Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Truong

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Truong [2016] FCAFC 54

Appeal from: Truong v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2319
File number: NSD 1072 of 2015
Judges: TRACEY, FLICK AND GRIFFITHS JJ
Date of judgment: 5 April 2016
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – no onus on Migration Review Tribunal to make out a claimant’s case – Tribunal not bound by the rules of evidence

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – duty of Tribunal to make its – own decision – prior apprehended domestic violence order – relevance of orders founded upon a domestic relationship – failure on the part of the Tribunal to refer to basis of order – no jurisdictional error

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – issues raised by Notice of Contention   

Legislation:

Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), ss 15, 16

Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 5F, 65, 75

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 1.15A(3), 1.23(4), Sch 2, cl 801.221

Cases cited: Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 7, (2015) 89 ALJR 382
General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1251
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCASL 27
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 61 FLR 354
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385, (2000) 106 FCR 313
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30, (2001) 206 CLR 323
Ridley v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1993) 42 FCR 276
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87, (2015) 229 FCR 301
Sudath v Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NSWCA 171, (2012) 84 NSWLR 474
SZVCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 24
Truong v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2319
WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184, (2003) 75 ALD 630
Date of hearing: 2 March 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 82
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the Appellant: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the First Respondent: My T Nguyen Solicitors
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1072 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

UYEN PHUONG TRUONG

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

TRACEY, FLICK AND GRIFFITHS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 APRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The First Respondent, Ms Uyen Phuong Truong, was born in Vietnam in 1984 and is a citizen of Vietnam.

  2. In…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Truong, the appellant, Ms Truong, sought judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) to deny her Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa. The Tribunal had concluded that Ms Truong did not meet the criteria for the visa because it was not satisfied that she and her sponsor had a genuine spousal relationship, which was a necessary condition for the visa.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal erred in its decision-making process, particularly concerning the assessment of Ms Truong’s credibility and the relevance of the Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO). Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by not referring to all parts of the ADVO that were intended to be before it.

The court found that the Tribunal did not commit a jurisdictional error by failing to refer to the basis of the ADVO, as the Tribunal was not bound by strict evidentiary rules and had a duty to make its own decision. The court also determined that the adverse findings regarding Ms Truong’s credibility permeated the Tribunal’s reasoning and could not be dissected from the overall decision-making process. Therefore, the Tribunal's failure to give conclusive effect to the ADVO did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The court further found that the Tribunal’s oversight in not considering a three-page document related to the ADVO was material and constituted jurisdictional error, warranting the setting aside of the Tribunal’s decision.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal’s errors did not warrant overturning the decision. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is concluded that the adverse findings as to credit which were made by the Tribunal permeate its reasoning such that it would be impermissible to dissect from the entirety of that reasoning such findings as may have been made which were not influenced – at least in part – by the adverse assessment made by the Tribunal of Ms Truong’s credibility.Has suffered family violence – conclusive evidence? One subsidiary argument advanced on behalf of Ms Truong should separately be addressed. It is prudent to address the argument, albeit briefly, lest it is resurrected when the matter proceeds to a re-hearing before the Tribunal. In seeking to impugn the decision of the Tribunal, Counsel for Ms Truong submitted that the decision should be set aside because the Tribunal erred in not giving “conclusive effect” to the Apprehended Domestic Violence Order. The argument starts from a possible misconception. The submission that “conclusive effect” is to be given to the making of the Apprehended Domestic Violence Order seeks to invoke reg 1.23(4) of the Migration Regulations. That regulation provides as follows:Circumstances in which family violence is suffered and committed—court order (4)The alleged victim is taken to have suffered family violence, and the alleged perpetrator is taken to have committed family violence, if: (a)a court has made an order under a law of a State or Territory against the alleged perpetrator for the protection of the alleged victim from violence; and (b)the order was made after the court had given the alleged perpetrator an opportunity to be heard, or otherwise to make submissions to the court, in relation to the matter.Once an order has been made, Counsel for Ms Truong contended that reg 1.23(4)(a) expressly provides that Ms Truong is “taken to have suffered domestic violence…”. The difficulty with the argument, had it arisen for decision, is that reg 1.23(4)(b) was most probably not satisfied on the basis of the available evidence. The Regulation only provides that a person is “taken to have suffered family violence” if both paras (a) and (b) are satisfied. That does not appear to be so in the present case.The fate of Ground 3 Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal is rejected.THE NOTICE OF CONTENTION A Notice of Contention has been filed on behalf of Ms Truong. The Notice of Contention seeks to argue that there remain unresolved two further bases upon which the decision of the Tribunal should have been set aside, namely the failure on the part of the Tribunal:·to have regard to those parts of the Provisional Apprehended Domestic Violence Order that were before it; and ·to “take into account the legal basis upon which the final Apprehended Domestic Violence Order was taken out …”. Given that the matter is to be re-heard by the Tribunal, it is perhaps prudent to not say anything about the first basis. When the matter is re-heard the Tribunal will presumably have the entirety of the Provisional Order before it and the Tribunal will proceed to make such fresh findings of fact as it sees fit. It is not for this Court to trespass into the arena of what findings could have been made in respect to only part of that Order and thereby inadvertently express views on what findings of fact may be warranted based solely upon only part of the Order.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was after setting forth these findings and reasons that the Tribunal expressed its conclusion as follows (without alteration): CONCLUSION68.Given the above findings, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the parties had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others that the relationship was genuine and continuing at any time. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the parties have ever lived together or did not live separately and apart on a permanent basis. The Tribunal therefore finds that the applicant does not meet the definition of ‘spouse’ in s.5F(2)(b)-(d).69.Therefore the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant meets cl.801.221(6).70.As is indicated above, in order to rely upon a claim that the applicant satisfies the criteria in cl.801.221(6) the applicant must show that she would meet the requirements of cl.801.221(2), including the requirement of being the spouse of the sponsoring partner, except that the relationship has ceased. As the Tribunal has found that the applicant and the sponsor were never in as spousal relationship as defined in s.5F of the Act the applicant does not meet the criteria in cl.801.221(6) and it is not necessary to assess the claim of family violence.71.There is no evidence to indicate that applicant meets the alternative criteria contained in cl.801.221.72.For the reasons above, the applicant does not satisfy the criteria for the grant of the visa.The Tribunal then proceeded to affirm the decision not to grant Ms Truong her Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa. In setting aside the decision of the Tribunal, the Federal Circuit Court Judge focussed attention upon the question of whether it was Ms Truong who contacted the police, and para [63] of the Tribunal’s reasons, and continued (without alteration):[17] It is in these combined circumstances of both alleged critical paragraphs that I find that the reasoning of the Tribunal was such that the missing three-page document to which the Tribunal did not have regard was material. I find that the three-page document was material in relation to the fact-finding process by the Tribunal in relation to whether the applicant and sponsor ever living together, in the fact-finding process in relation to the applicant’s credit, the fact-finding process as to what occurred in relation to the attendance by the police and the removal of the sponsor from the premises on 24 January 2015, and the fact-finding process in relation to evaluating the applicant’s evidence in relation to the alleged inconsistency of the sponsor having moved out four months earlier and as to who called the police.[18] In the context of the statement to the police that the parties had been in a domestic relationship for four years, counsel for the first respondent did take the Court to the financial documents in the sponsor’s name in respect of which the mortgage account being paid by the sponsor for the benefit of his parents. These records showed one particular bank records were being sent to the Greenfield Park address and also a joint account with a different bank in relation to the sponsor were sent to the same address. The use of that same address by the sponsor was consistent with the applicant’s evidence.[19] It is in these circumstances that I find that there was jurisdictional error by the Tribunal not having regard to the missing three pages of the apprehended violence order that the applicant intended to be before the Tribunal in the conduct of its review.These paragraphs of the reasoning, it will be noticed, address the question of whether Ms Truong and Mr Tran “ever lived together”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established