National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Victoria University

Case

[2014] FWC 7711

11 NOVEMBER 2014

No judgment structure available for this case.

[2014] FWC 7711 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2014/8035) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 8 May 2015 [[2015] FWCFB 2892] for result of appeal.]
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.739—Dispute resolution

National Tertiary Education Industry Union
v
Victoria University
(C2014/1067)

Educational services

COMMISSIONER BISSETT

MELBOURNE, 11 NOVEMBER 2014

Alleged dispute concerning interpretation of agreement - Job Security clause - forced redundancy - requirement to pursue all options to avoid forced redundancies.

[1] The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) has made an application to the Commission to deal with a dispute pursuant to the dispute settling procedure of the Victoria University Enterprise Agreement 2013 (the current Agreement). The dispute relates to the process utilised by Victoria University to achieve a reduction in staff numbers.

[2] In February 2014 the University commenced consultation with the NTEU with respect to major change in the Engagement, International & Governance area of the University. The University commenced implementation of changes, including staff reductions in about June 2014. For a group of three employees known as ‘Pool B’ the University indicated that it would require the three staff to apply for the two positions that would remain after the restructure in that Pool.

[3] The NTEU raised a dispute and say that the University has not met the requirements of clause 65 of the current Agreement in the process it has applied. It submits that the effect of the process implemented by the University is that the unsuccessful candidate was made forcibly redundant.

[4] The NTEU says that the Agreement is clear that, prior to proceeding with forced redundancies, all other options must be exhausted. To this end it says that the University failed to comply with its obligations under clause 65 of the Agreement by:

  • Not considering forced redundancy as a last resort;


  • Failing to pursue all other options before considering forced redundancies;


  • Failing to pursue the options of retraining, natural attrition, voluntary separations, fixed term retirement contracts, leave without pay, voluntary conversion to part time employment, long service leave, or internal transfer before proceeding with forced redundancies.


[5] The University says that the suggestion in the clause that all other options must be exhausted prior to forced redundancies is aspirational and cannot be construed to set an absolute requirement on the University.

[6] Over the last few years the University has undergone ‘organisational reform’ in the face of financial challenges. This has resulted in a substantial number of employees being made redundant. This change has been implemented through the Organisational Reform Program (ORP). The first phase of the ORP took effect in January 2013. In the second phase, to which this dispute relates, the University seeks to ‘consolidate savings made during the first phase.’ 1

[7] Until the current dispute there have been no forced redundancies with voluntary separations being the primary means by which staffing numbers have been reduced. Whilst this was satisfactory through the first phase of ORP the University says that it now needs to retain staff that have the ‘qualifications, skills and competencies required in the new structure.’ 2

The dispute

[8] The dispute has arisen through a decision by the University to not pursue all of the options in clause 65.2 of the current Agreement prior to proceeding with forced redundancies.

[9] The matter in dispute is the proper construction of clause 65 of the Agreement such that it can be implemented in line with its intent.

[10] The determination of this requires consideration of whether clause 65 places a mandatory obligation on the University to exhaust a range of specified options prior to implementing compulsory redundancies.

Jurisdiction

[11] I am satisfied that the matter in dispute is a matter arising under the current Agreement and that the provisions of the dispute settling procedures at clause 59 are properly invoked.

[12] Further, I am satisfied, and it was not subject to dispute, that the requirements of the dispute settling procedures have been complied with such that the dispute is properly before the Commission and the Commission has jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

Clause 65 of the agreement and its predecessors

[13] Clause 65 of the current Agreement states:

    INTRODUCTION OF CHANGE, WORKPLACE CONSULTATION, RELOCATION AND REDUNDANCY

    65 Job Security

      65.1 The University recognises that security of employment is an important issue for its staff members. The goal of the University is to endeavour that there be no net reduction in jobs.

      65.2 The University will pursue the options of retraining, natural attrition, voluntary separations, fixed term retirement contracts, leave without pay, voluntary conversion to part-time employment, long service leave, or internal transfer before proceeding with forced redundancies.

      65.3 The University will seek wherever possible to avoid forced redundancies, but reserves the right to adopt this approach. Forced redundancies will be considered only as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted.

[14] This is followed by clauses on organisational change (clause 66), relocation of staff (clause 67), redundancy - general (clause 68), redundancy and redeployment for professional staff (clauses 69 and 70) and redundancy for academic staff (clause 71).

