FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Hay Point Services Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 182
Appeal from: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hay Point Services [2018] FCA 417 File number: QUD 232 of 2018 Judges: REEVES, BROMBERG AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ Date of judgment: 23 October 2018 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether provision of enterprise agreement providing that an employer may require an employee to work reasonable overtime is capable of being contravened by the employer for the purpose of s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – principles of construction of an enterprise agreement Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 50, 61, 62 Cases cited: AmcorLimited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241
Date of hearing: 16 August 2018 Registry: Queensland Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 24 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C Dowling SC with Mr C Massy Solicitor for the Appellant: Hall Payne Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr I Neil SC with Ms H Blattman Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills ORDERS
QUD 232 of 2018 BETWEEN: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Appellant
AND: HAY POINT SERVICES PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGES:
REEVES, BROMBERG AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
23 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The order of the primary judge dismissing the application is set aside.
3.The proceeding be remitted for further determination by the primary judge in accordance with the Full Court’s reasons.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Section 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”) provides that “[a] person must not contravene a term of an enterprise agreement”. The Hay Point Services Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2013 (“Agreement”) is an enterprise agreement made and approved pursuant to the provisions of Pt 2-4 of the FW Act and an “enterprise agreement” within the meaning of s 50. The Agreement contains a clause dealing with overtime work which includes the following subclause:
34.1 Reasonable Overtime
HPS may require an employee to work reasonable overtime and the employee shall work such overtime as required.
Before the primary judge, the appellant (“CFMMEU”) alleged that by implementing a new roster, the effect of which was to require employees to work 455 hours of overtime per year or 8.7 hours of overtime per week, the respondent (“HPS”) contravened, and continues to contravene, cl 34.1 of the Agreement.
The primary judge dismissed the CFMMEU’s application on the basis of a threshold question raised by HPS. Her Honour found that cl 34.1 was not a provision which can be “contravened” by HPS for the purposes of s 50 of the FW Act (at [29]). That was because her Honour found that cl…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the enterprise agreement could be contravened by requiring employees to work unreasonable overtime and the principles of construction of an enterprise agreement. The Full Court considered the ordinary meaning of the words in the clause, read as a whole and in context, and the industrial realities and customs of the relevant industry. The Full Court noted that the clause used the word "may," which did not impose an obligation upon HPS to require reasonable overtime. The Full Court held that the primary judge was correct in her construction of the clause, and the appeal was allowed. The proceeding was remitted for further determination by the primary judge in accordance with the Full Court's reasons.
The Full Court's decision emphasised the importance of interpreting enterprise agreements in their industrial context and purpose, with a purposive approach to interpretation. The Full Court held that the use of the word "may" in the clause did not impose an obligation upon HPS to require reasonable overtime, and the clause merely granted an entitlement to HPS. The Full Court set aside the order of the primary judge dismissing the application and remitted the proceeding for further determination. The Full Court's decision provides guidance for interpreting enterprise agreements and the principles of construction in the context of industrial relations disputes.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The order of the primary judge dismissing the application is set aside.
3. The proceeding be remitted for further determination by the primary judge in accordance with the Full Court’s reasons.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Her Honour continued at [37] (emphasis in original):Finally, cl 34.1 does not provide that HPS “may not” require an employee to work overtime unless that overtime is reasonable. The submission of HPS that the CFMEU’s reading of the clause turns the clause “on its head” is correct. It does not follow from the existence of a mere entitlement to require employees to work reasonable overtime that there is a prohibition on requiring employees to work overtime that is at variance with the relevant standard. Those two points do not logically nor necessarily correlate.CONSIDERATIONS The applicable principles for interpreting an enterprise agreement were recently recounted by a Full Court in WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131 (Tracey, Bromberg and Rangiah JJ) at [197]:The starting point for interpretation of an enterprise agreement is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context: City of Wanneroo vHolmes (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378 (French J). The interpretation “… turns on the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose …”: AmcorLimited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [2] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). The words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities (Holmes at 378); rather, industrial agreements are made for various industries in the light of the customs and working conditions of each, and they are frequently couched in terms intelligible to the parties but without the careful attention to form and draftsmanship that one expects to find in an Act of Parliament (Holmes at 378–9, citing Geo A Bond & Co Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR(NSW) 498 at 503 (Street J)). To similar effect, it has been said that the framers of such documents were likely of a “practical bent of mind” and may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in a way likely to be understood in the relevant industry rather than with legal niceties and jargon, so that a purposive approach to interpretation is appropriate and a narrow or pedantic approach is misplaced: see Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 (Madgwick J); Shop Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association v Woolworths SA Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 67 at [16] (Marshall, Tracey and Flick JJ); Amcor at [96] (Kirby J). The reference there made to the observations of Kirby J at [96] of Amcor is a reference to his Honour’s remarks that the construction to be given to a clause in an industrial instrument “should not be a strict one but one that contributes to a sensible industrial outcome such as should be attributed to the parties who negotiated and executed the Agreement”. HPS contended that the primary judge was correct in her construction of cl 34.1 and, in particular, correct to have relied on the use of the word “may” to support her Honour’s conclusion that the clause merely granted an entitlement to HPS without imposing any obligation upon it.