FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Reeves v MaxiTRANS Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 970
INDUSTRIAL LAW – collective agreement – interpretation – requirement for consultation with employee’s chosen representative – extent to which provision merely hortatory or aspirational – whether enforceable obligation imposed
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 340(2), 719 and 824
Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182
Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees Union of Australia v Shire of Albany (1990) 32 IR 470
National Tertiary Education Industry Union v University of Wollongong [2002] FCA 31
Ambulance Service Victoria (South Western Region) v Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union (1998) 80 IR 275
Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2008) 176 IR 183
Ventana Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corp and Fairways Group Pty Ltd and Fairways Leisure Market Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 538
Van Efferen v CMA Corporation Limited [2009] FCA 597
Bell v Minister for Health [2006] FCA 134
Termination Change and Redundancy Case (1984) 8 IR 34
United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2006) 152 FCR 18
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union v Qantas Airways Limited (2001) 106 IR 307HELEN REEVES and CRAIG CAMBLIN v MAXITRANS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
VID 701 of 2008
RYAN J
28 AUGUST 2009
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
VID 701 of 2008
BETWEEN: HELEN REEVES
First ApplicantCRAIG CAMBLIN
Second ApplicantAND: MAXITRANS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 AUGUST 2009
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
VID 701 of 2008
BETWEEN: HELEN REEVES
First ApplicantCRAIG CAMBLIN
Second Applicant
AND: MAXITRANS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE:
28 AUGUST 2009
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an application which turns largely on its own facts. In September 2008, the Respondent’s employees, upon it being put to them for a second time, voted for the MaxiTRANS Australia Collective Agreement 2008 (“the 2008 Agreement”), which replaced the MaxiTRANS Australia Pty Ltd Collective Agreement 2006 (“the 2006 Agreement”).
The question raised by the amended statement of claim is whether consultation with the union representatives of two of the respondent’s employees, the applicants in this case, complied with the requirements of the 2006 Agreement with respect to consultation. Contingently on a negative answer to that question, the applicants seek the imposition of a penalty pursuant to s 719 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the WR Act”).
Background
The respondent, MaxiTRANS Australia Pty Ltd (“MaxiTRANS”) is a manufacturer of truck trailers. Its primary factory site is at Ballarat in Victoria. Each of the applicants was, at all relevant times, an employee of MaxiTRANS.…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 970
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated that their interpretation of the 2006 Agreement was the preferable one. Clause 12 of the 2006 Agreement required MaxiTRANS to consult with representatives chosen by employees, but the court found that this did not necessitate equal treatment of all representatives. Instead, the weight given to submissions by chosen representatives could vary based on several factors. The court concluded that while there was no consultation with the AMWU representatives before the first vote on a collective agreement, the negative vote rendered the agreement moot. Consequently, imposing a penalty for the lack of consultation before the vote was deemed inappropriate.
The court dismissed the application for penalty imposition, finding that the applicants had not met the burden of establishing a breach of the certified agreement. The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of the 2006 Agreement, emphasizing that while MaxiTRANS was required to entertain representations from chosen representatives, it was not obligated to accord equal weight to their submissions. The court also noted that the absence of consultation before the first vote made it inappropriate to impose a penalty. The final order was that the application be dismissed with no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: RYAN J
Counsel for MaxiTRANS submitted that the applicant’s construction, outlined at [14] above, “does not accord with the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in clause 12 and, in the context of ongoing enterprise bargaining negotiations, could readily give rise to absurd, exploratory, capricious and irrational outcomes”. That submission was premised on the contention that it would be unworkable to allow each and every employee to choose his or her own representative, and then for each such representative to be treated with complete equality in the process of negotiating an enterprise agreement.Consideration It will readily be perceived that the three limbs of the applicants’ argument as distilled at [14] above do not purport to constitute a logical syllogism. I accept that the use of the word “encouraged” in cl 12 of the 2006 Agreement was an acknowledgement that employees might have represented their views or interests to management otherwise than through “their own Employee Committee representative” or the Committee as a whole. The clause, I consider, did not preclude employees, either individually or as a group, from approaching management directly or through a representative, including a union organiser or delegate, who was not an Employee Committee representative or other member of the Committee. The weight to be accorded to such alternative forms of representation would, however, have been a matter for MaxiTRANS management and may well have varied according to the circumstances and the nature of the matter in issue. The effect which, in my view, should be given to the word “encouraged” in cl 12 does not entail that precisely the same treatment is to be accorded to each representative of an employee who has been chosen to represent that employee in relation to a particular issue. The phrase “equally and without prejudice” in cl 12 is a compound one and gains colour from its proximity to the recognition in the same clause of “freedom of association.” Understood in this way the phrase does not qualify an Employee Committee representative “elected” by employees to the Consultative Committee as contemplated by the first part of the cl 12. Rather, it refers to the representative “chosen” by one or more employees to represent him, her or them in respect of a particular issue. As suggested at [16] above, MaxiTRANS was obliged to entertain representations from such a representative without adverse discrimination or “prejudice” referable to, for example, the union affiliation, or lack of it, of the chosen representative or the fact that he or she had been chosen in preference to the Employee Committee representative on the Consultative Committee. However, that obligation was, I consider, not so extensive as to require MaxiTRANS to accord equal, or any particular, weight to the submissions on a specific issue of such a chosen representative. As already indicated, that weight might reasonably depend on a multitude of factors, including the inherent cogency of the submission, the number of employees represented and the nature of the issue to which the submission was directed.