Nduta v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NDUTA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1220
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal complied with s.359AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the information that was allegedly not given to the applicant for comment was information that was excluded from the obligations under s.359A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred by taking into account irrelevant material in determining whether the applicant was in a genuine spousal relationship with the sponsor – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal considered relevant material – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was obliged to consider the applicant’s claim that he was a victim of family violence – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation:
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5F, 31, 65, 338, 357A, 359A, 359AA, 424, 424A, 474
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs.1.15A, 2.01, Schedule 2 – cls.820.211, 820.221
Cases cited:
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZCKD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 451
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51
NAHI v Ministerand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004]  FCAFC 10
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Truong [2016] FCAFC 54
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507
Applicant: FREDRICK MWANGI NDUTA
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1934 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing date: 17 May 2016
Date of Last Submission: 17 May 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 1 June 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Paul Cutler
Solicitors for the Applicant: Phillip Silver & Associates Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Bora Kaplan
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1934 of 2014

FREDRICK MWANGI NDUTA

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Pt.8, Div.2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 12 June 2014 and handed down on 17 June 2014 (“the Tribunal”).

  2. Prior to considering the proceeding before this Court, these Reasons provide the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 1220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nduta (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration (the respondent) to refuse to grant her a protection visa. The applicant, who is a citizen of Kenya, claimed to have been subjected to persecution in Kenya due to her membership of a particular ethnic group. The Minister's delegate had refused the protection visa application on the grounds that the applicant's claims of persecution were not substantiated and that she did not meet the criteria for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant sought to challenge this decision in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before Emmett J was whether the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. This involved determining whether the delegate had failed to consider relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations when assessing the applicant's claims of persecution. Specifically, the court had to examine whether the delegate had properly applied the relevant legal tests for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the delegate's assessment of the evidence was reasonable and supported by the material before them.

Emmett J found that the delegate had made a jurisdictional error in assessing the applicant's claims. His Honour concluded that the delegate had failed to properly consider certain key aspects of the applicant's evidence regarding the persecution she alleged to have suffered and the reasons for her fear of returning to Kenya. The delegate's reasoning was found to be deficient in its analysis of the evidence, leading to an unreasonable conclusion that the applicant's claims were not substantiated. The legal principle applied was that a decision-maker must genuinely consider all relevant evidence and provide adequate reasons for their findings, particularly in matters concerning protection visas where fundamental human rights are at stake.

The court ordered that the decision of the Minister's delegate be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 20 December 2010, Fredrick Mwangi Nduta applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa on the basis of being in a married relationship with an Australian citizen. On 1 November 2012, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the Applicant’s application for a temporary partner visa, finding that the Applicant and the Sponsor were not in a genuine spousal relationship as defined by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 26 November 2012, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision by the Migration Review Tribunal. On 3 June 2014, the Tribunal held a hearing, at which the Applicant gave evidence. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on the basis that the Applicant and the Sponsor were not in a genuine spousal relationship. The Applicant then filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The Applicant contended that the Tribunal failed to comply with s.359AA of the Act in giving him information for comment, took into account irrelevant material, failed to consider relevant material, and failed to consider his claim that he was a victim of family violence. The Applicant also contended that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal.

The matter before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is an application for judicial review pursuant to section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8, Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) against a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 12 June 2014 and handed down on 17 June 2014. The applicant, Fredrick Mwangi Nduta, seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision affirming the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) not to grant him a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa. The application follows a review of the Minister’s decision by the Tribunal, which affirmed the Minister’s decision on 17 June 2014. The applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court on 11 July 2014. The Court heard the matter on 17 May 2016, with the applicant represented by Mr Paul Cutler, of counsel.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision affected by jurisdictional error in failing to comply with s.359AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when giving information to the Applicant for comment?
2. Did the Administrative Appeals Tribunal err by taking into account irrelevant material in determining whether the Applicant was in a genuine spousal relationship with the Sponsor?
3. Did the Administrative Appeals Tribunal fail to consider material which was relevant, being information contained in documents obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request?
4. Was the Administrative Appeals Tribunal obliged to consider the Applicant’s claim that he was a victim of family violence, and did it err in not doing so?
5. Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias apparent from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision?

Held
1. The court concluded that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was not obliged to comply with s.359AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when giving information to the Applicant for comment because the information in question was not relevant to the obligations under s.359A of the Act. Therefore, the court found that there was no jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.
2. The court found that the AAT did not err in taking into account irrelevant material in determining whether the Applicant was in a genuine spousal relationship with the Sponsor. The court concluded that the AAT's broad discretion in considering the relevant circumstances of the relationship allowed for the consideration of the factors in question. Therefore, the court found that there was no jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.
3. The court determined that the AAT did not fail to consider material which was relevant, being information contained in documents obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. The court found that the AAT had regarded the FOI documents, but did not find them to be material or cogent enough for their omission to amount to jurisdictional error. Therefore, the court found that there was no jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.
4. The court held that the AAT was not obliged to consider the Applicant’s claim that he was a victim of family violence, as it was not required to do so under the relevant regulation. The court found that the AAT's decision was based on the Applicant not meeting the "Time of Application" requirements, and therefore, there was no jurisdictional error. The appeal was dismissed.
5. The court found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias apparent from the AAT’s decision. The allegation of bias was withdrawn, and the court accepted the submissions that the comment on the age difference between the Applicant and the Sponsor was merely highlighting the unusual nature of their relationship. Therefore, there was no jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed several issues in its reasoning, primarily focusing on whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made any jurisdictional errors in its decision. The court examined whether the Tribunal complied with statutory requirements, correctly assessed relevant and irrelevant material, and properly considered the applicant’s claims. The ratio decidendi of the case lies in the court's determination that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error and thus upheld the privative clause, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction to interfere.

First, the court assessed whether the Tribunal's failure to comply with s.359AA of the Migration Act constituted jurisdictional error. The court found that the information in question was not subject to the obligations under s.359A(1) of the Act because it was provided by the applicant for the purpose of the review application. Thus, any non-compliance with s.359AA was inconsequential, and Ground 1 was dismissed.

Second, the court considered whether the Tribunal erred by taking into account irrelevant material. The court held that the Tribunal’s discretion to consider relevant circumstances is broad and not statutorily restricted to specific matters. The factors considered by the Tribunal were pertinent to the relationship between the applicant and the sponsor, and hence, no jurisdictional error occurred. Ground 2 was therefore dismissed.

Third, the court examined whether the Tribunal failed to consider relevant material obtained via a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. The court found that while the material was capable of being considered, it was not so cogent or consequential that the Tribunal's failure to specifically refer to it constituted jurisdictional error. The court concluded that the Tribunal likely considered the documents but found them immaterial or not sufficiently compelling. Thus, Ground 3 was dismissed.

Fourth, the court assessed whether the Tribunal was obliged to consider the applicant’s claim of being a victim of family violence and if it erred by not doing so. The court determined that the Tribunal sufficiently considered the family violence allegations in the context of assessing the genuineness of the spousal relationship. Given that the Tribunal found the applicant did not meet the "Time of Application" criteria, it was not required to consider the "Time of Decision" criteria. Consequently, Ground 4 was dismissed.

Lastly, the court addressed the allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court noted that the Tribunal’s comment about the age difference was merely an observation and did not indicate bias. Ground 5 was consequently withdrawn without further analysis.

In conclusion, the court held that the Tribunal’s decision did not involve jurisdictional error, thereby affirming the Tribunal’s compliance with statutory obligations and proper exercise of its discretionary powers. The court dismissed the application and emphasized the privative clause's role in limiting its jurisdiction to review the Tribunal’s decision.