IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M12 of 2017
B e t w e e n -
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Applicant
and
AVTAR SINGH
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 12 MAY 2017, AT 11.42 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.R. KENNETT, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR P.M. KNOWLES for the applicant. (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)
MR C.J. HORAN, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A. ALEKSOV for the first respondent. (instructed by Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers)
KEANE J: Mr Kennett.
MR KENNETT: Your Honours, the issues of significance in this case really boil down to three, which I propose to say a little bit about. The first relates to section 357A(1) of the Migration Act, which your Honours will set out on page 99 of the book; the second relates to subsection (2) of the same section; and the third issue relates to principles of procedural fairness more generally, and in particular the emphasis which the Full Court placed in that connection on the need for the Tribunal to work out whether the certificate it had before it was effective and, therefore, what consequences it had for its procedure.
Before I come to those matters, and lest I forget it later, can I note that we also rely, for the purposes of indicating a question of importance, on the large and, I understand, growing caseload directly affected by this matter which we have referred to at paragraphs 29 and 30 of the application, pages 93 to 94.
If I could come to section 357A(1), we note in approaching this that the decision under review in the court below and the decision said to be affected by error is the final decision of the Tribunal on its review, affirming a decision of the delegate. We spent a bit of time in the court below on this matter, but there is no anterior exercise of power for the Tribunal to undertake in this regard in relation to the certificate. It emerged in the hearing below that what was complained about, doctrinally speaking, was a lack of procedural fairness in the Tribunal’s ultimate decision.
Whether that decision was vitiated by a denial of procedural fairness of course involves identifying the scope of the procedural fairness obligations that attended its making, and that has to be done, we say, by reference to subsection (1) of section 357A, on page 99 of the book.
GORDON J: What do you say the matter is that is being addressed in that section?
MR KENNETT: In that particular section? The matters it deals with?
KEANE J: Yes.
MR KENNETT: This was considered by this Court in Saeed, which referred back to a decision of Justice Lindgren and decided…
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- Case
- [2017] HCATrans 107
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine the scope of section 357A(1) and (2) of the *Migration Act*, specifically whether these provisions exhaustively defined the hearing rules in relation to certain matters, thereby limiting any implied procedural fairness obligations. A further issue was whether the Full Court had placed undue emphasis on the need for the Tribunal to assess the effectiveness of a section 375A certificate and provide applicants with an opportunity to challenge its validity, and whether this created an overly broad procedural fairness obligation. The Court also considered the interaction between section 357A and other provisions, such as section 362A, which grants applicants a right to access written material before the Tribunal.
The Minister argued that section 357A(1) made specific provisions within Division 5 of the Act exhaustive regarding the subject matters they addressed, including the provision of information and documents to applicants. This, it was submitted, excluded any further implied obligations of procedural fairness. Regarding section 357A(2), the Minister contended that it operated to narrow existing procedural fairness obligations, meaning an applicant would not have a right to a hearing about a certificate or the Tribunal's handling of it unless specifically provided for in the referenced sections, such as section 375A. The Minister further argued that procedural fairness obligations only qualify grants of decision-making power and do not extend to a decision-maker's internal contemplation of procedures, particularly when those procedures are dictated by the Act itself, as was the case with the section 375A certificate.
The respondent, Mr. Singh, argued that the Full Court's decision correctly applied principles of procedural fairness to the facts, and that no question of public importance arose. The respondent contended that section 375A itself did not deal with the disclosure of a certificate's existence, but rather with the protection of confidential material. Furthermore, the specific sections in Division 5, such as section 359A, dealt only with limited disclosures of adverse information, not all occasions on which the Tribunal might disclose information. The respondent submitted that the Full Court's emphasis on the Tribunal's obligation to allow applicants to query the validity of a certificate was a correct application of procedural fairness principles.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi