AMI17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMI17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 2017
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming decision not to grant applicant a protection visa – whether the Tribunal discriminated against the applicant or otherwise acted unfairly towards him – whether the Tribunal’s failure to disclose to the applicant an invalid 438 Certificate and the documents covered by that certificate was material to the Tribunal’s decision – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 91R(3), 418, 437, 438

Cases cited:

AVO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 566
BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3

Applicant: AMI17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG  333 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 27 July 2018
Date of Last Submission: 27 July 2018
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 26 July 2019

REPRESENTATION

Applicant in person, assisted by an interpreter
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Ms A Zinn of Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 333 of 2017

AMI17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant, who is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).

Background

  1. The applicant applied for a Protection visa on 16 July 2014. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a Protection visa on 31 March 2015. The applicant applied for review of the delegate’s decision. A differently constituted Tribunal (the first Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision. On 23 March 2016, however, this Court, by consent, set asidethe first Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal.

Applicant’s claims for protection

  1. In a statement dated 15 July 2014 attached to his application for a protection visa, the applicant made the following claims:[1]

    [1] CB27-29

    a)In May 2007 the applicant started working at a pharmaceutical company. The work was difficult and he suffered from exhaustion and other ailments. That caused him marital problems.

    b)In May 2010 the applicant met a Falun Gong practitioner (Mr P) at a gathering. Mr P introduced the applicant to the benefits of Falun Gong. Without being “fully aware” of the government’s policy towards Falun Gong, the applicant decided to “have a try”.

    c)After practising Falun Gong privately for six months he “felt the conspicuous benefit” of that practice. He thought it was “

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 2017
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) that affirmed a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant alleged that the Tribunal had discriminated against him or otherwise acted unfairly, and specifically questioned whether the Tribunal's failure to disclose an invalid 438 Certificate and the documents covered by it was material to its decision.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's failure to disclose a 438 Certificate, or the documents covered by it, to the applicant constituted jurisdictional error. The court considered differing views on this issue, with a plurality of justices holding that such a failure might give rise to jurisdictional error if materiality was put in issue and the applicant discharged the burden of proving that the non-disclosure was in fact material. Materiality was defined as whether compliance realistically could have resulted in a different decision. In contrast, a non-plurality of justices found that a breach of the obligation to disclose a 438 Certificate automatically gave rise to jurisdictional error, irrespective of materiality, although materiality could be relevant to the court's discretion to refuse relief.