[15] The predecessor to the current Agreement is the Victoria University (Academic & General Staff) Enterprise Agreement 2011 (the 2011 Agreement). The Job Security clause and following clauses in that Agreement are identical to the provisions of the current Agreement.

[16] The predecessor to the 2011 Agreement is the Victoria University (Academic & General Staff) Enterprise Agreement 2009 (the 2009 Agreement). The Job Security clause was at clause 69 of that Agreement. It is identical to clause 65 in the current Agreement.

[17] Prior to the 2009 Agreement was the Victoria University Academic & General Staff Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 2005 (the 2005 Agreement). It provided, at clause 11:

    11 Intent of Agreement

    ...

    11.3 The University recognises that in the climate of change, security of employment is an important issues for its staff members. The goal of the University is to endeavour that there be no net reduction in jobs. The University is committed to exploring all measures, to avoid forced redundancies. Where possible, it will pursue the options of retraining, natural attrition, voluntary separations, fixed term retirement contracts, leave without pay, voluntary conversion to part-time employment, long service leave, or internal transfer before proceeding with forced redundancies.

Principles of construction

[18] The principles applicable to the interpretation of an industrial instrument are well established. There is no great dispute between the NTEU and the University on this point. Both have referred me to the decision of the High Court in Amcor v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 3 (Amcor), and Kucks v CSR Limited4 (Kucks).

[19] In Kucks Madgwick J said:

    It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. For reasons such as these, expressions which have been held in the case of other instruments to have been used to mean particular things may sensibly and properly be held to mean something else in the document at hand.

    But the task remains one of interpreting a document produced by another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just, regardless of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing award means is a process quite different from deciding, as an arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So, for example, ordinary or well-understood words are in general to be accorded their ordinary or usual meaning. 5

[20] In Amcor Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated:

    Clause 55.1.1 must be read in context. It is necessary, therefore, to have regard not only to the text of cl 55.1.1, but also to a number of other matters: first, the other provisions made by cl 55; secondly, the text and operation of the Agreement both as a whole and by reference to other particular provisions made by it; and, thirdly, the legislative background against which the Agreement was made and in which it was to operate. 6

[21] Kirby J said in Amcor:

    ...However, certified agreements such as this commonly lack the precise drafting of legislation. As appears from a scrutiny of the provisions of the Agreement, it bears the common hallmarks of colloquial language and a measure of imprecision. Doubtless this is a result of the background of the drafters, the circumstances and possibly the urging of the preparation, the process of negotiation and the omission to hammer out every detail - including possibly because such an endeavour would endanger the accord necessary to consensus and certification by the Commission.

    ...

    The nature of the document, the manner of its expression, the context in which it operated and the industrial purpose it served combine to suggest that the construction to be given to cl 55.1.1 should not be a strict one but one that contributes to a sensible industrial outcome such as should be attributed to the parties who negotiated and executed the Agreement. Approaching the interpretation of the clause in that way accords with the proper way, adopted by this Court, of interpreting industrial instruments and especially certified agreements... 7

[22] Callinan J in Amcor stated that there was substance in the observation of Madgwick J in Kucks. He then said:

    An industrial agreement has a number of purposes, to settle disputes, to anticipate and make provision for the resolution of future disputes, to ensure fair and just treatment of both employer and employees, and generally to promote harmony in the workplace. It is with the third of these that cl 55 of the Agreement is particularly concerned. It is important to keep in mind therefore the desirability of a construction, if it is reasonably available, that will operate fairly towards both parties... 8

[23] The treatment of extrinsic material in relation to interpretation of agreements was considered in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW 9(Codelfa). In that matter Mason J (with whom Stephen, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed) said:

    The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties, although, as we have seen, if the facts are notorious knowledge of them will be presumed.

    It is here that a difficulty arises with respect to the evidence of prior negotiations. Obviously the prior negotiations will tend to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties and the subject matter of the contract. To the extent to which they have this tendency they are admissible. But in so far as they consist of statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations they are not receivable. The point is that such statements and actions reveal the terms of the contract which the parties intended or hoped to make. They are superseded by, and merged in, the contract itself. The object of the parol evidence rule is to exclude them, the prior oral agreement of the parties being inadmissible in aid of construction, though admissible in an action for rectification.

