals that the member assessed and weighed the evidence as to the nature of the relationship between the appellant and her sponsor and determined that it was not a spousal relationship within the definition of “spouse” in the Act. There was no error of law in the Tribunal’s approach and it is not for the Court to re-exercise the Tribunal’s fact-finding function.Ground Four – Failure to consider domestic violence As I have said, the criteria for the grant of the partner visa are set out in cl 820 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. At the relevant time, cl 820.21 provided these criteria under the heading “Criteria to be satisfied at time of application”. Clause 820.211 provided:(2)An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant is the spouse or de facto partner of a person who:(i) is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; and ... At the relevant time cl 820.221(3) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations provided:(3)An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant would continue to meet the requirements of subclause 820.211(2), (5) or (6) except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner has ceased; and(b)either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i) either or both of the following:(A)the applicant;(B)a dependent child of the sponsoring partner or of the applicant or of both of them;has suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner;… (Emphasis added.) Clause 820.221(3) refers back to cl 820.211 and indicates that it must be satisfied at the time that a visa application is lodged. Although cl 820.211(3) sets a requirement to continue to meet the requirements of 820.211(2), (5) or (6), in the present case only cl 820.211(2) is relevant.