FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
GIO18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 93
File number(s): SYG 3402 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS Date of judgment: 31 January 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – protection visa – claim of public interest immunity upheld – whether the Tribunal made a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have made it – whether Tribunal erred by not adjourning or offering to adjourn hearing to enable applicant to obtain legal advice regarding issue of self-incrimination – whether the Tribunal erred by not making obvious inquiries about critical facts – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 128, 130(1), 130(4)(e)
Migration Act 1965 (Cth) ss 420, 424, 424AA, 433
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh & Anor (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 100 Date of hearing: 4 December 2024 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicants: Mr Bodisco Solicitor for the Applicants: ABU Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Maddocks Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 3402 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: GIO18
First Applicant
GIP18
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:
31 JANUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent is amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
2.Pursuant to s 130(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) the redacted information in Annexure KE 2 of the Evans affidavit is not adduced as evidence.
3.The application, as amended on 29 November 2024, is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SKAROS
INTRODUCTION
By application filed on 6 December 2018, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) (as it then was) dated 13 November 2018. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister)…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 93
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal made a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have made it, focusing on whether the Tribunal erred by not adjourning or offering to adjourn the hearing to enable the applicant to obtain legal advice regarding the issue of self-incrimination, and whether the Tribunal erred by not making obvious inquiries about critical facts. The court found that the Tribunal, in conducting a review of a Part 7 reviewable decision, was not bound by the rules of evidence. It also noted that while the applicant had a common law right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination, the Tribunal was not obligated to adjourn the hearing to allow the applicant to obtain legal advice. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error as it had considered the applicant’s claims and the relevant evidence, and had made findings based on the credibility of the applicant. The application for judicial review was dismissed.
The court’s decision was grounded in the principles of legal unreasonableness and jurisdictional error. It found that the Tribunal had not acted unreasonably by failing to adjourn the proceedings to allow the applicant to obtain legal advice, as the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence and the applicant’s common law right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination did not require such an adjournment. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred by not making obvious inquiries about critical facts, as it had considered the applicant’s claims and the relevant evidence, and had made findings based on the credibility of the applicant. The court’s decision was strictly supervisory, and it did not review the merits of the decision or substitute its own view as to how a power should have been exercised.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of ground two, the Minister contends that there is no general obligation on the Tribunal to conduct inquiries and that in the circumstances of this case there was no obvious inquiry that could have been made. In respect of the Tribunal’s credibility findings, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s concerns were discussed with the applicant at the hearing, including the putting of information to the applicant under s 424AA of the Act. CONSIDERATION By grounds one and two, the applicant contends that the decision made by the Tribunal was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have made it. The unreasonableness in ground one is said to arise from the Tribunal’s failure to adjourn (or offer to adjourn) the proceedings to enable the applicant to confer with his lawyer and/or obtain legal advice before giving evidence which may involve admissions by the applicant to have engaged in criminal activity (self-incrimination) or putting the applicant on notice about self-incrimination before the hearing. The unreasonableness in ground two is said to arise from the Tribunal’s failure to make obvious inquiries about critical facts. These failures, as appears to be contended by the applicant, tainted the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal against the applicant. The applicant’s submission sets out the legal principles relevant to the ground of legal unreasonableness as considered in Li, Singh and Stretton. It is common ground that jurisdictional error will be established if a decision is affected by legal unreasonableness. In considering the ground of legal unreasonableness, the Court’s role is strictly supervisory. The Court does not review the merits of a decision or substitute its own view as to how a power should have been exercised. Did the Tribunal act unreasonably by not offering to adjourn the proceedings to enable the applicant to obtain legal advice, or by not putting the applicant on notice about the issue of self-incrimination before the hearing? Under common law, a person has a right not to give evidence on the ground that the evidence may tend to incriminate them (the privilege against self-incrimination). As noted by counsel for the applicant, the privilege against self-incrimination is codified in the Evidence Act at s 128. The Court notes, however, that the Tribunal, in conducting a review of a Part 7 reviewable decision, was not bound by the rules of evidence: s 420. The fact that the Act has since been amended and now reflects similar wording to the provisions of the Evidence Act is of no consequence. It is the provisions of the Act that applied at the time the Tribunal conducted the review that are relevant for the purposes of the present proceedings. Relevantly, s 433(2), which appeared in Division 6 of Part 7 of the Act, stated it was an offence for a person appearing as a witness before the Tribunal to fail to answer a question that the Tribunal has required them to answer for the purposes of the proceeding. However, consistent with the common law right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination, s 433(3) of the Act provides that the offence would not apply if answering the question might tend to incriminate the person.