SZSUN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSUN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 234

Appeal from: SZSUN v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2296
File number: NSD 1627 of 2017
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 7 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – Where appellant sought judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – Whether primary judge erred in dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review – Appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 65, 116, 438
Cases cited:

AVO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 566

BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51

SZSUN v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2296

Date of hearing: 1 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Counsel for the Appellants: The appellants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms M Donald of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Appellant: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1627 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZSUN

First Appellant

SZSUO

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. The appellants appeal from orders made and judgment given by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 1 September 2017 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal): SZSUN v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2296 (SZSUN).  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the appellants Protection (Class XA) visas (Visas) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellants, who are husband and wife, are citizens of India. They arrived in Australia on 28 November 2012 as the holders of Business Entry (Class UC) visas which were subsequently cancelled pursuant to s 116 of the Act.

  3. Under cover of a letter dated 14 December 2012, received by the Minister’s department on 19 December 2012, the appellants lodged their applications for the Visas.  The wife’s claims for protection were dependant upon those of her husband. 

  4. The husband’s claims for protection were set out in a statement annexed to his application for the Visas.  The husband claimed to fear harm from a Muslim man named…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 234
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by the appellants against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed their application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellants sought to have the Tribunal’s decision reviewed on the basis that it was flawed due to jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness. The Tribunal had previously dismissed the appellants’ application for a visa on the grounds that they were not credible witnesses and that there was no real chance of harm if they returned to India.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge had erred in dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review. The appellants raised two grounds of appeal. The first ground alleged that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal did not consider the husband’s life was in danger on the basis of being a Sikh or because of his bad relations with the Muslim community. The second ground alleged that the primary judge erred by not finding that there was a lack of procedural fairness in the decision of the Tribunal. The court considered whether the primary judge had correctly identified the task before the court and whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error.

The court found that the primary judge had correctly identified the task before the court and that the Tribunal had considered the claims made by the husband regarding his religion and relations with the Muslim community. The court further found that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellants’ case and that there was no lack of procedural fairness in the Tribunal’s decision. The court noted that the appellants had not provided any evidence of efforts to seek legal advice and had failed to provide a sufficient basis for an adjournment. The court concluded that the primary judge had correctly dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review and that the appeal should be dismissed.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay the first respondent’s costs. The orders were made under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 10 October 2014 the appellants appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal, differently constituted, with the assistance of a Hindi interpreter and accompanied by their representative. On 26 November 2014 that Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal had concerns about the appellants’ credibility. It found that the husband was not a witness of truth in relation to his claims of past harm, threats and feared future harm and that the wife was also not a witness of truth. It did not accept the wife’s assertion that she is in danger because she is a member of the husband’s family unit or that there is any reason for the wife to fear harm in India. In reaching its conclusions about the appellants’ credibility the Tribunal had regard to a range of inconsistencies and other issues arising from their evidence, including:(1)the husband’s inconsistent evidence about the discovery of the weapons and how many days after that discovery he was threatened;(2)the husband’s changing evidence about how long it took him to leave his village and go to Delhi after he was beaten up;(3)the husband’s evidence about how long he stayed in Delhi before his first return to the village; (4)the inconsistency between the husband’s claim that he fled his village fearing he would be killed and the fact he returned to his village for his wedding; (5)the inconsistent and confused evidence about the husband’s return to his village for the birth of his son;(6)the differences between the husband’s claims and the background information in his application form;(7)the wife’s evidence, given when she was detained upon arrival in Australia on 28 November 2012, that she left India and came to Australia as she wished to settle in Australia, and that she and her husband were not able to look after their child in India and so decided to come to Australia to work hard for a good future. The Tribunal considered that the wife’s evidence upon arrival could have indicated the real intention of the appellants in coming to Australia. It considered that it was unlikely and not credible that the wife had no idea why they were coming to Australia;(8)the Tribunal was concerned as to why the appellants left their child in India as he was also a member of the family unit. It was not persuaded by the explanations provided by the wife and considered that the fact the appellants left their child with the husband’s family in the village for some of the time since their departure undermined the claim that the husband and members of his family unit faced danger; and(9)the husband’s inconsistent evidence concerning when he decided to leave India and the appellants’ delay in actually leaving India, noting that their visas were granted on 14 September 2012 but that they did not leave India until 28 November 2012, which suggested that there was not a genuine fear of harm or concern for safety. The Tribunal also considered whether there could be any other reason for the difficulties with the husband’s evidence, including nervousness about appearing before a tribunal; his lack of familiarity with the immigration and formal interview process; the husband’s “limited education”; the necessity to use an interpreter; the fact that at the time of the departmental interview and the hearing with the first Tribunal the appellants were in immigration detention; the wife’s pregnancy at the time of the first Tribunal hearing; and the husband’s claimed medical condition. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that these matters explained the difficulties with the husband’s evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The notice of appeal was filed on 19 September 2017. That is, approximately five months prior to the hearing. While the appeal book was served in January 2018, a time at which people may traditionally be on holiday, that was still some seven weeks prior to the hearing. Further, the appeal book was substantially made up of documents that were before the Federal Circuit Court and was thus material of which the appellants were aware and which had been provided to them for the purpose of that proceeding. The Minister’s submissions were served in accordance with the Court’s timetable. Finally, there was no evidence from the appellants of any efforts they had made to seek legal advice. In those circumstances, I refused the application for an adjournment. Consideration The first ground of appeal raises similar issues to those raised by ground two in the court below. It alleges that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal did not consider the husband’s life was in danger on the basis of being a Sikh or because of his bad relations with the Muslim community. But, as the primary judge identified, the ground did no more than express the appellants’ disagreement with findings of fact made by the Tribunal. The primary judge correctly identified that the court’s task was to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error and that it could not rehear the appellant’s application for a visa. In any event, as submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal did consider the claims made by the husband that his life was in danger because of his religion and because of his poor relations with the Muslim community. In particular at [62] of its decision record the Tribunal said:The pre-hearing submissions referred to militant activity in Jammu relating to the links that Naggo has with the extremist Muslim groups and the applicant is a Sikh which made him a target for the extremist groups operating within the village. Having regard to the problems with the applicant’s evidence as set out above, the Tribunal does not accept this claim. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has suffered harm in his village, nor that there is any reason to find that he faces a real chance of harm in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returns to his village, either because of the claimed links to the person Naggo, claimed extremist groups, claimed extremist Muslim groups, or because he is a Sikh. (emphasis added) Ground one is not made out. Ground two alleges that the primary judge erred by not finding that there was a lack of procedural fairness in the decision of the Tribunal. The appellants submitted orally that they informed the primary judge that the Tribunal did not give proper consideration to their case, that the husband was “bombarded” with several questions during the Tribunal hearing and that he was so rushed that he could not answer those questions properly. A similar submission was made to the primary judge: see SZSUN at [13].