MF Lady Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Henry Morgan Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MF Lady Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Henry Morgan Limited [2022] FCA 978

File number: NSD 1382 of 2020
Judgment of: JACKSON J
Date of judgment: 22 August 2022
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS - winding up - application to wind up company on just and equitable ground - purpose of company established by prospectus initially issued - fundamental departure from original purpose - whether change of purpose authorised by shareholders - transactions warranting investigation - compliance breaches - company's solvency position not a factor against winding up in the circumstances - plaintiffs not acting unreasonably to seek winding up rather than pursuing alternative remedies - just and equitable to wind company up - application to wind up also made on oppression ground - oppression shown on evidence - winding up order made
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 204A, 228, 232, 250N, 311, 461, 462, 467, 494, 712, 739, Chapter 2E, Part 5.3A

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131, 136

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 7.23

Cases cited:

Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 48; [2018] 3 Qd R 520

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1075

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers Ltd [2001] VSC 383

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 234

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Chase Capital Management Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 27

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Merlin Diamonds Ltd [2019] FCA 1546

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Uglii Corporation Ltd [2016] FCA 1099

Benjamin Hornigold Limited 02 and Henry Morgan Limited 02 [2019] ATP 1

Benjamin Hornigold Limited 05, 06 & 07 [2019] ATP 18

Boros v Pages Property Investments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 288

CIC Insurance Ltd (prov liq apptd) v Hannan & Co Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 437

Commonwealth v ABC2 Group Pty Ltd (court-apptd recs and mgrs apptd) [2009] NSWSC 1442

Cumberland Holdings Ltd v Washington H Soul Pattinson & Co Ltd (1977) 13 ALR 561

Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360

Galanopoulos v Moustafa [2010] VSC 380

Frigger v Trenfield (No 7) [2020] FCA 1740

Gognos Holdings Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] QCA 181

Gregor v British-Israel-World Federation [2002] NSWSC 12

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller [2019] FCA 1672

Haselgrove v Lavender Estates Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1076

Hillam v Ample Source International Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 73; (2012) 202 FCR 336

Hillig v Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council [2006] NSWSC 1371

Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 75

Host-Plus Pty Ltd v Australian Hotels Association [2003] VSC 145

Hylepin Pty Ltd v Doshay Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 201; (2021) 288 FCR 104

In Re Straw Products Pty Ltd [1942] VLR 222

John J Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (A'asia) Pty Ltd (1991) 6 ACSR 63

Kingjade Holdings Pty Ltd v Pineridge Nominees…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 978
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

MF Lady Pty Ltd (Trustee) applied to wind up Henry Morgan Limited (HML) on the grounds that it was just and equitable to do so, and also that its affairs were being conducted in a manner oppressive to shareholders. HML opposed the application. The Court found that it was just and equitable to wind up HML and also that its affairs had been conducted in an oppressive manner. The Court ordered that HML be wound up, appointed liquidators and awarded the plaintiffs' costs of the proceeding.

The Court considered whether it was appropriate to wind HML up on the just and equitable ground. The plaintiffs established that HML had departed fundamentally from its original purpose as set out in its prospectus. The evidence showed that HML had invested substantially in unlisted connected companies without the authorisation of its shareholders. The transactions warranted investigation which was best carried out by a liquidator. HML's lack of candour with shareholders, the market and regulators exacerbated the justifiable lack of confidence in HML's management. The Court found that the plaintiffs were not acting unreasonably in seeking winding up instead of pursuing other remedies. The Court concluded that it was just and equitable to wind HML up. The Court also found that HML's affairs had been conducted in an oppressive manner, contrary to the interests of members as a whole.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendant be wound up pursuant to s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up.

2. Ian Niccol and Vincent Pirina are appointed as the joint and several liquidators of the defendant.

3. The plaintiffs' costs of this application are costs in the winding up of the defendant.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background to the corporate group

[3]

Diagram 1 - corporate group structure

[3]

HML

[5]

JBL

[9]

JBFG

[13]

Directors and executives

[16]

The proceeding, the pleadings and the issues

[21]

Principles

[35]

The legislation

[35]

The just and equitable ground

[38]

Failure of company's purpose and failure of substratum

[44]

Relevance of breaches of the law

[59]

Oppression

[62]

Relevance of solvency

[65]

Section 467(4)

[68]

Application to set aside a subpoena

[70]

Application to reopen

[80]

The evidence

[101]

Stuart McAuliffe

[101]

2014

[110]

2015

[111]

The Management Services Agreement with JBL

[111]

The Prospectus

[113]

2016

[135]

Transactions in relation to connected companies in late 2016

[139]

2017

[146]

January to April connected party transactions

[146]

The bonus option offer and the ASIC stop order

[149]

The ASX suspension

[157]

July 2017 connected company transactions

[160]

Retractions to ASX announcements

[165]

September to November 2017 connected party transactions

[173]

2018

[177]

More ASX queries

[177]

Diagram 2 - Annexure A

[178]

Request to lift ASX suspension

[191]

July to September 2018 connected party transactions

[195]

HML's annual report for FYE 2018

[201]

