Patel v Minister for Immigration
[2015] FCCA 1624
•22 June 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| PATEL & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 1624 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – Migration Review Tribunal – Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa – whether applicants advised of hearing – whether denial of procedural fairness – whether bogus document in relation to visa application – whether reasonable suspicion skills assessment obtained because of false or misleading statement – whether jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.97, 360(1), 360A(1) and (5), 362B, 379, 379A, 379G, 474, 476 |
| Batra v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 274; (2013) 212 FCR 84 Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 822 Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1282 Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 915; (2014) 141 ALD 619 Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 1251 Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2015] HCASL 27 Lodhawala v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 238 Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCA 390; (2014) 220 FCR 494 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li & Anor [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332; (2013) 87 ALJR 618; (2013) 297 ALR 225 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf& Anor [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73; (2006) 150 FCR 439; (2006) 231 ALR 630 NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 NBBL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1045; (2006) 152 FCR 592 Patel v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 22 Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 359 Singh v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 27; (2011) 190 FCR 552; (2011) 276 ALR 180 Trivedi & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection& Anor [2014] FCAFC 42; (2014) 220 FCR 169 |
| First Applicant: | PARUL HARSHADKUMAR PATEL |
| Second Applicant: | HARSHADKUMAR CHANDULAL PATEL |
| Third Applicant: | DHARA PATEL |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 332 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Antoni Lucev |
| Hearing date: | 19 March 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 19 March 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 22 June 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| For the First Applicant: | In person |
| For the Second Applicant: | In person |
| For the Third Applicant: | A minor, was present in Court |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr B Dube |
| For the Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance, save as to costs |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDER
That the application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 332 of 2014
| PARUL HARSHADKUMAR PATEL |
First Applicant
| HARSHADKUMAR CHANDULAL PATEL |
Second Applicant
| DHARA PATEL |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By application filed on 23 October 2014, the applicants seek judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) of a decision of the second respondent, the Migration Review Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively). The Tribunal Decision made on 20 October 2014, which is at Court Book (“CB”) 248-257, affirmed a decision of a delegate (“Delegate” and Delegate’s Decision” respectively) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“Minister”) to refuse to grant a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa (“Skilled Visa”) to the first applicant, Ms Patel. The Delegate’s Decision made on 1 December 2013 is at CB 205-211. The second and third applicants (Ms Patel’s husband and child respectively) sought visas on the basis of being members of Ms Patel’s family unit.
The Skilled Visa application
Ms Patel lodged an application for the Skilled Visa on 28 May 2009: CB 2-28. Ms Patel:
a)nominated “hairdresser” as her nominated occupation: CB 5; and
b)stated that the applicable assessing authority was Trades Recognition Australia (“TRA”) and that the date of the relevant skills assessment was 23 September 2008 (“TRA Skills Assessment”). A copy of the TRA Skills Assessment was provided to the Department with the application: CB 88-89. The relevant past employment details that Ms Patel provided were as a hairdresser at Gessi’s Hairdressing Salon in Greensborough, Victoria, from 1 June 2007 to 20 July 2008: CB 122-124.
Grounds of review
The following ground of review is set out in the application:
My application was refused by the Department of Immigration on the basis of providing a false document in support of my application. To seek fair outcome I applied for the review of decision to the Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Department of Immigration without giving me the opportunity to explain. I believe all the supporting document I provided with my application were genuine.
Distilled, there are two grounds, as follows:
a)there was a denial of procedural fairness by reason of not having an opportunity to be heard before the Tribunal (ground 1); and
b)Ms Patel’s belief that the documents provided with the Skilled Visa application were genuine, and were not obtained because of any false or misleading information (ground 2).
No written submissions were filed by the applicants notwithstanding the Registrar’s orders of 10 December 2014 allowing them to do so.
