FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZTBJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 580 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa – applicant found to have well-founded fear of significant harm in Nepal under complementary protection criterion – applicant found to have right to enter and reside in India under s.36(3) – definition of “right to enter and reside in” – whether Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations – operation of India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship – no error in decision of Tribunal – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s.5(1)(f) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(3), 36(4), 36(5), 36(5A), 476(2)(a) |
| Applicant: | SZTBJ |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1617 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Lloyd-Jones |
| Hearing date: | 7 May 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 24 March 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J Williams |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Baker & McKenzie |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr J Smith |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | DLA Piper |
| The Second… |
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Details
- Case
- [2015] FCCA 580
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case concerned an application for judicial review brought by the applicant against the Minister for Immigration. The applicant, who claimed to be a citizen of Nepal and to hold no other citizenship, sought to challenge a decision made by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had found that the applicant had a right to enter and reside in India, a conclusion that was consistent with the applicant's own evidence given to the Department.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test in determining the applicant's protection claims under section 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the applicant argued that the Tribunal erred by applying the test of "effective protection" in India, rather than the correct test of a "legally enforceable right" to enter and reside in that country. The applicant contended that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to establish effective protection and that the High Court had previously disapproved of the "effective protection" test.
Lloyd-Jones J considered the applicant's submissions regarding the correct test for assessing protection claims in a third country. The applicant relied on international refugee law principles, including the cornerstone of non-refoulement, and argued that the prohibition of refoulement applies to any forcible removal or non-admission at a border. The applicant further submitted that states are generally required to grant access to territory and fair asylum procedures to individuals seeking international protection. The court noted the applicant's reliance on UNHCR views concerning the interpretation of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention and the travaux préparatoires, which suggest a broad interpretation of the non-refoulement obligation. The applicant also referred to the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 31, which indicates that a state can be held accountable for violations of rights committed by its agents outside its territory.
The court found that the Tribunal's decision was open to be made on the material before it, and consequently, Ground 1 of the Amended Application was dismissed. The court did not make specific orders regarding Ground 2, as the focus of the provided text was on the Tribunal's findings and the applicant's arguments concerning the correct legal test.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test in determining the applicant's protection claims under section 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the applicant argued that the Tribunal erred by applying the test of "effective protection" in India, rather than the correct test of a "legally enforceable right" to enter and reside in that country. The applicant contended that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to establish effective protection and that the High Court had previously disapproved of the "effective protection" test.
Lloyd-Jones J considered the applicant's submissions regarding the correct test for assessing protection claims in a third country. The applicant relied on international refugee law principles, including the cornerstone of non-refoulement, and argued that the prohibition of refoulement applies to any forcible removal or non-admission at a border. The applicant further submitted that states are generally required to grant access to territory and fair asylum procedures to individuals seeking international protection. The court noted the applicant's reliance on UNHCR views concerning the interpretation of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention and the travaux préparatoires, which suggest a broad interpretation of the non-refoulement obligation. The applicant also referred to the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 31, which indicates that a state can be held accountable for violations of rights committed by its agents outside its territory.
The court found that the Tribunal's decision was open to be made on the material before it, and consequently, Ground 1 of the Amended Application was dismissed. The court did not make specific orders regarding Ground 2, as the focus of the provided text was on the Tribunal's findings and the applicant's arguments concerning the correct legal test.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The above material appearing in the Tribunal’s decision was entirely consistent with what the applicant himself had said in evidence to the delegate during an interview at Darwin Airport Lodge on 23 September 2012, namely:Evidence and ReasonsThe applicant claims to be a citizen of Nepal. He claims that he does not hold any other citizenship. The applicant was asked if a Nepalese person needed a visa to enter India. His reply was “No because anyone can go, no problem” he was asked if could go anywhere in India that he wished. “Any part of India. No problem”. Do you need to show any documentation? He replied “a photo Identity”. The applicant stated that he cannot not get work in India as the Nepalese are not trusted.(CB 148-149) Consequently the applicant’s evidence before the Department was consistent with the material found by the Tribunal and relied upon and in addition to the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950 to conclude that he did have a right to enter and to reside in India. It is on that basis that on the material before the Tribunal it was open to make that decision. Consequently, Ground 1 of the Amended Application cannot be sustained and should be dismissed. Ground 2 of the Amended Application pleads:2. The decision by the Second Respondent involved an error of law, in that Second Respondent applied the incorrect test regarding s 36(3) of the Act.Particularsa) The Second Respondent applied the incorrect test of ‘effective protection’ instead of the test of a ‘legally enforceable right’ with regard to s 36(3) of the Act. On behalf of the applicant, it is submitted that the Tribunal failed to ask the correct question, being whether the applicant had effective protection in India. It is claimed that there was no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant had effective protection in India. Alternatively, the Tribunal applied the incorrect test of “effective protection”, instead of the preferred test of a “legally enforceable right” with regard to s.36(3) of the Migration Act. Relevantly, the Tribunal found that:44. Having made this finding however I am reasonably satisfied that the applicant has effective protection in India.(CB 298) The applicant submits that the doctrine of effective protection has been controversial in this Court. In NAGV andNAGW of 2002 (supra) the High Court re-considered the line of authority beginning with Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (2000) 199 CLR 343 and, while the interpretation of the revised s.36(3) did not arise, the High Court unanimously disapproved of the test of effective protection. It is further submitted that the Full Bench of the Federal Court of Australia in SZRHU FCAFC applied the incorrect test of “effective protection”. The applicant submits that the preferred test to be applied is whether the applicant had at the time of the determination of his Australian visa application a “legally enforceable right” to enter and reside in a third country for the following reasons:a)The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the cornerstone of international refugee protection. It follows that the principle of non-refoulement applies not only to recognise refugees, but also to those who have not have their status formally declared;b)The prohibition of refoulement to a danger of persecution under international refugee law is applicable to any form of forcible removal, including deportation, expulsion, extradition, informal transfer or “rendition”, and the non-admission at the border in circumstances described below;c)As a general rule, in order to give effect to the obligation under the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol, states will be requires to grant individuals seeking international protection access to the territory and to fair and effective asylum procedures;d)The UNHCR is of the view that the prohibition of refoulement of refugees, as enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention and complemented by non-refoulement obligations under the International Human Rights Law, satisfies these criteria and constitutes a rule of customary international law;e)The UNHCR is of the view that the purpose, intent and meaning of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention are unambiguous and establish an obligation not to return a refugee or asylum seeker to a country where he or she would be at risk of persecution or other serious harm which applies whenever a state exercises jurisdiction, including at the frontier, on the High Seas or on the territory of another state. f)A comprehensive review of the travaux perparatoires confirms the overriding humanitarian object and purpose of the Convention and provides significant evidence that the non-refoulement provisions of Article 33(1) were intended to prohibit any acts of omission by a contracting state which have the effect of returning a refugee to territories where he or she is likely to face persecution, or danger to life or freedom;g)Limiting the territorial scope of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention to conduct of a state within its national territories would also be a variation with subsequent state practice and relevant rules of international law applicable between states party to the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950 in question;h)The decisive criteria is not whether that person is on state national territory, or within a territory which is de jure under the sovereign control of the state, but rather whether or not he or she is subject to that state’s effective authority and control; andi)In its general comments number 31 of the Nature of the General Legal Obligations Proposed on State Parties to the [ICCPR], the Human Rights Committee reaffirms consistent jurisprudence to the effect that the State can “be held accountable for violations of rights under the ICCPR which its agents comment on the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the government of that State or in opposition to it and that in certain circumstances, “person may fall under the subject matter of the State party [to the ICCPR] even when outside the State’s territory”.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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