SZTBJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTBJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1182

Citation: SZTBJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1182
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: SZTBJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 580
Parties: SZTBJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 443 of 2015
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 5 November 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time – nature of the right conferred by the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950 – correct test under s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R
Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal, 31 July 1950, Kathmandu, [1950] INTSer 12   
Cases cited: Applicant C v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 229
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRHU (2013) 215 FCR 35
NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161
SZRBJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 1240
V856/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 408
Date of hearing: 6 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Williams (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr MP Cleary
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 443 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZTBJ
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be granted.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 443 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZTBJ
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

5 NOVEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE DISPUTE

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal from final orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 24 March 2015.  He is a citizen of Nepal who arrived in Australia with his wife on 17 July 2012.  He is married with three children.  Two reside in India with their maternal grandparents.  The third was born in Australia. The extension of time is unopposed and will be permitted. 

  2. The appeal is opposed and…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTBJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appeal by the applicant against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to affirm the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's refusal to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The applicant is a Nepalese citizen who fears significant harm if returned to Nepal due to his membership of a particular social group and political opinions. He arrived in Australia in July 2012 and applied for a protection visa on 19 September 2012, which was subsequently refused on 6 December 2012. The Tribunal upheld the refusal on 19 June 2013. The central issue in this appeal is the correct interpretation of s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), specifically the nature of the 'right' referred to in that subsection. The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred in concluding that he had a presently existing right to enter and reside in India under the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950, and that this interpretation fails to give proper consideration to Australia's international non-refoulement obligations.

The Federal Court considered the arguments put forward by the applicant regarding the interpretation of s 36(3) and the nature of the right conferred by the India-Nepal Treaty. The Court found that the primary judge was correct in concluding that SZRHU was binding on him and that the right in s 36(3) is not constrained to one that is legally enforceable within the domestic law of a third country. The Court referred to the decision in SZRHU, which held that the India-Nepal Treaty itself was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of s 36(3)(c). The Court also noted that the Tribunal was not required to make a finding that the applicant had a legally enforceable right to enter and reside in India. The Court further stated that the right in s 36(3) does not necessitate a legally enforceable right within the domestic law of India, as Nepalese citizens do not in practice require a visa to enter India.

The Court dismissed the appeal and rejected the applicant's claims that there was no evidence to support the Tribunal's findings. The Court held that it was not relevant to the Tribunal's function to consider whether there was any evidence to support a conclusion that the applicant had a 'legally enforceable right' to enter and reside in India. The Court concluded that the right referred to in s 36(3) is not constrained to one which is legally enforceable within the domestic law of a third country, in this instance India. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision was not plainly wrong and that the applicant's arguments did not successfully challenge the Tribunal's interpretation of the right under s 36(3).