On 14 January 2015 the applicant filed an affidavit in support of her application. The annexures at pages 2-4 of the affidavit are not documents that were before the Delegate or the Tribunal and the Minister objected to the acceptance of those documents into evidence. The documents are copies of text messages sent on 30 April 2013 and 4 May 2013 seemingly by Ms Patel to the proprietor, or former proprietor, of Gessi’s Hairdressing Salon. They evidence attempts by Ms Patel to contact the proprietor with respect to her hours of work experience. There is no evidence of any reply from the proprietor. The documents pre-date the Delegate’s Decision, but do not appear in the Court Book. They do not appear to have been before either the Delegate or the Tribunal. The failure to submit them to the Delegate or the Tribunal is not explained. In any event, they evidence nothing more than an attempt by Ms Patel to contact the proprietor and no outcome therefrom. They do not, and cannot, establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. For those reasons, the Court considers the documents to be inadmissible, and therefore no further regard will be had to them in these Reasons for Judgment.
Ground 1 – procedural fairness
Facts relevant to the procedural fairness ground are as follows:
a)on 20 December 2013 the Tribunal wrote a letter to the applicants, but addressed to Ms Patel, acknowledging receipt of the application for review of the Delegate’s Decision: CB 224-225. The Tribunal’s letter said:
If you wish to provide material or written arguments for the tribunal to consider, you should do so as soon as possible.
CB 224;
b)on 26 May 2014 Mr Dildeep Singh of Milestone Education and Immigration was appointed as the applicants’ representative and authorised recipient (“Authorised Recipient”): CB 328;
c)on 1 August 2014 the applicants were invited by the Tribunal under s.360(1) of the Migration Act to attend a hearing scheduled on 26 September 2014 to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues under review: CB 239-241. The Tribunal letter said:
If you are not able to attend the hearing you should advise the Tribunal as soon as possible. Please note that the Tribunal will only change this date if satisfied that you have a very good reason for being granted an adjournment. If the Tribunal does not advise you that an adjournment has been granted, you must assume that the hearing will go ahead. If you do not attend the scheduled hearing, the Tribunal may make a decision without taking any further action to allow or enable you to appear before it.
The Tribunal requests that any additional documents or information that you may wish to rely on during the hearing be provided to the Tribunal by 19 September 2014.
CB 240 - emphasis in original;
d)the Tribunal was required under s.379G of the Migration Act to give to the Authorised Recipient, instead of the applicants, any document that it would have otherwise given to the applicants, and if the Tribunal does so the document it is taken to have been given to the applicants: Migration Act, s.379G(2). The applicants had appointed the Authorised Recipient on 26 May 2014: CB 238. The Tribunal therefore communicated with the Authorised Recipient, rather than applicants. There is no evidence to suggest that the Authorised Recipient did not receive the invitation. Therefore, the applicants are taken to have received the hearing invitation;
e)the hearing invitation sent on 1 August 2014 complied with the requirements under the Migration Act because it:
i)invited the applicants to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence: Migration Act, s.360(1);
ii)provided notice of the specified day, time and place of the hearing: Migration Act, s.360A(1);
iii)provided a period of notice to the applicants that exceeded the prescribed period of 14 days after the notice was received: reg.4.21 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Migration Regulations”); and
iv)was sent to the applicants by prepaid post: Migration Act, s.379A(4);
f)contained a statement about the effect of s.362B of the Migration Act (as required by s.360A(5) of the Migration Act) – namely, the options available to the Tribunal if the applicants failed to appear before it;
g)the applicants:
i)provided no documents to the Tribunal prior to 19 September 2014, or at all; and
ii)did not attend the Tribunal hearing: CB 242-245; and
h)in the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal:
i)found that the applicants failed to attend the hearing at the scheduled date and time: CB 249, Tribunal Decision at [3]; and
ii)rather than rescheduling the hearing or delaying its decision the Tribunal elected to proceed to make a decision under s.362B of the Migration Act: CB 249, Tribunal Decision at [4];
The power conferred by s.362B of the Migration Act must be exercised reasonably: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li & Anor [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332; (2013) 87 ALJR 618; (2013) 297 ALR 225 (“Li”). The Tribunal’s election to make a decision on the review is not, by itself, the expression of an unreasonable exercise of power: NBBL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1045; (2006) 152 FCR 592 at [20]-[21] per Greenwood J; Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 822 at [25]-[35] per Barnes FM. The Tribunal is entitled to assume that the Authorised Recipient would check the mail at the addresses provided: Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCA 390; (2014) 220 FCR 494 at [40] per Buchanan J; Singh v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 27; (2011) 190 FCR 552; (2011) 276 ALR 180 at [40] per Keane CJ, Collier and Logan JJ. There was no obligation on the Tribunal to make any inquiry as to the failure on the part of an applicant to appear or “to search the papers lodged with it to discover if there might be some other avenue of communicating with the applicant”: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73; (2006) 150 FCR 439; (2006) 231 ALR 630 at [39] per Spender, French and Cowdroy JJ; Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 915; (2014) 141 ALD 619 at [133] per Mortimer J. There was nothing unreasonable about the Tribunal Decision to proceed under s.362B of the Migration Act in circumstances where:
a)the hearing invitation had been sent to the Authorised Recipient;
b)there was no explanation before the Tribunal for the applicants’ failure to appear;
c)no hearing confirmation certificate had been returned to the Tribunal; and
d)the applicants had failed to provide any evidence to the Tribunal despite being invited to do so in the hearing invitation.
No error was made by the Tribunal in proceeding in the manner that it did. In all of the above circumstances, the alleged denial of procedural fairness is not made out, and ground 1 must fail.
Ground 2 – bogus documents
Clause 4020 of Schedule 4 to the Migration Regulations is one of the Public Interest Criteria set out in Part 1 of Schedule 4, and is commonly known as PIC 4020, and must be satisfied before the Skilled Visa can be granted. PIC 4020 relevantly provides as follows:
(1) There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Migration Review Tribunal, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:
(a) the application for the visa; or
(b) a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.
(2) The Minister is satisfied that during the period:
(a) starting 3 years before the application was made; and
(b) ending when the Minister makes a decision to grant or refuse to grant the application;
the applicant and each member of a family unit of the applicant has not been refused a visa because of a failure to satisfy the criteria in subclause (1).
(2A) ...
(2B) ...
(3) To avoid doubt, subclauses (1) and (2) apply whether or not the Minister became aware of the bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular because of information given by the applicant.
(4) The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:
(a) compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or
(b) compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;
justify the granting of the visa.
(5) In this clause:
information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:
(a) false or misleading at the time it is given; and
(b) relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information.
Section 97 of the Migration Act defines “bogus document” as follows:
“bogus document”, in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:
(a) purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or
(b) is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or
(c) was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly.
The issue of what constitutes “information that is false or misleading in a material particular” for the purposes of PIC 4020 has recently been addressed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Trivedi & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection& Anor [2014] FCAFC 42; (2014) 220 FCR 169 at [32]-[33] (“Trivedi”), where Buchanan J delivered the leading judgment, and said that:
It is apparent from the terms of PIC 4020 that it addressed the problem of attempts to work a fraud or deception on the assessment of claims for a visa. That is also evident from the fact that PIC 4020 states a ‘public interest’ criterion, from the narrow and exceptional circumstances necessary to waive its requirements and, more generally, from the serious consequences that follow from its application. I would not infer any apparent intention to disqualify a visa applicant who could not explain an innocent mistake in a document or information provided by them. PIC 4020 is not directed, in my view, to innocent, unintended and accidental matters. However, different questions arise when information or documents provided in support of an application are revealed as false, in the purposely untrue sense of that term.
