GIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 33 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

GIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 93  

File number(s): SYG 3402 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS
Date of judgment: 31 January 2025
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – protection visa – claim of public interest immunity upheld – whether the Tribunal made a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have made it – whether Tribunal erred by not adjourning or offering to adjourn hearing to enable applicant to obtain legal advice regarding issue of self-incrimination – whether the Tribunal erred by not making obvious inquiries about critical facts – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 128, 130(1), 130(4)(e)

Migration Act 1965 (Cth) ss 420, 424, 424AA, 433  

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh & Anor (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11

 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 100
Date of hearing: 4 December 2024
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr Bodisco
Solicitor for the Applicants: ABU Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Maddocks
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 3402 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

GIO18

First Applicant

GIP18

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SKAROS

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JANUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

2.Pursuant to s 130(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) the redacted information in Annexure KE 2 of the Evans affidavit is not adduced as evidence.

3.The application, as amended on 29 November 2024, is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SKAROS

INTRODUCTION

  1. By application filed on 6 December 2018, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) (as it then was) dated 13 November 2018. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister)…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read GIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, citizens of Fiji, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to refuse to grant them protection visas. The applicants argued that the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable due to its failure to adjourn the proceedings to allow the applicant to obtain legal advice about the potential for self-incrimination and its failure to make obvious inquiries about critical facts. The Minister countered that the Tribunal was not obligated to conduct such inquiries and that its concerns were discussed with the applicant during the hearing.

The court examined whether the Tribunal made a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have made it, focusing on whether the Tribunal erred by not adjourning or offering to adjourn the hearing to enable the applicant to obtain legal advice regarding the issue of self-incrimination, and whether the Tribunal erred by not making obvious inquiries about critical facts. The court found that the Tribunal, in conducting a review of a Part 7 reviewable decision, was not bound by the rules of evidence. It also noted that while the applicant had a common law right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination, the Tribunal was not obligated to adjourn the hearing to allow the applicant to obtain legal advice. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error as it had considered the applicant’s claims and the relevant evidence, and had made findings based on the credibility of the applicant. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The court’s decision was grounded in the principles of legal unreasonableness and jurisdictional error. It found that the Tribunal had not acted unreasonably by failing to adjourn the proceedings to allow the applicant to obtain legal advice, as the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence and the applicant’s common law right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination did not require such an adjournment. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred by not making obvious inquiries about critical facts, as it had considered the applicant’s claims and the relevant evidence, and had made findings based on the credibility of the applicant. The court’s decision was strictly supervisory, and it did not review the merits of the decision or substitute its own view as to how a power should have been exercised.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