    Consequently when the issue is which of two or more possible meanings is to be given to a contractual provision we look, not to the actual intentions, aspirations or expectations of the parties before or at the time of the contract, except in so far as they are expressed in the contract, but to the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence, and to the parties’ presumed intention in this setting. We do not take into account the actual intentions of the parties and for the very good reason that an investigation of those matters would not only be time consuming but it would also be unrewarding as it would tend to give too much weight to these factors at the expense of the actual language of the written contract. 10

[24] In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm 11 Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ said:

    The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction. 12

[25] In K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon and Gotch Limited 13Mason J said:

    Problems of legal interpretation are not solved satisfactorily by ritual incantations which emphasize the clarity of meaning which words have when viewed in isolation, divorced from their context. The modern approach to interpretation insists that the context be considered in the first instance, especially in the case of general words, and not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise. 14

[26] I have been mindful of, and relevantly applied, these principles in coming to my decision.

Submissions as to meaning of the clause

NTEU

[27] The NTEU submits that an industrial dispute in 2006 (the 2006 dispute) resolved by arbitration in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in relation to clause 11 of the 2005 Agreement 15 is relevant to understanding the intent of clause 65 of the current Agreement.

[28] The NTEU says that in renegotiating the 2005 Agreement (during 2008 and 2009) it and the University were well aware of the decision in the 2006 dispute. On the basis of the AIRC decision the NTEU advanced, throughout the negotiations, an improvement in the job security provisions. The NTEU says it made three critical improvements in the provision:

  • Moved the provisions from an ‘intent of agreement’ clause to a dedicated ‘job security’ clause;


  • Removed the words ‘where possible’ to indicate the parties intention that the provision be complied with and could not be avoided;


  • Included a new sentence: ‘Forced redundancies will be considered as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted’ to crystallise when forced redundancies could be utilised. 16


[29] The NTEU submits that correspondence between it and University in 2009 makes it clear that these issues were ventilated in negotiations and that the University understood and agreed to the effect of the proposed clause.

[30] The NTEU submits the resulting clause 69 of the 2009 Agreement reflects these negotiations and understanding and is relevant as clause 65 in the current Agreement is in identical terms to clause 69 in the 2009 Agreement.

[31] The NTEU says that the University guidelines for the implementation of major change also reflects the shared view of the intent of clause 65 of the current Agreement. These guidelines were promulgated by the University at the time the current Agreement was approved by the Commission.

[32] The NTEU further says that, since the making of the 2009 Agreement it has been custom and practice of the University to pursue one or more of the options in clause 65.2 of the current Agreement prior to using forced redundancies. 17

[33] The NTEU submits that clause 65 of the current Agreement contains no ambiguity. It submits that the negotiated clause manifests a provision using ordinary and well understood words. If, however, there is ambiguity the NTEU says that custom and practice should weigh in its favour. Attempts by the University to disregard or re-write the explicit provision of the current Agreement should be rejected. Clause 65.3, which requires the university to ‘seek wherever possible to avoid forced redundancies,’ should be understood to mean the imposition of a course of action on the University which attempts to avoid forced redundancy. The word ‘pursue’ in clause 65.2 cannot be read down to a ‘mere analysis, consideration and weighing of options.’ 18 The NTEU says there no basis to impute words into the obligation in the clause that do not exist.

[34] In practical terms the NTEU submits that clause 65 places a clear obligation on the University to implement the requirements of clause 65, including the provisions of clause 65.2, prior to a consideration of any forced redundancies. By determining who, of the three effected employees in ‘Pool B’, would be appointed to the two available positions the University determined who would be made forcibly redundant. This action denied the employees their rights pursuant to clause 65.2.

Victoria University

[35] The University submits that clause 65.1 of the current Agreement is expressed in aspirational terms. It says that the words are ‘incapable of importing a binding obligation.’ It submits that the use of the word ‘goal’ in clause 65.1 indicates the party’s intention to aspire to the position rather than setting an absolute obligation. To the extent that any obligation is imposed by clause 65.2 that obligation is limited to ‘pursue’ various options prior to ‘proceeding’ with forced redundancies.

[36] With respect to clause 65.3 the University submits that to the extent that it imposes any obligation on the University that obligation is to ‘seek’ to avoid forced redundancies ‘wherever possible’. Again it submits that there is no absolute obligation placed on the University.

[37] The University says that its construction of clause 65 is consistent with the natural meaning of the words, the circumstances of the negotiation of the clause and the workability of the Agreement.

[38] The University says that the clause must be considered in context and the relevant context is the text of the current Agreement. To this extent it is relevant that the clause is in that part of the current Agreement dealing with the introduction of change, consultation, relocation and redundancy.

[39] The University submits that any interpretation of the clause that leads to capricious or unintended consequences should be avoided.