In my view, it should be accepted that an element of fraud or deception is necessary in order to attract the operation of PIC 4020. To take the example of bogus documents, a counterfeit document is not produced accidentally. Similarly, to charge that a statement is false is not to say only that it is wrong. The accusation potentially imports some element of knowledge or intention on somebody’s part, and in my view does so in the present context.
In Trivedi Buchanan J concluded at [43]:
In my view, it is not necessary … to show knowing complicity by a visa applicant. That would impose an impossible task on those administering the visa system. But it is necessary that the information or document have the necessary quality of purposeful falsity, whether or not the visa applicant can be shown to have knowledge of that fact.
See also Batra v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 274; (2013) 212 FCR 84 (“Batra”); and Patel v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 22.
The task before the Tribunal was to determine whether the TRA Skills Assessment was a bogus document or was false or misleading in a material particular. The Tribunal clearly understood its task, and the law attaching to that task, referring to both s.97 of the Migration Act and PIC 4020, as well as the relevant case law, namely Batra and Trivedi: CB 250, Tribunal Decision at [8]-[9].
In the Tribunal’s view Ms Patel’s TRA Skills Assessment was a bogus document as the Tribunal reasonably suspected that it was obtained because of a false or misleading statement regarding Ms Patel’s alleged volunteer work experience at Gessi’s Hairdressing Salon: Migration Act, s.97(c); CB 250, Tribunal Decision at [10]. The Tribunal’s rationale is set out in the following extract from the Tribunal Decision:
10. For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that the applicant's skills assessment issued by TRA is a bogus document within the meaning of s 97(c) on the basis that the Tribunal reasonably suspects that it was obtained because of a false or misleading statement regarding the applicant's alleged volunteer work experience. In making this findings, the Tribunal has placed weight on the information contained in the decision record of the delegate (a copy of which the applicant provided to the Tribunal as part of the present review) regarding a Department interview with the former owner of the applicant's alleged former employer, Gessi's Hairdressing Salon (Gessi's). According to the information in the decision record:
a. the owner did not recognise the applicant from a picture and had no recollection of her working at the salon;
b. the owner confirmed that he did not write the work reference used by the applicant to support her 900 hours of work experience claims, although he may have signed the work reference;
c. he contradicted certain claims in the work reference, such as that the applicant was involved in training new apprentices and was able to work unsupervised as a hairdresser and had the ability to run the salon.
11. The delegate also noted that, when provided with this information by the Department, the applicant responded with no further evidence or information, other than to state that she was unable to contact the owner of the business and therefore could not provide any further evidence.
12. Second, the Tribunal notes its concern with the applicant's non-attendance at the scheduled hearing. The applicant was clearly on notice from the decision record of the delegate's concerns regarding the genuineness of her work experience claims. However, despite being informed of the Tribunal's hearing invitation that the Tribunal was unable to make a favourable decision on the information before it, the applicant did not attend the ·scheduled hearing to answer questions about her alleged work experience. Nor has she provided any further information or evidence to counter the concerns raised by the delegate in the decision record.
13. On balance, in light of the information set out in the decision record combined with the loss of any opportunity to question the applicant about this information in the context of the hearing, the Tribunal has been left with a reasonable suspicion that the applicant's skills assessment from TRA was obtained because of a false or misleading statement and is therefore a bogus document within the meaning of s.97(c).
14. In making this finding, the Tribunal is mindful that it does not have any direct evidence showing that the applicant's skills assessment was obtained on the basis of her work reference letter from Gessi's. However, viewing her application overall, the Tribunal infers this to be the case. The Tribunal notes that her skills assessment from TRA is stated to have been based in part on her satisfaction of the 900 hours of directly related work experience and her visa application to the Department does not disclose any other potential source of this work experience other than with Gessi's. Likewise, her agent's response to the Department's natural justice letter (at folio 105) is consistent with her having obtained her skills assessment in reliance upon her alleged work experience reference letter from Gessi's.
CB 250-251, Tribunal Decision at [10]-[14].
