Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hay Point Services

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hay Point Services [2018] FCA 417

File number: QUD 776 of 2016
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 28 March 2018
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – principles of construction of enterprise agreements – relevance of history of negotiations to the interpretation of an enterprise agreement – permissive and obligatory language – whether provision of enterprise agreement capable of being contravened –whether contravention within meaning of s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 50, 62
Cases cited:

ACTEW Corporation Ltd v Pangallo [2002] FCAFC 325; (2002) 127 FCR 1

Amcor Limited v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10; (2005) 222 CLR 241

Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation v Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1246

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 123; (2015) 235 FCR 305

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 149

National Tertiary Education v Latrobe University [2015] FCAFC 142; (2015) 254 IR 238

Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 148; (2014) 245 IR 449

Date of hearing: 11 April 2017, 12 April 2017 and 29 May 2017
Registry: Queensland
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr CW Dowling
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall Payne Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr I Neil SC with Ms H Blattman
Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills

ORDERS

QUD 776 of 2016
BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

Applicant

AND:

HAY POINT SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 009 836 800

Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application filed 6 October 2016 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant union (CFMEU) seeks declarations of contravention, together with pecuniary penalties, against the respondent, Hay Point Services Pty Ltd (HPS), pursuant to s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act). Section 50 provides:

    50       Contravening an enterprise agreement

    A person must not contravene a term of an enterprise agreement.

    Note 1:This section is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).

    Note 2:A person does not contravene a term of an enterprise agreement unless the agreement applies to the person: see subsection 51(1).

  2. The CFMEU alleges that HPS contravened cl 34.1 of the Hay Point Services Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2013 (2013 Enterprise Agreement) by imposing rostering arrangements in May 2016 which required HPS employees to work overtime hours that were not reasonable. Clause 34.1 provided that HPS:

    May require an employee to work reasonable overtime and the employee shall work such overtime as required.

  3. In…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 417
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) took legal action against Hay Point Services (HPS), contesting the terms of an enterprise agreement between the two parties. The primary contention was whether the provisions of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement could be contravened under section 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Specifically, the CFMEU argued that the new rostering arrangements introduced by HPS exceeded the reasonable overtime limits stipulated in the agreement. The court was tasked with interpreting the language of clause 34.1 of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement, determining whether it imposed a prohibition or merely granted a permission regarding overtime work.

The central legal issue revolved around the interpretation of clause 34.1, which stated that HPS could require an employee to work reasonable overtime, and the definition of "reasonable overtime" within the context of the agreement. The court examined whether the use of the word "may" in clause 34.1 indicated a permissive or obligatory term. Additionally, it assessed whether the history of negotiations between the parties could influence the interpretation of the clause. The court also needed to determine if the CFMEU's reliance on the intentions behind the agreement and the history of overtime provisions could lead to a restriction on HPS's actions.

The court held that clause 34.1 did not impose a prohibition on HPS requiring employees to work overtime that deviated from the standard. The word "may" in clause 34.1 was interpreted as granting permission rather than an obligation, and thus, it could not be contravened under section 50 of the Act. The court emphasised that the obligation to work overtime lay with the employees, not the employer. Moreover, the court found that the history of negotiations did not restrict the employer's actions in requiring reasonable overtime. Consequently, the court concluded that clause 34.1 did not provide for a contravention under the Act, and further consideration of other issues was unnecessary.