[40] In the context of the matter in dispute the University argues that to do as submitted by the NTEU would require the University to ‘make concrete offers of voluntary separations, even before it had determined to make employees redundant. In the financially challenging environment confronting the University, a construction that puts significant impediments in the way of the university commencing’ the redundancy process of the Agreement would result in capricious or unreasonable consequences. 19

The 2006 dispute and negotiations for the 2009 Agreement

[41] Clause 65 of the current Agreement must be considered in context of the Agreement as a whole. Given that there has been no change in the provisions since the 2009 Agreement it is reasonable to consider the context of the negotiations for the 2009 Agreement and the facts and circumstances that were known to the parties at the time those negotiations took place.

[42] Clause 11 in the 2005 Agreement was subject to an industrial dispute resulting in an arbitrated decision of the AIRC in 2006. 20 That decision preceded negotiations for the 2009 Agreement. The words in the 2009 Agreement varied those of the 2005 Agreement and shifted the placement of the clause from a section headed ‘Intent’ to the section headed ‘Introduction of Change, workplace consultation, relocation and redundancy’ section of the 2009 Agreement.

[43] In his decision in respect of the 2006 dispute SDP Kaufman said:

    [39] In my view the university’s construction is to be preferred. Regard may be had to headings to contextualize a particular provision. Clause 11, as its heading suggests, deals with the intent of the agreement. It deals with several topics that are important to the parties and sets out their aspirations in relation thereto. To the extent that clause 11.3 could be said to impose any obligations upon the university, it does so in relation to the manner in which the university is to deal with redundancies under clauses 65 and 70. As I read clause 11, when acting under clause 65 or clause 70 the university is required, where possible, to have regard to and pursue the matters set out in clause 11.3. To adopt the construction favoured by the union is to impose an unwarranted and unrequired burden upon the university. On the NTEU’s construction the university could not even contemplate major changes, as described in clause 65, before it had gone through each and every option referred to in clause 11.3. Such a process is clearly unworkable. The necessity for considering the clause 11.3 options does not arise until it appears that a contemplated organizational change might have an impact on the employment of academic staff. It is at that stage that clause 11.3 informs the process that is to be undertaken under clause 65, or for that matter clause 70. There is no warrant for reading into clause 11 a requirement that the options referred to in clause 11.3 need to be explored before the university contemplates implementing major change.

    [footnote omitted]

[44] It is reasonable to conclude that the decision of the AIRC in 2006 had some bearing on the position adopted by the NTEU in the negotiations for the 2009 Agreement. Such a conclusion is supported by the evidence.

[45] In the lead up to the finalisation of the 2009 Agreement the NTEU received a letter from the then Vice-Chancellor dated 2 March 2009 which said:

    I am not able to agree to the “no forced redundancy” arrangements which the NTEU is seeking to include in the new Agreement. However I give you my firm assurance that targeted redundancies will be considered only as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted. 21

[46] It can be reasonably inferred from the correspondence that the NTEU sought to have included in the 2009 Agreement a provision which would put an absolute bar on the ability of the University to forcibly make any employee redundant. This was obviously not a position acceptable to the University.

[47] On 3 March 2009 the then Vice-Chancellor sent a further letter to the NTEU. That letter said, in part:

    Thank you for your approach to the University to resolve outstanding issues that would lead to the NTEU deferring its proposed strike action...

    You have sought clarification around a number of issues in the draft Heads of Agreement [the subject of the 2 March letter] and this letter responds to that request.

    I am able to confirm:...

  • The University agrees to include the following words in the proposed Agreement:


    “Targeted redundancies will be considered only as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted” 22

[48] Whilst these exact words are not replicated in the 2009 Agreement the sentiment they reflect is clearly evident in clause 69 (and clause 65 of the current Agreement).

[49] I am satisfied that the outcome of the correspondence between the University and the NTEU following the decision in the 2006 dispute provides a framework within which the final words in the 2009 Agreement were settled. The objective intention of the parties from this framework is clear.

The University policy

[50] A policy document was promulgated by the University in January 2014, at the same time as the making and approval by the Commission of the current Agreement. That document further supports the submissions of the NTEU as to the operation of clause 65 of the current Agreement.