By application filed on 6 December 2018, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) (as it then was) dated 13 November 2018. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visas (the visas) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). BACKGROUND The applicants are citizens of Fiji. They are de facto partners. The first applicant (the applicant) entered Australia multiple times and last arrived in Australia on 1 March 2014 as the holder of a Visitor (Subclass 600) visa (CB 16). The second applicant last arrived in Australia on 29 April 2014 (CB 42). She had also entered Australia several times prior. On 21 May 2014, the applicants applied for a Carer (Residence) Subclass 836 visas. That application was refused. A review of the decision was lodged with the then Migration Review Tribunal, however, it did not have jurisdiction to review the matter as the application for review was not lodged within the prescribed period. The applicants were notified of that decision on 3 July 2015. On 27 July 2015, the applicants lodged a protection visa application, in which the applicant made claims for protection. In summary, he claimed that:·he was a police informant from 1996 to 1998 and 2007 to 2014;·criminals were aware that he was assisting the authorities;·he was threatened by powerful people in Fiji;·his home was raided in 2010, while he and his family were home. His son was harmed but the second applicant fled after being threatened with a knife to her neck. The applicant was stabbed with a spear and the second applicant screamed to draw the neighbour’s attention;·he received threats by phone, even in Australia, threatening his life;·he requested a meeting with the Attorney-General (Mr AK) to seek protection for him and his family, however, protection was not available; ·as the threats continued, he obtained a new ID and passport with a different name and date of birth ‘to avoid being identified by the authority who was also involved in’ the threats;·he travelled to Australia to test the passport and ID and then returned to Fiji where he stayed in hiding until his most recent travel to Australia when his parents called for help; and·the reason he used illegitimate documents was to protect his life and his family’s wellbeing. On 28 October 2015, the applicant attended an interview with the delegate at which he provided a new statement of claims which included, among other things, that:(a)the people threatening him in Fiji were associated with three senior policemen;(b)the raid occurred in 2009, not 2010 as previously claimed, with the aggressors taking the applicant’s car when they left;(c)he received death threats from a Mr AR, the head of the gang, and threats from H, whom he had met once in Fiji in 2013, and the authorities were unable to protect him; (d)he had no alternative but to travel to Australia using illegitimate documents as he would be killed by the powerful policeman involved;(e)he would face serious and/or significant harm in Fiji due to his membership of a particular social group being ‘informants for the Fijian authorities’ and for his imputed political opinion (as a perceived supporter of the Fijian political system); and (f)if deported, he would be imprisoned by the Fijian authorities for the documents used and the ‘persecutors’ would easily locate him and end his life.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 13 November 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the visas. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In considering the claims, the Tribunal stated that the issue before it was the credibility of the applicant and whether, on accepted claims, the protection visa criteria had been satisfied. The Tribunal set out the criteria for a protection visa, noting that the applicant must either satisfy the ‘refugee’ criterion or meet the ‘complementary protection’ grounds for protection. The relevant definition of ‘refugee’ and the complementary protection grounds under the Act were also set out. The Tribunal noted that it must have regard to Ministerial Direction No. 56 made under s 499 of the Act, and that it must take into account the policy guidelines titled PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines, and PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines and any relevant country information assessments. The Tribunal identified that it had regard to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Report – Fiji, 27 September 2017. The Tribunal detailed the applicant’s personal and immigration history. It summarised information provided in the applicant’s protection visa application form. The Tribunal then provided an extract of a statement provided by the applicant to the Department, which it noted contained material differences to an earlier statement provided. The Tribunal made adverse credibility findings in respect of these discrepancies at [51] - [58] of its reasons. The Tribunal also summarised material before it, including:(1)An affidavit of Mr Chandra stating that he was an ex-police officer, having served with the Fijian Police for 20 years, that the applicant was a police informer who provided information to the police department, that criminals had threatened the applicant’s life, and that the applicant’s home was attacked. (2)A letter from the applicant’s son indicating that he and the second applicant had a genuine fear for their family in Fiji. (3)A letter by a crime officer regarding a report by the applicant on 26 May 2009 that six unknown, armed persons forcibly entered his home and stole jewellery and cash. Two accused were arrested and charged with robbery and violence and the matter was finalised in court.(4)A letter by the applicant’s other son indicating he witnessed the home invasion. He claimed to have witnessed an attempt to stab the applicant.(5)Media reports regarding a Nadi named businessman who was accused of drug trafficking but is a free man in Sydney. The Tribunal then considered the credibility of the applicant. It was not satisfied that the applicant was a witness of truth. The Tribunal’s finding was based on six credibility concerns, which it considered cumulatively. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not seek protection, between 1998 and 2007, when he was living in New Zealand, despite claiming to have left Fiji in 1998 out of fear for his safety. The applicant claimed that his fraudulent passport provided him with permanent residency and, once it lapsed, he claimed not to know that he could have sought the New Zealand equivalent of a protection visa. The Tribunal found this difficult to accept, but it gave it limited adverse weight: [42] - [45].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In respect of ground two, the Minister contends that there is no general obligation on the Tribunal to conduct inquiries and that in the circumstances of this case there was no obvious inquiry that could have been made. In respect of the Tribunal’s credibility findings, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s concerns were discussed with the applicant at the hearing, including the putting of information to the applicant under s 424AA of the Act. CONSIDERATION By grounds one and two, the applicant contends that the decision made by the Tribunal was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have made it. The unreasonableness in ground one is said to arise from the Tribunal’s failure to adjourn (or offer to adjourn) the proceedings to enable the applicant to confer with his lawyer and/or obtain legal advice before giving evidence which may involve admissions by the applicant to have engaged in criminal activity (self-incrimination) or putting the applicant on notice about self-incrimination before the hearing. The unreasonableness in ground two is said to arise from the Tribunal’s failure to make obvious inquiries about critical facts. These failures, as appears to be contended by the applicant, tainted the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal against the applicant. The applicant’s submission sets out the legal principles relevant to the ground of legal unreasonableness as considered in Li, Singh and Stretton. It is common ground that jurisdictional error will be established if a decision is affected by legal unreasonableness. In considering the ground of legal unreasonableness, the Court’s role is strictly supervisory. The Court does not review the merits of a decision or substitute its own view as to how a power should have been exercised. Did the Tribunal act unreasonably by not offering to adjourn the proceedings to enable the applicant to obtain legal advice, or by not putting the applicant on notice about the issue of self-incrimination before the hearing? Under common law, a person has a right not to give evidence on the ground that the evidence may tend to incriminate them (the privilege against self-incrimination). As noted by counsel for the applicant, the privilege against self-incrimination is codified in the Evidence Act at s 128. The Court notes, however, that the Tribunal, in conducting a review of a Part 7 reviewable decision, was not bound by the rules of evidence: s 420. The fact that the Act has since been amended and now reflects similar wording to the provisions of the Evidence Act is of no consequence. It is the provisions of the Act that applied at the time the Tribunal conducted the review that are relevant for the purposes of the present proceedings. Relevantly, s 433(2), which appeared in Division 6 of Part 7 of the Act, stated it was an offence for a person appearing as a witness before the Tribunal to fail to answer a question that the Tribunal has required them to answer for the purposes of the proceeding. However, consistent with the common law right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination, s 433(3) of the Act provides that the offence would not apply if answering the question might tend to incriminate the person.