FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
National Tertiary Education Union v La Trobe University [2015] FCAFC 142
Citation: National Tertiary Education Union v La Trobe University [2015] FCAFC 142 Appeal from: National Tertiary Education Union v La Trobe University [2014] FCA 1330 Parties: NATIONAL TERTIARY EDUCATION UNION v LA TROBE UNIVERSITY File number: VID 762 of 2014 Judges: JESSUP, BROMBERG AND WHITE JJ Date of judgment: 8 October 2015 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – alleged breach of clause of enterprise agreement – separate question as to whether clause imposed any binding obligations on respondent – appeal from primary judge’s determination that clause was merely aspirational – whether question was properly the subject of a separate question – construction of enterprise agreement – clause did not name party allegedly bound – clause phrased in passive voice – allegedly-obligatory sentences did not use words “will” or “shall” to connote obligation and instead used words “are to be” – allegedly-obligatory sentence qualified by words “wherever possible” – overlap between clause and another clause – whether, in those premises, clause not binding and merely aspirational – clause binding – appeal allowed
INDUSTRIAL LAW – onus – whether moving party bore onus to establish correctness of construction for which it contended
INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether primary judge erred in failing to have regard to material relating to negotiation for enterprise agreement, said to bespeak “common understanding” – whether primary judge erred in concluding that there was no evidence of reason for inclusion of “sunset clause” in previous iteration of relevant clause – whether primary judge erred in having regard to failure by appellant to have recourse to alternative or additional remedy
Legislation: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 60B, 87, 322O, 322K, 322R
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 50, 62, 389, 414(5), 499
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 30.01
Severe Substance Dependence Treatment Act 2010 (Vic) s 26(1)(c)Cases cited: Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing And Kindred Industries Union v Total Corrosion Control Pty Ltd [2006] AIRC 186
AFMEPKIU v Qantas Airways Limited (2001) 106 IR 307
Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640
Ford Motor Co Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers [1969] 2 QB 303
National Tertiary Education Union v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (2013) 234 IR 139
National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Victoria University [2014] FWC 7711
Newcastle & Hunter Valley Speleological Society Inc v Upper Hunter Shire Council (No 2) [2010] NSWLEC 104
Oberon Property Holdings Pty Ltd v R & D Panelform Limited Partnership [2009] NSWSC 1429
QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 161
Reeves v MaxiTRANS Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 188 IR 297
ROI Properties Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney [2010] NSWLEC 1096
Sharpe v Town of Vincent [2010] WASC 391
Stocks & Holdings (Constructors) Pty Limited v Arrowsmith (1964) 112 CLR 646
Termination, Change and Redundancy Case (1984) 8 IR 34 and 9…
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- Case
- [2015] FCAFC 142
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in the case revolved around the interpretation of clause 74 in the EBA and whether the primary judge correctly determined that the clause was merely aspirational. The NTEU argued that the clause imposed binding obligations on La Trobe University, while the university contended that the clause was non-binding and aspirational. The court needed to determine whether the clause imposed any binding obligations on La Trobe University and whether the primary judge's interpretation was correct.
The court found that the primary judge's interpretation of clause 74 was incorrect. The court held that the clause did impose binding obligations on La Trobe University. The court noted that the clause was phrased in a prescriptive manner, using words such as "are to be avoided" and "only to be used as a last resort," which indicated an obligational nature. Additionally, the clause's qualification by the words "wherever possible" did not negate the binding nature of the clause. The court held that the primary judge erred in concluding that the clause was merely aspirational. The court found that the clause imposed binding obligations on La Trobe University, and the primary judge's interpretation was incorrect. The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the primary judge for further consideration in accordance with the law.
The final orders of the court were to amend the previous order by deleting the words "by consent," allow the appeal, set aside the primary judge's order, remit the matter to the primary judge for further consideration, and make no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Court’s order made on 11 December 2014 be amended by the deletion of the words, “by consent”.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. Order 1 of the Court’s orders made on 11 December 2014 be set aside.
4. The matter be remitted to the primary Judge to be heard and determined in accordance with law.
5. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Having determined that issue, it would have been possible in substantive proceedings and on the basis of facts proved or admitted to ascertain whether – in the particular factual circumstances of this case – whatever obligation was imposed by cl 74 was breached by the failure to take identified alternative actions. That is what the primary judge had in mind and I consider that the determination he made conformed with judicial process. A sound footing exists upon which an appeal on the grounds pressed by the NTEU may be determined.Consideration The NTEU’s first and primary ground of appeal was that the primary judge erred in concluding that cl 74 imposed no binding obligations on La Trobe and contained no more than aspirational or hortatory statements. The task of construction must begin with the text of cl 74. It is not in contest that the first sentence does not impose any binding obligation upon La Trobe. It records La Trobe’s commitment to job security or, in other words, La Trobe’s commitment to providing security of employment to its employees. That serves to introduce and frame the remainder of the clause by identifying the underlying goal or objective. The second sentence deals with method. It identifies the means or mechanism by which the overarching goal is to be effected or carried into practice. The context is prescriptive. The words specify what is to be done (redundancies are to be avoided) and what is not to be done (compulsory retrenchment is only to be used as a last resort) and when and in what circumstances that is to occur (“wherever possible”). In that context, there is nothing aspirational conveyed by the word “are” in the phrase “are to be avoided”. Nor does a direction made in that context that something only be done as “a last resort” connote an aspiration. Whilst not an absolute prohibition, such a stipulation is nevertheless injunctive. It imposes a stringent limitation upon action otherwise available. The context includes that the reservation of La Trobe’s rights in the third sentence would be unnecessary if the second sentence left those rights unaffected. The third sentence reflects that the second sentence contains a limitation upon at least some of La Trobe’s rights. It would not have been necessary for La Trobe to have reserved its rights as against something that was merely aspirational. The qualified nature of the reservation in the third sentence is also couched in prescriptive rather than aspirational terms, and, in the context of its close connection with the second sentence, gives colour to the obligational nature of the second sentence. In that context, the words of the second sentence of cl 74 are words of obligation. There are two reasons recorded to support the primary judge’s conclusion at [45] that the second sentence of cl 74 “does no more than provide aspirational particulars of the aspirational commitment made in the first sentence.” First, the second sentence does not expressly refer to La Trobe. Second, it does not contain words of obligations such as “will” or “shall,” which are employed elsewhere in the EBA to impose obligations on La Trobe. On appeal, La Trobe supported the primary judge’s construction on the same bases.