The court then examined the specific documents covered by the 438 Certificate to determine their materiality to the Tribunal's decision. The court found that each of the documents, relating to the validity of the application, the applicant's identity, previous visa applications, checklists regarding section 437 or 438 of the Act, correspondence between the Tribunal and the Department, and internal departmental emails concerning file retrieval, were irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunal. Consequently, the court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to disclose the 438 Certificate and its associated documents was not material to its decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There are two reasons for judgment in SZMTA, one given by Bell, Gageler, and Keane JJ (plurality judgment), and the other given by Nettle and Gordon JJ (non-plurality judgment). All justices were of the opinion that the issue to the Tribunal of a 438 certificate or purported 438 certificate obliged the Tribunal to disclose to the applicant the 438 certificate.[27] There is a difference between the plurality judgment and the non-plurality judgment about the consequences of the Tribunal’s failing to disclose to the applicant the issue of a 438 certificate. [27] [2019] HCA 3, [28], [115] According to the plurality judgment, the Tribunal’s failure to disclose a 438 certificate may give rise to jurisdictional error. Whether or not it does so depends on whether “materiality is put in issue” and, where it has been put in issue, whether the applicant discharges the burden that lies on him or her to show that the Tribunal’s failure to disclose the 438 certificate was in fact material.[28] Here “materiality” in relation to the Tribunal’s failure to comply with its obligation to disclose the existence of a 438 certificate denotes the affirmative answer to the hypothetical question: could compliance realistically have resulted in a different decision?[29] The “question of materiality of the breach is an ordinary question of fact in respect of which the applicant bears the onus of proof”.[30][28] [2019] HCA 3, [4][29] [2019] HCA 3, [45][30] [2019] HCA 3, [46] According to the non-plurality judgment, a breach by the Tribunal of an obligation to disclose a 438 certificate gives rise to a jurisdictional error.[31] Unlike the plurality judgment, however, whether or not the breach is material is not relevant to whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. In other words, materiality of error is not a criterion of jurisdictional error.[32] Materiality, however, may be relevant to whether the Court should refuse relief.[31] [2019] HCA 3, [117][32] [2019] HCA 3, [92] The question, therefore, is whether the Tribunal’s failure to disclose the 438 Certificate to the applicant, or the document covered by the certificate, was material to the Tribunal’s decision. In practical terms, the answer to that question turns on whether any of the documents covered by the 438 Certificate could reasonably be considered to be relevant to the applicant’s claims. Those documents are as follows:a)The first document is folio 34. It is titled “Protection Visa Application VALIDITY CHECK”. It is a checklist to determine whether the formal requirements for the making of protection visa application have been met. Because there was no question about the validity of the protection visa application the applicant lodged, the information contained in this document is irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunal. b)The second document is folio 36. It is titled “IDENTIFICATION TEST: PROTECTION VISA APPICANTS”. It is designed to assist in determining whether a person who applies for a protection visa is the person the applicant claims he or she is. The information contained in this document is irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunal because the identity of the applicant was not an issue.c)The third, fourth, and fifth documents are folios 62, 63 and 64. These documents relate to applications the applicant made for a Highly Specialised (Subclass 400) visa, a Business Visitor (Subclass 600) visa, and a Business (Short Stay) (Subclass 456) visa. The documents are irrelevant to any issue that was before the Tribunal.d)The sixth document is folio 79. It is a checklist about whether there are any documents on file to which s.437 or 438 of the Act apply. The document records there are no such documents on the file. Folio 79, therefore, is also irrelevant to any issue before the Tribunal.e)The seventh document is folio 89, and it is a copy of a letter dated 20 January 2016 from the Tribunal to the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) enclosing a copy of the first Tribunal’s decision, and the documents of the Department in relation to the applicant. The document by itself is irrelevant to any issue that was before the Tribunal.f)The eighth document is folio 90. It is an email from an officer who holds the position within the Department of “Administration Officer – Protection Processing Administration” addressed to “OSA Recall Requests” and copied to “OPNSW AAT Liaison”, noting that the Tribunal requested two files that are located in “Recall”, and requesting that the files be forwarded to “my address”. The email is not dated, but it is reasonably open to infer, and I do infer, that the email was sent after 23 March 2016, being the date on which this Court set aside the first Tribunal’s decision. It is also reasonably open to infer, and I do infer, that the files the email notes the Tribunal requested are the files the Tribunal had returned to the Department under cover of its letter dated 20 January 2016. The email that is folio 90 by itself is irrelevant to any issue before the Tribunal; and although the files to which it refers are relevant, there is nothing to suggest that the files consisted of anything more than what the Secretary of the Department had previously sent to the first Tribunal under s.418 of the Act after the applicant applied to the first Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision, and which the Tribunal had returned to the Department by the letter dated 20 January 2016 (being the document that is folio 89).g)The ninth and final document is folio 91. It is an email from a “Records Team Member” within the Department to “OSA Recall requests” sent on 30 March 2016 acknowledging the request made in the email that is folio 90. The email does not in terms identify the files that were the subject of the request, but it is reasonable to infer, and I do infer, that the files to which it refers are the files referred to in the email that is folio 90. The email sent on 30 March 2016 by itself is irrelevant to any issue before the Tribunal; and although the files to which it refers are relevant, I have found there is nothing to suggest that the files consisted of anything other than what the Secretary of the Department was required to send to the Tribunal under s.418 of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established