JBFG's results for FYE 2018

[215]

JBL's results for FYE 2018

[219]

KPMG step down as auditors

[221]

2019

[222]

Diagram 3 - Takeovers Panel diagram

[223]

ASX refuses to lift the suspension

[224]

Capital Credit loan novated

[228]

HML's financial reporting for FYE 2019

[229]

Other developments in 2019

[234]

2020

[236]

Link share registry

[239]

Further developments in 2020

[246]

2021

[254]

HML's directors and future plans

[254]

Mr McAuliffe promises to advance money to HML

[259]

Capital raising

[263]

The declaration of solvency

[264]

The EGM

[268]

The financial statements

[279]

Audit

[292]

Possible proposed litigation

[299]

Consideration

[304]

Fundamental change of purpose

[307]

Resolutions concerning changes in Investment Mandate or purpose

[319]

Transactions with connected companies

[331]

Governance concerns

[340]

Solvency and HML's prospects

[344]

Whether plaintiffs are acting unreasonably in not pursuing another remedy

[349]

Conclusion on just and equitable winding up

[358]

Oppression ground

[360]

Orders

[361]

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, an order winding HML up will be made.Background to the corporate group HML is part of a complex corporate group, which is best described by means of the following diagram. The diagram is taken from a report dated 13 December 2019 that was prepared by administrators of one of the companies in the group, JB Financial Group Pty Ltd (JBFG):Diagram 1 - corporate group structure Neither party contested the accuracy of the diagram. However the question of the relationships between the various companies, including whether they were relationships of control, was controversial. Describing the companies as a corporate group implies no finding that they are, for example, 'holding companies' or 'subsidiaries' of each other as those terms are defined in the Corporations Act. At this point it is simply convenient to group the companies together for the purpose of this judgment.HML According to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol 8 (15th ed, 1993), Sir Henry Morgan was a 'Welsh buccaneer, most famous of the adventurers who plundered Spain's Caribbean colonies during the late 17th century'. Henry Morgan Ltd was incorporated on 26 September 2014. In late 2015 it made an initial public offering of its shares, together with one option for every share issued. The prospectus for that public offering described it as an unlisted investment company which sought to become a listed investment company on the ASX. The prospectus referred to a 'Management Services Agreement' with John Bridgeman Limited (JBL, the company in the centre of the top row of Diagram 1) into which HML had entered on 12 March 2015. The agreement was said to relate to the provision of investment management services to HML. The public offering closed on 17 December 2015, having raised $15.6 million. The official quotation of the issued shares in HML on the ASX commenced on Friday 5 February 2016. It appears that approximately $15 million in further funds were raised by reason of the conversion of options over subsequent years. On 9 June 2017, all of HML's securities were suspended from quotation on the ASX, in circumstances that will be described below. From around June 2018, HML began to ask ASX to lift the suspension. Substantial correspondence between HML and ASX ensued, which will also be described further below. On 30 May 2019, ASX expressed the view that it would be inappropriate to reinstate the securities of HML to trading until the outcome of certain investigations by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) were known. ASX removed HML from its official list on 3 February 2020.JBL The book International Criminals Past and Present (Frederic Boutet, Walter Mostyn trans, Hutchinson & Co, 1930) records that '[c]onspicuous among those pirates of the seventeenth century were the strange beings who were known as the Kings of Madagascar, and of whom James Avery became the most famous' (at 124). Avery had many aliases, including Henry Every, Long Ben and Captain Bridgeman, and so went by the name of John Bridgeman: Encylopaedia Britannica (online). John Bridgeman Limited, that is, JBL, is a public company. It was listed on the National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX). That listing was, however, suspended on 1 October 2019, because the company failed to lodge its audited financial statements for FYE 2019 (although the securities had originally been suspended on 10 April 2019). On 23 October 2020 the NSX removed JBL from its official list which, according to NSX, was due to the non-payment of annual listing fees for FYE 2021 (this judgment will use the convention 'FYE' to designate the financial year ending on 30 June in the relevant year).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I did, however, put some weight on the plaintiffs' submission that HML could have sought an adjournment of the hearing pending the production of the annual reports. The audit was expected to be concluded as soon as 28 January 2022, noting that final submissions did not come in until 20 January 2022. The option of an adjournment application was raised in discussion between the bar and the bench at the hearing, but was not taken, instead leaving any developments after the hearing to depend on an application to reopen, as has in fact occurred. It was appropriate to hold that decision not to seek an adjournment against HML's application, given the importance of holding parties to some finality in the closing of their cases.The evidenceStuart McAuliffe It is convenient to start the discussion of the evidence by making some observations about the evidence of Mr McAuliffe, as he was the only witness from whom HML adduced evidence and the only person who gave oral evidence in the proceeding. Mr McAuliffe was 51 years of age when he gave evidence. He holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Queensland, a Graduate Diploma of Legal Studies from the Queensland University of Technology, and a Masters of Education from Bond University. Between 2007 and 2014 he was an Associate Professor in finance and investment analysis at Bond University. Between 2012 and 2015 he was investment manager for the Aliom Managed Futures Fund No 1, a 'wholesale investment fund'. His various positions at HML and other companies are identified above and below. According to Mr McAuliffe, those roles as director or CEO of companies have given him approximately seven years of experience managing listed and unlisted investment companies and managing