The Tribunal found that the TRA Skills Assessment was included as part of Ms Patel’s Skilled Visa application, and Ms Patel therefore caused what the Tribunal had found to be a bogus document, namely the TRA Skills Assessment, to be provided to the Department: CB 251, Tribunal Decision at [15].
On the basis of its finding that the TRA Skills Assessment was a bogus document, and that it was provided to the Department by Ms Patel, the Tribunal was not satisfied that Ms Patel satisfied the requirements of PIC 4020(1) of the Migration Regulations for the purposes of either cll.487.228 or 485.224 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations. There being no claims or evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that the other applicants otherwise met the primary criteria for the grant of the Skilled Visa, the Delegate’s Decision was affirmed by the Tribunal: CB 251 and 252, Tribunal Decision at [15] and [18]-[20].
The applicants, who it must be remembered did not appear before, or make any submissions to, the Tribunal, did not raise with the Tribunal any specific circumstances relevant to the exercise of the compelling or compassionate circumstances waiver in PIC 4020(4). The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the applicants’ circumstances were compelling or compassionate, or that they affected the interests of Australia or the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident, or an eligible New Zealand citizen: CB 251, Tribunal Decision at [17].
The Tribunal Decision is only reviewable by this Court if it is affected by jurisdictional error: Migration Act, ss.474 and 476; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 at [76] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. An error by the Tribunal will only constitute jurisdictional error if the Tribunal:
a)identifies a wrong issue;
b)asks the wrong question;
c)ignores relevant material; or
d)relies on irrelevant material,
in such a way that the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given under the Migration Act: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf& Anor [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
The evaluation of the evidence, including the attribution of weight in respect of the evidence, and the making of findings in relation to the evidence was a matter for the Tribunal: “To engage in fact-finding about the merits of the … case is no part of the function of the Court”: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ (“NAHI”). The weight to be given to various matters taken into account by the Tribunal in exercising its discretion, both as to whether it is satisfied that the criteria for the grant of a Skilled Visa were met, and with respect to the compelling or compassionate circumstances waiver, was a matter for the Tribunal. That the Tribunal decided as it did is hardly surprising given the Delegate’s Decision upon which it was entitled to rely in the absence of any submissions by the applicants and the applicants’ non-attendance at the Tribunal hearing. In those circumstances what the applicants now seek to have the Court do is to impermissibly engage in a review of the merits of the Tribunal Decision: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1; CLR at 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (“Wu Shan Liang”). Where, as here, the findings made by the Tribunal as to fact and the consequent conclusion were open to be made, it is not for the Court exercising a power of judicial review to interfere with the Tribunal’s fact-finding and exercise of discretion properly based on those facts as reflected in the Tribunal Decision. To do would be to conduct a merits review, not a judicial review, and would be contrary to well-established principles, regularly applied: Wu Shan Liang at 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ recently applied by this Court in, for example, Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 359 at [23] per Judge Lucev, Lodhawala v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 238 at [34] per Judge Nicholls; Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1282 at [32] per Judge Lucev, from which an appeal to the Federal Court by the applicant was dismissed: see Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 1251 and an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court by the applicant was also dismissed: Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2015] HCASL 27.
In the above circumstances the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error by identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong issue, asking the wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material. Further, it relied upon the evidence before it to reach conclusions which were open to it, and which are not reviewable by this Court. In the circumstances there was, therefore, no jurisdictional error by the Tribunal in relation to the issue of bogus documents, and ground 2 must fail.
Conclusion and orders
The Court has concluded that:
a)the applicants were not denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal in relation to the Tribunal hearing; and
b)there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s conclusion with respect to whether the TRA Skills Assessment was a bogus document,
and, in those circumstances, there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. The Tribunal Decision is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s.474 of the Migration Act. The application must therefore be dismissed.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Antoni Lucev
Associate:
Date: 22 June 2015
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