[51] The NTEU submits that the PDF file containing the document downloaded from the University website indicates that the document was created on 16 January 2014.23

[52] The policy document says:

    Redundancy (as a result of major workplace change)

    Step 1 - Job security and strategies to avoid forced redundancies (VU EA clause 65)

    The Fair Work Act 2009, the Enterprise Agreement and University policy place a significant onus on the University to avoid forced redundancies. Before proceeding with redundancies, alternative strategies to avoid forced job losses must be pursued. These alternative strategies include but are not limited to:

    • voluntary separations


    • natural attrition


    • retraining


    • redeployment


    • leave without pay


    • voluntary conversion to part-time employment


    • long service leave


    • fixed-term retirement contracts


    Once alternative strategies have been exhausted or deemed unsuitable, the University reserves the right to adopt forced redundancies. 24

[53] The existence of the Policy and its wording, and that it was developed and promulgated by the University, supports the position put by the NTEU of a shared understanding of the changes in the clause brought about by the negotiations for the 2009 Agreement.

[54] I am satisfied that the Policy document indicates that the provisions of clause 65 in the current Agreement are more than merely aspirational in nature.

The requirement in clause 65

[55] It is reasonable to have regard to the surrounding circumstances in the negotiation of what became clause 65 in the current Agreement; in particular regard can be had to the 2006 dispute and the exchange of correspondence between the NTEU and the University in the lead up to the 2009 Agreement. The letter of the Vice Chancellor of 3 March 2009 is highly relevant. It evinces a shared understanding to use targeted redundancies only where all other options have been exhausted. It makes clear the shared intentions of the parties in making the 2009 Agreement in respect to clause 69 (which became clause 65 in the current Agreement).

[56] The University policy recognises that the current Agreement places a ‘significant onus’ on the University to avoid forced redundancies. It appears to accept that the clause is more than ‘aspirational’ in nature and accepts that alternative strategies must be exhausted prior to moving to forced redundancies. This is a University document. It does not support what the University now says is the intent of clause 65 of the current Agreement.

[57] The provisions of clause 65 in the current Agreement must be read as a whole - attempts to concentrate on the meaning of specific words in isolation of their context, and on this basis find some alternative meaning of the clause, is not an acceptable approach to interpretation.

[58] An interpretation of clause 65 of the current Agreement in the context of the University’s ‘financially challenging environment’ is inappropriate and unhelpful. If the current Agreement no longer meets the needs of the University there are means under the Act by which the University can seek to have it varied. Reinterpreting the current Agreement to accommodate the University’s changed circumstances is not the appropriate means by which to determine the intent of the clause.

[59] An objective approach must be taken to the interpretation of the clause - the University’s approach to the clause is subjective and should be avoided. This is not to say there may not be merit in what the University has put to me in relation to its financial situation, but the current Agreement cannot be considered a ‘fair weather’ agreement - to be given one meaning when it suits the University and another when circumstances change.

[60] The paragraph reproduced above from the decision of SDP Kaufman indicates that he put some weight on where the provision was placed in the 2005 Agreement as providing some guidance as to interpretation. The contextualisation within the 2005 Agreement itself was of some importance to him.

[61] I am satisfied that moving the provision to a ‘Job Security’ clause evinces an intention that the clause should be more than aspirational in nature - it should impose some obligations on the University in the context of major change.

[62] I do not accept that the placement of the job security clause within the section of the 2009 Agreement dealing with introduction of change, consultation, relocation and redundancy however should result in the obligation in 65.2 being read down to only require the University to fulfil the obligations in the following clauses on redeployment, relocation and redundancy and not the broader options set out in clause 65.2.

What is not in clause 65

[63] Clause 65 sets the framework as to how the University might achieve reductions in staff numbers where this is necessary but, apart from the options offered, says little of how this might be put into action.

[64] Nothing in clause 65 places any timeframe around how long the University should pursue the identified options set out in clause 65.2 before it can be said that these are ‘exhausted’. This was not a matter subject to submissions and is perhaps a matter to be addressed on a case by case basis.

[65] There is nothing in the clause that precludes the University from rejecting, for example, a volunteer for separation or a request for conversion to part time employment. Whilst clause 65.2 places some positive obligations on the University it does not place any obligation on the University to accept a request for access to the options.

[66] There is also nothing in clause 65 which indicates how broadly the University must call for voluntary separations, seek conversion to part-time employment etc. It does not make sense that the University, in wishing to reduce the number of staff for example in its human resources area would ask for volunteers for redundancy from its academic ranks.

