FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZQOA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 512
Appeal from: SZQOA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3137 File number: NSD 2026 of 2016 Judge: LEE J Date of judgment: 12 April 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that non-disclosure of a certificate issued under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to an earlier visa application by the same applicant constituted a breach of procedural fairness – where earlier file not before the delegate of the Minister in relation to the application and decision the subject of this proceeding – whether error on the part of the primary judge is identified Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(aa), 375A, 425, 438 Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183; (2016) 244 FCR 305
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2017] HCATrans 107
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; (2016) 243 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BJN16 [2017] FCAFC 197
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 [2017] FCAFC 194
BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198
Date of hearing: 12 April 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 2026 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZQOA
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
LEE J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 APRIL 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)LEE J:
A RELEVANT BACKGROUND
This proceeding was commenced by way of an application for an extension of time as long ago as November 2016. By consent, in May 2017, the then applicant was granted an extension of time to bring his appeal. Hence, before the Court is an appeal (in the form that was previously the draft notice of appeal). The determination of the appeal was delayed on the basis that the present matter could conceivably have given rise to similar issues to those considered by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183; (2016) 244 FCR 305. When the matter was…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 512
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is convenient to leave the basis upon which his Honour dealt with the third of the issues until later in these reasons. C CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL The appeal to this Court advances three grounds of error on the part of the primary judge. Grounds 1 and 2 both assert that the primary judge fell into error in failing to find that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness requirements in that it failed to identify the “adverse issue or material” regarding other applicants who did not claim to be homosexual in their original applications but then made such a claim at a later stage. As would have been evident from the characterisation of the issues by the primary judge, the issue of procedural fairness was raised in the Court below, but it was not particularised in quite the same way as before me. Be that as it may, the question of the ‘adverse issue or material’ is inextricably linked to the appellant’s credibility in relation to his claim of homosexuality which, in the way I have explained, was dealt with expressly by the primary judge. No error is demonstrated in this regard. As the primary judge explained (and as is clear from the Tribunal’s decision record at [18]-[29]), the relevant adverse issue was put to the appellant in more than sufficient detail for the appellant to respond. Ground 3 has two aspects: first, it alleges error is demonstrated by reason of the fact that the primary judge failed to find that the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s claim of harm from the Maoists in finding he had no political interest or opinion; secondly, that it was irrational or unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on the material in concluding that Maoists did not harm or try to harm the appellant. As I have indicated above, this was an argument advanced before the primary judge in the context of a contention made that the decision was arbitrary. In relation to the first aspect, it is evident that the Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims of harm from Maoists (see [15]-[17] and [22]-[25] of the decision record) and moreover, the Tribunal stated that it had carefully considered the appellant’s claims and evidence regarding the alleged harm from the Maoists, but on the basis of country information and its findings as to credibility, rejected the appellant’s contention that the attacks took place. There is no error demonstrated in the primary judge’s rejection of the argument that the decision was arbitrary. The credibility findings revealed a logical basis. As to the second aspect, the primary judge was correct in rejecting the notion that arbitrariness was demonstrated by the way the Tribunal dealt with the appellant’s contention that he was attacked. The decision record at [23] and [37] notes that there was no reporting of any incidents as alleged by the appellant. This leaves the one matter which might at least be thought to have some more substance, namely, that the primary judge fell into error by reason of his consideration as to whether the s 438 certificate issued in relation to this matter caused a jurisdictional error.