The Court made the following orders: the application for an extension of time within which to appeal was granted, the appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal is opposed and for the following reasons must be dismissed. BACKGROUND On 19 September 2012, the applicant applied for a protection visa. He claims protection on both refugee and complimentary protection grounds fearing serious or significant harm if he and his family were to be returned to Nepal. His fear is based on reasons of his membership of a particular social group (Khotany Sewa Samag) and his political opinion (as a supporter of the Democratic Political Party), actual or imputed. The applicant is a member of a wealthy family with large land holdings. The family was targeted by operatives of the ruling Maoist party as a result of their allegiances. The applicant also claims that he was targeted because he refused to store contraband sandalwood at his property when requested by Mr Lama – a man who has allegedly ‘joined hands’ with the Minister and is responsible for illegally smuggling sandalwood to China. The applicant claims that his family estate was threatened, his uncle’s property burnt down and that he was extorted and beaten by local authorities. He contends that he and his family were forced to leave Nepal and flee to the Nepal-India border. The applicant spoke to his father when there and his father said that the applicant’s ‘house had been taken over by the smugglers’. If he returns, he fears his family will be ‘tracked down and killed by the Minister and his group’ (by reference to the Minister, the applicant refers to the Nepalese Home Minister and his agents). Having arrived with his family in Australia in July 2012, he applied in September 2012 to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection for a protection visa. On 6 December 2012, that visa application was refused. The applicant was invited to appear before the Refugee Review Tribunal on 18 March 2013. This did take place. On 19 June 2013 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate for the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant. STATUTORY PROVISIONS This appeal involves the correct approach to the construction of s 36(3) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth), particularly in relation to the ‘right’ referred to in that subsection. Relevant to this appeal, s 36 provides (relevantly):36 Protection visas-criteria provided for by this Act…(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or(aa)non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations) because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; …Protection obligations(3)Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national. (emphasis added)(4)However, subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a country in respect of which:(a)the non-citizen has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or(b)the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen availing himself or herself of a right mentioned in subsection (3), there would be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm in relation to the country.(5)Subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a country if the non-citizen has a well-founded fear that:(a)the country will return the non-citizen to another country; and(b)the non-citizen will be persecuted in that other country for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.(5A) Also, subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a country if:(a)the non-citizen has a well-founded fear that the country will return the non-citizen to another country; and(b)the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen availing himself or herself of a right mentioned in subsection (3), there would be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm in relation to the other country.BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to ground 6, being the third ground of appeal in the present appeal, the primary judge rejected the applicant’s claims that there was no evidence to support a number of findings made by the Tribunal. The primary judge concluded that it was not relevant to the Tribunal’s function to consider whether there was any evidence to support a conclusion that the applicant had a ‘legally enforceable right’ to enter and reside in India. CONSIDERATIONGround 1 – incorrect approach to ‘right’ The applicant argues that the primary judge should have concluded that the Tribunal erred and misconstrued, misinterpreted or misapplied and failed to ask the correct question with regard to s 36(3) of the Act. Similarly, the applicant contends that the primary judge erred in concurring with the finding made by the Tribunal. First, by concluding the applicant had a ‘presently existing right to enter and reside in India’ when no such right existed and, secondly, by finding that the Peace Treaty would have itself, in the absence of incorporation into Indian law, given the applicant a presently existing right to enter and reside in India when no such right existed. Thirdly, it is contended that the primary judge erred by finding the applicant Nepalese citizen could seek to obtain a remedy or enforce a right in Indian courts arising from the Peace Treaty when no such right existed. Counsel for the applicant contends that notwithstanding different approaches having been taken by this five member Full Court recently assembled to deal with this issue, that a single judge sitting as a Full Court should be satisfied (taking into account Australia’s international non‑refoulement obligations) that the conclusion that the five member bench reached is so unsatisfactory that it should be rejected as being plainly wrong. Counsel for the applicant must acknowledge that, at least at this level, this is a particularly ambitious contention given that, the five member bench was expressly assembled in order to put to rest any debate and uncertainty in connection with this issue. Nonetheless counsel for the applicant fervently contends that the inadequate attention in these decisions to Australia’s international obligations should be rectified and that the right referred to in s 36(3) of the Act must give greater protection than that decision would suggest. He stresses that the present appeal is a very suitable vehicle to make this point, given that the Tribunal found that the applicant would be potentially at risk of death in India, albeit that such a finding was not reached in the context of Nepal where the applicant’s family had been living safely for up to 16 months. The primary judge was correct to conclude that SZRHU was binding on him. In addition, in my view, SZRHU was, with respect, correctly decided for the reasons explained by Buchanan J with whom the other members of the Court agreed. It follows that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to make a finding that the applicant had a legally enforceable right to enter and reside in India. The right in s 36(3) is not constrained to one which is legally enforceable within the domestic law of a third country, in this instance India. The analysis in SZHRU also happens to be precisely in the context of a Nepalese citizen and this particular Peace Treaty. Buchanan J examined the terms of the Peace Treaty itself (at [17]), and referred to advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as to the effect which is common ground that Nepalese citizens do not in practice require a visa to enter India. A Nepalese citizen arriving by air would need to produce as an identity document a valid national passport, valid photo identity issued by the Indian authorities or an emergency certificate issued by the Embassy of Nepal in Delhi in respect of Nepalese citizens (at [18]). Flick J expressed his own reasons which were, relevantly to the present appeal, substantially in accordance with those of Buchanan J, save that had it been necessary, Flick J (at [128]) would also have concluded that the Peace Treaty itself was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of s 36(3)(c). Buchanan J, however, stated (at [27]) that it was clear that there was no foundation for the Tribunal to conclude that the visa applicant had a relevant right under India’s domestic law to enter and reside in India.