all aspects of their operations. I found Mr McAuliffe to be an unsatisfactory witness. His approach to his cross examination tended to be obstructive and, beyond that, to have an unreal quality. For example, he accepted that HML, JBL, BHD, Bartholomew Roberts and JBFG were all located at the same Brisbane CBD address, which had been notified to ASIC as their business premises, but asserted that 'the operational [sic] of the company was with the independent directors, and they weren't located there'. He accepted that the companies all had interests in each other, including that HML was the largest shareholder in JBFG. He accepted that there were various loans between the different companies. He appeared to accept that they used the same accounting staff, although he sought to qualify that by saying 'Some internal people were - were the same; although, I don't know if that's really exactly accurate, because not every person worked on - on - on every company'. He accepted that JBL was the investment manager for HML, and that: his role at JBL was investment manager; he was also the Managing Director of JBL; and that he had oversight of its business. He accepted that he was a director of JBL along with his father and Mr Patane, and that he has a 22% shareholding in JBL. He accepted that JBL provided office services and corporate support to HML. And yet he did not accept the common sense proposition that HML was 'part of a wider group of companies which appears to be referred to variously as the JBL Group'.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As for the final 'alternative remedy' that HML says the plaintiffs should pursue, being action by ASIC, there is no evidence that it intends to continue its investigations into HML, when those investigations might result in litigation, or how such litigation might directly benefit shareholders in HML. The suggestion that this is an alternative remedy that the plaintiffs should pursue is entirely speculative and, since it depends on action by ASIC, not the plaintiffs, it would not fit the relevant words of s 467(4) of some other remedy that is 'available to the applicants'. Even if a narrow view of what is in the plaintiffs' interests is taken, they are not acting unreasonably in pursuing the appointment of a liquidator with powers to recover assets for the benefit of shareholders rather than, say, agreeing to be bought out at a value that is likely to reflect the company's parlous financial state. In my view, the proviso in s 467(4) is not engaged.Conclusion on just and equitable winding up One of the bases of HML's opposition to winding up was that the alleged circumstances constituting a 'failure of substratum' did not arise and, if they did, did not justify winding up. But I have found that there has been a fundamental abandonment of HML's original purposes which has contributed to a catastrophic loss of shareholder funds. HML also claims that at the time of the hearing the various failures of compliance had been addressed or would be addressed soon. But even if that is so, those failures have been fundamental and persistent, with partially effective measures only taken at the eleventh hour before the hearing, even in the face of a winding up application that had been on foot for a year beforehand. They provide serious cause for concern leading to a justifiable lack of confidence in HML's management. The company's lack of candour with shareholders, the market and regulators exacerbates that concern. And the concerns arising from the transactions described above warrant investigation which is best carried out by a liquidator. I take account of the authorities on s 461 that describe winding up a solvent company as an extreme step with far reaching consequences beyond the plaintiffs. Even assuming that HML is solvent (which is at least doubtful), I consider that the extreme step is warranted here. The reasons just given lead to the conclusion, after examining the entire conduct of the affairs of the company, that the Court can have no confidence in the propensity of those managing HML to comply with their obligations. The company has not carried on its business candidly with the public and in a straightforward manner and it will be protective of the public interest to wind the company up.Oppression ground Having reached that conclusion it is not strictly necessary for me to express any view about whether HML should be wound up on the ground that its affairs have been conducted in a manner that has been oppressive to shareholders such as the plaintiffs. I need only comment on that ground briefly. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs or any minority shareholders have been specifically targeted for unfair treatment to the benefit of majority shareholders. While I do not put any weight in the company's favour on the outcome of the EGM, I do not find that it rises to the level of oppressive conduct. But the conduct of the affairs of the company as I have described it does meet the criterion of having been contrary to the interests of members as a whole. As required by the principles set out earlier in these reasons, the conduct of the affairs of the company has not complied with accepted standards of corporate behaviour and is not consistent with how reasonable directors would have acted in attending to the affairs of the company. It is not necessary to repeat all the reasons given above, which apply equally here. Whether any individual occurrence would merit the description of oppressive conduct in the sense of conduct contrary to the interests of members as a whole, the accumulation of conduct that has been described does merit that description: see Hylepin at [63] above. For that reason, and contrary to HML's submissions [32], the complaints on which the plaintiffs rely go beyond the complaints of minority shareholders who disagree with management decisions and are disgruntled at the loss of the value of their investments. At the very least, before embarking on a program of investing substantial funds in unlisted connected companies and advancing substantial sums to such companies, reasonable directors would have made full disclosure to shareholders of their intentions and the possible outcomes of the transactions. They would have put the change in strategy to shareholders for approval before risking their capital in a quite different venture from the one that they originally embarked on. However the case for just and equitable winding up is stronger and it is on that basis that HML will be wound up.Orders

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.