FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AVO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 566
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: AVO15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2101 File number: NSD 1429 of 2016 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 24 May 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal – application for judicial review in Federal Circuit Court dismissed at show cause hearing – where Tribunal affirmed decision not to grant protection (class XA) visa – whether primary decision attended by sufficient doubt – non-disclosure certificate under s 438(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – respondent raises issue as model litigant Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R, 424A, 438(1)(a)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001(Cth) rr 44.12, 44.12(1)(a), 44.12(2)
Cases cited: AVO15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2101
BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2778
Hossam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1161
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326; [2015] HCA 40
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28
VAUX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158
Date of hearing: 23 May 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 93 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms D Watson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1429 of 2016 BETWEEN: AVO15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 MAY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BARKER J:
The applicant, a male citizen of Pakistan, applies for leave to appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing his application for review in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant him a protection (class XA) visa under the Migration Act1958 (Cth).
The applicant arrived in Australia on 30 November 2012 on a visitor visa and lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa on 10 January 2013.
In his application, the applicant claimed to fear harm from the Pakistani Government on the basis of his support for the Jeay Sindh Quami Mahas (JSQM),…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 566
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue for the court was whether the Tribunal’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The applicant argued that the Tribunal should have independently assessed the authenticity of documents provided by the applicant, which originated from Pakistan. The Minister argued that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant’s claims and that the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt.
The court found that the Tribunal had given comprehensive consideration to the applicant’s claims and the evidence provided, including the authenticity of documents. The court noted that the Tribunal was not persuaded by the applicant’s credibility and found inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was not attended by sufficient doubt, and therefore, the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The court also considered that any procedural issues raised by the applicant were adequately addressed by the Tribunal.
The court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed, and the applicant pay the Minister’s costs. This decision was based on the court's finding that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the applicant’s claims and evidence, and the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the course of making his submissions, the applicant also submitted that the Tribunal had even doubted the authenticity of medical reports supplied by him to the Tribunal and made by Australian medical practitioners. In relation to that submission, the Minister’s lawyer submitted that the Tribunal had not doubted the authenticity of the relevant psychologist’s report, but did not consider that his medical condition prevented the applicant from properly presenting his case in the Tribunal, and so there was no denial of procedural fairness.CONSIDERATION For the reasons which follow, in my view, the application should be dismissed. As the Minister submits, ground 1 of the application for leave to appeal appears to raise an entirely new ground not argued before the primary judge. Indeed, the terms of ground 1, referring as it does to the “FM” (Federal Magistrate), suggests that it is a pro forma proposed ground of appeal, not particularly related to the circumstances of the applicant’s case. In any event, there is nothing in the reasons of the Tribunal to suggest that it failed to consider the applicant’s claims in terms of s 91R of the Act or that the primary judge failed to consider any such argument to that effect. So far as the proposed ground 2 is concerned, this also appears to reflect some very general claim as to the Tribunal’s decision being “unjust” without taking into account the circumstances of the claim of the applicant or its consequences. In many ways, that proposed ground reflects much of grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the judicial review application considered by the primary judge, and fairly found by him to lack any substance. In any event, I do not consider that proposed ground 2 has any realistic chances of success in light of the decision of the Tribunal and the reasons of the primary judge, which, in this regard, are not attended by any real doubt. In the circumstances, I do not consider that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. I do not consider that any substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal. As set out above, the central submission concerning legal error made by the applicant was to the effect that the Tribunal should independently have, and failed in law in not doing so, embarked on an inquiry into the authenticity of the documents supplied by the applicant to the Tribunal that had a Pakistani origin. At [45] of its reasons, the Tribunal said it did not give any weight to these documents because the Tribunal did not accept the credibility of the applicant and having regard to country information. When read in context, what the Tribunal said at [45] of its reasons is fully supported by the preceding reasons, particularly from [8] to [44]. In those paragraphs the Tribunal dealt with all the major aspects of the applicant’s claims as to why he should have protection as a refugee, but by reason of the various inconsistencies in the evidence of the applicant, which it noted, was not prepared to accept him as credible. It particularly found inconsistencies in a document, being a police report, which plainly led the Tribunal not to consider that document to be authentic.