The Federal Court dismissed the application filed by the CFMEU on 6 October 2016. The court ruled that clause 34.1 of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement could not be contravened by HPS under section 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The application was dismissed, and no further consideration of the other issues raised by the CFMEU was deemed necessary.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application filed 6 October 2016 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to the issues in question it is first convenient to examine the background facts.Background HPS employs persons at its business operating at the Hay Point Coal Terminal (HPCT) in Queensland. Prior to May 2016, HPS’s employees worked a roster described as the “five panel roster”, which involved crews working over five different shifts. Crews were required to work two days, followed by two nights, followed by a six day break. Under the five panel roster, HPS’s employees were required to work 35 ordinary hours per week. In May 2016, HPS decided to change its rostering arrangements from a “five panel roster” to a “four panel roster”, referred to as the “New Roster”. The New Roster commenced at HPCT on 16 July 2016. Under the New Roster, crews worked over four shifts and the employees were required to work as follows:·two consecutive day shifts, followed by two consecutive night shifts, followed by a five-day break; then·two consecutive night shifts, followed by three consecutive night shifts, followed by a four-day break; then·three consecutive day shifts followed by two consecutive night shifts, followed by a five-day break. According to the CFMEU, the New Roster required employees to work 35 ordinary hours per week, with 8.75 hours of rostered overtime per week, meaning the New Roster required employees to work 455 hours of overtime per year. HPS does not take issue with the CFMEU’s calculation of overtime hours, but noted that employees were also entitled to six weeks’ annual leave. HPS claims that the effect of employees actually taking that annual leave, assuming that they did so, would be that their overtime hours would be 402.5 hours per year.The 2013 Enterprise Agreement The 2013 Enterprise Agreement commenced on 24 January 2014. It is an enterprise agreement within the meaning of s 50 of the Act. There is no dispute that the CFMEU and HPS were covered by the 2013 Enterprise Agreement at all material times. Relevant provisions include the following:·Clause 6.1 provides that full-time employees are engaged for a maximum of 35 ordinary hours per week, averaged over the work cycle of the area concerned. ·Clause 34.1 provides: “HPS may require an employee to work reasonable overtime and the employee shall work such overtime as required.”·Clause 34.2 relates to the previous factored overtime scheme and its phasing out. It provides that employees who work overtime hours exceeding the designated amount of 104 hours will be paid the appropriate excess overtime rate. ·Clause 5 provides the following in respect of “Reasonable Overtime”:for the purposes of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement, 104 hours overtime in a year is generally considered reasonable. This does not infer that 104 hours will be available to every employee, nor does it infer that each employee must work 104 hours of overtime.History of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement A considerable volume of evidence and submissions concerns the history of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, cl 34.1 does not provide that HPS “may not” require an employee to work overtime unless that overtime is reasonable. The submission of HPS that the CFMEU’s reading of the clause turns the clause “on its head” is correct. It does not follow from the existence of a mere entitlement to require employees to work reasonable overtime that there is a prohibition on requiring employees to work overtime that is at variance with the relevant standard. Those two points do not logically nor necessarily correlate. Conclusion Detailed submissions have been advanced by each party in respect of the second and third issues in this litigation. However, in light of my finding that cl 34.1 is not a term which can be contravened by HPS within the meaning of s 50 of the Act, it is not necessary for me to consider these issues further. The appropriate order is to dismiss the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

HPS further contended that the protection that the CFMEU seeks to read into cl 34.1 by this implication is found in s 62 of the Act, which limits the hours that a full-time employee can be required and effectively acts as a ‘safety net’ that cannot be displaced by the terms of the 2013 Enterprise Agreement. However, the CFMEU has not alleged a contravention of s 62 of the Act. Consideration The principles of construction applicable to enterprise agreements are not in dispute. They include:·It is necessary to discern the objective meaning of the words used in the enterprise agreement, bearing in mind the context in which they appear and the purpose they are intended to serve (Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 148; (2014) 245 IR 449 at [22], Amcor Limited v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10; (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [66], [30]). ·Enterprise agreements are solely creatures of statute, in the interpretation of which there is no scope for private law concepts of contract or equity (ACTEW Corporation Ltd v Pangallo [2002] FCAFC 325; (2002) 127 FCR 1 at [33]). It follows that it is doubtful whether terms may be implied into enterprise agreements (Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation v Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1246 at [500]). ·Evidence of negotiations may be used to determine the “background facts”, known to both parties, however such evidence may not be adduced if it goes only to intentions or expectations (Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 123; (2015) 235 FCR 305 at [120]). Upon examining cl 34.1 in light of these principles, I am not satisfied that it is a provision which can be “contravened” for the purposes of founding a breach of s 50 of the Act. First, turning to the language of cl 34.1, it is plain that the word “may” in that clause means no more than “has permission to”. In other words, cl 34.1 provides that HPS has permission to require an employee to work reasonable overtime. Certainly the word “may” does not mean “must” or “shall”, such that HPS is obliged to require an employee or employees to work reasonable overtime. The use of the word “may” in respect of HPS can be juxtaposed with the statement that employees “shall” work such overtime “as required”. The clause grants an entitlement to HPS to require employees to work reasonable overtime – the obligation is on employees to work such overtime as is reasonable by reference to cl 5. Second, while the CFMEU places considerable reliance in its arguments on the intentions of the framers of the relevant enterprise agreement and the history of enterprise agreements between the parties, I am not persuaded that this history or HPS’s desire for certainty in identifying “reasonable” overtime results in restriction being imposed on HPS. In closing submissions the CFMEU summarised the evidence of Mr Spillman as:(1)During the course of negotiations for the 2007 Enterprise Agreement the representatives of HPS made it clear that under the proposed new arrangement it had the ability to require people to work reasonable overtime despite the phasing out of the factored overtime scheme, and the CFMEU accepted that position; and(2)During the negotiations Mr Randall said words to the effect that “the company wanted some form of quantification of reasonable overtime in the enterprise agreement so as to achieve certainty, following the decision to phase out the factored overtime scheme”, and in response to that request Mr Spillman suggested two hours per week or 104 hours per annum because that was the same number that had previously been worked by the operational staff under the factored overtime scheme.