[67] On any reasonable reading of the clause it would appear that it cannot become operational before a change has been identified that will lead to a possible reduction in staff numbers. Having identified the reduction (and therefore the aspiration in clause 65.1 cannot be achieved) there are options to be pursued prior to any forced redundancies. For how long these should be pursued or the breadth of such pursuit it seems are matters better resolved on a case by case basis. Again this is not something on which there have been substantial submissions made and is not a matter on which I intend to make any finding.

The matter in dispute

[68] The particular matter in dispute relates to the process by which the University achieved a reduction in staffing numbers in Pool B. The NTEU submits that, in determining who of the three employees would be appointed to the two remaining positions, the University did not properly implement the requirements of clause 65 and, by this method determined who would be made redundant. By the process adopted, the University forcibly made an employee redundant.

[69] The University says that it did explore all of the available options under clause 65.2 in the context of the University seeking to retain particular skills. It requested the three employees lodge an expression of interest in the two positions, resulting in two employees receiving offers of employment and the third employee receiving a ‘voluntary separation package’ in accordance with clause 65.2.

[70] I am not convinced that the University has met its obligations in respect of clause 65.2. It is, in my view, disingenuous to suggest that, because one of the three employees received a separation package the University met its obligations under clause 65.2. There is no evidence that the University explored all options under clause 65.2. It may well have been that, had the University explored the options in clause 65.2 with the affected staff, it would have resulted in the same outcome. But this is not something that can be known.

[71] Ultimately the result of the process implemented by the University is that a person was made redundant. This has occurred through a process which, at its very commencement (the requirement to lodge an expression of interest for the positions and a selection process occurring) left the person without a position. In the situation of the University where it is going through a substantial reduction in staffing numbers the University effectively determined who would be made redundant prior to determining if it could have achieved the reduction in numbers through some other mechanism in clause 65.2.

Conclusion

[72] I accept that clause 65.1 of the current Agreement is aspirational in nature (the University is to endeavour that there be no net reduction in jobs).

[73] Clause 65.2 however places a positive obligation on the University (the University will pursue options...before forced redundancies) and clause 65.3 gives the University the right to consider forced redundancies if all other options have been exhausted.

[74] I am satisfied that the approach adopted by the University in the Engagement, International & Governance area, where, in the first instance in ‘Pool B’ it required three employees to apply for two positions, was a mechanism by which it implemented a forced redundancy program prior to exhausting the options required in clause 65.2.

[75] I will issue an order that requires the University to pursue the options in clause 65.2 prior to proceeding with forced redundancies. Whilst this will have little practical effect in respect of ‘Pool B’ employees referenced above (I understand the third person has left the University) this does not alter what the University should have done in that case. It may also provide some guidance for the University in future.

[76] I decline to issue an order that requires the University in all circumstances to pursue the options in clause 65.2 on a University wide basis as sought by the NTEU. I have not had submissions or evidence led on this issue such that an order of this breadth could be considered. As I have found, it seems to me that clause 65, whilst placing an obligation on the University, is silent on how that obligation is to be achieved - on a University wide basis or within an identified part of the University - and for how long such options must be pursued before they can be said to be exhausted. This is perhaps a matter that needs to be addressed by the parties. Given the situation the University now says it is in, this is perhaps a matter to be addressed sooner rather than later.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

J. Cullinan of the NTEU.

C. O’Grady of Counsel with N. Ruskin of K&L Gates for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

2014.

Melbourne:

4 and 19 September.

Final written submissions:

Applicant: 12 September 2014.

Respondent: 17 September 2014

 1   Exhibit VU4, paragraph 8.

 2   Ibid, paragraph 9.

 3 (2005) 222 CLR 241.

 4 (1996) 66 IR 182.

 5   Ibid, at 184.

 6 (2005) 222 CLR 241, [30].

 7 Ibid, [94], [96].

 8   Ibid, [131].

 9 (1982) 149 CLR 337.

 10 Ibid, [22] - [24].

 11 (2004) 219 CLR 165.

 12   Ibid at 179 ,[40]

 13 (1985) 157 CLR 309.

 14   Ibid at 315.

 15   PR973712 (SDP Kaufman, 23 August 2006).

 16   Exhibit NTEU1, paragraphs 33-35.

 17 Exhibit NTEU1, paragraph [26].

 18   NTEU4, paragraph 31.

 19   Exhibit VU4, paragraph 35.

 20   PR973712 (SDP Kaufman, 23 August 2006).

 21   Exhibit NTEU1, attachment PA-10.

 22   Exhibit NTEU1, attachment PA-11.

23 Exhibit NTEU3, paragraph 22.

 24   Exhibit NTEU1, attachment PA-12.

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