SZQOA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 14 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQOA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 512

Appeal from: SZQOA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3137
File number: NSD 2026 of 2016
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 12 April 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that non-disclosure of a certificate issued under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to an earlier visa application by the same applicant constituted a breach of procedural fairness – where earlier file not before the delegate of the Minister in relation to the application and decision the subject of this proceeding – whether error on the part of the primary judge is identified
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(aa), 375A, 425, 438
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183; (2016) 244 FCR 305

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2017] HCATrans 107

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; (2016) 243 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BJN16 [2017] FCAFC 197

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 [2017] FCAFC 194

BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198

Date of hearing: 12 April 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 2026 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZQOA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 APRIL 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A        RELEVANT BACKGROUND

  1. This proceeding was commenced by way of an application for an extension of time as long ago as November 2016.  By consent, in May 2017, the then applicant was granted an extension of time to bring his appeal.  Hence, before the Court is an appeal (in the form that was previously the draft notice of appeal).  The determination of the appeal was delayed on the basis that the present matter could conceivably have given rise to similar issues to those considered by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183; (2016) 244 FCR 305. When the matter was…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZQOA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 512
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZQOA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant, SZQOA, challenges the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which upheld a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to reject his application for a protection visa. The Tribunal found SZQOA to be a less than credible witness and concluded that his claims were not genuine, particularly his claim of homosexuality which was only raised after his earlier protection claims were rejected. The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal's decision was arbitrary, whether the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by not disclosing a certificate issued under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and whether the Tribunal's decision was infected by jurisdictional error based on the s 438 certificate. The primary judge rejected the appellant's contentions that the decision was arbitrary or that procedural fairness was breached, and also held that the s 438 certificate did not cause jurisdictional error. The appellant's appeal to the Federal Court advanced three grounds of error, focusing on the Tribunal's failure to identify adverse issues and its consideration of the appellant's claims of harm from Maoists. The Court found that the primary judge's reasoning was sound and that no error was demonstrated. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In short, the Tribunal found the appellant to be a less than credible witness and considered that he had fashioned his claims to suit the circumstances of his claim for a protection visa. In particular, the Tribunal found that the appellant’s claim of homosexuality was opportunistic and was only advanced following the rejection of the appellant’s prior protection claims. It followed the Tribunal was not satisfied the appellant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). B THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT Before the primary judge, three grounds were advanced which, as summarised and reformulated by his Honour, were described as follows:(a)Was the decision made by the Tribunal arbitrary?(b)Did the findings made by the Tribunal amount to a denial of procedural fairness?(c)In the light of the decision of Beach J in MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; (2016) 243 FCR 1, did the certificate purporting to be made under s 438 of the Act infect the Tribunal’s decision with jurisdictional error? With regard to the first of these issues, the primary judge held that the decision of the Tribunal could not be described as arbitrary. In doing so, his Honour referred to paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons which demonstrated that the findings turned on matters of credit and were reached by reference to reasoning which could be described as logical. In those circumstances, his Honour rejected the first contention. Turning to the second issue, his Honour made the observation that procedural fairness does not concern the outcome of the administrative process but rather the process adopted. It was clear, the primary judge held, that the appellant was on notice that his credibility was a live issue at the hearing as the delegate had not accepted the appellant’s factual claims, especially his claim as to his homosexuality. Further, the primary judge regarded the decision record as reflecting the fact that the appellant was given every opportunity to give evidence and present arguments with respect to his credibility. Consequently, his Honour accepted that the Tribunal had complied with its relevant obligations under s 425 of the Act and that no procedural unfairness was occasioned. It is convenient to leave the basis upon which his Honour dealt with the third of the issues until later in these reasons. C CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL The appeal to this Court advances three grounds of error on the part of the primary judge. Grounds 1 and 2 both assert that the primary judge fell into error in failing to find that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness requirements in that it failed to identify the “adverse issue or material” regarding other applicants who did not claim to be homosexual in their original applications but then made such a claim at a later stage. As would have been evident from the characterisation of the issues by the primary judge, the issue of procedural fairness was raised in the Court below, but it was not particularised in quite the same way as before me. Be that as it may, the question of the ‘adverse issue or material’ is inextricably linked to the appellant’s credibility in relation to his claim of homosexuality which, in the way I have explained, was dealt with expressly by the primary judge. No error is demonstrated in this regard. As the primary judge explained (and as is clear from the Tribunal’s decision record at [18]-[29]), the relevant adverse issue was put to the appellant in more than sufficient detail for the appellant to respond.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is convenient to leave the basis upon which his Honour dealt with the third of the issues until later in these reasons. C CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL The appeal to this Court advances three grounds of error on the part of the primary judge. Grounds 1 and 2 both assert that the primary judge fell into error in failing to find that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness requirements in that it failed to identify the “adverse issue or material” regarding other applicants who did not claim to be homosexual in their original applications but then made such a claim at a later stage. As would have been evident from the characterisation of the issues by the primary judge, the issue of procedural fairness was raised in the Court below, but it was not particularised in quite the same way as before me. Be that as it may, the question of the ‘adverse issue or material’ is inextricably linked to the appellant’s credibility in relation to his claim of homosexuality which, in the way I have explained, was dealt with expressly by the primary judge. No error is demonstrated in this regard. As the primary judge explained (and as is clear from the Tribunal’s decision record at [18]-[29]), the relevant adverse issue was put to the appellant in more than sufficient detail for the appellant to respond. Ground 3 has two aspects: first, it alleges error is demonstrated by reason of the fact that the primary judge failed to find that the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s claim of harm from the Maoists in finding he had no political interest or opinion; secondly, that it was irrational or unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on the material in concluding that Maoists did not harm or try to harm the appellant. As I have indicated above, this was an argument advanced before the primary judge in the context of a contention made that the decision was arbitrary. In relation to the first aspect, it is evident that the Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims of harm from Maoists (see [15]-[17] and [22]-[25] of the decision record) and moreover, the Tribunal stated that it had carefully considered the appellant’s claims and evidence regarding the alleged harm from the Maoists, but on the basis of country information and its findings as to credibility, rejected the appellant’s contention that the attacks took place. There is no error demonstrated in the primary judge’s rejection of the argument that the decision was arbitrary. The credibility findings revealed a logical basis. As to the second aspect, the primary judge was correct in rejecting the notion that arbitrariness was demonstrated by the way the Tribunal dealt with the appellant’s contention that he was attacked. The decision record at [23] and [37] notes that there was no reporting of any incidents as alleged by the appellant. This leaves the one matter which might at least be thought to have some more substance, namely, that the primary judge fell into error by reason of his consideration as to whether the s 438 certificate issued in relation to this matter caused a jurisdictional error.